Sunday, April 26, 2026

Best Option for North Caucasian Peoples is Restoration of Mountaineer Republic, Chechen Member of Russian Platform at PACE Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 23 – Ruslan Kutayev, the head of the Assembly of Peoples of the Caucasus and one of the five non-Russians on the Russian Platform at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, says the best option for the peoples of the North Caucasus is the restoration of a single Mountaineer Republic from the Black to the Caspian sea.

            In a wide-ranging interview to Ukraine’s Rizniy lyudi, he argues that each people there has the right to declare independence but that they will be better able to maintain it against Russian aggression is they create a common state (ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/04/23/ruslan-kutaev-mi-kavkaztsi-v-moskve-postavim-takuyu-vlast-kakaya-nam-udobna-a193444).

            (For background on efforts to revive the Mountaineer Republic of 1918-1919, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2017/04/moscow-unwittingly-promoting-broader.html and jamestown.org/resurgent-dreams-of-independence-in-the-north-caucasus/ and sources cited therein.)

            Two other comments by Kutayev are especially important as well. First of all, he says, that the members of the Russian Platform have not addressed yet the issue of the possible disintegration of the Russian Federation but that when they do, it is certain that there will be a variety of opinions rather than any clear agreement.

            And second, he argues, those who think Putin has acted on his own as far as aggression against Ukraine and other non-Russians are wrong. In reality, Putin has simply carried out what most Russians believe and want because they are followers of “the religion of Russian nationalism, which is called the ideology of the Russian world.”

On 40th Anniversary of Chernobyl Disaster, Nearly 80 Percent of Russians Prepared to Rely on Nuclear Power Stations, VTsIOM Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 23 – Forth years ago this week, the world’s worst nuclear power disaster took place in Chernobyl in what was then the Ukrainian SSR. People in Ukraine, Belarus and the Russian Federation continue to struggle with the consequences; but in Russia at least, people are no longer opposed to the development of nuclear power plants, a VTsIOM poll finds.

            In 1990, a survey found that only 14 percent of Russians favored building and using such plants. Now, 78 percent do; with the number of opponents of such an approach falling from 56 percent to 12 percent. And at the same time, the belief that nuclear power is safe rose, albeit in smaller amounts (readovka.news/news/241777/).

            Today, 27 percent of Russians say that the recurrence of a Chernobyl-type accident is “practically impossible,” up from 20 percent in 1990; and the share of those who remain convinced that similar accidents are “quite probable” fell over the same period from 20 percent to 17 percent.

            Over the last decade, VTsIOM surveys have found that Russians are less concerned about the impact of any accident on public health but far more concerned about the environmental damage such accidents cause. In 2016, 17 percent said their impact on the environment was the most destructive thing. Now, 55 percent of Russians do.

 

Despite Putin’s Promotion of Traditional Families, Few Russians Now Can Say Who is Head of Family, VTsIOM Director Suggests

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 23 – In yet another indication that the Putin regime’s neo-traditionalism is running up against fundamental changes in Russian life, Valery Fedorov, head of the VTsIOM polling agency, says that “the role of head of the family has disappeared for the majority of Russians.”

             He told the all-Russian conference on The Demographic Transition in Russia that “today, when we ask people, ‘Who is the head of your family?’ it turns out that they do not have a head of the family. That role has disappeared,” one of “the radical changes” which has occurred in Russian family life (vz.ru/news/2026/4/23/1413173.html).

            Another major change has been a revision of accepted roles of men and women and the increasing problem of a shortage of men, something that reflects among other things losses from problems with the health of the male portion of the population and losses in the war in Ukraine. These changes will affect the country for “many decades ahead.”

            But perhaps the most important change is the declining importance of family as a Russian value. It now ranks second to health; and that declining importance in the significance and importance of family life is preventing Russia from solving  existing demographic problems, Fedorov continues.

            Two other problems affecting Russian family life and undermining any possibility that the patriarchal values the Kremlin is promoting can be achieved are the increasing share of Russians who are growing up in single-parent families and the rising tide of violence within families.

            At present, 40 percent of Russian children now grow up in single-parent families, most of this trend being the result of divorce, death and desertion; but now Russian officials and experts are worried about an additional factor: the decision of women to raise children on their own rather than establishing families (nakanune.ru/articles/124609/).

            The other major problem attracting attention is a rising tide of home violence which is now at a higher level than even during the covid pandemic which forced people to remain together a higher percentage of the time and led to an earlier spike in violence within families (nemoskva.net/2026/04/24/novosti-nemoskvy-za-noch-24-aprelya-2/).

Saturday, April 25, 2026

Russians ‘Weary’ of Constant Bans on This or That Action, Senior Kremlin Aide Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 23 – Sergey Novikov, a close aide to Presidential Administration official Sergey Kiriyenko, says that “our society has grown weary of prohibitive rhetoric” and “it is thus no loner possible to keep banning things.” Instead, he says, the government must encourage certain attitudes and behaviors rather than simply ban others.

            Speaking to a conference on “The Demographic Turning Point in Russia,” the head of the Kremlin’s directorate for public projects who has been identified as the chief censor, says that this is especially important with regard to new parents who have far too much to worry about and don’t need new bans (rbc.ru/politics/23/04/2026/69e9e8549a7947a4136a5ba1).

            If the state issues bans and threats to new parents, Novikov continues, “it won’t lead to anything good.” The best way forward is to “foster an attitude within society, a stimulating environment” in which people aren’t afraid to have children and can be confident that they will receive support.

            Moreover, Novikov stresses, “the inclination of young people to start families as early as possible—and to have children—is a very delicate process ... Naturally, we need to make this 'fashionable'—to ensure that people truly understand the meaning of happiness, of motherhood, and of fatherhood.”

Repeating What Happened at End of Soviet Times, Russians are Changing in Their Thinking but Not Yet in Their Behavior, Shelin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 24 – “Putin’s subjects are embarking on the path taken by people in the late Soviet era,” Sergey Shelin says. “They are beginning to spend their leisure time engaging in cautious jabs at the regime and are growing accustomed to complaining about the Leader’s obsolescence. But this shift has not yet translated into a change in public behavior.”

            Many have come to believe that the declaration by Vika Bonya has raised “oppositionist sentiments among Russia’s ‘deep people’ to a new and formidable level,” the Russian commentator says; but he argues that this is “an exaggeration” except in one area (ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/04/24/chto-menyaetsya-v-golove-u-rossiyanina-a193554).

            The loyalist complaints she made are shared by almost all Russians today, Shelin suggests, except for one thing: her attacks on misogynistic attitudes by Kremlin allies. Such attacks on women are out of step with he views of many, and the Kremlin has responded by declaring through its mouthpieces that Russians must “do more” to combat misogyny.

            “The runaway success of Bony’s show suggests,” Shelin continues, “not so much that popular anger is on the verge of erupting but rather that the public has grown nostalgic for media freedom and is delighted when someone gossips about current troubles in the style” of the earlier Putin years.

            On the key issue of the war in Ukraine, attitudes among Russians “do not appear to have changed over the past year” in terms of willingness to dissent. But “Russians have grown more weary of the war than they were, a form of ‘loyal weariness” that “doesn’t translate into aner or a desire to change the status quota but rather into a wish to disengage from the conflict.”

            Russians haven’t “suddenly experienced a moral awakening” about the war. They have simply become increasingly concerned about their “own personal hardships,” although even there “this anxiety is not translating into any form of collective action, whether grassroots or top-down, even of the most innocuous kind.”

            What has happened is “a growing public appetite for consuming media criticism as a form of leisure,” just as was the case at the end of Soviet times, Shelin says. At the same time, direct attacks on Putin are being offered by military correspondents, where the image of ‘the Leader’ is now associated with obsolescence and a complete loss of touch with reality.”

            That, of course, is “a bad omen for an autocrat!”t

            Moreover, “after a three-year break, discussions, albeit still theoretical, have once again come into vogue among affluent circles, centering on the notion that emigration is after all inevitable.” People in them are withdrawing money from their bank accounts; and while it is still too soon to call this panic, that certainly appears to be something looming in the future.”

            Shelin continues: “Arguably, while the level of loyalty in the minds of Russians has not diminished of late, their sense of discontent has certainly intensified. Disapproval of the regime’s growing irrationality now encompasses virtually everyone—from staunch conformists to rabid statists.”

            And he concludes: “As of today, this discontent is likely no more intense than the routine cynicism that characterized the populace of the late Soviet Union. It could persist for a long time in forms that pose no threat to the regime—but only if Putin ceases his relentless efforts to drive his otherwise compliant subjects to the brink of exasperation.”

Vod Activist on PACE Platform for Dialogue with Russian Democratic Forces Calls for Europe to Restore the Name Ingria to What Moscow Now Calls Leningrad Oblast

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 23 – Yekaterina Kuznetsova, one of the five non-Russians on the Platform for Dialogue with Russian Democratic Forces within the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, is calling for PACE and other European institutions to restore the name Ingria to what Moscow now calls Leningrad Oblast.

            An ethnic Vod who now heads the Ingria House in Estonia’s border city of Narva, lays out her arguments in an appeal to PACE members (t.me/ingerimaja/7276 reposted at region.expert/ingria-lenobl). While it has been overshadowed by the declaration of Russian members of this platform, it may have more immediate consequences.

            Below is the full text in English as prepared by Kuznetsova:

On Changing the Name of Leningrad Oblast on European Maps

In the languages of the indigenous peoples of this territory, most of what is now Russia’s Leningrad Oblast historically bore the name Ingria (Ingeri, Inkeri, Inkerimaa). After the region became part of Sweden in the early 17th century, it was officially called Ingermanland.

This name remained in use for some time even after the region was conquered by the troops of Tsar Peter I and the founding of the city of Saint Petersburg. In 1725, Ingermanland Governorate was renamed Saint Petersburg Governorate. However, the Finnish-speaking indigenous population of the region continued to call their homeland Ingria.

In 1924, the former capital of the Russian Empire was renamed Leningrad, and the surrounding lands became known as Leningrad Oblast, in honor of Vladimir Lenin.

In 1991, by decision of Leningrad’s residents in a referendum, the city was restored to its historical name, Saint Petersburg. However, by that time the city and the surrounding region were separate administrative units, and as a result the official name «Leningrad Oblast» has remained to this day.

Since 2000, a dictatorial regime under Putin has formed and consolidated in Russia. A revival of imperial ideology began. All national autonomies have effectively reverted to the status of disenfranchised colonies. Moreover, the Kremlin has launched an active campaign against any movements advocating for the rights of indigenous peoples. In Leningrad Oblast, this campaign has led to a ban on even mentioning the word «Ingria». It has been removed from official Russian textbooks; Ingrian Finns have been denied recognition as an indigenous people; and in 2025, the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Ingria, which had existed in the region since 1611, was renamed the Russian Lutheran Church by government directive.

Something similar occurred in the 19th century under the ideology of the Russian Empire. As part of Russification and the suppression of national liberation movements, the official use of the names Poland, Lithuania, and Belarus was banned. Instead, terms such as the Vistula Land and the Northwestern Krai were introduced. As is well known, this attempt by imperial ideologues to erase the historical names of vast regions ultimately failed. Today’s map
includes independent Poland, Lithuania, and Belarus.

In a similar manner, the authorities of modern Russia now falsely claim that Ukraine «never existed».

We propose that, as part of supporting policies of decolonization and resisting the Kremlin’s imperial narratives, European countries begin using the historically accurate name «Ingria» instead of «Leningrad Oblast» on their maps. There are precedents for such changes.

For example, in recent years some European countries have begun referring to Georgia by its historical Georgian name, Sakartvelo. A similar situation exists with the largest region of the Russian Federation—Yakutia—which in the 1990s restored its historical name, Sakha.

Ingria is not just the correct historical name of the region. It is a symbol of the struggle for decolonization and for freedom from Russia’s aggressive and deceptive imperial ideology. We ask for your support!

For background on the Ingria movement and its constituent units, including the Vods, see  Ott Kurs , “Ingria: The Broken Landbridge Between Estonia and Finland,” GeoJournal 33.1 (1994): 107–113; Ian Matley, “The Dispersal of the Ingrian Finns,” Slavic Review 38:1 (1979): 1-16; windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2021/12/ingermanlanders-launch-podcast-to.html,   windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2021/09/ingermanland-activists-open-house-in.html,  windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2022/09/ingria-will-be-free-petersburg-hip-hop.html, www.windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2021/07/two-other-baltic-republics-remembered.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2019/07/a-new-aspirant-to-be-fourth-baltic.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2016/06/regionalism-threatens-russia-today-way.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2016/05/by-attacking-free-ingria-leader-moscow.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2013/10/window-on-eurasia-ingermanland-is-ready.html.

Central Bank Says Russians Overwhelmingly Want to Return to Soviet-Style Economy

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 21 – According to a new study by the Russian Central Bank, a large share of the population of its country want to restore a Soviet-style economy with tight controls over prices, the development of Russia’s own national resources, the production of all necessary goods at home, and the re-industrialization of country.

            The 44-page study says that “many respondents describe the ideal economy as self-sufficient and not dependent on external support, analogous to the USSR or present-day China” so that prices won’t grow faster than incomes and so factories will once again dominate the landscape (cbr.ru/StaticHtml/File/187618/wp_166.pdf).

            Achieving these goals, most Russians believe, requires the active intervention of the state in order to compensate for the greed of producers. The report, however, does not mention the shortages for which the USSR was notorious or the fact that many Soviet plants produced things no one wanted or needed, major reasons for the rejection of the Soviet model at the end of the 1980s.