Common Law Wives of Russian Soldiers Can Get Payments Only If Couple Lived Together and had at Least One Child Together, Moscow Rules

Paul Goble

              Staunton, June 3 – Common law wives of Russian soldiers who have fought and died in Ukraine have appealed a Russian government decision not to grant them any benefits unless they can prove they lived with such men for at least three years and had at least one child in each case.

              This issue has become increasingly explosive not only because of mounting fraud – women who claim benefits without such ties are an increasing problem – but also because of the explosive growth in the number of young Russians who live together without getting married officially (nakanune.ru/articles/124713/).

              One reason many Russian women have given for joining the suit is that they began living together with someone who then volunteered to fight in Ukraine before they had been together for three years but fully expected to return alive and continue the relationship after doing so.

              But there are two major reasons why the government is resisting: the amount of money given to widows of combat victims is large and there is a fear among officials that if the women win this case, others will use it as precedent to expand the rights of common law wives to claim property or inheritances, issues still muddy in Russian law. 

Even for Housing without Indoor Plumbing, Residents of Regions Outside of Moscow Must Save for Years, ‘Horizontal Russia’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 1 – That people in the Russian Federation beyond Moscow’s ring road are more likely to be poor than residents of the capital is common knowledge; but just how great their suffering is as a result and how long they must wait to purchase housing is all too often ignored, according to the Horizontal Russia portal.

            The portal, which focuses on developments outside Moscow, found that in some places, families with two children and an average income for their federal subjects must save for decades and in one case more than 90 years to be able to get into substandard housing often without indoor plumbing (semnasem.org/articles/2026/06/01/do-90-let).

            The situation in the North Caucasian republic of Karachayevo-Cherkessia is the worst of those regions and republics Horizontal Russia examined. There, such families may have to wait as long as 91.5 years. In many places, the wait is only a few years; but in other non-Russian republics, it may be as long as 20 years.

            This is a measure of poverty that is rarely taken, but it is a sign of just how dire the situation is for many in the Russian Federation whose government is quite willing to spend billions of rubles on Putin’s war in Ukraine – and one that suggests that in some places at least, the potential for a social explosion is very real indeed. 

Officials Obscuring Siberia’s Economic Decline by Not Factoring Inflation into Statistics, Verkhoturov Says

Paul Goble

              Staunton, June 3 – Adjusted for inflation, Siberia has been declining economically since at least 2020, Dmitry Verkhoturov says; but that decline has been hidden from Moscow and the population by officials in the region who report annual figures as if there had been no inflation.

              But over this period, the Siberian economics reporter says, inflation has exceeded 50 percent; and that means that any figures for 2025 that have not increased by more than that amount over the same period in fact show that the economy has been declining (sibmix.com/?doc=21449).

              In all but two of the 10 federal subjects in the Siberian Federal District, the inflation-adjusted figures show a decline; and in two, Kemerovo and Altai Kray, the increases are far smaller than the 50 percent rise that inflation alone would have boosted them, Verkhoturov continues.

              This statistical sleight of hand not only highlights the incompetence of regional leaders to make real progress but explains why the Siberian FD is losing population. Residents can see that they have few prospects for a better life there if they remain and so are choosing to leave. 

              Unless Siberian FD officials are forced to be more honest, the situation is only going to deteriorate, regardless of how many positive things these officials or those in the Russian capital continue to utter. 

Central Asians Consume 2.5 to 5 Times the Amount of Water Russians Do, Ecologists Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 2 – The debate on whether to divert water from Siberian rivers to Central Asia continues, but except for plans to use pipes rather than canals, little has changed since plans to do so were debated and shelved in Gorbachev’s time, the Kedr environmentalist portal says.

            But there is one major change that few have been talking about that suggests that, in the words of the portal, “no matter how much water comes from Siberia, it will not be enough” to solve Central Asia’s shortages (kedr.media/stories/skolko-by-vody-ni-prishlo-iz-sibiri-ee-budet-malo/).

            The reason, Kedr says, is that Central Asians use vastly more water per capita than do Russians because the former overuse water for agricultural uses and lose much because of inadequate distribution channels. Unless that changes, the situation is going to remain hopeless whatever Russia does.

            According to statistics the portal cites, Kazakhstan uses 3397 liters of water per person daily; Tajikistan, 4153;  Uzbekistan, 4778; and Turkmenistan, 15,445, figures 2.5 to five times more than in the Russian Federation. (The site does not give figures for Kyrgyzstann, but they are certainly above the Russian figure as well.)

            These disproportionate figures suggest that any talk about Siberian river diversion should end until the Central Asians do something about their over-consumption of water.  

New Ethnographic Dictionary of Terms Russian Soldiers in Ukraine Use Highlights Tension between Their Reality and What Moscow Says, Compilers Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 1 – A Russian anthropologist and a Russian psychologist have analyzed the language Russian soldiers use when they appeal to the Russian human rights ombudsman to call attention to the tension between what soldier actually experience and what they feel they can say to Russian officials.

            The two, Aleksandr Arkhipova, who now works in Paris, and Yury Lapshin, who writes for the SHKRAB telegram channel, examined 9476 soldiers’ letters they gained access to and have now released a dictionary of 77 of the most common and revelatory terms (echofm.online/opinions/chto-takoe-etnograficheskij-slovar-vojny-i-kak-on-ustroen).

            In presenting these terms and their definitions, they stress that they are aware of both the tension between the official version of reality and that of the soldiers’ experiences and the way that the compromises the soldiers make in writing to officials nonetheless provides a window into their world.

            The dictionary which is soon to be published in hard copy is already available online at slovar-svo.online/. Among some of the most intriguing and suggestive terms are the following:

·       The word “enemy” isn’t found and there is almost no mention of Ukrainians.

·       “Contract” refers to “the new social contract: ‘Take money and be ready to die for the motherland.’”

·       “Liquidate” is used in place of “kill” or “destroy.”

·       “Musician” is used for Wagner Group members because of the association of the name of their units with Richard Wagner.

·       “Negative lists” refer to lists of those killed in combat.

·       “Bird” is a drone.

·       “Write-Off” refers to those discharged from the military for health reasons.

·       “Black widow” refers to women who enter into marriages, often fictitious, with war veterans as a way to make money.

Varangian-Local Division among Russia's Governors No Longer Only One That Matters, Kynyev Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 1 – Ever since Vladimir Putin began installing as governors people from the outside, known in Russian as “Varangians,” analysts and observers have been dividing the gubernatorial corps of the Russian Federation between them and people who have grown up in the federal subject where they are now head, Aleksandr Kynyev says.

            But in a new study, the HSE political scientist argues that, the real divide is now between those who act simply as agents of the Kremlin regardless of how local people feel and those who mobilize the population by reaching out and winning local support (ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/06/01/regionalnaya-nomenklatura-v-2026-godu-evolyutsiya-i-adaptatsiya-v-novih-usloviyah-a196888).

            Kynyev, who gained wide.spread attention for his 2024 book that compared these two groups and helped solidify the Varangian-local divide, now says that recent developments show that the situation has become more complicated in part because many Varangians have learned that only by reaching out can they be effective. 

            And as the Kremlin has made effectiveness ever more important than personal loyalty among governors (club-rf.ru/theme/693), that is a powerful incentive to work more closely with local elites rather than use Moscow’s backing to override any and all opposition to what Moscow wants.

            Obviously, that does not mean that governors from the outside appointed by Putin are going to cease to do what he wants or that this shift, which involves only some of the governors even now, is about to return the Russian Federation to the 1990s when governors were local powerhouses and regularly opposed Moscow.

            But it does introduce a new element in regional politics and may mean, during the looming succession crisis, even Varangians who have reached out to the population, may more quickly move to its side against some in Moscow than analysts have suggested in recent years.

            For that reason, the details that Kynyev offers in his 8,000-word analysis of changes in gubernatorial behavior over the last several years are important and suggest that even the appointment of Varangians doesn’t ensure that they will remain on the sidelines if they calculate the center is weakening. 

Russia has Been Redirecting Ukrainian Drones to Attack Latvian Targets, Riga Says

Paul Goble

              Staunton, June 1 – Over the last month, three drones have crashed in various parts of Latvia; and according to the Latvian defense ministry, “as a rule,” these are Ukrainian drones that Kyiv targeted against Russia but that Russian electronic warfare specialists have hacked and retargeted to hit Latvia.

              While the number of such attacks has been small, the impact of these has been large, with constant air raids, canceled year-end examinations, the drones themselves, and the loss of tourists, Latvian officials say (svoboda.org/a/latgalia-granitsa-rf-upali-tri-bespilotnika/33770038.html).

              But perhaps the most important aspect of this history lies in a different place: If Moscow is in fact redirecting Ukrainian drones, the Russian government has the capacity to do this in a more serious way and can use such tactics to avoid responsibility and engage in a covert war for a long time that some won’t identify as being the handiwork of Russia.

              Indeed, what the Latvian defense ministry is reporting may be a signal of just how Moscow intends to ramp up tensions across the Baltic region and to prepare for what could prove to be an attempt by Russian forces there to seize territory in ways that could lead to controversies within NATO as to how to respond.