Laboratory of the Future Asks Russians Whether Their Country Even Needs a Parliament

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 17 – A few weeks ago, the independent sociological Laboratory of the Future asked Russians when Russia in its current state really needs a parliament, Elena Panfilova and Aleksey Levinson say. While only three percent answered in the affirmative, many others gave answers that were less than a resounding endorsement of the Duma as an institution.

            Eleven percent said Russia needed a parliament because all “civilized” countries have one, the two sociologists said; 25 percent said it was needed to express the views of the population; but the largest share – 28 percent – said the Duma’s job was to help the president  Duma (novayagazeta.ru/articles/2026/09/17/nuzhen-li-strane-parlament).

            Given the way in which the Russian political system actually operates, one in which the president dominates everything including what the Duma does, this is hardly a ringing endorsement of the very idea that Russia needs a parliament at all, Panfilova and Levinson continue.

            They suggest that one of the reasons Russians give such answers is that they know very little about what he Duma actually does or what it could do if it lived up to its constitutional role. According to a recent Russian Field survey, more than half of those surveyed could not give the right answer to any of four questions about the Russian parliament.

            Such attitudes and ignorance are especially striking now as Russia heads toward the end of a lengthy campaign to elect a new Duma; but together they reflect the increasing decision of Russians to go their own way while allowing the Russian powers to go their own, a not unreasonable position given how little influence the population has on the powers. 

Russia’s Parliamentary Parties Adopting Ever More Radical Anti-Immigrant Positions as Election Approaches

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 17 -- In every Russian election since Gorbachev’s time, observers have expressed concern that electoral campaigns will exacerbate inter-ethnic relations in the country. Usually, that has not happened; but this time around, Russia’s major parties are contributing to that by taking ever radical anti-immigrant positions.

            Alena Itskova, a journalist for Novaya Gazeta Europe, traces this development, one likely reflecting the experience of candidates who find that attacking immigrants and demanding their expulsion is a winning issue in Russia today (novayagazeta.eu/articles/2026/09/17/vsekh-v-deportobus).

            That has happened, she suggests, because attacking immigrants is popular and also is an issue which the Kremlin has not yet “prohibited;” but it is disturbing because playing the anti-immigrant card could easily lead to precisely the kind of increases in tension among Russia’s indigenous nationalities as well.

            Itzkova traces how this trend in Russian politics has developed from the LDPR for whom anti-immigrant attitudes has long been a mainstay to the KPRF which has generally but ever less consistently opposed anti-ethnic minority messaging. She doesn’t address what is the largest question: can this issue be pushed back into the bottle after the parties have loosed it?

            That is unlikely to be the case, and the Kremlin may then take even more radical positions against immigrants and against indigenous nationalities who many view as somehow related even when that harms the Russian economy and threatens to trigger more conflicts and even more pro-independence movements among them. 

Almost Half of Russia’s Regions Now Paying Bonuses to School-Age Girls who Give Birth Despite Public Opposition and Expert Predictions Such Aid won’t Boost Birthrate

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 14 – Because Putin has said that women who have their first child earliest will have more children later in life, a proposition experts dispute, 37 regions are now paying enormous bonuses of up to 345,000 rubles (4,000 US dollars) to school-age girls who give register and give birth to a child.

            On this rapidly expanding program, see svoboda.org/a/stavropolje-lidiruet-v-strane-po-chislu-vyplachennyh-posobiy-za-rannyuyu-beremennostj/33853818.html and nemoskva.net/2026/09/14/posobiya-dlya-beremennyh-shkolnicz-vveli-v-37-regionah-rossii/.

            But not only Russian demographers are casting doubt on the premises of this program, arguing that such bonuses will change only when women give birth and not how often they do so, but many Russian citizens are opposed to it because they see it violating moral norms and harming the health of these women and their children (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/03/moscows-promotion-of-abortion-bans-and.html).

            That this program has taken off in this way highlights both the power of a Putin suggestion to get the regions and republics to fall in line and the failure of other programs to boost the birthrate. Because of that, Moscow and those it controls seem now prepared to try even this risky strategy which in all likelihood will fail.

Having Provoked Anti-Russian Attitudes in Central Asia with Tough New Migration Policies, Moscow must Get Ready to Evacuate ‘Tens of Thousands’ of Russians from There, Aksyonov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 14 – Many Russians welcome Moscow’s tough new policies on migration but fail to note that these are producing anti-Russian attitudes in Central Asia where there are still many ethnic Russians and from which Moscow must be ready to evacuate Russians because local governments can’t protect them, Sergey Aksyonov says.

            The Svobodnaya Pressa commentator says it is understandable that some Central Asians will be angry at Russians for how Moscow is now treating them and that such anger can lead to “a wave of Russophobia” in their countries which the Russians living there now can only escape from by fleeing back to Moscow (svpressa.ru/society/article/532061/).

            The two countries in Central Asia which have sent the most migrant workers and thus are most likely to create a situation for ethnic Russians in them who may decide that they have no choice but to flee are Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, the first with one million and the second with 1.3 million workers in Russia and with 30,000 and 600,000 Russians at home.

            “It is naïve,” Aksyonov says, to think that the authorities in either country can protect ethnic Russians living there from popular retribution. After all, he continues, “you can’t put a police officer next to every ‘Muscovite.’” Consequently, large numbers of Russians now in Central Asia are likely to want to leave as Moscow puts more pressure on immigrants.

            Because this is the case, he continues, “Moscow needs to prepare in case of need to urgently help compatriots in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. And not just attempt to calm passions  by saying we must live together as it tried in the Donbass but be ready for the evacuation of tens or even hundreds of thousands of ethnic Russians” back to Russia.

Church Procession in St. Petersburg Mirrors One in Moscow and Attracts Few Extreme Nationalists, SOVA Reports

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 15 – The St. Petersburg church procession on Sept. 12 was about the same size – 90,000 as against 100,000 – and attracted just as few extreme Russian nationalists – less than one percent in the northern capital compared to about two percent in both cases, according to the SOVA Center which tracks extremism.

            For data on the extremists in the procession in the northern capital, see sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/news/racism-nationalism/2026/09/d54533/; for a discussion of the march in Moscow, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2026/09/representatives-of-extreme-russian.html.

            On the one hand, what used to be considered extremism has in many cases gone mainstream in Russia and so those in “extremist” groups march with others rather than separately; but on the other, it is incorrect to describe the latest processions as a recrudescence of the Russian marches of earlier times. 

FSB Fighting Losing Battle against Illegal Armorers who Convert Weapons flowing into Russia from Putin’s War in Ukraine

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 14 – Since Putin launched his expanded war in Ukraine in 2022, guns from that conflict have been flooding into the Russian Federation where they are adapted by underground armorers for use by private individuals, criminal organizations and at least potentially anti-Moscow underground organizations.

            Over the last four years, the FSB has repeatedly reported that it has identified and closed down the armorers involved in this process and closed them down. For those claims and their frequent repetition, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2026/05/guns-flooding-into-north-caucasus-from.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/08/fsb-raids-underground-armament-firms-in.html and the sources cited therein.

            This week, the FSB made a similar announcement, declaring that it, together with the interior ministry and the Russian Guard, had arrested more than a hundred people involved in this illegal arms trade in 43 regions of Russia, among which the North Caucasus was singled out as a major focus (vfokuse.mail.ru/articles/69641897-fsb-soobshila-o-raskrytii-chernyh-oruzhejnikov-bolee-chem-v-40-regionah/ and kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/426613).

            The fact that this announcement is so similar to earlier announcements by the FSB shows that the Russian siloviki are currently fighting a losing battle on this front and that both more guns are flowing from the front into Russia and that more people are now involved in this illicit process than earlier, yet another way Putin’s war in Ukraine is coming home to Russians.

              Russian experts say there may now be more than 30 million guns in private hands, many of them illegal, and that even in Moscow there may be as many as 250,000 residents who have almost 700,000 guns in their possession (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2026/02/more-than-quarter-million-muscovites.html).

              Most of these figures involve guns that are registered, but not all – and the means there is almost certainly going to be an upsurge in violent crime and even violent underground political activity, something that means siloviki who go after such people may discover that they face newly armed opponents.

Aral Sea Basin Now a CO2 Emitter which Threatens to Increase Global Warming rather than a C02 Sink which Restrained that Trend, Kazakh Analysts Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 12 – The impact of the death of the Aral Sea on surrounding areas is well-documented and much of the discussion about what to do now is between those who want to find more water to flow into the seabed, a difficult task indeed, and those who want to plant trees on the former seabed to prevent the spread of dust and dangerous elements.

            Those favoring a focus on planting trees to hold the soil in place have had the upper hand not only because such steps can be taken by the government that controls the specific littoral of the former sea but also because planting trees is much easier than changing water use patterns on the rivers which had filled the sea in the past.

            But new research on the death of the Aral suggests that the consequences of its death are larger and more international than any had thought earlier and that it could even be the case that international payments to fight global warming could lead to the restoration of the sea by providing money for dealing with the feeder rivers.

            What this research shows, Kazakhstan investigators say, is that as long as the sea was in existence,  vegetation on its bed help enormous among of carbon dioxide; but now that the sea has died, all of that CO2 is being released, increasing global warming and harming more than just those around the sea (vlast.kz/obsshestvo/70851-vysohsee-dno-aralskogo-mora-stanovitsa-istocnikom-ugleroda-cto-s-etim-delat.html).

            According to European research cited by the Kazakh experts, international payments to support carbon sinks and reverse the release of more carbon dioxide could amount to as much as 15.8 billion euros (18 billion US dollars). That could be sufficient to take the steps needed to change water use patterns on the feeder rivers and allow the Aral Sea to make a comeback.

            This is almost certainly an overly optimistic view; but the fact that it is being offered may change the debate over the Aral and other threatened bodies of water, shifting the balance away from those who see the death of these bodies of water as irreversible to those who now can show just how dangerous to how many countries failure to take steps in that direction would be.