Share of Russian Pupils Studying in Second Shift has Risen Not Fallen Since Putin Pledged in 2018 to Do Away with This Practice by 2025, ‘To Be Precise’ Reports

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 18 – In 2018, Vladimir Putin pledged to do away with the unpopular practice of having a significant share of pupils in Russian schools study in second shifts by 2025. But in fact, the share doing so over that period has risen from 13 percent to 15.8 percent, with much higher figures in some federal subjects, the To Be Precise portal says.

            That means that as of today, 2.54 million young Russians are inschool beginning in the afternoon and ending in the evening. In a few cases, there are schools which operate not just on the basis of two shifts but rather on the basis of three, although that practice was largely eliminated by 2021 (tochno.st/materials/kazdyi-sedmoi-skolnik-ucitsia-vo-vtoruiu-smenu).

            Parents have long been upset when their children have had to go to school not during their working hours but long after them, and polls showed that Russians were overwhelmingly pleased by Putin’s commitment to end this arrangement. That he hasn’t kept his promise undoubtedly is corroding support for the Kremlin leader.

            In a few federal subjects, there has been real progress. In Ingushetia, for example, the share of pupils in second shift schedules has fallen from 42 percent in 2016 to 14 percent in 2025; in Chechnya, from 43 percent to 24 percent; and in Adygeya, from 25 percent to 16 percent.

            But in 59 of the federal subjects, the situation has “either not changed or gotten worse” since Putin made his promise. In Tyva, for example, almost half of all students are attending via a second shift; and in Tyumen Oblast, the share doing so has risen from 18 percent in 2016 to 33 percent last year.

            These varying trends reflect both demography – where birthrates are higher, it has been harder for the authorities to end the practice of second shifts – and economics – regions and republics that are poorer have been unable to build schools, prevent the closure of others or even pay teachers in a timely fashion (novayagazeta.ru/articles/2026/02/18/shkoly-net-i-ne-budet).

            In particular, Putin’s optimization campaign intended to save money on education and social costs to have money for war has led to the closure of 861 schools since the start of his expanded war in Ukraine (nemoskva.net/2026/02/18/v-rossii-zakryli-bolee-860-selskih-shkol-s-2022-goda-prichiny-i-regiony-lidery/).

            And as regional governments have had to tighten their belts given budgetary stringencies which are the result of Moscow’s unfunded mandates, officials in ten regions have delayed paying their teachers in a timely fashion, leading many to quit and forcing others to  two shift work (ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/02/19/uchitelyam-v-10-regionah-nachali-zaderzhivat-zarplati-iz-za-problem-byudzheta-a187646).

Amur Oblast Official Seeks to Calm Russians East of the Urals about China’s Rise

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb.16 – A senior official in Blagoveshechensk, a Russian city on the border with China and within sight of the much larger and more developed city on the other side of that line, says that the residents of Heihi are doing better than those in his own city because China is richer and has been committed to development far longer.

            But Boris Beloborodov, the business ombudsman for the Amur Oblast, continues, Russians in Blagoveshchensk and other regions east of the Urals need not be afraid of a mythical “yellow peril” and instead recognize that people on the Russian side of the border are catching up (novayagazeta.ru/articles/2026/02/16/kitaitsy-nachali-gorazdo-ranshe-i-ushli-vpered).

            He says that both Moscow and Russian regions have worked to tighten rules on foreign businesses, including Chinese, and that as a result, while trade between Russia and China has continued to expand, the operations of Chinese firms producing goods in the Russian Federation has declined over the last decade.

            What has happened, Beloborodov says, has been an effort to make the Russian production sphere more Russian with the chances for foreigners to penetrate it far more difficult. Given that, “no one should be speaking about any special preferences for Chinese business.” That may have been a problem earlier, but it isn’t now.

            Russians often compare the city of Blagoveshchensk with the Chinese metropolis of Heihi on the other side of the border. The latter has more skyscrapers and more modern housing but that is because China has more money than Russian does and has for a long time built up its urban centers especially along the border. 

            A major reason why Chinese success inside Russia has been so noticeable, the ombudsman says, is that Chinese businesses are concentrated in the highly visible service sector where they do well because of a Chinese commitment to the idea that the customer is always right, a commitment many Russians don’t share and thus fall behind. 

            Beloborodov also says that Russians are more interested in going to China than the Chinese are in going to Russia and that despite the appearance of ethnic Chinese in Russia east of the Urals, “there have always been more Chinese living permanently in Moscow than in any of the regions of the Far East.”

Fewer Compatriots Returned to Russia in 2025 than at Any Time in Last 15 Years

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 17 – Only 26,700 people took part in Moscow’s program to support the return of people with roots in Russia to their homeland in 2025, more than 16 percent fewer than the year before and the lowest number in the last 15 years, a trend that is only adding to Russia’s demographic difficulties.

            Moscow experts said that the decline reflected propaganda by other countries against this program at a time of Putin’s continuing war in Ukraine, economic difficulties in Russia itself, and language requirements that have been toughed. But most argue that the reason that fewer are returning is because those who wanted to already have (kommersant.ru/doc/8440619).

            Each of these factors certainly played a role in the decline: Coverage of Putin’s war has certainly discouraged some, information about Russia’s economdesiresy has discouraged others, and the risk that children of those returning will have to take Russian language tests has concerned others, prompting Putin to talk about dropping such requirements.

            Moreover, there likely is some truth in the assertion of Russian officials that those who want to return already have. But that is not completely the case as many who do want to claim compatriot status and return are being denied that opportunity because their language skills and ethnicity do not correspond to Moscow’s requirements.

            The most significant of these groups, of course, is the Circassian nation. There are more than seven million Circassians living abroad, and even if only 10 percent of them came back, Moscow could claim victory as far as the return of compatriots is concerned. But the return of Circassians would change the ethnic mix in the North Caucasus, something Moscow is against.

            In many respects, the most important aspect of the current decline in the return of compatriots is that they continue to come from the five countries of Central Asia. Their departure from that region and return to the Russian Federation may slow the decline of the ethnic Russians in that country’s population but it will reduce the influence of Russians in that region. 

Russia’s Nuclear Icebreaker Fleet More Overstretched and Thus Less Intimidating than Moscow Likes to Suggest

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 16 – Moscow officials and media outlets routinely celebrate the fact that Russia now has eight nuclear-powered icebreakers, far outpacing any other country and ensuring that the Russian government is in a position to dominate the Northern Sea Route and the Arctic well into the future.

            Such Russian claims are often picked up by Western media outlets who either adopt a defeatist attitude as far as the so-called “icebreaker race” in the Arctic is concerned or call for the rapid expansion of their own fleets of icebreakers, especially as China, Russia’s current ally, is building such ships at an ever more rapid rate.

            But such appeals, while certainly justified given the growing importance of the northern ocean, typically overstate Russia’s dominance in the region at least as far as its icebreaker fleet there is concerned. There are three major reasons for that conclusion, each of which has only grown in importance over the last several years.

            First of all, given the enormous length of the northern borders of the Russian Federation, its icebreaker fleet is responsible not only for keeping the Northern Sea Route open and projecting Russian power deeper into the Arctic but for a variety of other tasks as well, including keeping ports and even rivers flowing into that ocean open.

            To keep these riverine routes open, Moscow routinely has to shift icebreakers from the NSR to ports, Siberian rivers, and even the Gulf of Finland to keep those open, thus reducing the size of the Russian icebreaker fleet in the Arctic itself (thebarentsobserver.com/news/nuclear-icebreaker-makes-rare-midwinter-transfer-from-arctic-to-baltic-sea/445532,  thebarentsobserver.com/news/shadow-tanker-blocked-by-arctic-sea-icenbsp/442007 and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/12/russian-oil-companies-should-use.html).

            Second, global warming is changing the nature of the challenge in the Arctic. Many parts of it are now ice-free far longer, something that has increased the importance of ice-capable ships relative to icebreakers (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/08/western-sections-of-northern-sea-route.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2022/08/arctic-warming-far-faster-than-expected.html).

            And third – and this may prove to be the most important of all – Russia’s icebreaker fleet suffers from increasing problems with production and repair, problems that mean its fleet of this kind of ships isn’t expanding as planned and that many of its ships are in ill-repair or even confined to distant yards for servicing much of their lives.

            Despite Putin’s promises, Russia has built only one icebreaker since the start of his expanded war in Ukraine (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/09/russia-has-built-only-one-icebreaker.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/10/ukrainian-war-costs-forces-moscow-to.html).

            Its existing vessels suffer from outmoded electronic systems and have been suffering from one problem after another (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/07/moscow-facing-growing-problems-with-its.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/07/russias-much-ballyhooed-new-nuclear.html), problems that require its icebreakers to sail to distant ports for servicing there are no facilities on the Arctic (thebarentsobserver.com/news/nuclear-icebreaker-had-to-sail-all-to-st-petersburg-for-basic-hull-work-as-russias-lacks-northern-dock/432778).

            None of this means that Russia’s icebreaker fleet does not represent a challenge, but it does mean that those who analyze what is going on must recognize that Moscow has not created something that is beyond the capacity of others to challenge and contain given the problems its fleet continues to suffer.   

Russia’s Truck Drivers Demand that No Law Affecting Them be Adopted without Their Participation

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 15 – The Russian Truckdrivers Union has sent a letter to the president, prime minister and transportation minister arguing that no law affecting them should be adopted and that any laws on the books since 1991 should be reviewed and possibly repealed with the participation of the union’s membership.

            The letter, a copy of which has been acquired by the Svobodnaya pressa portal, documents a wide variety of steps Moscow has taken or is currently considering taking without listening to the truck drivers and insists that situation is unjust, unsustainable and must be changed (svpressa.ru/society/article/502720/).

            It is extremely unlikely that Russia’s top officials will agree to such an arrangement, but it is an intriguing one nonetheless because it is an example of how Putin’s de-institutionalization of Russian governance is leading at least some groups to push for a corporatist style of government, one in which powerful sectors would have at least a veto on what Moscow does.

            As such, the union action may be a bellwether of the ways in which the Russian government may function regarding at least some groups in the future, likely without much publicity except in cases where the group involved, as in this case with the truck drivers, feels excluded and decides it has no choice but to raise this to the level of public discussion. 

Under New Constitution, Kazakhstan will Break Free of Soviet Russian Past and Become Kazakh Eli

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 18 – For some time, activists and commentators in Central Asian countries have wanted to change the names of their countries now ending in “stan” because they see it as the imposition of a Soviet Russian definition of their states and one that leads many outsider to dismissively think about “the stans” as something exotic and filled with conflict.

            Now Kazakhstan is on the way to being the first of the five countries in Central Asia to make this change. Its draft constitution set to be approved next month identifies that country not as Kazakhstan but as Kazak ili, “the land of the Kazakhs” (altyn-orda.kz/ot-kazahstana-k-kazak-eli-simvolicheskij-razryv-s-epohoj-sovka/).

In a commentary welcoming this change the Altyn Orda portal says that “the name ‘Kazakhstan’ appeared in the Soviet system of coordinates,” designating a territory but not reflecting “the death of historical traditions. ‘Kazakh eli sounds different: it isn’t an administrative formula but is a name arising from the people and its history.”

“Translated,” the portal continues, “’Kazakh eli’ means ‘the State of the Kazakhs” and represents “a return to its own name without the Soviet superstructure and without the ideological links of the past.” As such, this move is “a symbolic break with the era of things Soviet; it is not a denial of history but a completion of the post-Soviet period.”

It is already the case, Altyn Orda says, that “the young generation does not think of itself in terms of ‘the post-Soviet space.’ Rather it thinks of itself in global terms, mobile and confident. Thus, the adoption of this new name is not some radical step but a logical continuation of ongoing processes.”

Importantly, the portal says, the term is not about exclusion but about the basis of the state. “The historic nucleus of statehood has been formed by the Kazakh people, but the present-day state remains a hope for all its citizens. The name fixes the cultural foundation but it is not about any limiting of rights.”

            There are at least two countries that are likely to be unhappy with this change: Russia, which will view it as yet another sign of Kazakhstan’s divorce from Moscow and the former Soviet space; and Turkey, which has become calling all of Central Asia Turkestan and thus may see the new name as distancing Kazakhstan from Ankara in some way.

Free Russian Forum Now Focuses on Helping Ukraine rather than on Transforming Russia, Shtepa Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 18 – All people of good will can only welcome the commitment of the Free Russia Forum to support Ukraine against Russian aggression, Vadim Shtepa says; but such people can only bemoan the fact that that Forum is almost completely ignoring the need to transform Russia.

            The editor of the Tallinn-based regionalist portal Region.Expert argues that this is doubly unfortunate. On the one hand, unless Russia is transformed, the Muscovite state will remain a threat to Ukraine even if Kyiv succeeds in achieving its proclaimed goal of restoring its control up to its 1991 borders.

            And on the other, such an approach ignores the problems the residents of the country Moscow rules that any group offers itself as being about a Free Russia should be trying to come up with (ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/02/18/forum-svobodnoi-ukraini-ili-kak-iz-rossiiskogo-meropriyatiya-ischezla-rossiiskaya-povestka-a187616 reposted at region.expert/fsu/).

            This week, the Forum of Free Russia met in Vilnius for two days. The first day was closed, but the second was open; and the meeting released a statement about what it had hoped ot achieve. What the accessible information suggests, Shtepa says, is that the Forum’s participants see a Ukrainian victory even as defined by Ukraine as a magic solution to Russia’s problems.

            But unless the restoration of Ukrainian control over all that country’s land up to the 199a borders leads to the transformation of Russia, the Muscovite state will still present challenges not only to Ukraine but also to other neighbors of that country and perhaps especially to the peoples living within the borders of the Russian Federation.

            According to the regionalist, “the problem of the Forum of Free Russia from its very first meetings ten years ago is that its organizers from the outset considered the regional issue as something secondary” and its activities showed that “Muscovite politicians even in emigration remained Moscow-centric” rather than considering what a truly Free Russia should look like.

            In the current situation, emigres can have only a limited impact on what goes on inside their country; but the Free Russia Forum should follow the example of earlier Russian emigrations and at a minimum focus on the problems of the entire country and offer ideas for discussion, steps it is not now taking, Shtepa argues.

            Indeed, even the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has recognized this need, given that it has included at least a limited number of representatives of the regions and republics of the current Russian Federation in its platform for discussions with the democratic Russian opposition.

            It is time, Shtepa says, that the Free Russian Forum do at least as much. Otherwise, it won’t help Ukraine as much as it hopes; and it won’t help Russia very much at all. That is because unless the state now called the Russian Federation changes, it will remain a threat to Ukraine even if Kyiv "wins" and a threat to its own people and others regardless of the outcome of Putin's war.