Moscow Responds to Growing Income Inequality by Changing How It is Measured

Paul Goble

              Staunton, May 5 – Instead of taking measures that will actually reduce growing income inequality among Russians, Moscow has responded in the first instance by changing the way statistics about that are gathered and presented to make comparisons more difficult and the situation look better than it is, Maksim Blant says.

              In 2025, income inequality in the Russian Federation rose to the highest level it has been since 2007. Putin promised to change that, but the greatest change his government has made is to modify the way his government processes data about that, the Radio Liberty analyst says (svoboda.org/a/zagnatj-dzhini-v-butylku-kak-vlasti-boryutsya-s-neravenstvom/33750448.html).

              It has redefined the Gini coefficient in ways that make comparisons with the past in Russia more difficult and at the same time make it far more difficult to compare with the situation in other countries, Blant says.  And he suggests that if Russia doesn’t meet the income equalization goals it has announced, Moscow will do the same again.

              Consequently, he continues, however defensible the changes in how the Gini coefficient is calculated in Russia may be – and there are reasons to see the new method as improved on a standalone basis – the ways this change will hide what is really going on are likely to be far more important at least politically.

Ukrainian Society Now Fundamentally Different than When Putin Began His Expanded War in 2022 and Won’t Revert to What It was Before, Minakov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 6 – Ukrainian society has changed significantly since Russia began its expanded war in 2022 and will not simply revert to what it was before that date, according to Mikhail Minakhov who as surveyed senior Ukrainian social scientists who have remained in their positions since the war began on what has changed and what won’t change back.

            The Ukrainian political scientist who now works at the Kennan Institute in Washington, D.C. makes the following points (sapere.online/chto-proishodit-s-ukrainskim-obshhestvom-na-pyatom-godu-vojny/):

·       First, the Ukrainian population has declined by 20 to 35 percent as a result of emigration and deaths in combat. It will not immediately return to what it was even if a sizeable portion of those who left return and change Ukrainnian life as a result of their experiences abroad.

·       Second, the country’s economy will depend on older workers than ever before and on different regions than it did earlier.

·       Third,  those serving in the military now are “the main middle class in Ukraine, the country’s class structure has changed, and the average income is now defined by those in the army. Around them has arisen a service sector.”

·       Fourth, “the state now is the main source for the redistribution of means as more than 90 percent of them passes through the budget and those who had been at most risk, the precariat, have moved into the bureaucracy.”

·       Fifth, the territorial structure of the population has changed, with young men dominating front areas, the elderly behind them, and others having moved further back or emigrated.

·       Sixth, social solidarity has changed. Both vertical and horizonal solidarity were strong, but now the former has strengthened at the expense of the latter. People still trust volunteers but the amount of funds they control has declined precipitously.

·       Seventh, society is now divided between fighters and non-combatants, something that affects both local and regional divisions. All other divisions have become relatively less important.

·       Eighth, attitudes toward the state have changed. On the one hand, Ukrainians view it with greater detachment; but on the other, they see it as a key defender of their country. Anarchic attitudes have declined precipitously.

·       Ninth, the war years have seen a rollercoaster development in popular attitudes from optimism to pessimism and back again among others, something that may continue and create a society very different from the one that displayed less turbulence than before the war.

·       And tenth, for Ukrainians, the war has become routine but not as the norm. They think of their future not as one of permanent conflict but as peaceful and look forward to a future without fighting all the time.

Kazakhstan will Soon Again have a Vice President, a Position It Dispensed with in 1996

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 8 – Kazakhstan soon will again have a vice president, a position which it dispensed with in 1996 but which is mandated by recent constitutional changes and is now being defined more precisely by a bill that that country’s parliament has already passed its first reading (eurasiatoday.ru/v-kazahstane-vnov-poyavitsya-dolzhnost-vitse-prezidenta-podrobnosti/).

            Like the Russian Federation which dispensed with a vice presidency after the October 1993 clash between him and Boris Yeltsin, Kazakhstan first introduced that position to make transitions easier and divide power but then eliminated it to avoid the creation of any alternative power to the president.

            Because the new position in Kazakhstan will be filled directly by that country’s president, the government of that Central Asian country hopes to avoid the basis of any such clashes in the future; but if remains unclear whether the position can fill a real political niche or will remain vestigial except in the case of the death or incapacity of the president.

            Some in Kazakhstan think that this new post will transform Kazakh politics, but others are less certain. What is beyond question is that it will be closely watched not only there but in other post-Soviet states that currently lack vice presidencies and may bring them back or introduce them if the Kazakhstan revival works in a positive way.

Kursk Oblast Makes Plans to Erect Memorial to Leonid Brezhnev

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 8 – Officials and activists in Kursk Oblast have formed a regional committee to plan the commemoration of the 120^th anniversary of the birth of Leonid Brezhnev in December of this year, an action that likely enjoys Putin’s backing and may spread to other locations in the Russian Federation in the months ahead.

            The organizing committee wants to establish a memorial to the former Soviet dictator in the center of the regional capital of Kursk and includes among its members the father of one of Putin’s assistants (echofm.online/news/vlasti-kurskoj-oblasti-ponjdderzhali-ustanovku-pamyatnika-brezhnevu-s-inicziativoj-vystupil-otecz-pomoshhnika-putina).

            Lt.Gen. Gennady Dyumin says that he will bear all the costs of the erection of such a monument and stresses that while Brezhnev was not born in Kursk, he lived and worked there in the first years of his life. Consequently, it is important that the city and region take the lead in memorializing him.

            Brezhnev today has neither the large number of supporters or large number of opponents among Russians. Instead, most have mixed feelings about him, as someone whose rule was generally quiet for most of them but who behaved in ways that made him the subject of some of the best Soviet anecdotes.

            Dealing with the Brezhnev period is especially hard for Putin now given that like the late Soviet dictator, the current Russian one is aging and has both supporters and opponents who back Putin in much the same way they earlier backed Brezhnev with mixed feelings.

            Calling attention to Brezhnev by putting up memorials will only increase the number of those on both sides who will draw parallels between Putin and the former CPSU leader.

Moscow Softens Punishment for Many Baymak Protesters Lest It Provoke Greater Bashkir Opposition to Itself, Davidis Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 6 – When hundreds of Bashkirs went into the streets in January 2024, the Russian authorities took a hard line arresting a large of them and sending them to prisons and camps. But now, it is releasing many from such facilities although still imposing lighter restrictions and punishments on them.

            Many Bashkir activists see this as a great victory for the Bashkirs in their struggle to protect their republic from untrammeled economic development that has had devastating environmental consequences (idelreal.org/a/eto-bolshoy-shag-k-pobede-osuzhdennye-po-baymakskomu-delu-vozvraschayutsya-iz-koloniy-v-bashkortostan/33750988.html).

            That may be true, but Memorial’s Sergey Davidis suggests that more may be going on and that it is likely to inform how the Kremlin will deal with mass protests in non-Russian areas in the future by offering not only sticks but carrots to those who may take part in such demonstrations.

            According to the expert on protests in Russia, Russian judges aren’t releasing prisoners to lesser punishments now out of some kind of humanism but only in response to a central decision that the use of repression alone may make protests in the republics more anti-Moscow and that a calibrated approach is more effective.

            Moscow doesn’t like any independent movement, Davidis says; and it is especially nervous about ethnic movements. But these aren’t going to disappear and so the center wants to use methods that will divide and weaken such groups rather than unite them against the Russian center.

            “The Baymak events,” he continues, “were neither an anti-war nor even an anti-Putin protest. Instead, they arose as a result of a specific ethno-national grievance. Consequently, the authorities sought to intimidate those involved … [but] recognize that they cannot afford to turn these people into enemies.”

            Therefore, Davidis says, the powers that be “are currently employing a ‘carrot and stick’ approach. The ‘stick’ has already been applied: people have been frightened, and the unacceptability of protesting against the authorities has been clearly demonstrated. Now, the ‘carrot’ is being offered” with some being released.  

            Obviously, such “carrots” are being offered only to those not deemed to be leaders, he says. As for the others, they may receive even harsher sentences now and in the future. But Moscow’s effort to treat the followers more gently may have the effect of slowing the growth of national movements to the point that they could threaten the center.

Police from Tajikistan Now in Moscow to Deal with Tajik Migrants There

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 8 – To cope with its severe shortage of police and especially with the problems of crime among immigrant communities, Moscow has agreed to bring in police from their homelands to help Russian siloviki do their jobs, even though the appearance of such foreign policemen in Moscow and other cities offends many Russians.

            The first case of this involved Kyrgyz officers who arrived in the Russian capital in 2024 (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/12/to-cope-with-enormous-shortage-of.html). Last year, Vladimir Putin called for an expansion of this program to include officers from Tajikistan (nazaccent.ru/content/44674-v-moskve-poyavitsya-policiya-tadzhikistana/).

            Now, that additional step is being realized with an unspecified number of Tajik officers taking an ever more public role in Moscow, according to the Nazaccent portal (nazaccent.ru/content/45460-policejskie-iz-tadzhikistana-priedut-v-moskvu-chtoby-reshat-migracionnye-problemy/).

            As their role increases, many ethnic Russians are likely to be offended and upset that their own government has taken this step. At the very least, they will probably give more support to notorious groups like the Russian Community, something that will in itself provoke more problems (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/07/russian-community-complains-chelyabinsk.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/06/russian-community-now-country-wide.html).

Moscow Counts Soviet Troops who Fought Nationalist Underground in Baltics, Belarus and Ukraine until 1951 as Veterans of the Great Fatherland War

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 8 – Only 6800 men and women who fought in the Soviet army or in partisan detachments against the Germans or worked as war correspondents are still alive, down from 230,000 two decades ago, according to official Russian statistics surveyed by the To Be Precise portal.

            But as the number of people whom most would count as veterans in the normal sense as fallen with the passage of time, Moscow has included two other groups to keep the number of veterans up, including those who lived through the blockade of Leningrad, the battle of Stalingrad, and those  who worked in construction or transport near the front lines.

            There are approximately 40,000 of these people, bring the total number of veterans of fighting between 1941 and 1945 to about 47,000, the portal says, all of whom continue to be celebrated as their numbers decline with the passage of time (tochno.st/materials/ostalos-v-rossii).

            But there is an additional category of people Russian law defines as veterans of the Great Fatherland War: those who took part in operations “for the liquidation of the nationalist undergroundon the territories of Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia between January 1, 1944 and December 31, 1951” (kremlin.ru/acts/bank/7432).

            To Be Precise does not give figures for this category nor do Russian officials, likely because the numbers of Soviet troops involved in the tens if not hundreds of thousands to suppress these national movements only serves to highlight just how much resistance there was in these places and for how long.

            But despite this silence, the 1995 Russian law that adds them to the number of veterans of the Great Fatherland War remains very much in force and is no doubt actually applied so as to ensure that for another decade or so there will be at least a few remaining veterans the Kremlin can celebrate, although some in these countries may feel differently.