Russians Not Telling Putin ‘No’ But No Longer are Saying ‘Yes,’ Gallyamov Argues

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 21 – The average Russia is not now saying “’no’ to Putin,” Abbas Gallyamov says. “That is too dangerous.” But ever more of them are “no longer saying ‘yes’” either, “the only form of opposition available to most in a totalitarian state” and a kind that ultimately subverts such regimes.

            The former Putin speechwriter and current Putin critic says Russians have been on a rollercoaster in this regard since Putin launched his expanded war against Ukraine in 2022. That move “led to a sharp politicization of Russians,” with many backing Putin because they felt involved in “something grandiose” (pointmedia.io/story/6a8810f775d0d3346a25cb7f).

            That response, Gallyamov continues, is typical: “People who feel involved in something grandiose usually are grateful to the one who gave them that opportunity at least as long as the price to pay for this chance does not become to high.” But now that the price has risen and become more obvious, Russians have changed their minds.

            Kremlin repression keeps this disappointment from taking the form of open protest, he says; but that leaves as “the only means of expressing discontent depoliticization,” a good choice for many because it allows for asking “from time to time to ask questions about what is happening” with less risk.

            In this new situation, Gallyamov argues, “the average Russian now does not say ‘no’ to Putin – that is too dangerous; but he just stops saying ‘yes’ to him.” At first, the state welcomes this passivity and even encourages it; but over time, the regime needs more support and such “apathy” becomes a problem.

Depoliticization is not just an escape from politics,” the commentator says. “In conditions when the government demands from a person constant emotional mobilization -- that he should follow, worry, be proud, hate, be willing to sacrifice and unite -- the refusal to do all this becomes a political gesture” – and an ever more important one at that.

Initially, Putin build his power precisely because “he provided the system with legitimacy,” thus reducing the dangers to the central authorities that grew during the 1990s. He stabilized the situation; but now as the population stops saying yes to him because of his repressions and failure to deliver more, “Putin is ever less needed” and elites can see that.

 “What the Russian president is doing in Ukraine and in the international arena as a whole is completely contrary to the interests of the vast majority of the domestic establishment. Elites are rational people and to wreck the country’s economy for the sake of taking a small piece of scorched earth is viewed as a profound mistake.”

And Gallyamov concludes: “depoliticization allows Russians to get out of the game imposed” by Putin;  but eventually, it encourages members of the establishment to think about demanding the leader listen to it or face replacement especially if he is doing things as Putin now is that are harming these elites. 

Kremlin-Backed Buddhist Forum Declaration Suggests Moscow May Drop Judaism from Its List of Favored ‘Traditional Religions of Russia’

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 20 – Perhaps the most important aspect of the just concluded Fourth International Buddhist Forum in Tyva was not the greetings from Putin or the fact that some 1,000 people from 20 countries took part but rather the meeting’s declaration which violated long-standing practice concerning which are the traditional religions of Russia.

            Since the end of Soviet times, Moscow has been consistent in declaring that there are four traditional religions of Russia – Orthodox Christianity, Islam, Buddhism and Judaism – giving special deference to these and reducing others like Protestantism and Catholicsm to a lesser status (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2019/02/kremlin-divides-churches-subordinate-to.html).

            While the Russian Federation does not have a formalized ideology that the Soviet Union did, it does have certain formulations such as about “the four traditional religions of Russia” which are almost never violated. That makes what happened at the Tyva conference so intriguing.

            The forum concluded with a declaration that said in part that “Russia is a multi-confessional, multi-national country where Buddhism, Orthodoxy and Islam live in peace and harmony, failing to mention Judaism in its list (asiarussia.ru/news/52107/ and egov-buryatia.ru/press_center/news/detail.php?ID=208193).

            That a meeting as important as this one should do so is striking and suggests that even though Putin himself has continued to meet with Jewish leaders on occasion and other groups have used the standard formulation in recent months, there appears to be a greater willingness than in the past to change that formulation and drop the reference to Judaism in this favored list.

            That list continues to matter not just as a declaration but as a guide to policy. Putin himself has worked hard to marginalize all faiths not on the list (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/04/putin-seeks-to-marginalize-or-even.html); and groups as diverse as Protestants and Shamans have sought to join it (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/07/putins-war-in-ukraine-has-divided.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2022/02/russias-4000-shamans-seek-official.html).

            If what the Buddhists have now done at a Kremlin-backed meeting is a harbinger of the possible ideological fate of Judaism in Russia, that could presage a major change in Moscow’s policies toward Jews. At the very least, it will encourage those Russian nationalist groups that they may be able to act more aggressively against Judaism than in the past. 

 

More than Just Fears of Mobilization Driving Up New Interest in Emigration among Russians, Emigration Activists Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 20 – Unlike in 2022 when most Russians thinking about or actually pursuing emigration because of fears they would be mobilized for service in Ukraine, today, Russians thinking about leaving the country are doing so for a broad range of reasons including the conviction that the situation in Russia is getting worse, Ark emigration activists say.

            This change suggests three important conclusions, although the Ark analysts who report this development aren’t drawing these at least in public. First, even if the threat of mobilization this fall passes, interest in and even actions toward emigration will continue          (echofm.online/news/eto-lyudi-kotorye-gotovy-ehat-pravozashhitniki-iz-kovchega-rasskazali-ehu-o-novoj-volne-emigraczii-iz-rossii).

            Second, the number of steps the Russian government would have to take to change this situation is enormously broad, ranging from a significant decline in repression to an economic policy improving the lives of ordinary Russians and reducing the enormous gap between the wealthy and the poor in that country.

            And third, because the Putin regime shows no signs of moving in that direction, the Kremlin almost certainly will seek to make emigration both less attractive and more difficult and take ever more steps to restore the situation of pre-perestroika times when few people were allowed to leave.

            Given that free travel to and from foreign countries is one of the benefits of the collapse of the Soviet system that Russians say they most value, Putin will likely try to avoid a public declaration that he is closing the borders lest making such a move would likely trigger even more anger than his moves against the internet.

Unlike Stalin, Putin isn’t Compensating for Repression with Victories, Gallyamov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 20 – Many observers are suggesting that Russians will accept Putin repressions for a long time to come because they accepted Stalin’s a century ago, but those who do are missing an essential point, Abbas Gallyamov says; and it is this: Unlike Stalin, Putin isn’t compensating for his repressions with victories.

            According to the former Putin speechwriter turned Putin critic, “repressions against one’s own population, carried out by the authorities when they are defeating an external enemy, have far more legitimacy than do repressions when the authorities are unable to defeat such an enemy” (echofm.online/opinions/stalin-kompensiroval-repressii-pobedami).

            “Therefore,” Gallyamov says, “it makes no sense in the current situation to point to the fact that Russians supposedly accept the Stalin-era repressions with equanimity. Stalin offset repressions with victories; in recent years, Putin has brought the country nothing but defeats alongside his repressions.”

            And what that means in turn is that Putin must have an outcome in Ukraine that he can present to Russians as a victory or he will likely be confronted with a population that will be far less willing to accept his repressive policies because he hasn’t given them the victory that he has been promising.

            That is a major reason why Putin can’t agree to anything other than what he can describe as a victory, however much pressure anyone puts on him because for him victory in Ukraine is not a geopolitical issue but an existential one of his survival in power and perhaps even more than that. 

Even Before Drone Attacks, Many Russians who had Supported Putin’s War Earlier had Turned against It, Public Sociology Laboratory Interviews Show

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 30 – Russia’s independent Public Sociology Laboratory earlier this year re-interviewed Russians with whom it had spoken two years ago and who then supported Putin’s war in Ukraine. Now, the Laboratory says, many of them have become critics of the war.

            Most of their criticism, one of the Laboratory’s sociologists says, is still “at the non-political level,” that is it isn’t directed at Putin as such, but the critiques Russians are now offering of the war are often very specific and detailed (cherta.media/interview/kak-menyaetsya-otnoshenie-rossiyan-k-vojne/).

            Significantly, these in-depth interviews took place before Ukraine expanded its drone attacks on Russia this summer, an action that many suggest has brought the war home to Russia and shaken their support for Kremlin policies. That suggests the opposition to the war the Laboratory reports may have continued to increase in recent weeks.

Emigration and Silence Far From Only Options for Russians who Recognize Putin’s Russian Federation as Their ‘Main Enemy,’ Savvin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 19 – Many Russians when thinking about how those who object to Putinism and its actions should act offer only two extreme options, emigration so as not to live under its control or silent obedience to the Kremlin lest they get into trouble, despite their feelings, Dimitry Savvin says.

            But in fact, the editor of the Riga-based conservative Russian portal Harbin says, the situation is far more complicated than that and that there are other options although it must be admitted to begin with that “each has its own price” which those choosing it must be willing to pay (harbin.lv/chto-delat-chestnomu-cheloveku-v-rossii).

            In making one’s choice, each Russian must decide what “the so-called Russian Federation” is to him or her. “There are only two basic answers: either it is “my state and my country” or alternatively it is now “the main enemy of the Russian people and the other peoples of Russia.’

            “If you still honor the Russian Federation by Russia itself, and not with a cancerous tumor, on the body of Russia that has grown up,” Savvin says, there is nothing more to be discussed. But “if you realize that the chief and most terrible enemy of the Russian person is the state of the Russian Federation,” then a lot more needs to be considered.

            If a Russian is in the latter category, then he or she must recognize that in Putin’s Russia maintaining “clean hands and an honest name have their price.” There are many in fact, but in “at least a few, you will have to make sacrifices” and in many cases these will not be small but may be very large indeed, the Russian nationalist editor says.

            “The main thing is not to lie to yourself. There has been no opposition in Russia for a long time.” And that means, Savvin argues, that those who want to do something to oppose the Putin regime must either engage in active resistance, a serious step given the likelihood of retribution, or adopt other forms of dissent, which also have costs but lesser ones.

            Emigration for those who oppose Putin remains an option, although it is likely only for a short period more, the Russian conservative says. Putin almost certainly will work to close off that possibility just as Stalin did and do it sooner rather than later. Those who feel they can’t take the risks other actions would lead to should get out while they can.

            There are steps for those who can’t or won’t emigrate but want to act against the Putin regime, possibly in ways that will not entail the most serious consequences for themselves like militant activism but will make clear to others that they are not collaborating with the Kremlin and want to retain or recover their moral purity.

            The first step such people need to take is to “not participate” in anything the regime is organizing that is obviously fraudulent like elections. The second is to break with those who do and make clear why such a step is needed. And the third is to stop listening to the regime and reading its newspapers and instead build up an alternative library.

            “Finally,” Savvin says, “it is impossible not to turn to those who are already within the state system but who have realized that this system is the main enemy of the Russian people and a mortal danger to all free people” and having done so to take steps to try to bring them out and join the opposition.

There won’t be a large number of such people at first; but as their numbers grow, the Russian conservative suggests, the opponents of the regime will strengthen while the regime itself will grow ever weaker. The time is long past when it is enough to sit in one’s kitchen and complain about how bad things are.

Even War in Ukraine for Putin is a Means to the End of His Not Being Succeeded by Someone who will Pursue ‘De-Putinization,’ Gallyamov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 19 – Vladimir Putin’s “super task” is to be succeeded by someone who will continue to rule in his name as Stalin did after the death of Lenin rather than by someone who will turn away from his system and move in new directions as Khrushchev did after the death of Stalin, Gallyamov says.

            The former Putin speechwriter who is now a prominent Putin critic insists that even the current Kremlin leader’s expanded war in Ukraine is a means to that end rather than having the independent and all-important quality for him that is often suggested (t.me/abbasgallyamovpolitics/10989 reposted at echofm.online/opinions/glavnaya-czel-putina-putin-posle-putina).

            This reflects the fact, Gallyamov says, that “Putin is a president of the status quo, not of revisionism. He has no ideals for which he would be willing to take serious risks. Of course, he does not want to appear a cynical egoist, so he likes to throw dust in people's eyes by feigning high aspirations and values … but this is nothing more than a show.”

            The current Kremlin leader “is a revisionist,” he continues, “precisely because he is a guardian of the status quo on the inside. He may redraw borders, dismantled the international order and start wars; but his ultimate political aim is conservative: ensuring that power remains exactly where it now lies.”

            Indeed, “even posthumous greatness is something Putin needs primarily as an insurance policy. In his view, a good successor is not someone who will build an even greater Russia, but someone whose own political survival depends on preserving the Putin pantheon, the Putin elite, and the Putin version of history.”