Moscow Media Referring to ‘Pro-Russian Underground’ in Ukraine Far Less Often Now than in the Past, ‘Vot-Tak TV’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 17 – After frequently speaking about the supposed existence in Ukraine of a pro-Russian underground during the first two years of Putin’s war in Ukraine, Russian media have cut back their references dramatically with the number falling by half between 2024 and 2025 and continuing to fall during the first quarter of 2026, Vot-Tak TV reports.

            In the first three months of this year, the independent television network says, there were only 47 news reports about the supposed existence of “a pro-Russian underground” in Ukraine, less than a third of the 161 references to such a phenomenon during the same period in 2025 (vot-tak.tv/92131398/propaganda-prorossiiskoe-podpolie).

            Ukrainian intelligence officials say that such Russian reportage is intended to legitimize what Putin’s invasion force is doing, draw parallels with the resistance to the Nazis in World War II, and sow panic within the Ukrainians about their ability to defend themselves against the Russian army.

            But they and other experts say that there is no way to say how many people in Ukraine are really part of any such underground, although most express confidence that it is far smaller than Moscow has ever claimed, a judgment that Moscow media now appear to agree with given the decision to give such stories less space.

            It is also the case, although Vot-Tak TV doesn’t mention this possibility, that as the war drags on, the credibility of such stories is declining given that Ukrainians are still able to defend their country effectively and even in places to advance into areas Russian forces had once occupied, hardly evidence there is much support for Moscow anywhere in Ukraine.

Majority of Russians Really Tired of War but Expect It to Continue Anyway, ‘Novaya Gazeta’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 17 – Whenever any pollster has suggested that Russians are tired of war, the conflict’s supporters insist that isn’t the case because in their view those not involved at the frontlines or in regions subject to heavy attacks can place the blame for their tiredness on the war itself.

            But the Laboratory of the Future of Novaya Gazeta working with the Levada Center has now conducted a poll which makes such objections irrelevant. Its survey asked its representative sample what they think are the attitudes of other Russians to the war as well as what they personally feel (novayagazeta.ru/articles/2026/03/17/sindrom-khronicheskoi-voennoi-ustalosti).

            This sampling of Russian public opinion found that only nine percent feel that those around them are “enthusiastic” about the war, five percent say people are indifferent, while 73 percent say they are tired of the conflict. The remaining 14 percent say they find it difficult to answer that question.

            With regard to the first question, the paper says, “the ‘enthusiasm’ option was chosen most frequently by men, affluent individuals, Moscow residents, managers at various levels, and readers of newspapers and magazines.” The “indifferent” one was selected “most often by young people, students, entrepreneurs and residents of the Urals.”

            “’Fatigue,’ however was selected by practically all groups and demographics with remarkable uniformity,” Novaya Gazeta reports.

            Strikingly, it continues, “even among those who believe the country is currently moving in the right direction—and that Vladimir Putin is doing a good job—nearly two-thirds of respondents still selected the "fatigue" option.”

            Concerning how people themselves feel about the war, “the results turned out slightly different but on the whole they reflected the same overarching trend. Twenty-six percent chose the enthusiastic option, seven percent the “don’t care” one. But 52 percent chose the option which declared “’I am fed up with all of this.’”

            That confirms wat other polls have found, the paper says; and it shows that “people are weary, they desire peace negotiations but they don’t expect to be heard or anticipate that their aspirations will ever be realized.” Consequently, they are tired of what is going on and presumably will become even more tired the longer it does.

Across Russia, Police Increasingly Take Side of Aggressors in Cases of Family Violence, ‘Ad Rem’ Report Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar.17 – In cases of family violence, police across Russia now take the side of the aggressors and thus become their “accomplices” rather than defending the victims of such attacks, a pattern that originated in the North Caucasus but has become almost universal in that country after family violence was decriminalized, research by the Ad Rem group says.

            In a detailed study released earlier this year and now discussed by Novaya Gazeta, sociologists say that the situation of the victims, overwhelmingly but not exclusively women, is thus deteriorating (adrem.help/wp-content/uploads/2025/12 /Преследование-вместо-защиты-1.pdf and novayagazeta.eu/articles/2026/03/17/kavkazskie-praktiki-po-usmireniiu-zhertv-domashnego-nasiliia-teper-primeniaiut-po-vsei-rossii).

            The failure of the police to defend the victims and thus allow the perpetrators of such violence to get away with it reflects “an attitude shared by Russian society at large that domestic violence is a private family matter,” Novaya Gazeta says. Most Russians believe that any problems within the family should be solve there rather than involve anyone else.

            That has long been the North Caucasian model, but now Russian law enforcement in almost all places “view the problem of domestic violence in much the same way.” And any police who disagree now lack a law punishing such violence if they seek to protect the victim, making that extremely difficult.  

            “Consequently,” they continue, “and largely due to the decriminalization of domestic violence, the perpetrator often receives a punishment in the form of an administrative fine lower than the penalty for illegal parking.” But Ad Rem points to an even “more alarming trend: a shift from a passively negative state stance to increasingly active state intervention.”

            But now, the report says and the Novaya Gazeta commentary concurs, this intervention is “on the side of the aggressor” rather than on the victim, thus giving a green light to those who commit such violence in the Russian Federation and providing little hope for those who are their victims.   

Putin Constantly Talks about Preserving Russia’s Heritage but New Duma Measure Puts Almost 90 Percent of Heritage Sites at Risk

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 13 – As was the case in Soviet times, the Russian Federation maintains lists of heritage sites which cannot be tampered with or destroyed except after what has usually been a slow and difficult process. But now that arrangement may be about to change, putting at

            The Duma has passed on first reading a bill which hands over to local and regional officials the decision as to whether this or that object of cultural heritage no longer should have that status and may be modified or destroyed altogether to save money or make room for new construction (https://nemoskva.net/2026/03/13/sudbu-regionalnyh-pamyatnikov-otdali-na-otkup-mestnym-vlastyam-eto-stavit-ih-pod-ugrozu/).

            Conservators and historical preservationist activists say this will put some 85,000 historical sites and monuments at risk, some 84.5 percent of all such places in the Russian Federation and that the new law is “a trojan horse” that will open the door to the wholesale destruction of lesser-known heritage sites (t.me/Bukin_Oleg/1247 and t.me/regaspect/352). 

            These activists say that they do not think there is any way the proposed law can be modified to make it better and are calling for the Duma to reject it.  But their appeals are unlikely to succeed and the Duma appears set to approve the measure next month. In that event, the hard-pressed regions will likely open the door to the wholesale destruction of such monuments.

Forced Confession and Draconian Sentence of Adygey Activist a Warning to All Circassians that Moscow will Repress Them for Any Independent Thought, Kik Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 17 – Russia’s Southern Military District Court sentenced Ibragin Nagoyev, an Adygey activist, to 11 years in prison after forcing him to confess to invented charges that he had been working with the émigré group, the Council of United Circassia, that Moscow has identified as a terrorist organization.

            Prosecutors claimed Nagoyev had operated an internet page in which he posted materials from the Council and that he had been behind efforts in 2025 to mark the 161^st anniversary of the expulsion of the Circassians from the Russian Empire, an action Circassians view as an act of genocide (oc-media.org/circassian-activist-from-adygea-sentenced-to-11-years-on-terrorism-charges/).

            Responding to the case and the sentence the Russian court passed down, Kase Kik, chairman of the Council of United Circassia, said that both the case and the sentence have nothing to do with justice but are “an outright act of political violence carried out by the repressive machine of the Russian occupation state” (unitedcircassia.org/arrest-in-maikop).

            Nagoyev’s “only ‘fault,” the Circassian organizer says, “is his interest in the fate of his people and their right to think freely.” The charges against him were invented, including the prosecutors’ claims that he was a member of the United Circassian Council movement, Kik continues. That was not and is not true.

“The policy of our organization categorically excludes any involvement of people located on the territory of the Russian Federation. We are well aware that under the current regime, even minimal contact or sympathy for our activities automatically makes a person an object of persecution. We would never, under any circumstances, put our compatriots in such danger.”

​            “I am convinced,” Kik adds, “that the guilty plea was obtained under duress, including through the use of torture. This is a typical practice that has been repeatedly documented in relation to politically motivated cases. In such cases, the Russian judicial system does not act as an organ of justice, but as an instrument for legitimizing violence.”

            And the chairman of the United Circassian Council concludes that Nagoyev’s conviction “is not just a sentence for one person: it is a signal to all of Circassian society: for any manifestation of consciousness, for any word, for any though, punishment will follow. This is a policy of intimidation and suppression.”

            “Silence in such a situation is tantamount to complicity,” Kik says, adding that “we will seek publicity for this case and continue to fight for the rights of our people, despite pressure, threats and repression.”

            There are three reasons for drawing attention to this case. First, it is a sign of just how repressive the Russian government has become with regard to the Circassians and other non-Russian groups. Second, that in turn is a sign of just how fearful the Kremlin is of their growing influence on their co-ethnics.

            And third – and this may be the most important immediate lesson – it is a sign of how carefully émigré groups must interact with their co-ethnics within the current borders of the Russian Federation lest they create problems for the latter. As Kik’s statement shows, the Circassians understand that. Other non-Russian groups must do so as well.    

 

In the Fifth Year of Putin’s War in Ukraine, ‘No Russian Region Can Feel Safe,’ Shoigu Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 17 – As Putin’s expanded war in Ukraine enters its fifth year, Sergey Shoigu, Russian Council Secretary says, not a single Russian region “can feel safe” from Ukrainian drone attacks or from terrorist attacks and sabotage now being organized by 56 countries.

            In a speech in the Urals Federal District, the former defense minister, says that earlier Ukrainian drones could not reach much of the country but that today they can and that other countries have expanded their actions against Russia (httnovayagazeta.ru/articles/2026/03/17/shoigu-na-piatyi-god-svo-ni-odin-region-rossii-ne-mozhet-chuvstvovat-sebia-v-bezopasnosti-protivnik-kovaren-56-stran-gotoviat-protiv-rossii-terakty-i-diversii-news). 

            Shoigu says that Ukraine and its allies are “using the internet to influence ‘marginalized groups’” within the Russian Federation to commit such crimes. And he stresses that “underestimating the level of the threats or any slowness in the elimination of existing vulnerabilities could lead to tragic consequences and undermine socio-economic stability.”

            This is the clearest indication yet that the Kremlin now recognizes that the war Putin launched and has tried so hard to keep from affecting the lives of most Russians has very much come home and is now calling into question the stability of the country. But it is also a sign that Moscow intends to expand repression in an effort to prevent that from happening. 

Internet Shutdowns Highlight that Moscow is Again Part of Russia, Orekh Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 16 – Especially since launched his expanded war in Ukraine in 2022, Vladimir Puitn has sought to shield Moscow from the greatest impact of that conflict on Russian society, arranging things so that the hardest hit groups were marginal ones typically far from the Russian capital.

             But with his attack on the internet, Anton Orekh says, Moscow is “now Russia” again, something which has profound consequences for Muscovites given their sense of apartness from the rest of the country and for the stability of the Putin regime given its sensitivity to how people in the capital think (novayagazeta.ru/articles/2026/03/16/moskva-teper-rossiia).

            “We Muscovite live not in Russia,” the commentator says. “We sometimes visit it, but we know this country more in theory” than in practice. Indeed, Russians in Moscow [except for those with professional responsibilities involving the periphery] are more likely to have travelled abroad than to visit the oblasts, krays, and republics of the country.

            This creates a powerful divide: Muscovites ignore what is happening beyond the periphery unless there is some crisis there; while people in the federal subjects are kept up to date on what is happening in Moscow even if there is little or no prospect that they will ever visit the capital, Orekh continues.

            People in many federal subjects have had to make do without the internet, but until now Muscovites have been protected. Now however what has been happening in the rest of the country is happening to them as well. And that means that Muscovites must now again “feel themselves part of Russia.”

            “The Moscow-centric nature of our country was also explained by the central government’s particularly solicitous attitude toward the capital. The government itself is entirely based here, and it understands that if unrest were to flare up in any other region, it wouldn't pose a major problem” as the Khabarovsk events showed.

            Instead, the Kremlin’s “main priority was simply to ensure that everything remained calm in Moscow. In 1991, it took merely a few tens of thousands of Muscovites gathering outside the White House to bring about the collapse of the USSR.” No one among the powers that be wants to risk that again.

            For its rulers, “the capital had to remain content; it was best left undisturbed unless absolutely necessary. Even when the "special military operation" began, the federal leadership turned a blind eye to the fact that Muscovites were rarely being deployed to the front lines; instead, their quotas were filled by newcomers—migrants and visitors—willing to take up arms.”

“In Moscow,” Orekh writes, “much like in the fabled Baghdad, everything has been calm. The recent episode involving the internet, however, demonstrated that even the capital can be jolted out of its comfort zone. That entails a willingness to risk the tranquility of both the capital itself and the authorities.”

              What comes next may be something truly fateful, the crushing even of Moscow, Orekh says; or it may be the transformation of Russia as far as the Internet is concerned into North Korea or Iran, a development which would have its own consequences for Moscow and the regions. Which it will be and which would be worse remains to be seen.