Putin's Call for Renaming Russian Streets and Schools after Soldiers who Died Fighting in His War Likely to Spark Controversy

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 12 – At a meeting he held with shock troop  soldiers on the Day of Russia, Vladimir Putin called for memorializing those of their comrades who died there by renaming streets and schools across the Russian Federation, something that may change the face of Russia but will certainly spark conflict in many places.

            Putin’s latest appeal (t.me/tass_agency/380394) is fully consistent with what he has said before; but as EkhoFM points out, memorializing all the soldiers who have died in this way will transform the nomenclature given that there have been more than 220,000 killed (echofm.online/news/putin-predlozhil-nazyvat-uliczy-i-shkoly-v-chest-pogibshih-geroev-svo-shkol-v-rossii-pochti-v-shest-raz-menshe-chem-ubityh-uchastnikov-vojny-v-ukraine).

            Some Russians will object to changing the names of streets and schools so soon after the names given to these replaced Soviet ones after a struggle; but even those who will be inclined to go along will likely find themselves in conflict with one another given that in many places, there are more combat deaths to be memorialized than places to do so.

            And what may prove even more likely to spark public conflict is this: who will be given the more prominent streets and schools and who will be given this designation only in the case of smaller streets and less important schools? Those who receiving what they view as less honor than others are certain to be upset.

            In this way, yet another move by Putin will set Russians against Russians in the runup to the Duma elections set to take place in September. 

Former Russian Militiaman Sentenced for Urging that Moscow be Isolated from Rest of the Country

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 12 – In response to a suggestion that Moscow should restrict the access of students from the regions and republics to universities in the capital, a retired policeman has called for Moscow to be isolated from the rest of Russia. For his post to that effect, the Astrakhan resident was charged with promoting separatism and fined 70,000 rubles (800 US dollars).

            In March of last year, the 49-year-old retiree posted online that “Muscovy needs to be detached from Russia. A year later, local law enforcement personnel discovered the comment and brought him to trial (nemoskva.net/2026/06/12/astrahancza-oshtrafovali-za-predlozhenie-otsoedinit-moskvu-ot-rf/).

            “Human rights activists point out,” This is Not Moscow Speaking says that “this case stands out from the general pattern of repressive practices.” Cases about calling for separatism “most often target indigenous residents of national republics rather than those who seriously or ironically call for Moscow to secede from the rest of the country.”

KPRF has Found a Formula to Criticize Putin without Naming Him that Recalls what Milyukov Did in 1916, Gallyamov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 12 – The KPRF has come up with “a formula which allows them to criticize the authorities vigorously while formally maintaining ‘a patriotic stance,’” Abbas Gallyamov says. All they have to do is mention some unfulfilled presidential orders and avoid calling for an immediate end to the war in Ukraine.

            That is because, the former Putin speechwriter and now Putin critic argues, “after 26 years of undivided rule, any criticism of the system in general reflects poorly on Putin personally” (t.me/abbasgallyamovpolitics/10616 reposted at echofm.online/opinions/posle-26-let-bezrazdelnogo-vlastvovaniya-lyubaya-kritika-sistemy-byot-po-putinu).

            While this may not win the KPRF votes, such an approach is far from “harmless” as far as Putin is concerned given that “any criticism of the system reflects poorly on him,” Gallyamov continues. ‘The good Tsar, bad boyars’ formula stopped working long ago because everyone knows that the Tsar personally selected and appointed these ‘boyars.’”

            What happened at the end of imperial times is suggestive, Gallyamov says. When Pavel Milyukov gave his famous “is this stupidity or is this treason?” the liberal Russian leader “formally directed his grievances at the ministers rather than the Emperor, but everyone understood” who was the real target. “Three months later, Nicholas himself was overthrown.”

Win or Lose in Ukraine, Moscow Likely to Lose Part of Russia’s Periphery in the Next Decade, MGIMO Scholar Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 10 – In the same address to the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in which he predicted conflict with the West will continue after the war in Ukraine ends, Andrey Bezrukov argued that regardless of the outcome of that war, Moscow will likely lose part of Russia’s periphery over the following decade.

            Many act as if the end of the war will return everything to the status quo ante, the MGIMO scholar says, but in fact overcoming the results of the war will be difficult and all the problems Russia had earlier will return, be even more acute and require increased efforts to prevent disaster (gumilev-center.ru/77005-2/).

            Changing the Russian economy from a wartime one to a peacetime one is something a few Russians are beginning to talk about, Bezrukov says; but one of the most serious is likely to be fissiparousness in the regions and republics and the declaration of independence by some of them.

            According to some recent studies by European scholars, the chance of “a partial disintegration of Russia” along ethnic lines will be just over 20 percent over the period of 12 to 23 years after the war concludes. According to Bezrukov, “this must be considered as a serious post-war threat.”

            The most likely to exit are “the depressed periphery regions like the Caucasus, Karelia or Tyva, who may declare independence and gain Western support. Those wealthier and deeper within the Russian Federation like Tatarstan or the Khanty-Mansiysk AD are less likely to try to leave or be supported in that effort.

            According to Bezrukov, at the start of the expanded war in Ukraine, many opposed to Russia’s policy focused on the disproportionate recruitment of indigenous ethnic minorities to fight there, but “no one paid any interest” in that at least not in the upper reaches of the Russian government.

            “Today, however, closer to the end of the special military operation, historical, psychological, political, economic, demographic and institutional preconditions for the sharpening of old contradictions have become more important. And they are now beginning to take on an ethnpolitical dimension.”

            Still, in the minds of many, he continues, “the development of peripheral regions whose contribution to the federal budget is small and whose population lives in large part on the basis of a natural economy does not appear to be a first-order task. But mistakes in assessing the situation and administration can cost dearly in the medium and long term.”

Russia ‘On Brink of Social Explosion’ Because of Kremlin Policies over the Last 25 Years, KPRF Duma Deputy from Buryatia Warns

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 12 – Vyacheslav Markhayev, a KPRF Duma deputy from Buryatia, says that Moscow’s failed policies over the last 25 years, precisely how long Vladimir Putin has been in power, have left Russia in a situation where the danger of a social explosion is increasingly likely unless changes are made.

            The deputy’s sharp words  (t.me/markhaev_official/2651reposted at echofm.online/documents/deputat-gosdumy-ot-buryatii-vyacheslav-marhaev-strana-nahoditsya-na-grani-soczialnogo-vzryva) have attracted widespread attention and even support.

            (For examples, see  nemoskva.net/2026/06/12/deputat-gosdumy-marhaev-potreboval-publichnyj-plan-zaversheniya-vojny/, novayagazeta.eu/articles/2026/06/12/deputat-gosdumy-raskritikoval-politiku-vlastei-sravnil-ikh-s-vneshnimi-vragami-i-zaiavil-chto-rossii-nuzhen-publichnyi-plan-zaversheniia-voiny-news and ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/06/12/deputat-dumi-otkprf-zayavil-obugroze-sotsialnogo-vzriva-ineobhodimosti-plana-zaversheniya-svo-a198035.)

            Markhayev begins his attack by pointing to the “relentless attacks by Ukrainian forces on our cities” and the Kremlin’s failure to call off the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum as it had earlier called off the May 9 Victory Day parade, a sign that those in power simply want to “project the illusion of prosperity” when there is “a lack of genuine achievements” – except for “the personal enrichment of the elite.”

“In recent years, numerous development programs and strategies have been drafted for every sector of the Russian economy., Markhayev continues; “but virtually none have been implemented; they remain merely on paper or in declarations made from international podiums. Instead we continue to face new bans, restrictions, and burdens.”

For example, he says, “utility rates have surged by 366% over the past 25 years …  pensioner who receives 22,000 rubles a month is thus forced to spend 12,000 on utilities alone. Infrastructure inherited from the USSR is crumbling while funds are diverted yachts, palaces, and overseas assets.”

While most Russians are suffering, Markhayev says, “the pockets of government officials and the inner circle of the elite remain full. According to 2026 Forbes data, the number of Russian billionaires hit a record high of 155, with a combined net worth of nearly $700 billion—a figure one and a half times the size of the federal budget.”

Moreover, “Embezzlement running into the billions, the arrest of officials at all levels, and the seizure of assets worth a trillion rubles annually—this is the reality. This trajectory is largely a legacy of the 1990s, when the country endured the wholesale plundering of state property.”

“What would a foreign enemy do if it conquered Russia?” Markhayev asks thetorically. “It would appropriate resources, loot industry, hike up utility rates, and build itself mansions. Yet no invasion occurred; the authorities accomplished this themselves—more effectively than any aggressor.”

In fact, the deputy continues, “not a single successful reform has been implemented in 35 years, while oligarchs continue to multiply and amass wealth—even now, in the fifth year of ‘the Special Military Operation,’” in which Russia is “losing the most active and reproductive segments of its people due to incompetent leadership.”

And he warns in conclusion that “If this situation persists, a social explosion and chaos become increasingly likely. The West will inevitably exploit this to finish off the remnants of Russian statehood. The same team has led the political system for a quarter of a century, yet appears to have largely lost touch with the people's needs.”

“Present-day Russia has existed for half as long as the Soviet Union did, yet the only ones who can boast of progress are the oligarchs and their inner circle—less than 5% of the population … The time for illusions has passed. The country is on the verge of a social explosion, and the entire responsibility for this will rest with the entrenched leadership.”

Another Symbolic Date Passes: Putin’s War in Ukraine Now Longer than Russia’s in World War I which Triggered Revolution

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 11 – In January, Putin’s expanded war in Ukraine passed the length of Russia’s participation in World War II, a conflict Russians refer to as the Great Patriotic War. Now, it has exceeded the length of Russia’s involvement in World War I, a conflict that triggered the revolutions of 1917.

            That makes this week’s anniversary far more symbolic if far more troubling than the more frequent comparison with World War II. At the end of that conflict, the USSR was a victor and in possession of half of Europe; but at the end of the earlier one, it was losing to the Central Powers and mired in revolution and civil war.

            Not surprisingly, the Putin regime isn’t interested in having anyone draw comparisons between today’s conflict with Ukraine and Russia’s defeat in World War I, especially on the question of revolution. But even pro-Kremlin commentators have not been able to avoid the temptation to suggest parallels even if they suggest the ultimate outcome will be different.

            For one of the more thoughtful examples of articles on this subject, see in particular Dmitry Seleznyov’s reflection on how the current war in Ukraine is both similar to and different from World War II and thus why its outcome is likely to be very different as well at apn-spb.ru/opinions/article39781.htm.

Resistance to Moscow’s Plan to Eliminate Local Municipalities Taking Political Form

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 10 – The Kremlin’s plan to eliminate municipal governments both to save money and increase central control has angered many, especially on the periphery of the Russian Federation where such local governments are most important; and there are signs that this anger is now sparking ever more political form.

            Two occurred this week, the first in the restive Komi Republic in the Russian North (semnasem.org/news/2026/06/09/kommunisty-iniciirovali-referendum-o-sohranenii-selsovetov-v-komi) and the second in the even more troubled Khabarovsk Kray in the far east (semnasem.org/news/2026/06/09/deputaty-uvolili-glavu-habarovskogo-sela-otkazavshegosya-unichtozhat-selsovety-za-nego-vstupilos-okolo-300-zhitelej).

            In Komi, the local branch of the KPRF submitted an application to the regional parliament to allow aa referendum that would reverse the May 28 decision of that body abolishing these local governments, a move the parliament may block but one that will stir up the republic’s population as the Russian Federation heads into the Duma elections this fall.

            Meanwhile, in the Khabarovsk village of Knyze-Volkonskoye, the local council voted eight to one to dismiss the head of  the government body there after he refused to disband the municipality as Moscow has demanded. Some 300 local people had petitioned the council not to dismiss him and not to disband their government; but at its closed meeting, the deputies did both.

            While those moves were a loss to the local population, this situation highlights just how angry many people in places where municipal governments are being disbanded at the Kremlin’s order and suggests that at least some of these people will be less inclined to support pro-Moscow candidates of United Russia now than they had been in the past.