Tuesday, October 20, 2026

New Film in Ukrainian and Polish Stresses ‘Special Place’ of Ukrainians within Promethean Movement

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 18 – To the outrage of some in Moscow (ritmeurasia.ru/news--2026-10-18--polskij-prometej-zhazhdet-krovi-91034), a new film in Ukrainian with Polish subtitles has appeared in Poland stressing “the special place” Ukrainians occupied in the Promethean movement in the 1920s and 1930s and why it continues to play that role.

            The 77-minute film, which features the commentaries of Pawel Liera of the Warsaw Institute of National Remembrance and Valentyna Piskun of Kyiv’s Institute of the History of Ukraine, tells the story of the Promethean League and Ukraine’s place in it. It is available at mieroszewski.pl/wiedza/dokumentalnie/polska-i-ukraina/prometeizm-zapomniany-projekt-przeciw-rosyjskiemu-imperializmowi.

            For background on Prometheanism and its continuing influence in Eastern Europe and on the territory now occupied by the Russian Federation and other former Soviet republics, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/04/prometheanism-showed-that-joint.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2021/12/revival-of-prometheanism-outrages.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2016/07/intermarium-idea-whose-time-is-coming.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2013/01/window-on-eurasia-polish-attention-to.html.  

Kremlin Propaganda has Done Something Worse than Generate Support for War in Ukraine, Kuleshova Says; It hadesgs Destroyed Ability of Russians to Make a Moral Assessment

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 19 – Many people suggest that Kremlin propaganda has effectively generated support for Putin’s war in Ukraine, but in fact, it has not done that, Anna Kulashova says. Instead, it has done something far worse: it has destroyed the ability of many Russians to make a moral assessment of that conflict and much else.

            Kremlin propaganda, the Russian sociologist who has worked in Luxembourg since 2022 says, has not “zombified millions of people and turned them into aggressive and ideological supporters of the armed conflict” (novayagazeta.ru/articles/2026/10/19/tsinizm-lukavogo-cheloveka).

            Polls have shown that the number of convinced supporters of Putin’s war is still about 22 percent, a figure roughly equal to the number of convinced opponents, she continues. Many more simply refuse to make any judgment and thus go along with whatever the regime wants because they no longer feel themselves capable of assessing things for themselves.

            One of the most powerful tools of Kremlin propaganda, she suggests, is the notion of “whataboutism,” the promotion of the idea that since things are far from perfect outside of Russia, “we [in Russia] can do everything” and thus conclude that “we are doing everything right.

            In this way, she says, “attention is shifted from one’s own acts to the motives and sins of those who criticize that individual.” And when the state promotes this view of the world or supports it by monetarizing death and suggesting that war is the eternal state of mankind, it deprives people of their own moral foundations and thus the basis for right action.

            “Once life without war is impossible, then trying to change something is meaningless” Kuleshova says. “Together with fatalism, propaganda imposes total cynicism, and It masterfully neutralizes any idealistic and humanistic values like calls for world peace, the value of human life, empathy and mercy.”

            The sociologist tsays that “the authorities do not need everyone to believe in the necessity of war. They are enough to ensure that no one believes in anything or that it is possible to live differently, nor that his own conscience is more important than a strange bad example, nor that the world is better than war.”

            And that in turn leaves Russian society in a far worse position: “A convinced opponent can be persuaded, but with cynics everything is more difficult, they have nothing to revise.” As a result, the restoration of the ability to moral judgment, to the simple thought “I will not do this, even if others do” is inevitably much more difficult.”

KPRF Duma Deputy Offers Bill to Rename St. Petersburg Leningrad and Volgograd Stalingrad

Paul Goble

Staunton, Oct. 19 – Angelika Glazkova, a KPRF Duma deputy has put forward a bill to restore the names Leningrad and Stalingrad to Russian cities now called St. Petersburg and Volgagrad. The last time the Duma took up and rejected restoring the name Stalingrad to Volgagrad was in 2015. It has not before considered a bill to restore the name Leningrad.

            Communist Party officials have frequently called for such moves, but only rarely have these calls led to the introduction of bills in the Duma that would achieve that end. Moreover, Glazkova has a poor track record of winning support for her ideas: Only 17 of the 57 bills she has put forward have been approved (agents.media/v-gosdumu-vnesli-zakonoproekt-o-pereimenovanii-sankt-peterburga-v-leningrad/).

            But Putin’s promotion of the restoration of the Soviet and Russian past and especially his focus on World War II may mean that this time around, a bill that would restore the name Stalingrad will have a better chance of passage, perhaps especially because it is linked to a change in the name of the northern capital rather than being a stand alone measure.


Over Last Decade, Birthrate in Belarus Fell by 52 Percent while Death Rate Rose by 1.59, Belstat Figures Show

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 19 – Figures released by Belstat, Minsk’s statistical agency, show that between 2015 and 2025, the number of births per 1000 people in the population of Belarus fell by 52 percent while the number of deaths for the same number rose by 1.59 percent, figures that put Belarus on a path of demographic decline.

            Not only do the birth figures mean that there are fewer children being born now but they also mean that the size of the prime child-bearing cohort of women will decline in the future, something that will make it very difficult to reverse (thinktanks.pro/publication/2026/10/19/v-belarusi-za-10-let-rozhdaemost-upala-na-52-a-smertnost-uvelichilas.html).

            At least part of the birthrate decline is the result of urbanization, The city of Minsk saw the largest fall in the number of births during this period while more rural areas saw much less. The relatively small increase in mortality in turn reflects the fact that it was already high ten years ago. 

            What is worrying about the mortality figures is that the number of deaths per 1000 population is nearly twice as high in rural areas as it is in cities, 19.8 as against 11, the result both of the outflow of younger people to the cities and the less adequate medical care available in rural locations.

Ukrainians Should Be Talking about De-Imperialization rather than De-Colonization, Alferov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 17 – Ukrainians and their supporters increasingly speak about the need for the “decolonization” of their country, but that is incorrect from a scholarly point of view, Oleksandr Alferov says. Instead, they should be focusing on the need to “de-imperialize” the way in which they view their history.

The reason for that, the head of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory says, is that Ukraine “never had the status of a colony in the classical sense but for centuries acted as a cultural donor and co-creator of Eastern European spaces” (rbc.ua/rus/news/chomu-termin-dekolonizatsiya-pomilkoviy-ukrayini-1791564315.html).

“Even when Ukrainian lands were part of the Russian Empire,” Alferov says, “a separate Little Russian nobility existed, something which highlights Ukraine’s historical agency rather than that of a status of disenfranchised colonial territory.” What it needs now, then, is not so much “decolonization” as “de-imperialization.”

That process, he continues, is a process of “cleansing” itself from the imperial heritage the Russian state has insisted upon, “getting rid of myths about ‘a common cradle,’ and reclaiming cultural figures of its own who worked within imperial borders,” something very different than what African and Asian countries have done in decolonizing themselves.

Alferov’s words are sparking controversy not only in Ukraine but in other former possessions of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union. Suggestive of just how sensitive and complicated this issue is likely to become is offered by Kazakhstan’s Altyn-Orda portal (altyn-orda.kz/dekolonizatsiya-ili-deimperializatsiya-chto-pravilnee/).

That article argues that what scholars and others should be doing is not so much choosing between these two concepts as seeing how each applies in each particular case. In the scholarly literature, Altyn-Orda says, “these concepts are related but not identical;” and the differences are important.

“Decolonization is liberation from colonial domination and its consequences,” the portal says. “In a broad historical and cultural sense, this concept includes the restoration of language, historical memory, cultural autonomy and the right of society to determine its own future. “

In contrast, it argues, “de-imperialization is the overcoming of the political, cultural, and intellectual mechanisms of imperial domination: imperial myths, hierarchies, symbols, and the notion that one people or state has special rights to the history and identity of other nations.”

Because that is so, “deimperialization is not a universal substitute for the term “decolonization”. These processes may partially coincide, but they are not completely identical. Society can free itself from colonial relations and simultaneously overcome imperial representations, even if its specific historical experience does not correspond to the classical model of a foreign colony.”

In support of that approach in the case of Kazakhstan, Altyn-Orda cites the recent work of two Western scholars, Edward Schatz (cambridge.org/core/journals/perspectives-on-politics/article/persistent-problems-with-decolonization-reflections-on-the-central-asian-example/) and Ulrich Hofmeister (cambridge.org/core/journals/slavic-review/article/colonialism-or-kolonizatsiia-why-the-difference-between-ukraine-and-central-asia-matters/).

Sunday, October 18, 2026

Russia Needs a State Ideology so Its Soldiers Will Know What They are Fighting and Dying For, Veteran Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 17 – Ever since Russia adopted its 1993 constitution which among other things banned the declaration of a state ideology, there have been voices in Russia urging that Moscow amend the country’s basic law so as to put in place a formal declaration of what Russia is about.

            Because of the Soviet experience, most have been reluctant to take that step; and because those of a liberal persuasion believed that the best chance for their values to remain in place was not to amend the constitution, something that would be difficult and raise more questions about the direction Putin is taking Russia.

            But the idea of having a formal state ideology may now be gaining wider support because one Russian veteran of Putin’s war in Ukraine says Russians in general and Russians fighting and dying for it in particular need to know what their country is about, something they believe only a state ideology can supply (svpressa.ru/politic/article/536357/).

            Lt.Col. Ivan Berstovsky, a Hero of Russia, called for the constitution to be amended so as to make cleaer to all that Russia is a country “based on traditional values” with “a unique identity” and won’t change with the winds at some time in the future as could happen if there isn’t such an ideological statement.

            That kind of appeal is likely to influence many around Putin and thus could prove to be the event that opens the door to yet another revenant of the Soviet past, an official state ideology with all the features it would have and all the institutions that would have to be charged with promoting it.

Abortion Tourism on the Rise in Russia with Regions Where Abortions are Restricted Now Surrounded by Those where Abortions have Increased in Number, Sakevich Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 17 – Abortion tourism, widely known in the United States, is now on the rise in Russia, leading to a situation in which those federal subjects which have restricted access to abortions are increasingly surrounded byregions where the number of abortions have risen, according to Viktoria Sakevich.

            The Higher School of Economics demographer says that it is thus very unlikely that restricting abortions region by region as the Putin regime has been doing will have the demographic consequences the Kremlin wants (“Abortion Policy and Abortion Prevalence Globally and in Russia” (in Russian), Demografichekoye obozreniye 2026 13: 3: 4-28.)

            The leaders of regions where abortions have gone up and thus their own standing with the Kremlin has gone down routinely complain about this development, but even were Moscow to ban abortions  for the country as a whole, that would not depress their number as much as many assume.

            Instead, in that event, Russia women would either travel abroad to get thisprocedure if they could afford to, Sakevich says; or, as the experience of other countries shows, they will turn to illegal providers with horrific consequences for the women, their children, and Russian society as a whole.