Half of All Kazakhstan Residents Get Their News from Kazakh Language Sources, with Third a Using Both Kazakh and Russian Outlets, and Only a Fifth Russian Ones Alone, ‘Demoscope’ Poll Shows

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 31 – Russian commentators, especially those in Moscow, continue to insist on a regular basis that most Kazakhs know Russian and use it widely despite the increasing share of ethnic Kazakhs and self-declared Kazakh speakers in the population of that Central Asian country.

            But a new and representative survey conducted by the Demoscope Bureau for the Express Monitoring of Public Opinion calls those Russian claims at least in part into question (vlast.kz/novosti/68864-osnovnym-istocnikom-informacii-dla-kazahstancev-ostautsa-socseti-opros-demoscope.html).

            It found that 45.4 percent of the population of Kazakhstan prefers to get news and information in Kazakh rather than Russian, that 31.1 percent use sources in both languages, and only 21.1 percent choose to use Russian language outlets, the final figure being only slightly larger than the share of ethnic Russians in the population.

            What this suggests if not proves is that Kazakh is becoming the language of public use in that country even among Kazakhs who know both languages and that the share of ethnic Kazakhs who prefer to use Russian to get their news is quite small and likely will continue to decline.

More than 23,000 People Evacuated from War Zone in Ukraine Four Years Ago Remain in Temporary Housing in Russia

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 30 – After Putin launched his expanded invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russian forces evacuated many residents from the war zone and placed them in what are known as “temporary accommodation centers.” Now, four years later, officials concede, there are more than 23,000 people in these places (tass.ru/obschestvo/26461721).

            Initially, these people were put in municipal hotels and sanatoria in small cities far from Moscow; but over time, most of those in such places have been moved to “old peoples’ homes” and that has become the name that both those living there and those they live among now use to refer to their locations (cherta.media/story/bezhency-v-rossii-pvr-i-pomoshh/).

            Never lavishly provided with food and services and often living crowded together in single rooms, the “temporarily” evacuated are at least alive for which they are grateful but increasingly have been provided with a narrower range of food products and some of them would like to return to their homes, moves the authorities have generally blocked.

            Because their numbers are small and because they have been put in places few tourists, Western journalists or diplomats are likely to visit, these people have received far less attention than other groups. That makes the compilation of some of the personal tragedies by the Cherta news portal especially valuable.

            What will happen to these people in the future remains unclear, and the uncertainty they feel about that defines their lives even more than the shortages and the lack of contact with their families and friends in former homes. Presumably if there is a settlement, some of these people will be able to return home, but even that is uncertain, as the “temporarily” housed admit. 

In Some Federal Subjects, More than Half of Candidates in United Russia Primaries for Duma Seats are Veterans of Putin’s War in Ukraine, ‘Novaya Gazeta Europe’ Reports

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 30 – More than half of the candidates in some oblasts, krays, and republics in United Russia primaries to select candidates for the race for Duma seats s are veterans of Putin’s war in Ukraine, although overall, they form less than nine percent of the total.

            The largest number of veteran candidates in these primary candidates come from Moscow city (38 out of 1898), Moscow region (21 of 322) and St. Petersburg (17 of 62); but higher percentages are where the number of candidates is smaller (novayagazeta.eu/articles/2026/03/30/kazhdyi-11-i-kandidat-na-praimeriz-edinoi-rossii-uchastvoval-v-rossiiskom-vtorzhenii-v-ukrainu-podschitala-novaia-evropa-news).

            In Sakha, for example, both of the two candidates competing in the primary are veterans of the war in Ukraine; and in Chelyabinsk oblast, five out of nine served in the Russian invasion force in Ukraine. What send the overall number are candidate in the occupied territories, the LNR, the DNR, and Zapozhizhya.

            Far from all of these veteran-candidates are likely to win. Many may have been listed in order to make it look like the regions involved were following Putin’s repeated injunctions to make the veterans the new ruling class of the Russian Federation, and they will lose to incumbents or those with more backing from local party elders.

            Nonetheless, these figures do suggest that the veterans are going to form a significant share of the new Duma, albeit far less than the 100 deputies that some have talked about. 

Despite Shortage of Police, Samara Oblast Creates Special Militia Department to Investigate Crimes against Veterans of Putin’s War in Ukraine

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 31 -- Despite the fact that the Samara region is currently suffering from a severe shortage of police officers, the interior ministry there has set up a special department within the militia to investigate crimes against veterans of Putin’s war in Ukraine, a sign that such crimes may be on the rise and that Moscow wants to reassure veterans of protection.

            There has been a great deal of attention to crimes committed by veterans of Putin’s war in Ukraine on their return home, but very little to what may be an ever increasing problem (idelreal.org/a/v-samarskom-gu-mvd-sozdali-otdel-po-rassledovaniyu-prestupleniy-v-otnoshenii-uchastnikov-rossiyskogo-vtorzheniya-v-ukrainu/33721335.html and idelreal.org/a/v-samarskoy-oblasti-ne-hvataet-svyshe-treh-tysyach-politseyskih-huzhe-vsego-situatsiya-v-konvoe-i-patrulno-postovoy-sluzhbe/33722203.html).

            Given that officials in Samara say they are suffering from a shortage of more than 3,000 police officers, a figure that is more than a quarter of the total number the oblast is supposed to have, this decision to create a new and special body to investigate crimes against rather than by veterans is striking.

            At the very least, this move seems to be an effort to show veterans that they will be protected, even if other groups in the population will have to suffer, one more indication that in Putin’s Russia, some, these veterans, are decidedly more equal than the others, and a likely driver of hostility toward and even attacks against such veterans.

            Many of Russia’s federal subjects suffer from serious shortages of police, something that has forced them to cut back services and leave residents at greater risk of crime. This is the first known indication that a region has decided to protect veterans in this way, but it is likely to spread if indeed it has not already, albeit with less publicity given that it may backfire. 

Moscow Unprepared for Oil Spills along Northern Sea Route, Bellona Foundation Warns

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 31 – Russia’s shortcomings in responding to oil spills in the Kerch Strait in 2024 highlight Moscow’s failure to be in a position to deal with oil spills in the far more inaccessible regions of the Arctic along the Northern Sea Route and the probability that any accidents will lead to disaster, researchers at Norway’s Bellona Foundation warn.

            Veslovod Levchenko and Charles Digges, researchers at the Foundation that gained international fame for its exposure of Soviet nuclear dumping in the Arctic, say that conclusion flows from a Moscow report to the International Maritime Organization about the 2024 spills in the Kerch Strait (themoscowtimes.com/2026/03/31/the-northern-sea-route-is-risky-and-russia-is-not-prepared-a92388).

            The report, which was filed unconscionably late, the two Bellona researchers say, showed that the Russian authorities were not able to cope with the relatively small oil spill in a much more accessible southern region where warmer temperatures mean that it should have been relatively easy to cope.

            Moreover, Levchenko and Digges point out, instead of welcoming popular help, the Russian authorities discouraged put obstacles in the way of such assistance and thus transformed what should have been a minor matter that could quickly have been managed                      into a major crisis that has still not been fully resolved.

            Dealing with similar accidents in the Arctic is much more difficult, they say, and “Russia is not prepared.” At lower temperatures, oil behaved differently; and it is far harder to get personnel and equipment in place in the event of any accident. As a result, even small spills there can have major and long-lasting consequences.

            This danger is now being exacerbated by other Russian policies: boosterism about the NSR, the use of aging ships some of which are of uncertain provenance, and the failure of the authorities to set up bases with the personnel and equipment to respond to accidents when they inevitably happen.

Russia’s Universities Now Forced to Provide Students with Knowledge Its Secondary Schools Should Have But Don’t, Patrushev Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 31 – Secondary schools in the Russian Federation have such low standards that Russia’s universities are forced to spend an enormous amount of time providing students with knowledge that the country’s secondary schools used to and should but no longer do, Nikolay Patrushev says.

            This sad fact of life, the Presidential assistant who head the country’s Maritime Board, told a meeting devoted to improving the quality of mathematics and natural science training in Russia, isn’t reflected in test scores but in life itself first in the universities and then in the professions (nakanune.ru/news/2026/3/31/22865093/).

            According to Nakanune journalist Yevgeny Chernyshov, Patrushev was likely basing his argument on the basis of a study which showed that “the majority of students” at St. Petersburg’s Mining University “possess virtually no familiarity with physics” when they arrive and thus have to be brought up to speed by the university itself.

            Pastrushev said that he is convinced that “it is already too late to try to fix things at the university level. Instead, the schools must be improved rather than praised, something that will require that “teachers have the opportunity to focus on teaching rather than on having up to two full-time loads just to make ends meet.”

            Specifically, the Putin aide called for “salary increases for mathematics, physics and chemistry teachers, warning that as a result of a lack of proficiency in these subjects among graduates, Russia will soon find itself with absolutely no specialists left to serve the shipbuilding industry and the navy.”

            What Patrushev did not say but what is likely on his mind and even more on those of his listeners is that the sad state of pre-university education in the Russian Federation is to a large extent the result of Vladimir Putin’s educational optimization programs and shift of money from schools to finance the war in Ukraine. 

‘Tatar Lobby’ in Moscow Plays Key Role Now and Could Play Larger One in the Future, Three Experts Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 30 – What is often called “the Tatar lobby” in Moscow -- the numerous officials and businessmen both ethnic Tatar and ethnic Russian who work in the Russian capital -- have long attracted attention there and in other republics for their role in promoting and defending the interests of Tatarstan there, sometimes successfully and sometimes not.

            (For background on this group, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2021/05/bashkirs-upset-by-power-of-tatar-lobby.html, prufy.ru/news/kazan/176823-ot_mordovii_do_khabarovska_kak_tatarskoe_lobbi_vozglavilo_ministerstva_i_regiony_v_8_subektakh_rf/ and realnoevremya.ru/articles/193598-v-moskve-vse-familii-izvestnyh-tatarstanskih-upravlencev-na-sluhu.)

            The IdelReal portal asked three experts –Ruslan Aysin, a Tatar political émigré and activist, Abbas Gallyamov, a former Putin speechwriter and now Putin critic who earlier worked in Bashkortostan, and Irina Busygina, formerly at the HSE and now at Harvard’s Davis Center, for their views on the Tatar lobby and its future (idelreal.org/a/tatarskoe-lobbi-i-predely-loyalnosti-gotova-li-kazan-k-samostoyatelnosti/33714210.html).

            Aysin says that Tatarstan’s political leadership posses “significant lobbying capabilities” but ones that tend to be concentrated in specific areas of importance to the republic such as construction. Their role there has become possible because “Moscow views the Tatarstan elite as highly effective and sufficiently loyal.” That gives this elite “a special value.”

            Sometime the lobby is successful in promoting a cause or delaying the implementation of a Moscow decision but that its position is “behavioral rather than strictly political” and in any case reflects the views of Kazan rather than being an independent actor in its own right. That could change, however, if Moscow weakened and could no longer eliminate rivals.

            Gallyamov says that neither the Kazan elite nor its lobby will push for secession anytime soon but instead will seek to maximize Tatarstan’s influence and freedom of action within the Russian Federation. Both groups resent much that Moscow does but recognize that too actively expressing such views would be dangerous.

            And Busygina observes that the Tatar lobby is an intriguing object for study because she does not know of any other region or republic which has anything like it -- although all have permanent representations in Moscow that may provide something similar. (On these, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2022/10/embassies-of-non-russian-republics.html and indowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/08/apparently-on-moscows-order-functions.html.)

            She says that there is discontent with Moscow in both Kazan and among the Tatar lobby and that “A weakening of Moscow could serve to expose it. But it is definitely there. However, to openly demonstrate this discontent right now would be tantamount to political suicide. It would be an absolutely irrational move."

She says that what she means by the "weakening of the center" would be Putin’s loss of his current ability to mediate among various groups in the center and have the last word. At present, none of these groups is capable of challenging him.”  But that could change; and if it did, these groups which “loathe one another” and have different visions of the future could act.

In that event, regional and republic capitals and their representatives in Moscow could play a dramatically expanded role in determining the direction Russia will take given the likelihood that some of the competitors for power in the Russian capital will seek them as allies in that struggle.