International Conference in Baku Denounces ‘New Wave of Persecution of Circassians’

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 23 – A conference organized in Baku by the Azerbaijani Silk Road Association which drew online participants from around the world denounced Moscow for what attendees described as “a new wave of persecution of Circassians” that recalls Russian actions in tsarist times and under Stalin.

            The conference had been in the works for some time given Moscow’s policies; but it was given new urgency by new reports that Russian officials in their drive to recruit Circassians for Putin’s war in Ukraine have tortured and killed a young Circassian, an action that has sparked protest through the Circassian world and in the countries where some seven million of them live.

            (For background on Russian actions in this regard and the growing reaction they have sparked, see saratoga-foundation.org/p/putins-conscription-drive-in-north, minval.az/news/124549681 and icpc-circassia.org/news-and-updates/circassian-young-man-nurdin-karaf-reportedly-killed-under-torture.)

            Speakers at the Baku conference denounced Moscow’s actions in this case but argued that they are part of a broader policy of suppressing the Circassians and other non-Russians and predicted that these acts of repression would have exactly the opposite effect and lead the Circassians and other non-Russians to increase their activism.

            They also thanked Azerbaijan, Lithuania, Turkey, Ukraine and other countries for focusing attention on the Circassian cause and suggested that such attention will play a key role in the expansion of the Circassian movement despite everything Moscow has done to try to suppress it (minval.az/news/124549797).

Russian Elites Attitudes toward Putin have Shifted But This By Itself isn’t Yet a Threat to Kremlin Leader, Pastukhov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug.23 – Over the past several months, the attitude of Russian elites toward Putin has become more negative, Vladimir Pastukhov says; but this isn’t yet a threat to the Kremlin leader because his use of repression has prevented them from acting on this shift and because the Russian people are even more hostile to these elites than they are to Putin himself.

            The London-based Russian analyst, one of the closest and most thoughtful observers of the Moscow scene, says that he is convinced that the shift in elite attitudes is real and not some notion promoted by Ukraine or others opposed to Putin (t.me/v_pastukhov/1988 reposted at echofm.online/opinions/perelom-nastroenij-v-elite-ne-mif).

            Moreover, Pastukhov continues, he views this frone “not so much as anti-war, however much many would like to see it, but rather as anti-Putin, a shift in attitudes that reflects the judgment of elites that Putin has failed to achieve his promised goals” and his allowing the war to come home to Russia and threaten their interests.

            This shift in elite attitudes thus “does not pose any danger to Putin at the moment, first of all because he has control of a repressive regime that can eliminate anyone who raises his head; second … because the Russian people dislike them even more than they dislike Putin; and third, because the frond does not have a leader.”

            But that doesn’t mean that it isn’t a problem. “The very fact of its existence is something Putin cannot ignore,” the London-based analyst says; and his reaction can turn this shift in attitudes into something more serious for the future of his rule. “The best way out would be to do nothing,” but that isn’t something Putin is capable of.

            Consequently, it will be how Putin reacts rather than how the elite feels that will define what will happen in the coming weeks and months, Pastukhov concludes. 

Finno-Ugric Movement Becoming Trans-Atlantic

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 21 – Since Moscow blocked most contacts between Finno-Ugric activists outside Russia and Finno-Ugric communities within Russia in the years since 2022, émigré Finno-Ugric activists have been expanding their activities across the Atlantic and now are calling for establishing in the US of a Day of Finno-Ugric Peoples on the third Saturday of October.

            Between the end of Soviet times and the beginning of Putin’s expanded war in Ukraine, activists in the three Finno-Ugric independent countries – Estonia, Hungary and Finland – took the lead in developing ties with their co-ethnics in the Russian Federation. But as Russia has blocked most of those channels, the activists abroad have begun to look across the Atlantic.

            This year, an American city, Hancock, Michigan, was named the Finno-Ugric Cultural Capital for 2026, hosted meetings with activists and officials from Finno-Ugric countries, and featured a call for the creation in the US of a Day of the Finno-Ugric Peoples on the third Saturday of every October (mariuver.eu/2026/08/21/fu-dvizhenije-transkontinentalnyj/).

            Estonians and Finno-Ugric activists, alarmed by Russia’s actions over the last five years, welcome this call because it will broaden support for numerically small groups inside the Russian Federation in ways that recall the impact of the Captive Nations Week declarations that helped the Baltic countries recover their independence.

            Indeed, Estonian commentator Anti Lillak entitled his report on this development “The Transcontinental Finno-Ugric World” (sirp.ee/transkontinentaalne-soome-ugri-maailm/) and said it was a useful response to Moscow’s actions that were documented in a report to the Estonian foreign ministry earlier this year. (For the text of that detailed report, see fennougria.ee/en/fenno-ugria-report-on-finno-ugric-peoples-in-russia/.)

            The most likely next step to ensure that such a day is created will be for Finno-Ugric activists in the US and Europe to appeal to the Baltic Caucus in the US Congress to have it push for the establishment of a day that will focus American attention on peoples who today are even less well known than were the union republic nationalities in Soviet times. 

Russians Not Telling Putin ‘No’ But No Longer are Saying ‘Yes,’ Gallyamov Argues

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 21 – The average Russia is not now saying “’no’ to Putin,” Abbas Gallyamov says. “That is too dangerous.” But ever more of them are “no longer saying ‘yes’” either, “the only form of opposition available to most in a totalitarian state” and a kind that ultimately subverts such regimes.

            The former Putin speechwriter and current Putin critic says Russians have been on a rollercoaster in this regard since Putin launched his expanded war against Ukraine in 2022. That move “led to a sharp politicization of Russians,” with many backing Putin because they felt involved in “something grandiose” (pointmedia.io/story/6a8810f775d0d3346a25cb7f).

            That response, Gallyamov continues, is typical: “People who feel involved in something grandiose usually are grateful to the one who gave them that opportunity at least as long as the price to pay for this chance does not become to high.” But now that the price has risen and become more obvious, Russians have changed their minds.

            Kremlin repression keeps this disappointment from taking the form of open protest, he says; but that leaves as “the only means of expressing discontent depoliticization,” a good choice for many because it allows for asking “from time to time to ask questions about what is happening” with less risk.

            In this new situation, Gallyamov argues, “the average Russian now does not say ‘no’ to Putin – that is too dangerous; but he just stops saying ‘yes’ to him.” At first, the state welcomes this passivity and even encourages it; but over time, the regime needs more support and such “apathy” becomes a problem.

Depoliticization is not just an escape from politics,” the commentator says. “In conditions when the government demands from a person constant emotional mobilization -- that he should follow, worry, be proud, hate, be willing to sacrifice and unite -- the refusal to do all this becomes a political gesture” – and an ever more important one at that.

Initially, Putin build his power precisely because “he provided the system with legitimacy,” thus reducing the dangers to the central authorities that grew during the 1990s. He stabilized the situation; but now as the population stops saying yes to him because of his repressions and failure to deliver more, “Putin is ever less needed” and elites can see that.

 “What the Russian president is doing in Ukraine and in the international arena as a whole is completely contrary to the interests of the vast majority of the domestic establishment. Elites are rational people and to wreck the country’s economy for the sake of taking a small piece of scorched earth is viewed as a profound mistake.”

And Gallyamov concludes: “depoliticization allows Russians to get out of the game imposed” by Putin;  but eventually, it encourages members of the establishment to think about demanding the leader listen to it or face replacement especially if he is doing things as Putin now is that are harming these elites. 

Kremlin-Backed Buddhist Forum Declaration Suggests Moscow May Drop Judaism from Its List of Favored ‘Traditional Religions of Russia’

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 20 – Perhaps the most important aspect of the just concluded Fourth International Buddhist Forum in Tyva was not the greetings from Putin or the fact that some 1,000 people from 20 countries took part but rather the meeting’s declaration which violated long-standing practice concerning which are the traditional religions of Russia.

            Since the end of Soviet times, Moscow has been consistent in declaring that there are four traditional religions of Russia – Orthodox Christianity, Islam, Buddhism and Judaism – giving special deference to these and reducing others like Protestantism and Catholicsm to a lesser status (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2019/02/kremlin-divides-churches-subordinate-to.html).

            While the Russian Federation does not have a formalized ideology that the Soviet Union did, it does have certain formulations such as about “the four traditional religions of Russia” which are almost never violated. That makes what happened at the Tyva conference so intriguing.

            The forum concluded with a declaration that said in part that “Russia is a multi-confessional, multi-national country where Buddhism, Orthodoxy and Islam live in peace and harmony, failing to mention Judaism in its list (asiarussia.ru/news/52107/ and egov-buryatia.ru/press_center/news/detail.php?ID=208193).

            That a meeting as important as this one should do so is striking and suggests that even though Putin himself has continued to meet with Jewish leaders on occasion and other groups have used the standard formulation in recent months, there appears to be a greater willingness than in the past to change that formulation and drop the reference to Judaism in this favored list.

            That list continues to matter not just as a declaration but as a guide to policy. Putin himself has worked hard to marginalize all faiths not on the list (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/04/putin-seeks-to-marginalize-or-even.html); and groups as diverse as Protestants and Shamans have sought to join it (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/07/putins-war-in-ukraine-has-divided.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2022/02/russias-4000-shamans-seek-official.html).

            If what the Buddhists have now done at a Kremlin-backed meeting is a harbinger of the possible ideological fate of Judaism in Russia, that could presage a major change in Moscow’s policies toward Jews. At the very least, it will encourage those Russian nationalist groups that they may be able to act more aggressively against Judaism than in the past. 

 

More than Just Fears of Mobilization Driving Up New Interest in Emigration among Russians, Emigration Activists Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 20 – Unlike in 2022 when most Russians thinking about or actually pursuing emigration because of fears they would be mobilized for service in Ukraine, today, Russians thinking about leaving the country are doing so for a broad range of reasons including the conviction that the situation in Russia is getting worse, Ark emigration activists say.

            This change suggests three important conclusions, although the Ark analysts who report this development aren’t drawing these at least in public. First, even if the threat of mobilization this fall passes, interest in and even actions toward emigration will continue          (echofm.online/news/eto-lyudi-kotorye-gotovy-ehat-pravozashhitniki-iz-kovchega-rasskazali-ehu-o-novoj-volne-emigraczii-iz-rossii).

            Second, the number of steps the Russian government would have to take to change this situation is enormously broad, ranging from a significant decline in repression to an economic policy improving the lives of ordinary Russians and reducing the enormous gap between the wealthy and the poor in that country.

            And third, because the Putin regime shows no signs of moving in that direction, the Kremlin almost certainly will seek to make emigration both less attractive and more difficult and take ever more steps to restore the situation of pre-perestroika times when few people were allowed to leave.

            Given that free travel to and from foreign countries is one of the benefits of the collapse of the Soviet system that Russians say they most value, Putin will likely try to avoid a public declaration that he is closing the borders lest making such a move would likely trigger even more anger than his moves against the internet.

Unlike Stalin, Putin isn’t Compensating for Repression with Victories, Gallyamov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 20 – Many observers are suggesting that Russians will accept Putin repressions for a long time to come because they accepted Stalin’s a century ago, but those who do are missing an essential point, Abbas Gallyamov says; and it is this: Unlike Stalin, Putin isn’t compensating for his repressions with victories.

            According to the former Putin speechwriter turned Putin critic, “repressions against one’s own population, carried out by the authorities when they are defeating an external enemy, have far more legitimacy than do repressions when the authorities are unable to defeat such an enemy” (echofm.online/opinions/stalin-kompensiroval-repressii-pobedami).

            “Therefore,” Gallyamov says, “it makes no sense in the current situation to point to the fact that Russians supposedly accept the Stalin-era repressions with equanimity. Stalin offset repressions with victories; in recent years, Putin has brought the country nothing but defeats alongside his repressions.”

            And what that means in turn is that Putin must have an outcome in Ukraine that he can present to Russians as a victory or he will likely be confronted with a population that will be far less willing to accept his repressive policies because he hasn’t given them the victory that he has been promising.

            That is a major reason why Putin can’t agree to anything other than what he can describe as a victory, however much pressure anyone puts on him because for him victory in Ukraine is not a geopolitical issue but an existential one of his survival in power and perhaps even more than that.