Russian Firms Less Likely to Hire Those who Took Bonuses to Fight in Ukraine than Those who Didn’t, New Study Finds

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 1 –Russian firms are less likely to hire those who took bonuses and signed contracts to fight in Ukraine than those who went there after being drafted, according to research conducted by Sergey Alekseyev, published in the Journal of Peace on August 25 and now republished by the Russian-language Riddle portal.

            The Russian scholar who teaches in Australia says that this is not “proof” of anti-war attitudes among employers but rather likely reflects concerns among then about “exposure to violence or trauma, concerns about workplace adjustment, and [an association of] volunteary enlistment to financial desperation of ideological zeal” (ridl.io/ru/geroj-na-bumage-minus-v-rezyume/ resposting academic.oup.com/jpr/advance-article/doi/10.1093/jopres/xjag064/8769484).

            What Alekseyev and  his research colleagues did was to send 120 fake but plausible applications to employers which were similar except for the cv line about military service with 60 declaring that they had signed contracts to serve in Ukraine and 60 saying that they had served as draftees.

            The differences in the response of potential employers was “stark,” Alekseyev says. Fifty-five percent of those who said they had served as draftees got callbacks while only 36.7 percent of those who said they were volunteers did no, “exactly one-third” fewer than the applications which said they had been draftees.

            This research was carried out in the late spring and over the summer, when Russia’s official unemployment level was at an all-time low of 2.2 percent, but before the introduction by regional governments of requirements that firms hire a certain number of veterans or face fines.

            Alekseyev’s overall conclusion is that “the Kremlin can flatten distinctions in official speech while civilian behavior restores them given that employers appear to distinguish between service and choice and between putting on a uniform and volunteering for the campaign” in Ukraine.

            The new  regional quotas for hiring veterans, the scholar says, “may suppress the visible consequences of that distinction but may also conceal rather than eliminate it” – and that is yet another consequence of Putin’s war in Ukraine on Russia that is likely to last long into the future.

Few Russians are Prepared to Call Putin a Criminal but Most are Now Ready to Label Him Incompetent, Gallyamov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 4 – What has been happening on the front lines in Ukraine and across Russia itself has not led many Russians to call Putin criminal – for the present, that is simply “too much,” Abbas Gallyamov says; but it has led a majority of them to conclude that he is incompetent and that in itself is eroding his support.

            According to the former Putin speechwriter and now Putin critic, that is because “Putin ever more strongly recalls a religious fanatic: his struggle with the West looks ever more like a real crusade; and fanaticism from the point of view of the public is the opposite of competence” (t.me/abbasgallyamovpolitics/11066 reposted at echofm.online/opinions/putin-vsyo-silnee-napominaet-religioznogo-fanatika).

            For most Russians as for most other people, Gallyamov continues, “a competent man thinks soberly and dispassionately; a fanatic however is not capable of either. And the latter, even if he doesn’t shout with bulging eyes like Hitler, still harbors a fixation which prevents him from viewing things in an adequate way.”

            Russians can now see that in Putin and it is why they are expressing less and less confidence in him. A recognition of incompetence by elites and masses can even be the start of his fall, something that has been true in the case of other leaders who have demonstrated their incompetence as well.

            Gallyamov sums up the situation by referring to the classic Soviet film about Stirlitz, the Russian spy in Nazi Germany, who was once told by “a wide Nazi general” that “fanatics can win at first, but they will never achieve a victory because they will get tired of themselves” and thus act in ways that will preclude such an outcome.  

Ingushetia Plays Down 1992 War with North Ossetia but is Worried Enough about That Clash to Bring in Police from Vladivostok to Man Border Post

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 2 – The 1992 border war between Ingushetia and North Ossetia has been forgotten by many, but it is still very much on the minds of Ingush who were forced to flee. The Ingush authorities this year have played it down in the hopes of avoiding protests, but they have been worried enough to bring in police from Vladivostok to man border post.

            The independent Ingush portal Fortanga noted that no senior official or government media outlet used the occasion of the day of memory of MIAs to recall the 1992 clashes in the Prigorodny district, an issue that still roils Ingush society (fortanga.org/2026/09/vlasti-ingushetii-ne-vspomnili-o-zhertvah-tragedii-v-prigorodnom-rajone-v-mezhdunarodnyj-den-propavshih-bez-vesti/).

              Just how much those events of more than 30 years ago do affect the thinking of Ingush, however, was implicitly recognized by those same officials when they brought in police from Vladivostok in the Russian Far East to guard the border post between the two republics (fortanga.org/2026/08/chermenskij-post-na-granicze-ingushetii-i-osetii-budut-ohranyat-policzejskie-iz-vladivostoka/).

              The commanders of these Russian units and the Ingush government not surprisingly presented this decision as one intended only to block illegal flows of goods and to protect the population, but there can be little doubt that these outside forces were brought in to prevent any protests about 1992 and the unresolved problems the war left behind.

              Ingushetia has brought in police from the Russian Far East before when it has felt threatened by popular protests; but analysts said that this earlier move had proved counterproductive because it had shown the Ingush people they remain part of an empire (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2021/06/moscows-use-in-ingushetia-of-police.html).

              What has happened in Ingushetia is a useful reminder of both how people who have suffered conflicts do not soon forget them however much the authorities try to encourage that and also how these authorities simultaneously refuse to address these problems and instead use outsiders to repress their own people and maintain their reputation in Moscow.

              In this case, it may also be that Magas doesn’t trust its own security forces, a reasonable view given that a group of Ingush police broke with Magas over the protests about the deal with Grozny that gave away a large portion of Ingush land. (On that case and its resonance, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2021/08/european-court-to-take-up-case-of-13.html.)  

              While attention to Ingushetia has declined since the end of the protests in 2019-2020 and the subsequent trial of the Ingush Seven, these latest reports from Magas suggest that the situation there is anything but calm and stable and that the authorities both in the Ingush capital and Moscow are worried. 

             

Putin’s Much Ballyhooed ‘Time of Heroes’ Program to Make Veterans New Elite Being Quietly Shut Down, ‘Agents Media’ Reports

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 1 – In February 2024, Putin announced the “Time of Heroes” program to train veterans of his war in Ukraine so that they could form the new political elite of the country. All federal subjects save Moscow city set up courses. But without fanfare, all but a handful have shut down; and the others are likely to soon, Agents Media reports.

            This is the latest example of a Putin program that was promoted by Kremlin media as a major policy effort that did not live up to expectations – few graduates entered elites even in the regions – and then was quietly shut down (agents.media/novoj-elity-bolshe-ne-nado-zapushhennye-putinym-karernye-lifty-dlya-voennyh-prekratili-nabor-pochti-v-90-regionov/).

            After Putin’s announcement, the governments of all federal subjects of the Russian Federation and four occupied and annexed territories of Ukraine set up these training schools and launched programs via the internet to recruit veterans to sign up so that they could become members of a new Russian elite.

            Almost immediately, however, current officials showed their unwillingness to accept even these privileged selectees as their colleagues; and both that resistance and the failure of the Kremlin to press the existing regimes to promote these new “heroes” to positions of responsibility suggested that the program was in trouble.

            By the end of last month, most of these programs were dying, with 77 of the federal subjects having taken in only one class in these programs, four taking in two, and only one -- St. Petersburg – having admitted the expected three rounds of veterans as students in this supposedly key Putin program. And few of them still had up accessible websites.

            Some 50,600 veterans reportedly applied to these courses, but only 3145 were admitted. Some veterans complained as recently as June, but the officials who oversaw the program have gone silent, an indication along with the cutback in access to their internet sites suggests the program is headed for the scrapheap.

Central Asians and All Others Must View Russian and Soviet History as ‘a History of Colonialism,’ Kazakh Historian Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 31 – Moscow continue to promote the myth that Russia was never an empire but a liberator and provider of assistance and that, if it had some aspects of an imperial state, these reflected authoritarianism rather than imperialism and were minor compared to the aid it gave to the people it absorbed, Botakoz Kasymbekova says.

            The Kazakh historian who is now at the University of Zurich says the facts of the case show that the Russian Empire and the USSR were imperial states who behaved like other colonial empires and that this must be recognized (azattyqasia.org/a/rossiya-i-tsentralnaya-aziya-ot-tsarizma-i-bolshevikov-do-nashih-dney/33842464.html).

            Russia to this day has “a state-forming myth that Russia has not advanced into countries but that they have voluntarily wanted to become part of Russia,” despite all the evidence of the ways Russia used military force to impose its discriminatory rule and then run the lives of the people in its colonies, Kasymbekova says.

            Not only do Russians not talk about these facts honestly, the Kazakh historian says; but they become angry when Central Asians or others who are members of the communities the Russian state has conquered and suppressed and seek to maintain a classical “post-colonial” situation in which the colonized do not recognize the truth.

            As she points out, “the great Kyrgyz writer Chingiz Aitmatov wrote about this with his story of the myth about the mankurt, an individual who loses his memory and comes to love the colonizers.” Such people exist in Central Asia and many other places, and much must be done to disabuse them of these falsehoods.

            “The most successful colonial project,” Kasymbekova continues, “is one in which the dirty work of colonialism is carried out by the colonized who have in fact taken over the colonial narrative” of the imperial regime. That is a clear sign of “the semi-colonial imperial consciousness in which they find themselves.”

            The roots of Russian colonialism today are less in the tsarist past than in the Soviet one, she suggests. “The Bolsheviks believed that if they established communism anywhere, they are “resolved all problems” and were not prepared to accept that their actions directed from Moscow were depriving others of the right to choose for themselves.

            As result, despite all the communist verbiage, the Soviet Union was “a colonial empire.” Today, the leaders of the Russian Federation are pursuing the same goal and justify themselves by the same denials. Sadly, many others have bought into the idea that the USSR was not so much a brutal empire as one that sought to promote a better life for all its subject peoples.

            This commitment to providing assistance, she continues, has given rise among Russians a certain “imperial innocence,” the sense that because they were on occasion promoting social development, they were not and thus could not be held accountable for the imperial nature of their state.

As she puts it, Russians and their followers continue to insist that “Russia was not and is not an empire; and if it is in some ways, it was and is a positive empire, something that brough civilization and developmemtn rather than force, inequality, repression, and the suppression of cultures and nations.”

That has unfortunately been accepted by many in the region and beyond as has its corollary that Russia’s problem is “authoritarianism but not colonialism.” The empire’s subjects can criticism actions as authoritarianism but any suggestion they flow from imperialism is something Russians consider highly offensive, she concludes.

After Russia Disintegrates, Three Russian Oblasts -- Samara, Saratov and Ulyanovsk -- Should Form a Volga Republic, Mulyukin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 31 – After Russia disintegrates, Aleksandr Mulyukin says, three Russian oblasts – Samara, Saratov and Ulyanovsk – should come together and form a new Volga Republic so as to be in a position to repel any challenges from a revived Muscovite state and the danger that local elites will take over and suppress democracy.

            The democracy activist, who fled Samara in 2019 to avoid persecution, argues that these regions like others need to avoid both of those threats and lays out his idea for a Volga Republic in a 6400-word article in Wschody, a Russian émigré journal published in Poland (wschody.net/povolzhskaya-respublika-shansy-na-uspeh-i-glavnye-lovushki-postimperskogo-perehoda/).

            What makes Mulyukin’s article so important is that it is a rare example of how predominantly ethnic Russian regions may cooperate to escape from Moscow’s rule and a proposal that seeks to address both threats from a surviving Muscovite state and from local elites who may seize power in the name of the people but rule for themselves.

            He begins with a proposition that is all too often ignored. “Independence,” Mulyukin argues, “is the beginning and not the end of history.” Past post-imperial transitions show that “the disappearance of the former political power center does not mean the disappearance of the former ways of organizing power.”

            Consequently, those who succeed in breaking away must “simultaneously protect their new statehood from the possible restoration of external domination and from a situation in which those who take power will not turn it into their own property in the early years of transition.”

            Creating an entirely new republic with new borders and a new capital city is a way to do both, Mulyukin argues, and indeed, its lack of a history is an advantage rather than the disadvantage many assume.  It can create a new world for itself and its people and thus will be more likely to survive and survive as a democracy.

            He continues: “If the Volga Parliamentary Republic is composed mainly of the Russian and Russian-speaking population, it may well define itself as a Russian national republic, a definition isn’t necessarily anti-democratic or imperial, since a nation state can be based on the cultural identity of the majority, without invoking that to rule other peoples.”

            Mulyukin makes and develops a variety of other points about such a Volga Republic and its potential analogues on the current territory of the Russian Federation. Among the most important of these are the following:

·       The greatest danger to such a new state is not military aggression by Muscovy but the privatization of state power into the hands of existing elites.

·       That means that institutions must be the focus of development because they are “more important thana strong leader” and are necessary to “change the culture of power itself.”

·       International cooperation is essential but they “cannot be a substitute for statehood.”

·       Security must be guaranteed both by cooperation and by the development of the new country’s military.

·       And finally “historical memory should not be allowed to become a new state religion.

But perhaps the most significant of Mulyukin’s arguments is that Russian identity isn’t “an obstacle to such a project because a Russian and Russian-speaking population may well create a Russian national republic for itself if self-determination is understood as the right to organize its own political life rather than a license to decide the fate of others.”

Like ‘Soviet’ in USSR Times, ‘Russian’ Today is a Constructed and Imposed Identity rather than an Innate One, Shamolin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 2 – “’Russian’ like ‘Soviet’ is not an innate quality” in people, Roman Shamolin says. Rather, it is “nothing but a learned way of describing life” that the leaders of the country impose on the vast majority of people who don’t form it on their own but are prepared to accept what the authorities tell them.

            Putin often suggests that Russian identity is something that has always existed and in the form as it exists now, the anthropologist from Novosibirsk says. But that simply isn’t the case. Instead, it has changed as leaders have selected on or another possible model to impose (novayagazeta.ru/articles/2026/09/02/chto-znachit-byt-russkim).

            What it meant to be a Russian in tsarist times, in Soviet times and now, Shamolin points out, has varied enormously, not so much because those bearing that national self-identification have changed as because the state, dealing with a relatively passive population, has imposed its evolving understanding of what kind of Russianness works best for the regimes.

            A collective identity like “Russianness” is “formed in a very different way than individual identities are, not through personal experiences and experimentation but rather through the assimilation and repetition of ideas that are promoted by the authorities and that most people are inclined to accept.

            In tsarist times, to be Russian was to be Orthodox and loyal to the tsar rather than a member of a nation, Shamolin argues; In Soviet times, “with its focus on internationalism, specifically Russian things did not go beyond an interest in the distant past and folklore.” Now, of course, it means something much more significant.

            But what it does mean at present, the anthropologist says, is something that is the result of the decision of the authorities to stress only one of the two aspects of Russianness talked about in the 19^th century, the way such Russianness makes Russians relatives of Europeanness or the way it makes them separate.

            Consequently, Shamolin concludes, it is a fundamental mistake to accept the idea that Russianness is innate rather than the product of state policy or that it does not have the chance to change. Indeed, that is the most likely fate of any proclaimed identity, however ancient and unchanging its advocates claim.