Kremlin Stepping Up Pressure on Universities to Get More Men for Putin’s War as Part of Broader Effort to Block ‘a Generational Revolution,’ Vakhstayn Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 31 – The Kremlin has increased its control of higher educational institutions not just to secure more men for its armed forces now fighting in Ukraine but also and perhaps more importantly to prevent the emergence of “a generational revolution” that could challenge Putin, according to Viktor Vakhshtain.

            The Russian sociologist who left Russia in 2022 and now  teaches and does research in Israel says that the changes that had taken place in Russian universities in recent decades have led the Kremlin to “view universities not as centers of scholarship but as sources of an existential threat to state stability” (echofm.online/news/rossijskie-vlasti-usilivayut-kontrol-nad-vuzami-chtoby-izbezhat-pokolencheskoj-revolyuczii-viktor-vahshtajn).

"Everyone understands perfectly well that a university—including a Russian one which has enjoyed 25 years of autonomy—is actually a highly resistant structure,” Vakhstayn says. “You can’t simply remove a rector and appoint a new one; even replacing half the governing body wouldn't work.”

“You have to use different tactics—for instance, by discrediting the administration in the eyes of the faculty and the faculty in the eyes of the students. In the past, if you went to the dean and said, 'Look, I think I’m about to be drafted; is there any way to schedule a retake so I can finish in time or perhaps avoid expulsion until the draft period ends?'’”

Until 2022, most deans “would try to ensure you didn't get expelled or conscripted,” the sociologist says. “Now, however, the dean receives a quota to send a certain number of people into the army.” As a result, students “probably wouldn't go to that dean with your problems anymore," the expert says.

In the pre-2022 period, students felt protected and thus became increasingly radical in their responses. Now, they know they aren’t going to be defended by their universities and that threats to them from state agencies are far greater. The Kremlin hopes that will keep them from radicalizing, although it is possible that it will do exactly the opposite.

 

Russia Responsible for 19 of 24 Cases of Pollution of the Caspian in June, ‘Transparent World’ Monitoring Project Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 1 – Russian coastal facilities were responsible for 19 of the 24 cases of pollution of the Caspian Sea in June by facilities in that littoral state, Azerbaijan for four,and Kazakhstan for one, according to a study based on satellite imagery the Transparent World in the Caspian Sea organization has carried out.

            Some of this pollution was the result of the draining of sewage into the sea, the group said; but most involved oil, including spills from ships and leakage from oil storage facilities and harbors (t.me/twworldkasp/5436 and svoboda.org/a/za-mesyats-v-kaspiyskom-more-zafiksirovali-24-sluchaya-zagryazneniya-boljshaya-chastj-u-beregov-dagestana/33819812.html).

            This study will exacerbate relations among the five littoral states, relations that are already fraught because of conflicts about the impact of reductions in the flow of rivers that help keep the Caspian from falling any more rapidly than it has been in recent years as a result of global warming.

Ukrainian Drone Attacks Giving New Impetus to Discussions about Moving Russian Capital to Siberia

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 30 – For more than a decade, Russian officials including those at the very top have been mulling the idea that if Russia is to make a new breakthrough in its development and be less integrated with the West, it needs to open “a window on Asia” analogous to the Window on Europe that Peter the Great did by establishing his capital in St. Petersburg.

            That is, Sergey Aksyonov of Svobodnaya Pressa says, Russia needs to decentralize the country’s economy and move the capital to Siberia, either by building up one of the existing cities there or creating an entirely new one analogous to what Peter the Great did when he established St. Petersburg as his “window on Europe” (svpressa.ru/economy/article/525545/).

            Of course, it would have been easier and better if this decision had been made calmly during the “fat” years when the Russian economy was growing rapidly rather than now when Ukrainian drones are raining down on the existing capital in Moscow,  the commentator says.

            But better late than never, he adds, even suggesting that interest in moving the capital has increased because if the political leadership moves, there will be less reason for enemies of Russia, Ukraine now but others in the future, to attack the city and thus allow it to remain the major economic center of the country.   

            Such a consideration will likely reduce the opposition many businesses are mounting to the idea of moving the capital, Aksyonov suggests; and so what has been an idea more or less at the margins of official discussions is now assuming a more central place – yet another consequence of the drone attacks on Russian thinking. 

Moscow’s Cutback in Release of Statistics Snowballing, as New Data Can’t be Released without Reference to Old Leading to Ever Larger Gap between Reporting and Reality

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 30 – Moscow has stopped releasing statistical data on a broad range of metrics especially since the start of Putin’s expanded war in Ukraine; and those cutbacks are now snowballing as the authorities end publication of more and more data sets and those they do release, which depend on suppressed data, are ever less accurate.

            During the first six months of 2026, the To Be Precise portal says, the Russian government stopped releasing data on the work of the courts and did not issue the bulletin on social supports (tochno.st/materials/suddep-perestal-obnovliat-dannye-o-rabote-sudov-a-na-emiss-aktualizirovali-vsego-54-pokazatelei).

            The loss of access to such data is serious, the portal says; but it points to another development which may prove even more consequential. Much new data on a wide variety of issues depends for its accuracy on comparisons with earlier data on the same subject. If the earlier data isn’t available, then soon such data sets can’t be released and now aren’t.

            That has enormous consequences for those seeking to analyze what is happening in Russian society, but another consequence that may prove to be even more serious happens when statistical organs release inaccurate data because they have to make estimates when the release of accurate date is stopped.

            That creates a situation where the difference between what the Russian government says and Russian officials and businessmen rely on and the real situation continues to grow,  something that introduces distortions in policies of all kinds as those involved assume that there are far more or far less of something than is in fact the case.

            That outcome will affect elections, draft quotas, production figures, and almost all issues where what the government or businesses do relies on data the government chooses to release, including data that by nature are inaccurate and becoming ever more so.

The Longer Putin Continues the War in Ukraine, the More Likely Ukraine will Become a Member of NATO, Gallyamov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 30 – By launching and then carrying out his expanded war of Ukraine, Putin has not demonstrated his cleverness and strength but his weakness and cruelty, Abbas Gallyamov says (pointmedia.io/story/6a6c55e075d0d3346a25cb69). But more than that, by continuing the war, he is subverting his own purpose in launching it in the first place.

            According to the former Putin speechwriter and now Putin critic, “if Putin had agreed to stop the war last year,” US President Donald Trump “would officially have denied Ukraine the chance to join NATO” (echofm.online/opinions/lechit-golovnuyu-bol-s-pomoshhyu-gilotiny).

            “If Putin were to stop the war right now,” Gallyamov continues, “the result would not be so obvious” as ever more countries in the West are ready to have Ukraine join the alliance given that Ukraine’s military successes would make it a valuable and welcome addition to NATO.

            But even more, the commentator says, “if Putin doesn’t stop right now, then in a year, NATO will ask Ukraine to join the alliance and Russia will not be able to prevent that from happening,” thus vitiating one of the key reasons Putin has given for carrying out his “special military operation” there. 

            The consequences of Putin’s miscalculations are already in evidence, Gallyamov argues. If he was afraid of having NATO approach Russia’s borders and that Ukraine would unleash a war against his country, “the worst has already happened;” and the longer the war goes on, the more Russia will suffer.

            “At the same time,” however, the commentator continues, “NATO did not ENTER the war – although the plight of the Russian army at some could it made it possible for the alliance to do so. This fact clearly proves that NATO was NOT GOING TO fight with Russia from the very beginning.”

            Thus, by going to war with Ukraine and continuing it for so long, Putin has “condemned his country to a strategic defeat. Russia is losing both in the east and in the west. In the east because Russia is tied down in a war; and in the West because Putin personally has opened the way to the revival of NATO and Ukraine’s membership in it.

In 2021, Moscow Focused on Blocking Registration of Opposition Duma Candidates; Now It is Doing More at Regional Level, ‘Horizontal Russia’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 31 – In the run up to the Duma elections in 2021, the Kremlin focused on blocking candidates it didn’t like from getting on the ballot, Horizontal Russia says. As a result, many independent-minded and even opposition-inclined candidates were able to run in regional and municipal elections.

            Already in tight control of the Duma candidate list, the Putin regime this time around has focused on imposing similar restrictions on regional and municipal balloting lest someone get on the ballot, win and then become a person around which people can mobilize against the Kremlin (semnasem.org/articles/2026/07/31/na-dalnih-podstupah).

            According to specialists on regional politics like Fyodor Krasheninnikov, the Kremlin’s fears in this regard are almost certainly exaggerated, those in power believe that they have an ideal opportunity to exclude from politics all who disagree anyone who is not happy either with Moscow or with Moscow’s agents in the federal subjects.

            There is another consequence of this shift, one that Horizontal Russia doesn’t address but that is critically important for shaping Western analytic opinion about what is going on. Because Moscow doesn’t have to do as much this time around to control the candidates for the Duma, its actions outside of Moscow as usual are getting less attention.

            And as a result, some may see the Putin regime as more successful in imposing its will and less likely to be increasing repression instead of being engaged in a real struggle for power at the regional and local levels where in fact, as Horizontal Russia documents, the Kremlin is if anything even more repressive this time around than last. 

Central Asian Countries have Exploited ‘Window of Opportunity’ Putin’s War in Ukraine has Given Them, Kyrgyz Commentator Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 31 – Because Moscow has been focusing so exclusively on Ukraine since Putin launched his expanded war in Ukraine in 2022, the countries of Central Asia have been able to address and solve issues that had long been considered too complicated” for any resolution, Adil Tudrukulov says.

            The five have exploited this “window of opportunity,” the Kyrgyz commentator says, to deal with complicated issues like border delimitation, building transport corridors, coordinating their policies with one another, and expanding ties with other world centers of power (exclusive.kz/ne-chuzhaja-vojna-kak-ukraina-izmenila-centralnuju-aziju).

            Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart took the lead in promoting a common front on foreign policy questions, Tudrukulov says; and Uzbekistan leader Shavkat Mirziyoyev served as “the architect of rapprochement” within the region. But the leaders of the other three countries in the region – Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan – have fully participated.

            The solution of many regional problems has further limited Russia’s influence in the region, given that many of them were of Moscow’s creation as part of its longstanding divide-and-rule strategy, the commentator continues, while acknowledging that Russian influence has not disappeared but rather has been limited by ties with other powers and a new self-confidence.

            Tudrukulov says that it remains to be seen what will happen once the war in Ukraine is concluded; but on the basis of the evidence he provides, when that does happen, one of the most important consequences of Putin’s war there may well be in Central Asia where countries are increasingly going their own way rather than remaining under Moscow.

            Indeed, the trends that the Kyrgyz analyst is pointing to mean that the war in Ukraine is yet another step toward the demise of the Muscovite empire, not only in Ukraine and not only in the former Soviet republics which gained independence in 1991 but in the other non-Russian state formations still under Moscow’s control.