Putin's Policies have Increasingly Left Russians Face to Face with the State and Some May React in Ways Kremlin Won’t Like, Otroshchenko Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 17 – The Putin regime has deprived Russians of a future by insisting that the future is the past, a development that has attracted widespread notice; but it has also deprived the population of any private space by imposing the state on every aspect of Russian life, Fyodor Otroshchenko says.

            The Russian specialist on art and intellectual history says that the Kremlin has eliminated any space “’outside of politics,” thus taking away from Russians one of the most prized aspects of life that they gained at the end of Soviet times and the beginning of post-Soviet ones (novayagazeta.ru/articles/2026/04/17/vne-politiki-bolshe-net).

            “The entire life of the most apolitical citizen of the country is now subordinated to politics,” Ostroshchenko continues; and that forces an increasing number of those citizens to confront a question that they had not wanted to answer: “how is that individual to respond when he finds himself face to face with the state” and without the ability to retreat to a private space?

            The answers to that question, of course, can be extremely “varied and unpredictable” and “it is certain” that at least some will decide that they must somehow act to oppose the state because the powers have taken away from them not just a future but rather the chance to have a life of their own.

            Many will see what the state is doing in this regard with “all its limitations, bans, and blockages” as increasingly unacceptable, the specialist says; and to the extent they do, “the result of these reflections” could be a response the state won’t like and might threaten that state more than almost anything else.

Collapse of Business Activity in Russia’s North Leading to Regional Budget Shortfalls Moscow May Soon Not Be Able to Cover, ‘The Barents Observer’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 15 – The amount of taxes regions and republics in Russia’s European north have fallen significantly, a reflection of declining business activity and a development that is leaving the governments of these federal subjects with larger budget shortfalls that Moscow’s own deficit may prevent it from being to cover as it has in the past, The Barents Observer says.

            The Russian government is releasing ever less data on such economic trends, Georgy Chentimirov of that outlet says; but there is enough from local media outlets and even from Moscow discussions to reach the conclusion that the situation is bad and getting worse rapidly (ru.thebarentsobserver.com/novosti/provalnyj-start-dohody-regionov-pokatilis-vniz/448754).

            In Russia’s European north, he reports, the number of companies which have gone bankrupt and been liquidated has doubled from the first quarter of last year to the same period of 2026; and “of those which remain in operation, over half are reporting losses.” As result, tax collections from businesses have plummeted by a third or more.

            So far, Chentimirov continues, the federal subject governments are getting enough money from other sources and from Moscow to be able to pay the salaries of state employees; but budgetary problems in Moscow which had a budget deficit in the first quarter equal to what it had projected for the entire year may mean that will soon no longer be possible.

            If Moscow can’t pay, the regional governments won’t be able to either; and they will either be compelled to seek private bank loans which are prohibitively expensive or demand that Moscow allow them to keep more of the taxes they are collecting from other sources. Either step will lead to hardships for their residents and set the stage for a political crisis.

Exclave Issue in Armenia and Azerbaijan Seen Heating Up Again after June Vote in Armenia

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 18 – The four Azerbaijani exclaves in Armenia and the three Armenian ones in Azerbaijan, marked on Soviet maps but largely depopulated and destroyed during the Karabakh war and seldom mentioned since, are likely to heat up after the June elections in Armenia, according to Russian Aleksey Baliyev.

            That is because in resolving the Karabakh dispute, he says, the two countries agreed to go back to the borders as established in Soviet times and thus must address the exclave issue as the two work to delimit and then demarcate the exact border between them and the likelihood that one or both sides will have to make concessions at odds with the feelings of their populations (vpoanalytics.com/konflikty/armeniya-azerbaydzhan-budet-li-obmen-anklavami/).

            (Some 50 such exclaves existed at the end of Soviet times, but most have disappeared as residents have left or been pushed out by the governments of the territories on which they are located (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2020/10/borders-and-enclaves-set-up-in-soviet.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2021/08/ethnic-exclaves-other-than-qarabagh-add.html).)

            Though small and in most cases either completely depopulated or with only a few remaining residents, all of these exclaves are symbolically important to both the country that wants to maintain them and the one that wants them to be abolished; but several of them are strategically important.

            The most significant of these, Baliyev suggests, one which lies just north of the border of Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan, and a second through which land transport between Yerevan and Armenia’s Syunik Region, which not only lies between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan but across a route Russia has long hoped to use as part of its north-south corridor to Iran.

            The fate of these villages thus continues to agitate national pride, especially in Armenia, because any concessions or even some exchange with Azerbaijan would further reduce the size of the Republic of Armenia, an especially sensitive issue given Yerevan’s loss of Karabakh and the way that still agitates refugees from there and Armenians more generally (e.g., windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/12/yerevan-seeking-to-resettle-refugees.html and  windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/04/only-1437-of-more-than-100000-ethnic.html).

Russian Airlines Carried Nearly Four Percent Fewer Passengers Domestically in 2025 than the Year Before, Mostly Because of a Shortage of Planes, Industry Association Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 17 – Russians travelled 3.8 percent fewer trips on domestic airlines in 2025 than they did the year before. Some of this decline may reflect the worsening economic situation in that country, but Russia’s Association of Air Transport Operators places the blame primarily on the shortage of planes that is the result of Western sanctions.

            But while domestic travel declined, international travel increased by 8.5 percent with carriers shifting their remaining planes from domestic to more profitable foreign routes, thus compounding (echofm.online/news/v-2025-godu-obyom-passazhirskih-aviaperevozok-vnutri-rossii-snizilsya-na-38-v-otraslevoj-assocziaczii-eto-obyasnili-deficzitom-samolyotov).

            According to the Association, these trends have continued into 2026.

Blaming All Russians for War in Ukraine Helps Putin and Hurts Anti-War Effort, Gallyamov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 15 – Many opponents of Putin’s war in Ukraine blame all Russians for that military adventure because so many residents of the Russian Federation support it and even insist that they should be punished for their support even if they are less committed to the prosecution of the war than earlier, Abbas Gallyamov says.

            But those who blame all Russians for the war and want to punish them for their support of it are failing to recognize that such positions undercut efforts to increase opposition to the war inside Russia but also mean that many Russians will continue to support it, the Russian commentator says (echofm.online/opinions/ne-nado-podtalkivat-grazhdan-v-storonu-vlastej-2).

            They will do so because they do not want to be punished for something many of them now question and thus believe that the only way to avoid being punished by those who blame all of them for the war is to fight on until Moscow achieves victory even if they would prefer to see the war end.

            Gallyamov cites two historical cases in support of his conclusion: Russia’s own experience during World War I when many Russians opposed the war without fear because “no one threatened them with punishment;” and the leaking of the Morgenthau Plan in 1944 which called for the punishment of Germans and led many of them to fight on even harder.

            Obviously, he argues, “the conclusion that it is necessary to stop discussing the issue of the guilt of all Russians is not pleasant, but it must be done as emotions should not get in the way of promoting anti-war agitations.” At the very least, talk about a Punic settlement of the war must stop lest it “push” Russians toward Putin and his war even if they increasing oppose both.

Alcoholism among Russians Increased Last Year by Largest Amount Since 2015, ‘Important Stories’ Reports

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 16 – Nearly 56 of every 100,000 residents of the Russian Federation were diagnosed as alcoholics or suffering from alcohol-induced psychosis last year, the highest level since 2015, and a 30 percent rise from 2024, strongly suggesting that it is related to the impact of Putin’s war in Ukraine and Russia’s current economic problems, Important Stories says.

            Last year’s dramatic rise reverses the declines between 2010 and 2021 when these alcoholism figures fell by nearly half from 100,000 to 53,000 for the Russian population as a whole, figures from the health ministry and private clinics show (storage.googleapis.com/istories/news/2026/04/16/zabolevaemost-rossiyan-alkogolizmom-i-alkogolnim-psikhozom-virosla-na-tret/index.html, ru.themoscowtimes.com/2024/01/15/v-rossii-uvelichilos-chislo-alkogolikov-na-fone-voini-v-ukraine-a118376 and ru.themoscowtimes.com/2024/06/24/v-moskve-zafiksirovali-vzrivnoi-rost-chisla-bolnih-alkogolizmom-a134827).

            Despite Putin’s calls for sobriety, the sales of hard liquor including vodka but not including moonshine or samogon as Russians call it rose to 8.5 liters per person per year, high enough to have a major impact on health (ru.themoscowtimes.com/2025/03/31/rossiyane-ustanovili-8-letnii-rekord-po-potrebleniyu-krepkogo-alkogolya-a159666).

Kazakhstan’s Plan to Expand the Small Aral Sea a ‘Hare-Brained Scheme,' Bayalimov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 16 – Astana’s plan to expand the Little Aral Sea, created when the Kokaral Dam was constructed in 2005 and slowed the drying up of what had been part of the larger and dying Aral Sea, Dauletiyar Bayalimov says. Adding to the height of that dam won’t do because there won’t be enough water to fill the Little Aral even to its originally planned level.

            The Kazakh member of the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea says that the plans on offer ignore not only massive evaporation but the likelihood that neither Kyrgyzstan nor Uzbekistan will allow enough water to flow in to improve the situation (spik.kz/2595-malyj-aral-200-milliardov-tenge-na-zavedomo-beznadezhnuju-zateju.html).

            Many in Kazakhstan and in the international community see the Little Aral Sea projects as a kind of magical salvation of the problems that have been killing off the Aral Sea as a whole; but such views reflect ignorance or worse and at best ignore the fact that Astana’s plans are nothing more than expensive “hare-brained” schemes.

            It would be far better to try to change the flow of water through the Little Aral so that it would become less saline once again and thus support fishing or to invest in improving the irrigation systems in the country. But those are not the kind of projects that many governments seem to prefer. Instead, they want flashy big ones that will fail, but only after their time.