Lacking Funds, Russia’ s Federal Subjects Cutting Back Payments to Those who Sign Military Contracts and to Families of Those who Die in Putin’s War in Ukraine

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 22 – In recent weeks, the governments of numerous Russia’s federal subjects have cut back the payments they have been making to get men to sign military contracts or to survivors of those who have died in Putin’s war in Ukraine, sometimes by enormous amounts and without advance warning.

            Earlier this month, for example, St. Petersburg cut its one-time payment to those who sign military contracts from 3.5 million rubles to 1 million , and other regions and republics have cut by as large or even larger percent (svoboda.org/a/v-rossii-sokraschayut-vyplaty-za-voennye-kontrakty-i-gibelj-na-voyne/33879626.html).

            A similar trend involves regional payments to survivors of those who have lost their lives in Ukraine. In Saratov Oblast, such payments have been reduced by 90 percent; and in Orenburg Oblast, which had paid out one million rubles for such losses, they have been eliminated altogether.

            So far, payments by the federal government for those who sign up or who die have not been reduced or eliminated; but the governments of the federal subjects, who in many cases were offering more than even Moscow, have been forced to take this step because they simply don’t have the money needed to continue to pay out such amounts.

            The reduction in bonuses offered by regions is going to make it more difficult for Moscow to meet its recruitment quotas, although it may be that differences in cutbacks of such payments among regions will lead to yet another form of Russian tourism, with those who want to sign up going to places where payments are highest.

            But families of those who have lost loved ones in Putin’s war do not have that option, and they are likely to become especially angry given what they were very publicly promised in the case of a death and what they are now not going to get, a shortcoming made even more infuriating because it has been done without public explanation.

Governments of Russia’s Federal Subjects Lack Funds to Hire and Hold Even Key Officials, Kalechev Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 21 – Many of the increasingly hard-pressed governments of Russia’s federal subjects lack the funds to hire and hold even key officials, Konstantin Kalachev says, losing out in the competition for such people to businesses and thus increasingly unable to perform either their own mandated responsibilities or tasks Moscow assigns them.

            The head of the Political Experts Group focuses on the situation in Tatarstan, in fact one of the regions  that is relatively better off, to point out the fact that even Kazan can’t offer salaries to attract and then retain the staff it needs (regcomment.ru/regions/rossiya/tatarstan-kak-zerkalo-kadrovyj-defitsit-stal-federalnoj-problemoj/).

            “The shortage of qualified personnel in the public service there is really creating risks to the quality and efficiency of management, makes it more likely that deadlines won’t be met, and can be accompanied by an increase in the threat of corruption,” Kalachev continues. As such, it “is not only a republic problem but also a federal one.”

            According to the specialist on regional affairs, this problem requires “not only an increase in the level of wages to competitive values but also a comprehensive improvement in working conditions, incentive mechanisms, a reduction in the burdens on the bureaucracy, a change in management culture, and expanded career opportunities.”

            In the short term at least, shortages of key officials in the regions means that Moscow has to intervene even more often than would otherwise be the case because it can’t count on the regional bureaucracies to carry out its will – or alternatively, the center must be willing to see a decay in governance across much of the country. 

Non-Russians Speak about Putin’s War Very Differently and More Bluntly when They Use Their Native Languages than When They Use Russian, ‘Novaya Gazeta Europe’ Investigation Finds

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 20 – Non-Russian speak about Putin’s war very differently and more bluntly and negatively when they use their native languages than when they use Russian, according Dalya Talanova, a data journalist for Novaya Gazeta Europe who oversaw a study of 800,000 comments on 21,700 channels of the VKontakte network.

            Overwhelmingly, she suggests, non-Russians when using Russian to make comments on VKontakte follow the conventions about Putin’s war that Moscow insists on; but when they use their native languages, they behave very differently (novgaz.com/index.php/2-news/4303-«пусть-тяжелая-земля-станет-легкой»).

            At the same time, she makes clear that more than 90 percent of non-Russians commenting about the war use Russian rather than their native languages, a pattern which means that those who do use native languages have already made a political choice and that likely carries over into their evaluations of the war.

            Few of them use the euphemism “special military operation,” most call the war a war, and many introduce religious or ethnic terms which show how horrified they are by the conflict and its human costs. For these people, who live in republics from which the Kremlin drew so many soldiers, the war is personal; and they use their native languages to underscore that point.

            Talanova gives example after example of this pattern, an indication that non-Russians clearly feel that they can be far more honest in expressing their views and feelings when they use their native languages than when they use Russian, likely because Moscow monitors the non-Russian texts less closely – and non-Russians know that.

New Film in Ukrainian and Polish Stresses ‘Special Place’ of Ukrainians within Promethean Movement

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 18 – To the outrage of some in Moscow (ritmeurasia.ru/news--2026-10-18--polskij-prometej-zhazhdet-krovi-91034), a new film in Ukrainian with Polish subtitles has appeared in Poland stressing “the special place” Ukrainians occupied in the Promethean movement in the 1920s and 1930s and why it continues to play that role.

            The 77-minute film, which features the commentaries of Pawel Liera of the Warsaw Institute of National Remembrance and Valentyna Piskun of Kyiv’s Institute of the History of Ukraine, tells the story of the Promethean League and Ukraine’s place in it. It is available at mieroszewski.pl/wiedza/dokumentalnie/polska-i-ukraina/prometeizm-zapomniany-projekt-przeciw-rosyjskiemu-imperializmowi.

            For background on Prometheanism and its continuing influence in Eastern Europe and on the territory now occupied by the Russian Federation and other former Soviet republics, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/04/prometheanism-showed-that-joint.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2021/12/revival-of-prometheanism-outrages.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2016/07/intermarium-idea-whose-time-is-coming.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2013/01/window-on-eurasia-polish-attention-to.html.  

Kremlin Propaganda has Done Something Worse than Generate Support for War in Ukraine, Kuleshova Says; It hadesgs Destroyed Ability of Russians to Make a Moral Assessment

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 19 – Many people suggest that Kremlin propaganda has effectively generated support for Putin’s war in Ukraine, but in fact, it has not done that, Anna Kulashova says. Instead, it has done something far worse: it has destroyed the ability of many Russians to make a moral assessment of that conflict and much else.

            Kremlin propaganda, the Russian sociologist who has worked in Luxembourg since 2022 says, has not “zombified millions of people and turned them into aggressive and ideological supporters of the armed conflict” (novayagazeta.ru/articles/2026/10/19/tsinizm-lukavogo-cheloveka).

            Polls have shown that the number of convinced supporters of Putin’s war is still about 22 percent, a figure roughly equal to the number of convinced opponents, she continues. Many more simply refuse to make any judgment and thus go along with whatever the regime wants because they no longer feel themselves capable of assessing things for themselves.

            One of the most powerful tools of Kremlin propaganda, she suggests, is the notion of “whataboutism,” the promotion of the idea that since things are far from perfect outside of Russia, “we [in Russia] can do everything” and thus conclude that “we are doing everything right.

            In this way, she says, “attention is shifted from one’s own acts to the motives and sins of those who criticize that individual.” And when the state promotes this view of the world or supports it by monetarizing death and suggesting that war is the eternal state of mankind, it deprives people of their own moral foundations and thus the basis for right action.

            “Once life without war is impossible, then trying to change something is meaningless” Kuleshova says. “Together with fatalism, propaganda imposes total cynicism, and It masterfully neutralizes any idealistic and humanistic values like calls for world peace, the value of human life, empathy and mercy.”

            The sociologist tsays that “the authorities do not need everyone to believe in the necessity of war. They are enough to ensure that no one believes in anything or that it is possible to live differently, nor that his own conscience is more important than a strange bad example, nor that the world is better than war.”

            And that in turn leaves Russian society in a far worse position: “A convinced opponent can be persuaded, but with cynics everything is more difficult, they have nothing to revise.” As a result, the restoration of the ability to moral judgment, to the simple thought “I will not do this, even if others do” is inevitably much more difficult.”

KPRF Duma Deputy Offers Bill to Rename St. Petersburg Leningrad and Volgograd Stalingrad

Paul Goble

Staunton, Oct. 19 – Angelika Glazkova, a KPRF Duma deputy has put forward a bill to restore the names Leningrad and Stalingrad to Russian cities now called St. Petersburg and Volgagrad. The last time the Duma took up and rejected restoring the name Stalingrad to Volgagrad was in 2015. It has not before considered a bill to restore the name Leningrad.

            Communist Party officials have frequently called for such moves, but only rarely have these calls led to the introduction of bills in the Duma that would achieve that end. Moreover, Glazkova has a poor track record of winning support for her ideas: Only 17 of the 57 bills she has put forward have been approved (agents.media/v-gosdumu-vnesli-zakonoproekt-o-pereimenovanii-sankt-peterburga-v-leningrad/).

            But Putin’s promotion of the restoration of the Soviet and Russian past and especially his focus on World War II may mean that this time around, a bill that would restore the name Stalingrad will have a better chance of passage, perhaps especially because it is linked to a change in the name of the northern capital rather than being a stand alone measure.

Over Last Decade, Birthrate in Belarus Fell by 52 Percent while Death Rate Rose by 1.59, Belstat Figures Show

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 19 – Figures released by Belstat, Minsk’s statistical agency, show that between 2015 and 2025, the number of births per 1000 people in the population of Belarus fell by 52 percent while the number of deaths for the same number rose by 1.59 percent, figures that put Belarus on a path of demographic decline.

            Not only do the birth figures mean that there are fewer children being born now but they also mean that the size of the prime child-bearing cohort of women will decline in the future, something that will make it very difficult to reverse (thinktanks.pro/publication/2026/10/19/v-belarusi-za-10-let-rozhdaemost-upala-na-52-a-smertnost-uvelichilas.html).

            At least part of the birthrate decline is the result of urbanization, The city of Minsk saw the largest fall in the number of births during this period while more rural areas saw much less. The relatively small increase in mortality in turn reflects the fact that it was already high ten years ago. 

            What is worrying about the mortality figures is that the number of deaths per 1000 population is nearly twice as high in rural areas as it is in cities, 19.8 as against 11, the result both of the outflow of younger people to the cities and the less adequate medical care available in rural locations.