Tuesday, June 30, 2026

Putin’s Plan to Make Veterans New Russian Elite Not the Social Escalator He’s Implied, ‘Meduza’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 29 – More than half of the 1300 veterans of Putin’s war in Ukraine who have been given government jobs had those or other government positions before they went to fight, according to a Meduza portal investigation, a pattern that calls into question Putin’s claim that his plan to make veterans a truly new elite.

            This reflects the fact that many left government positions to fight in Ukraine to curry favor with the Kremlin, but it means that this new Russian elite is far less new that Putin and his regime assert and that many observers accept as true (meduza.io/feature/2026/06/29/novaya-rossiyskaya-elita).

            The portal concedes that there almost certainly are more veterans now in the government because in many cases, individuals taking new positions do not list whether they are veterans or not. But the percentage it does report is indicative of the way that the veterans who are getting government jobs are not the complete outsiders many assume Putin intended.

            Meduza says there are three basic avenues for those veterans who do get government jobs: the Time of Heroes program and its regional analogues which select from among veterans for appointments, participation in elections mostly at the local and regional level, and returning to the same job or a better one after fighting in Ukraine.

            The study provides a wealth of data about veterans who join the government, but beyond question its most important finding is that the third category, those who had been working in the Russian government before fighting in Ukraine and then returning to such service afterwards, is far larger than most had assumed. 

Gas Crisis has Prompted Heads of Three Russian Regions to Declare a State of High Alert, a Step Allowing the Postponing of Elections

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 30 – The governors of three federal subjects – Penza, Transbaikal and Irkutsk – have declared a high state of alert because of the gas crisis, a move that permits them among other things postponing elections, including for the Duma. But Putin has indicated that he plans for the September vote to take place as scheduled, the Meduza portal reports.

            Because Putin’s commitment to hold the vote on time is almost certain to be determinative, some may be inclined to view this report as largely meaningless meduza.io/feature/2026/06/30/uzhe-tretiy-region-rossii-vvel-rezhim-povyshennoy-gotovnosti-iz-za-toplivnogo-krizisa-etot-rezhim-pozvolyaet-perenesti-vybory.

            But there are three reasons why that is likely a mistake, only the first of which Meduza mentions. First, as it notes, the heads of the FSB and the National Guard are lobbying for a postponement; and they are likely to use the governors’ declarations as a sign of support for their position.

            Second, these announcements give Putin himself an additional set of options, including putting off the elections if he judges the situation has changed or alternatively having the heads of the federal subjects deploy even more force to repress the population should that be needed.

            And third, the declaration of a state of heightened alert gives those governors who do it enormous powers to override normal procedures. It is entirely possible then that some governors want to do this in order to demonstrate support for the Kremlin, but it is not impossible to imagine that others who take this step may have other agendas.

40 Percent of Almaty Suffering Water Shortages During Periods of Peak Use, Kazakhstan Officials Acknowledge

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 29 – That Central Asia is suffering from a water shortage is universally acknowledged but that this shortage is so severe that it may require the evacuation of people from its largest cities or lead millions of residents to flee to neighboring countries remains a matter of dispute.

            Now, officials in Kazakhstan have acknowledged just how serious the problem is by reporting that “about 40 percent” of Almaty, that country’s largest city, is already suffering from a water shortage during periods of peak loads” (vlast.kz/novosti/69932-na-okolo-40-territorij-almaty-est-deficit-vody-v-casy-pikovoj-nagruzki.html).

            Among the steps the authorities say they plan to take to ensure “the comprehensive modernization of the water supply and sanitation system” are new filtration stations, replacement of more than 2450 km of water networks, expansion of sewage treatment by 50 percent, and the introduction of digital monitoring.

            If all those steps are taken, Kazakhstan may be able to avoid having to evacuate people from its metropolis and the embarrassment of seeing ever more  Kazakhs flee to other countries not just to earn money but to have access to sufficient water supplies to survive.

            But if the authorities aren’t able to take all of these steps, and they will be more expensive and take years to introduce, the apocalyptic predictions that some have made may prove to be the case. (On these all too real risks, see jamestown.org/growing-water-shortages-in-central-asia-threaten-region-and-its-neighbors/.)

Moscow Sending in More Troops into Circassian Regions of North Caucasus to Forcibly Recruit Men to Fight in Ukraine, Activists Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 29 – Moscow is currently sending more troops into Circassian regions in the North Caucasus, specifically, the republics of Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachayevo-Cherkessia and Adygeya to forcibly recruit men of that nationality to fight in Putin’s war in Ukraine, Circassian activists say.

            For the KBR alone, the troops have a quota of 3500 men, activists there say, an enormous number relative to the size of that national component in that republic’s population (abn.org.ua/en/news/war-at-the-cost-of-enslaved-peoples-circassian-activists-warn-of-mobilization-pressure/).

            In the first several years of the expanded war, Moscow recruited more heavily from non-Russian nations than from the ethnic Russian majority both in order to hide the extent of the conflict and of the losses the Russian military was taking. But at that time, the Circassians were not the focus of as much attention as they are now.

            Circassian activists say that this new effort has three goals: reducing the number of Circassians in the North Caucasus, providing cannon fodder for its war, and sowing discord between the Ukrainians and the Circassians, both of whom, they say, have been victims of Russia’s genocidal wars.

For Fourth Time Since 2022, Putin Boosts Size of Federal Protective Service after Leaving It Unchanged the Previous 13 Years

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 29 – In a clear indication of his nervousness about popular attacks on himself and other senior Russian officials, Putin has just boosted the size of the central office of the Federal Protective Service which is charged with protecting him and them. As of July 1, the FSO’s central bureaucracy will grow from 785 to 812, the Vyorstka portal says.

            These increases and their frequency stand in sharp contrast to the period before Putin launched his expanded war in Ukraine. Then, he went for 13 years before increasing the size of this staff (t.me/svobodnieslova/9174 and nemoskva.net/2026/06/29/putin-snova-uvelichil-shtat-czentralnogo-apparata-fso-v-chetvertyj-raz-za-vremya-vojny/).

            Moreover, it appears from this report that the Kremlin leader is doing so even more frequently now than he did in the first years of that war, boosting the number of staffers in the FSO central office in the middle of the year rather than at the end or beginning when it might be part of a more regular bureaucratic adjustment.

            These expansions in the size of the central offices of the FSO likely mean that the total number of people working in various branches of that security organization have increased as well, although the government documents Vyorstka examined do not provide data on that point.

China Now Dredging Kazakhstan’s Caspian Ports as It is Already Doing Russia’s

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 27 – Falling water levels in the Caspian and the rivers flowing into it are forcing littoral countries to dredge them so as to prevent the emergence of a situation in which large or fully laden ships are unable to pass. And because they lack the dredging capacity needed to do so, two of them have now turned to China for assistance.

            Russia began doing so last year (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/06/falling-water-levels-forcing-moscow-to.html). Now Kazakhstan has followed the same course and contracted with the China Harbor Engineering Company to dredge its port of Aktau (casp-geo.ru/dnouglubitelnye-raboty-v-portu-aktau-realizuet-kitajskaya-kompaniya/).

            Iran has a significant dredging capacity but none of the other littoral states do; and consequently, as the Caspian water level continues to fall, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan may be forced to do the same thing, unless other dredging operators sell them the necessary equipment to do it themselves.

            To the extent that happens and there is every reason to think that it will given how specialized and expensive dredging equipment is, China will gain yet another powerful position along the trade routes across the Caspian, something that will give it additional leverage not only over the littoral countries but further afield.

Neo-Stalinism and Political Islam Increasingly in Symbiotic Relationship in Russia, Advocate of Secularism and Humanism Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 25 – Neo-Stalinism and political Islam might seem unlikely bedfellows, Sergey Ivaneyev says; but increasingly in the Russian Federation, they are in a symbiotic relationship, with each taking ideas from the other and helping them both to expand.

            The president of an NGO that promotes secularism and a member of the expert council of the Duma Committee on Civil Society says that two events highlight this danger: the KPRF’s denunciation of the anti-Stalin campaign and the Russian government’s recognition of the Taliban as a legitimate government (ng.ru/ng_religii/2026-06-25/7_9524_symbiosis.html).

            Each of these developments and others as well have allowed neo-Stalinists and followers of political Islam to become allies, although few in either camp talks much about that. Instead, both talk about historical justice, the first in what they see as political justice and the second in what they believe is the requirement of their religious faith.

            According to Ivaneyev, the “symbiotic” relationship between the two is growing and will make the fight against both more difficult. Indeed, this unspoken alliance is pushing Russia ever further away from its commitments to secularism, humanism and genuine social justice.

            Combatting this phenomenon will be difficult; but the obvious first step is to recognize that it is a problem rather than acting as if those who favor Stalinism and those who support Taliban-style rule have nothing in common. They are far closer together than many Russians now imagine.