Water in Russia’s Major Rivers ‘Polluted’ and ‘Dirty,’ Government Report Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 29 – As if the Russian Federation did not have enough problems, the government’s ministry of nature says in a draft report that most of the largest rivers of the country including the Volga, the Ob, the Yenisey, the Don, the Amur, and their tributaries have water that is “polluted” and “dirty.”

            The main sources of this pollution are waste waters from urban areas and industries that are not treated adequately, the report says; but there is little prospect for cleaning them up given how many heavy metals have sunk to the bottom of these rivers (nemoskva.net/2026/09/29/minprirody-voda-v-krupnejshih-rekah-rossii-priznana-gryaznoj/).

            In the surface waters of these rivers, concentrations of iron, copper, organic waste, petroleum products and nitrates all exceed maximum permissible concentrations, few of which are adequately reduced by existing water treatment facilities. Consequently, the rivers are making Russians sick.

            The report does not address another aspect of this contamination, the international one. Many of these rivers, such as the Volga which flows into the Caspian Sea and the Amur which is on the Chinese border, affect neighboring countries; and so Russia’s failure to clean up its rivers is an international problem.

            It is likely that the Russian government will seek to modify the draft report to try to convince people that things are not that bad; and so it is fortunate the NeMoskva portal has provided not only a link to the draft report but also a discussion of just how much of the pollution of rivers is becoming.

Putin’s Invasion has Strengthened Ukrainian Identity including among Russian Speakers in Eastern Portions of Ukraine, Skorkin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 29 – Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has had the unintended and for him unwelcome consequence of strengthening Ukrainian national identity in the eastern portions of Ukraine and promoted the rise of “Russian-speaking Ukrainian nationalism,” according to Konstantin Skorkin.

            The journalist who reports on the Donbass says that what Putin has done has “radicalized” the population there, with Ukrainians there who opposed nationalist messages changing their position and many who earlier identified as Russians now identifying as Ukrainians at least in a civic sense (ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/09/29/novii-natsionalizm-kak-rossiya-ukrepila-ukrainskuyu-natsionalnuyu-identichnost-a207289).

            Both groups increasingly accept the Ukrainian nationalism that many in that country and abroad saw as restricted to the western portions of Ukraine that Stalin absorbed into the USSR at the end of World War II. That means that Ukraine has been integrated way and that Moscow and its backers will get a surprise if they force Kyiv to yield the east to Moscow.

            Such regions would not quickly integrate into Russia but rather become a source of resistance within that country, possibly even stronger than the one Ukrainians in the west displayed when Stalin moved the borders west. Neither Putin nor many others understand that if Putin gets want he wants in terms of borders, he will almost inevitably lose more than he gains.

            And such Ukrainian resistance then within the nominal borders of the Russian Federation would likely do more to spark both radical Russian nationalism and equally radical non-Russian nationalism in ways that would tear the Russian Federation apart, exactly the opposite of what the Kremlin says it wants.

            A few years ago, some joked that Ukrainians should put up two statues of Russian leaders in their capital who had done so much for Ukraine, one to Stalin who expanded Ukraine’s borders, and another to Putin, who is seeking to reduce them,  because each has done so much to promote a powerful upsurge of Ukrainian nationalism.

            That is no longer funny for Moscow, especially as the inclusion of  eastern Ukraine within the Russian Federation would have such likely fatal consequences for the survival of the Muscovite state. Indeed, it could even happen that Putin will have helped Ukraine even more than Stalin did by contributing to the destruction of Ukraine’s greatest enemy. 

Tehran May Allow Construction of Russian-Gauge Railway across Iran

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 29 – The Iranian government, which has already agreed to the use of the broader Russian-gauge railway (1520 mm as opposed to the international standard of 1435 km) on the 162 km Rasht-Astara section in the north, is now mulling allowing the extension of a railroad with the Russian gauge southward to the Gulf of Iran.

            That possibility has been announced by Tehran’s ambassador to Moscow, Kazen Jalali, and would eliminate the bottlenecks resulting from the need to change the chassis of trains from the Russian standard to the international standard at the border between the two countries (casp-geo.ru/iran-dopustil-prodlenie-rossijskoj-zh-d-kolei-1520-do-persidskogo-zaliva/).

            Were Tehran to agree and the two countries to arrange financing, something they have had difficulty in securing or coming up with, that would dramatically change trade patterns in the region, giving Russia enormous advantages in importing and exporting its goods and offering Iran large transit fees as well.

            What makes this possible agreement between the two countries so striking is that it comes after Moscow has been forced to agree to Chinese demands that it modify some of Russia’s domestic rail routes to accommodate Chinese trade. (For background on that, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2016/04/bowing-to-china-moscow-for-first-time.html.)

            Financing may kill this idea just as it has delayed the start of construction on the Rasht-Astara section, but it is an indication of just how much Russia wants this and how willing Iran is now prepared to talk about something that had not been on the table in the past. 

Udmurts Offer Third Way Between Two Self-Defeating Radicalisms, Shtepa Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 29 – Non-Russians all too often either strike out radical poses and demand independence for their nations rather than cooperation with those who live among them or yield to Moscow’s demands that they yield their national languages and traditions and accept Russian ones instead, Vadim Shtepa says.

           The first of these positions is self-defeating because Moscow can play up divisions between these ethnic groups and defeat any possibility of achieving either more autonomy or independence; and the second is so as well because it promotes the idea that resistance to what the Russian authorities are demanding is somehow inevitable. Neither need to be the case, the editor of the Tallinn-based Region.Expert portal says.

            But one nation and its representatives abroad have adopted a third way in between those positions, calling for the defense of the rights of all those who live on their territories regardless of nationality and the gradual acquisition of the language of the titular republic and thus a way to expand the nation's reach and ability to cooperate rather than limit both. 

            In an article for the Estonian journal Diplomaatia (diplomaatia.ee/udmurdi-revolutsioon-omaalgatuslikud-valimised/) which has been translated into Russian (region.expert/udmurt/) praises this moderate position and sees it as a model others non-Russian and Russian should consider adopting.

            For a discussion of how Udmurts living abroad have used secure voting to choose a body that supports this middle way and is appealing to international organizations, see my article on the Udmurt position and the election it has arranged are so important at jamestown.org/two-russian-elections-whose-outcome-really-matters-in-south-ossetia-and-udmurtia/.

Along with His War against Ukraine, Putin has Conducted ‘Special Demographic Operation’ against Russian Women, Russia’s Feminist Anti-War Resistance Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 28 – Since he launched his expanded war against Ukraine in 2022, Putin has expanded his “special demographic operation” against the reproductive rights of Russian women, gradually hollowing these rights out rather than banning them all at once, Russia’s Feminist Anti-War Resistance says in new report.

            The report, ‘A Special Demographic Operation’: The Erosion of Reproductive Rights in Russia during Military Times, is available in Russian at femantiwar.org/ru/report-reproductive-rights/ and is discussed at nemoskva.net/2026/09/28/opublikovan-doklad-o-narushenii-reproduktivnyh-prav-zhenshhin-v-rossii/).

              The report’s conclusions recall the famous Russian story, often repeated in Putin’s time, that a frog thrown into boiling water will try to jump out but one put in water that is gradually warmed to boiling will result in the death of the frog given that, according to the Russia Outside of Moscow portal, rights haven’t been abolished but hollowed out.

              Among the examples the report gives of both the changes and popular reaction to them are the following:

·       In 1996, Russian law allowed late abortions for 13 different reasons; now, it allows it only in cases of rape.

·       The right to abortion continues to be maintained in Russian law but is limited in 75 of the more than 80 federal subjects of the country, with induced abortion banned in more than a third of them.

·       Over the last decade, the share of Russians favoring a total ban on abortion has increased from three percent to 10 percent, while the share who consider abortion to be exclusively the decision of women has fallen from 65 percent to 47 percent.

Because these are relatively slow moving changes, they are often ignored in comparison with more dramatic and all-Russian actions; but the result, as the new report says, is that Putin’s “special demographic operation” is just as destructive of human rights as are any of his other “special operations.”

Russia is ‘a Capital City-Centric State’ but ‘Ukraine is More than Kyiv,’ Portnikov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 28 – One of the most common errors people make is to assume that others are like themselves, Vitaly Portnikov says. And thus because “Russia is a capital city-centric state,” Putin fails to understand that “Ukraine is more than Kyiv” and that attacking it will lead to the collapse of the country.

            Unfortunately for Putin and other Russian leaders, “the Kremlin still thinks” of other countries as it does of its own, assuming that their capitals are just as central to their existence as states as has been the case of Russia throughout its history, the Ukrainian analyst says (charter97.org/ru/news/2026/9/28/699968/).

            Given that point of view, Portnikov continues, Russian leaders right down to Putin have believed that “to destroy Kyiv is to destroy Ukraine” and that “to intimidate Kyiv is to intimidate Ukraine” even though Kyiv did not assemble Ukraine the way the Russian capitals assembled Russia.

            Putin assumes and has managed to convince many others who are also ignorant of the differences between Russia and Ukraine that this “capital-centric” vision is correct and that a Russian occupation of Kyiv will be not a partial but a total Russian victory over Ukraine as a whole.

            But Ukraine is more than Kyiv, Portnikov argues; and even if Russia should succeed with its attacks on Kyiv, other parts of Ukraine will on the basis of their history continue to resist, depriving the current Kremlin leader of the victory that he believes can be his if he takes the Ukrainian capital.

Moscow’s Increasing Dependence on China for Military Electronics Why Uzbekistan is Buying Chinese Weapons rather than Russian Ones, ‘Important Theme’ Portal Says

Paul Goble

            Sept. 27 – Uzbekistan and other Central Asian countries are increasingly purchasing military equipment from China because these countries can no longer count on Russia  because Moscow has been compelled to purchase military electronics from China, Russia’s Important Theme portal says.

            Officials in Tashkent and other Central Asian capitals know that China can cut off such supplies at will and thus prefer to purchase military equipment directly from Beijing lest that happen, given that Russia can’t produce the computers and other electronics modern weaponry is based on (temaglavnoe.ru/russia/32693/).

            Such Central Asian calculations are entirely reasonable, the portal suggests, given that Russia is increasingly unable to get such technology from anyone else, a reality that has increased since Putin launched his expanded war in Ukraine and one that means there is yet another reason for the collapse of Russian influence in Central Asia.

            “As long  as Chinese chips are in Russian weapons,” it continues, “Russia can’t convincingly position itself as an ‘independent’ alternative to China;” and potential purchasers of weapons thus see it “not as a geopolitical alternative supplier but as an assembly site dependent on the same source of technology as the competitor.”

            Unless Russia can begin to develop high tech industries to support its weapons production and export or find ways to get such technology from a variety of sources, it will continue to lose out to China, not so much because of a geopolitical choice, the portal concludes, but rather because of a simple and rational calculation.

            While the Important Theme portal doesn’t address this, it is entirely likely that other potential purchases of Russian weaponry are increasingly drawing the same conclusions and making the same decisions, further reducing Moscow’s influence on their governments not for ideological reasons but for calculations as simple as these.