Saturday, September 5, 2026

With Decision of European Court of Human Rights, Russians Lose Their Court of Last Resort – and Rights Activists Aren’t Pleased

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 3 – The European Court for Human Rights, a body that for many Russians was the court of last resort when they had exhausted their legal challenges in Russia, has said it will not take up the 879 cases by Russians about the violation of their rights by the Russian government.

            According to the court’s press release, all of the complaints it has now declined t hear were filed before September 16, 2022. That decision came in response to a Russian law banning the implementation of the court’s decisions coming into force in March of that year (rfi.fr/ru/россия/20260903-еспч-отказался-рассматривать-все-дела-россиян-которые-не-касаются-войн-в-украине-и-грузии).

            Now the ECHR has decided to stop considering such cases altogether if they concern domestic issues. It will however continue to take up cases against Russia related to wars in Georgia and Ukraine, which currently number approximately 5700 lawsuits, the press release stated.

            Among the issues of suits it will no longer hear are those involving the persecution of opposition figures, detentions at rallies, repressive legislation, restrictions on freedom of speech, prison conditions, immigration rights, freedom of movement, and the protection of personal data. For the time being, the ECHR will not hear such cases from Russians.

            Not surprisingly, Russian human rights activists are angry.  Maksim Olenichev of the First Department portal says that in his view, “this is a serious mistake, both legally and in terms of reputation … because these cases raise important issues in the context of modern Russia.” Others have said much the same.

            Anticipating such objections, the ECHR release said that it might be possible to reinstate such cases in the future “if circumstances change and conditions for the resumption of adversarial proceedings arise,” legalize for a shift in the Russian government’s position on enforcing ECHR decisions.

‘Horizontal Russia’ Lists Seven Steps Russian Voters Can Take to Limit Violations

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 4 – Noting that voting “is one of the few safe ways” for Russians to express their opinions about those in power and that rules governing elections have been violated in the past, the Horizontal Russia portal offers a list of seven steps Russian voters can take to limit such violations in the upcoming Duma elections.

            The eight, each of which is discussed in detail (semnasem.org/articles/2026/09/04/zashitit-svoj-golos), include:

1.     Vote in person at the polling place rather than online.

2.     Go the polls on the last day of voting rather than earlier.

3.     Ask for a new ballot if you make a mistake.

4.     Do not show your ballot to anyone once you have filled it in.

5.     Do not succumb to employer pressure as that is illegal.

6.     If you want to spoil your ballot, know in advance how to do it.

7.     Do not ignore violations at the polling place and know how to file complaints.

At a time when people in many countries are suspicious of how elections are carried out, it is intriguing to see that even in Russia, where violations by the authorities are typical and even expected, at least some people are trying to figure out how to act to make such violations harder and less common.

With Norwegian Seizure of Russian Ship, Svalbard Controversy Heats Up Again

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 4 – Russians have expressed outrage at the decision of a Norwegian court to detain a Russian ship in Svalbard (Spitzbergen) in fulfillment of a 2023 decision of the international criminal court to compensate a Ukrainian company for Russian seizures of its assets, a court decision that Moscow has ignored.

Vladimir Putin called the decision of the Norwegian court at the end of August and the actions of Svalbard police in carrying it out an act of “state terrorism” with others in Moscow demanding a tough response. So far, however, the Russian government has limited itself to appealing the decision and diplomatic protests.

            The passengers have been offloaded and will be returned to Russia, while the crew remains onboard. Whether Moscow will take further action very much remains to be seen (ru.thebarentsobserver.com/novosti/cuzezemcy-v-forme-i-spicbergen-russkaa-zemla-cto-proishodit-posle-aresta-professora-molcanova-na-arhipelage-i-v-rossijskih-media/457304).

            This is the latest chapter in the long-running story of Russian efforts to test the resolve of NATO on the archipelago that has a complicated treaty arrangement that Moscow has exploited to the fullest in the past and that some think will be the place where Russia will move first against NATO (jamestown.org/moscow-using-svalbard-to-test-natos-readiness-and-resolve/ and jamestown.org/moscows-first-move-against-nato-could-take-place-in-norways-svalbard-archipelago/).

            The ship in question, the Professor Molchanov, is identified by the Russians as a research vessel; but over the past two years, it has brought workers, tourists, and others to the islands to see just how far Russia can push the limits. (On that history, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2026/06/moscow-organizes-summer-school-in.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2026/05/russian-victory-day-ceremony-on.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2026/03/russian-company-on-svalbard-hoists.html.)  

Russian Firms in Far East Registering in China to Escape High Taxes and Get Cheaper Loans

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 4 – Firms in the Russian Far East are now registering their head offices in China in order to escape higher Russian taxes and to gain access to loans from Chinese banks that are now being offered at far lower rates, business leaders in the region tell Vedomosti.

            The exact number of such firms and their total size is not publicly known; but this shift is ongoing and almost certainly gives Beijing yet more leverage over the Russian Far East (vedomosti.ru/economics/articles/2026/09/04/1226136-malii-biznes-rasskazal-o-peremanivanii-dalnevostochnih-kompanii-v-kitai).

            It isn’t always easy for firms to take or maintain this status given the complexities of Russian business law, but Moscow seems unwilling or even unable to block such moves entirely. And as more take place, there is likely to be a backlash given that firms that do more to China will cost the Russian government tax revenue and Russian banks earnings.  

Russia’s Standup Comedians Now Hiring Lawyers to Advise Them about Jokes that Could Land them in Jail, ‘The Insider’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 2 – Today, Russia’s standup comedians are hiring lawyers to review their material in advance lest they cross some as yet poorly defined line of the permissible and land in jail, Valentina Matryonina says. And audiences too want these comedians to avoid political jokes as well lest they be recorded and those listening get in trouble too.

            While many Russian standup comedians left in 2022, others did not and some who went abroad have returned, the Insider journalist says. The world they live in now resembles that of humorists at the end of Soviet times but the rules are less clear and constantly changing (theins.ru/confession/296457).

            As these humorists note, “there is no concept of ‘a sense of humor’” in the Russian criminal code; and so they need help in figuring out what will offend some group or officials and avoid those things just as they now avoid any criticism of Putin or his war in Ukraine because those are very dangerous things to speak about.

            Audiences generally accept that as they are there to be entertained more than anything else. Consequently, the demand for political humor has fallen as well, even when it is expressed by hints or Aesopian language as was the case before glasnost, standup comedians with whom Matyonina spoke say.

            In many cases, the organizer of the sessions insist on reading the standup comedians’ texts and “delete everything that is impossible.” Sometimes this leads to absurdities. One comedian had to drop a joke about “the services of women on call for money.” He meant nurses but the bosses said he had to “reformulate it so there is no hint of prostitutes.”

            One group of standup comedians gets away with things none of the others can: those who are still in their teens. “Because they are not taken seriously,” one older comedian says, “they get away with a lot.” But if they continue to use the same jokes when they are over 18, “the consequences can be quite different.”

            As a result of increasing repression, what the comedians say and what audiences want is narrowing. All this recalls a joke that was widespread among Russians at the very end of the USSR: When things are bad, the joke ran, they told political jokes; but when things got worse, they stopped. 

Neither Rising Age of First-Time Mothers Nor War in Ukraine has Any Significant Impact on Russia’s Birthrate, Independent Demographer Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 2 – Neither the rising age of first-time mothers nor the war in Ukraine has had any significant impact on the birthrate in the Russian Federation, Aleksey Raksha says, despite Putin’s insistence that the first is critical and his opponent’s equally firm belief that the second is playing a major role.  

            According to the former Rosstat expert who now is an independent demographer, changes that can be attributed to either of these fall “within the margin of error” and thus are not behind the decline in Russian fertility (thereplica.io/post/demograf-aleksei-raksha-o-zayavleniyakh-vladimira-putina-o-prichinakh-nizkoi-rozhdaemosti-v-rossii).

            And despite the alarm expressed by Putin and other Russian politicians and commentators, Raksha says, “Russia’s current fertility rate is not exceptionally low compared to European countries.” Instead, it is “a perfectly average European level,” although Russia births still occur at a younger age than European ones do.

The demographer says that the age when women have their first child in Russia is 26.5, not the 29 years Putin has claimed; and the Russian figure while rising remains “one of the youngest” in Europe.  “Only Ukraine and Moldova now have lower ages” for when a woman first gives birth.

According to Raksha, the figure of 29 years cited by Putin is incorrect. "The calculation provided to him was wrong. It isn't 29 years; it's approximately 26.5." "This is one of the youngest ages for having a first child in all of Europe. Only Ukraine and Moldova have lower ages," he says.

While Russia is “roughly at or slightly above” this age metric among comparable countries for the first child, “it is noticeably below the average for the second. For the third, Russia ranks among the leaders … and for the fourth, Russia holds the top spot among this group of countries, including the US.”

Encouraging women to have a second child is both the most important and most difficult task Moscow faces in order to boost birthrates. After the first child is born, parents can see the impact on their lives and thus often are unwilling to have a second, Raksha’s analysis suggests. 

Friday, September 4, 2026

Russian Firms Less Likely to Hire Those who Took Bonuses to Fight in Ukraine than Those who Didn’t, New Study Finds

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 1 –Russian firms are less likely to hire those who took bonuses and signed contracts to fight in Ukraine than those who went there after being drafted, according to research conducted by Sergey Alekseyev, published in the Journal of Peace on August 25 and now republished by the Russian-language Riddle portal.

            The Russian scholar who teaches in Australia says that this is not “proof” of anti-war attitudes among employers but rather likely reflects concerns among then about “exposure to violence or trauma, concerns about workplace adjustment, and [an association of] volunteary enlistment to financial desperation of ideological zeal” (ridl.io/ru/geroj-na-bumage-minus-v-rezyume/ resposting academic.oup.com/jpr/advance-article/doi/10.1093/jopres/xjag064/8769484).

            What Alekseyev and  his research colleagues did was to send 120 fake but plausible applications to employers which were similar except for the cv line about military service with 60 declaring that they had signed contracts to serve in Ukraine and 60 saying that they had served as draftees.

            The differences in the response of potential employers was “stark,” Alekseyev says. Fifty-five percent of those who said they had served as draftees got callbacks while only 36.7 percent of those who said they were volunteers did no, “exactly one-third” fewer than the applications which said they had been draftees.

            This research was carried out in the late spring and over the summer, when Russia’s official unemployment level was at an all-time low of 2.2 percent, but before the introduction by regional governments of requirements that firms hire a certain number of veterans or face fines.

            Alekseyev’s overall conclusion is that “the Kremlin can flatten distinctions in official speech while civilian behavior restores them given that employers appear to distinguish between service and choice and between putting on a uniform and volunteering for the campaign” in Ukraine.

            The new  regional quotas for hiring veterans, the scholar says, “may suppress the visible consequences of that distinction but may also conceal rather than eliminate it” – and that is yet another consequence of Putin’s war in Ukraine on Russia that is likely to last long into the future.