Russia’s Northern Capital Must Remain Both Petersburg and Leningrad, Yaremenko Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 3 – The debate over whether to restore the name Stalingrad to Volgograd continues, but despite the centrality of World War II in Putin’s thinking and his hostility to the founder of the Bolshevik state, there has been nothing equivalent in the case of Petersburg/Leningrad.

            Instead, Nikolay Yaremenko, editor of the Rosbalt news agency, says, both names of the city and the combination of imperial and Soviet names for streets and squares not only coexist but reenforce the unity of the city on the Neva (rosbalt.rInstu/news/2026-05-03/leningrad-peterburg-toponimika-podviga-5588342).

            “In the run-up to Victory Day, the question of naming the city and its landmarks transcends the realm of linguistics, becoming instead a part of the broader discussion regarding historical justice,” Yaremenko says, especially as it is obvious that no one can speak of “the blockade of St. Petersburg.”

            Moreover, according to the commentator, “the name "Leningrad"—within the context of the years 1941–1944—has long since detached itself from the persona of the political figure in whose honor it was originally bestowed; it has instead evolved into a semantically constitutive element of ‘the blockade lexicon.’”

            Yaremenko continues: “’the toponymy of heroism’ manifests itself most vividly in the names of streets, squares, and monuments that emerged during the post-war era. While the city center preserves the classic fabric of St. Petersburg, the mass-development districts to the south and north constitute a frozen chronicle of the city’s defense.”

            Importantly, “These names serve as a kind of ethical compass, a reminder that the well-being of today’s St. Petersburg was paid for by the resilience of the people of Leningrad.
 the writer insists, adding that “an ideological analysis of ‘Blockade-era toponymy’ reveals that, for the city, the synthesis of both names is of critical importance.

“St. Petersburg is a museum-city, a cultural capital, and ‘a Window on Europe, while Leningrad is a soldier-city, a symbol of resistance unparalleled in history. Any attempt to "purge" Leningrad-era place names from the urban landscape would result in a form of philological amnesia,” he argues.

And he concludes that “by preserving Leningrad-era names of streets and landmarks in modern St. Petersburg, we affirm that the city’s history is not divided into “black” and “white,” but constitutes a single, unbroken continuum—a process in which the grandeur of the imperial capital was safeguarded by the fearlessness of the people who called themselves Leningraders.”

Fertility Rates in North Caucasus Falling with Chechnya Alone having One Just Above Replacement Level

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 4 – Historically and in the minds of many still today, the North Caucasus is a place where families include many children. Even Vladimir Putin is given to recommending that Russians copy the North Caucasian pattern to overcome Russia’s population decline (kavkazr.com/a/pravozaschitniki-raskritikovali-predlozhenie-putina-zhenitj-detey/33629760.html).

            But in reality, Natalya Kildiyarova of the Kavkazr portal says, that picture is out of date. Fertility rates, the number of children per woman per lifetime, have been falling across the North Caucasus (kavkazr.com/a/konets-demograficheskogo-isklyucheniya-chto-proishodit-s-rozhdaemostjyu-na-severnom-kavkaze/33748640.html).

            Except for Chechnya, which has a fertility rate of 2.56, just above the replacement level of 2.2, all the other national republics there have rates below that level and thus are seeing their populations decline. That means that the region is no longer the outlier it once was but is going to decline in total population, albeit not as rapidly as most of the rest of Russia.

            That of course means that the North Caucasus will in fact increase compared to predominantly ethnic Russian regions, but far less than many have been predicting and that Moscow has counted on to make up for losses in Russian areas where the fertility rate is now 1.0 or even lower. 

            On another related matter, a demographer with whom Kildiyarova spoke on condition of anonymity ts that this decline is part of a broader trend in modern societies and should not be explained by reference to the war in Ukraine. The statistics available simply do not support such conclusions, he says.

            The anonymous demographer says that his research suggests that 0.5 percent of men aged 18 to 60 have died while fighting in Ukraine but that the percentages of such losses are lower in the North Caucasus than they are in many other federal subjects and thus less likely to have a demographic impact.

            In Chechnya, for example, the percentage of men killed in Ukraine is only 0.12 percent. In Ingushetia, it is about 0.2 percent and in Dagestan, approximately 0.25 percent, far lower than the all-Russia average and much lower than in Buryatia where combat losses are 1.6 percent of the population, and Bashkortostan where the figure is 0.8 percent.

15 Languages Spoken in Russia a Century Ago have Died Out and a Third of the Remaining 155 are Now at Risk of Sharing That Fate

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 4 – Fifteen languages spoken in Russia a century ago have died out with the passing of their last speakers, and a third of the remaining 155 are at risk, mostly among the numerically small peoples of the north and far east where in some cases fewer than ten people now speak some of their languages, according to Semen Syrdyk, an ethnic activist.

            The most recent language to die in the Russian Federation was Aleut which ceased to be a spoken by anyone there in 2022 when the last speaker passed away, but approximately 50 are at risk because only a few people use them. In 10 cases, fewer than 10 people know the language  (mariuver.eu/2026/05/04/korennje-narody-i-jazyki-rossii-na-grani-ischeznovenija/#more-85571).

            Syrdyk points out that Russian census data overstates how many people speak these languages because many who have only a passive or incomplete knowledge and in fact don’t use these languages in heir daily life nonetheless claim the titular language as their own. That means the situation of these tongues is far more dire than many now think.

            As is true in other countries, languages spoken by such small numbers are at risk because of urbanization, the passing of traditional ways of life and assimilation; but in the Russian Federation now, these tongues are particularly at risk given Putin’s active promotion of Russian at the expense of all other languages.

Fertility Rate in Belarus Lower than Russia’s and Only Slightly Higher than Ukraine’s, a Country at War

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 4 – The fertility rate in Belarus is now 1.22 children per woman per lifetime, lower than in the Russian Federation where that measure stands at 1.3 and only slightly higher than in Ukraine, a country now at war where tis metric stands at 1.0. All these figures are below the replacement level of 2.2 and will lead to more population declines.

            On the one hand, more tan 70 percent of the world’s countries now have fertility rates below replacement levels, according to the Visual Capitalist Project as reported by the Belarusian Think Tanks portal (visualcapitalist.com/mapped-every-countrys-fertility-rate-births-decline/ and thinktanks.pro/publication/2026/05/04/belarus-v-kontse-mirovogo-reytinga-po-koeffitsientu-rozhdaemosti.htmcl).

            But on the other, Belarus like the Russian Federation has relied more heavily on population growth, an extensive rather than intensive way, that boosting productivity in the workplace. Consequently, these declines are having a serious negative impact on economic growth, one reason both Minsk and Moscow are worried about these figures.

Since Putin Began His Expanded War in Ukraine, Regional Statistical Offices have Stopped Publishing Data on Population Size to Hide Massive Declines, Especially among Men

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 1 – Like Rosstat in Moscow, regional statistical offices have also stopped publishing data on population size to hide massive declines not only in the overall size of the population but also to distract attention from the fact that this decline has been greatest among adult males, who have died in the fighting or fled to avoid service,

            The People of Baikal portal sys that the Buryat counterpart of Rosstat stopped publishing this and 114 other statistical measures last year, but figures released in late 2024 allow one to see just how great the impact of Putin’s war has been (baikal-stories.media/2026/05/01/muzhchin-v-buryatii-stalo-menshe-na-155-tysyach-za-chetyre-goda/).

            Between 2021 and 2024, the portal says, the number of men in Buryatia dropped by 15,500 while the number of women increased by almost 2,000. Previously the two figures had moved more or less in tandem, except of course during World War II. At least 4600 Buryat men have died in Putin’s war; the 11,000 additional decline likely reflects flight from that republic.

            The portal says similar demographic trends are occurring in Irkutsk Oblast. Prior to the covid pandemic in 2020 and the expanded war in Ukraine, that region’s population fell on average between 3,000 and 5,000 each year. Since 2020, the annual declines have risen to between 15,000 and 19,000, earlier from the pandemic and later from the war.

            As was the case with the Soviet Union as a whole following World War II, the loss of so many men in these republics has led to a massive gender imbalance in the prime childbearing age groups and thus is depressing growth still further. Clearly, the longer Putin’s war continues, the greater this impact is going to be.   

Kalashnikov Says Putin will Soon Be Gone and Russia will Face Collapse But Only for a Time

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 2 – Maksim Kalashnikov, a Z blogger who has frequently criticized Putin for failing to be more aggressive in Ukraine, says that “Putin’s tenure” as Russian leader is “drawing to a close” because of his failure to win the war in Ukraine decisively and that in the wake of his departure, Russia will enter “a period of chaos and instability.”

            Indeed, the Putin critic from the right argues that after Putin goes, Russian elites will “install a weak puppet leader to try to mend relations with the West and secure the lifting of sanctions” (dialog.ua/russia/z-bloger-kalashnikov-prizval-rossiyan-gotovitsya-k-tomu-chto-putina.html).

            "I foresee an inevitable inter-clan struggle for the redistribution of spheres of influence, assets, and financial flows," he says; and as that takes place, “the security services will be weakened, fragmented, and demoralized by the outcome of the so-called "Special Military Operation."

            Kalashnikov argues that returning veterans will face “a destitute and unsettled life” and sill thus contribute to further economic decline, a rise in crime, the growth of inter-ethnic clashes, and the radicalization of Russian society. And all this, he concludes that “the disintegration of the Russian Federation can’t be excluded, at least for a couple of years.”

            While Kalashnikov’s predictions are likely overstated, they are noteworthy for three reasons. First, his fears of what a Russian loss in Ukraine will mean for Putin and his country are likely widespread among Russian elites and will likely dictate that the Kremlin to the extent it can work to avoid that outcome.

            Second, his suggestion that returning veterans will exacerbate problems in Russian life goes far beyond the usual suggestions that they will increase crime. Such a broader impact will be far more difficult for Putin or his successors to cope with given that repression alone is unlikely to work.

            And third – and this is by far the most important – Kalashnikov’s suggestion that Russia will face a high risk of disintegration but only for a few years in the future means that in his view, Russia may disintegrate for a time but will with any luck be able to reassemble itself, as the Bolsheviks did after 1917.

Stalin’s Horrific Plan for Great Northern Railway Cancelled within Weeks of His Death by His Successors

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 2 – At a time when Moscow is praising Stalin and whitewashing his crimes, when Russian officials are suggesting Stalin’s giant projects are something that should be emulated, and when Putin is trying to build a railway across the Russian North, the NeMoskva portal provides a useful correction and even critique.

            Sergey Tashevsky, a commentator for that portal, tells the horrific story of Stalin’s  plan to build the Great Northern Railway from Salekhard to Igarka using tens of thousands of GULAG prisoners, a 1200 km project that became known as “the Way of the Dead” (nemoskva.net/2026/05/02/mertvaya-doroga-salehard-igarka/).

            Under discussion for most of Stalin’s time in office, this project was officially launched in January 1949 without any of the preparatory investigations of the ground and permafrost that were needed but with Stalin’s assurance that there would always be plenty of workers because he wanted to use GULAG inmates to construct this line.

            The line was not completed, but it left in its wake thousands of graves and enormous amounts of steel and other construction equipment. But it was such a failure that less than three weeks after Stalin died on March 5, 1953, his successors shut the project down completely, recognizing as Putin and company don’t seem to how awful Stalin’s “giant” plans were.