Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan Need Russian Bases More than Moscow Does, Khramchikhin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, October 12 – Moscow military commentator Aleksandr Khamchikhin asks a question few Russians are willing to address in public: “Does Russia need an advanced post in Central Asia?” -- or is it not the case that Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan need the Russian military bases they have on their territory far more than Moscow does”

            In Novoye voyennoye obozreniye today, the deputy director of the Moscow Institute for Political and Military Analysis even suggests that the imbalance in need for these bases is so great that Moscow should simply shut them down if the government of either country makes more demands for rent and other concessions (nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2018-10-12/5_1017_asia.html).

                Such an argument almost certainly reflects the economic stringencies the Russian military faces; but it is also a product of a broader strategic calculation: Russia can do without these bases; but these two countries can’t, given the weaknesses of their militaries and their states and the challenges facing them from within their own borders and from Afghanistan.

            In Kyrgyzstan, Russia has “a purely symbolic” air force “but more or less real ground forces,” Khramchikhin says; but in Tajikistan, “both kinds of these forces are purely symbolic.”  In both cases, the bases provide “a certain guarantee against aggression from neighboring countries and be ready to oppose the possible invasion of Islamist radicals from Afghanistan.”

            “Now,” of course, he continues, “Russia is attempting to organize talks on Afghanistan.” What will come of this is impossible to day; but if nothing, then the base in Tajikistan “sooner or later will have to fight.” If this were to be a conventional battle, the base would have the advantage, but “unfortunately,” the Islamists don’t fight that way – and it won’t.

            “And just how many resources Russia would need to conduct such a war is something that it is better not to think about, the Moscow military analyst says.

            The situation is further complicated by “the significant distance of Tajikistan from Russia, the extremely complicated natural and climatic conditions in this country and also serious internal instability.” If the civil war there were to restart, “it is completely unclear what Russian forces would do in that situation.”

            Were that to happen, Russia could lose yet another important military site in Tajikistan, the “Window” system which is capable of tracking even small objects in orbit. The climatic conditions there are perfect for such a system, Khramchikhin says, and cannot be easily duplicated in Russia.

            But despite the value of such systems, he continues, Russia could live without them, while “Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan could not live without our bases.” Consequently, they should be making demands of Russia; and Russia certainly should not be making any concessions to them when they do. Instead, it should simply signal its readiness to pull out.

            How many Russian political or military leaders think the same way is impossible to say; but Khramchikhin’s article suggests that at least some in Moscow are thinking this way now – and that represents a sea change from the past and from assumptions in the West that Moscow wants to project power in this way wherever it can on the post-Soviet space.