Kazakhstan’s Executive Branch Already Mono-Ethnic Kazakh and Its Legislative One has been Moving in That Direction, Asylbekov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 20 – Even though people who are not ethnic Kazakhs still form a quarter of the country’s population, the composition of officials in the executive branch of its government at both the center and in the region’s has become almost exclusively ethnic Kazakh and that of the legislative branch has been moving in that direction, Zhandos Asylbekov says.

            Unless this trend changes, it could exacerbate tensions in society, the head of the statistics department of Kazakhstan’s Procuracy says; but in the run up to the elections to the new unicameral legislature, it isn’t being discussed apparently because of “an unspoken taboo” (spik.kz/2667-najdutsja-li-v-kurultae-mesta-dlja-deputatov-nekazahov-i-skolko.html).

            Even in areas where ethnic Kazakhs form less than half of the population – Northern Kazakhstan and Kustanay oblasts – the minority majority of ethnic Russians and others is largely unrepresented in regional or even local executive branch positions, something non-ethnic Kazakhs have complained out, Asylbekov says.

            In the national legislature in the past, the share of non-ethnic Kazakhs has been less than their share of the population, although this metric as bounced around depending on the use of single member districts or party lists to determine outcomes, between 14 percent at its lowest point and “almost 30 percent” at its highest.

            The composition of the new single-member parliament will be determined exclusively by party list voting rather than single-member district majority voting and so that makes the decisions of the parties to include or not include non-ethnic Kazakhs on their lists critical.

            At present, most of these are far more ethnically Kazakh than is the population; and so it is likely but not certain that the new single-house parliament will be even more ethnic Kazakh than the current two-house one is and than the population is as well, Asylbekov says, noting that this could cause problems if that turns out to be the case.

Kazakhstan President Offers New Model for Dealing with Moscow, ‘Partnership without Political Alignment,’ Toyekin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 29 – During his July 25 meeting with Vladimir Putin, Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev offered a new model for non-Russian leaders dealing with Moscow: committing his country to “partnership” with Russia but not promising “political alignment” on all questions, Almat Toyekin says.

            The Kazakhstan analyst focuses on the way in which Tokayev acted; but perhaps indicative of his real goals in writing this piece, he placed it in the Caspian Post, an outlet devoted to South Caucasus affairs where Azerbaijan President Ilham Alyev has moved in a similar question (caspianpost.com/opinion/kazakhstan-s-message-to-moscow-partnership-without-political-alignment).

            What both Tokayev and Aliyev now offer is a new model of how the governments of the countries that gained independence in 1991 when the USSR disintegrated, one that represents a kind of halfway house between continuing subservience to Moscow that the Kremlin wants and the complete break with Moscow that many see as the only or at least ultimate pattern.

            Obviously, the Russian government will seek to limit movement in these directions; but by offering commitment to partnership without agreeing to support Moscow on all questions, many of these countries may find a way to navigate through what is a political minefield and prevent the Kremlin from taking more radical actions.

            Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan are perhaps best equipped to strike out in this direction. They have large oil reserves, occupy portions of the geopolitical map especially important to both Russia and outside powers, and have been building up both their diplomatic and military strength.

            But they are not alone, and many of the others in the region may see what Tokayev and Aliyev are doing as an attractive next stage in their national life, one that may allow them to expand their independence from Moscow in a safer way than a clearer break with the past might allow.

            At the very least, this possibility deserves both attention and understanding, as the demise of the Russocentric empire continues. 

Only Four Percent of Russians Charged with Espionage or Treason had Access to State Secrets, ‘Vyorstka’ Study Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 29 – Only one in every 25 of people who have been charged by Russian prosecutors with espionage or treason – a mere four percent in all -- had access to state secrets before their arrests, according to a comprehensive study by Vyorstka of these cases, an indication of how Moscow is using an elastic definition against its opponents.

            Since the beginning of 2022, it says, Russian prosecutors have brought charges of high treason, espionage and cooperate with foreign states against at least 1904 individuals, the independent portal says, even though most have no connection with state secrets. Two thirds of them are Russian citizens; the remainder, Ukrainian ones.

(For Vyorstka’s extremely detailed 10,000-word report, perhaps the most comprehensive in the public domain, see verstka.media/issledovanie-vyorstki-o-presledovanii-po-delam-svyazannym-s-gosbezopasnostyu; for its highlights, see nemoskva.net/2026/07/29/lish-4-figurantov-novyh-del-o-gosizmene-imeli-dostup-k-gostajne/.)

            Not only have the use of such charges increased over the past four years but the severity of punishments have as well. In 2022, the average sentence on conviction for such trumped up charges was 12 years. So far this year Vyorstka reports, the average sentences has increased from that level by more than four years to 16.

            According to the investigation, members of Russia’s scientific community are especially at risk of facing such charges. Since the start of Putin’s expanded war in Ukraine, at least 15 of them have been accused of high treason. Two thirds of these were 60 or older at the time of their arrest.

Putin Restores Military Construction Battalions He Eliminated in 2006

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 28 – As part of his most recent expansion of the size of the Russian military, Putin has restored the military construction battalions (stroybats) he disbanded in 2006. These institutions were notorious in Soviet times for their involvement with corrupt schemes and as places to keep non-Russian draftees away from a more active military role.

            The need for some kind of construction capacity in the military, of course, never disappeared; and in 2019, Moscow restored stroybats in all but name and in the view of critics for much the same reasons they existed in the Soviet military (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2019/12/notorious-soviet-style-construction.html).

            But now the Kremlin leader has formally restored them, nominally in order to cope with war damages especially from drone attacks as well as to create a ready reserve to fill losses at the front, according to Vladimir Mukhin, an observer for Nezavisimaya Gazeta (ng.ru/armies/2026-07-28/1_9547_army.html).

            However, while Mukhin does not address this issue, the restoration of stroybats now may lead not only to a revival of the same abuses that happened before 1991 but also and perhaps more importantly to the creation of a new matrix for a broader militarization of Russian life.

            According to a recent Vyorstka analysis, such a militarization of what is now civilian life in the Russian Federation is one of the things many Russians now fear may take place following the Duma elections (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2026/07/russians-fear-kremlin-will-take-harsh.html).

Siberian Woman Says She and Her Neighbors Want Their Region to become Part of China

Paul Goble

              Staunton, July 25 – People living in Siberia doesn’t care about what is happening in Moscow, 6,000 km away from where they live, and would like to see their region become part of China, a Siberian woman told the NewsBoom channel on YouTube (youtube.com/shorts/68_rG_qdMmo).

              There is no indication of how many Siberian residents share her views or even if this is not some kind of provocation; but the fact that it has appeared at all is likely indicative of how angry many people beyond the capital’s ring road are o about what Moscow is doing to help itself but not them and others overcome the gas crisis.

              Obviously, the woman does not speak for all Siberians; but her willingness to see her region being absorbed by China as something more desirable than remaining under Moscow’s rule is intriguing given the often fraught relationship between Siberia and China in the past.  

              Most Siberian regionalists up to now have either demanded more autonomy from Moscow or independence rather than declaring themselves in favor of being absorbed by anyone let alone China. That some are now willing to consider that as a desirable option speaks volumes about how they view Moscow today. 

Estonians Debate Whether to Sell, Demolish, Leave Alone or Transform into a Museum Russian Orthodox Cathedral in the Center of Tallinn

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 28 – Estonian Interior Minister Igor Taro has called for an end to the lease that the Orthodox Church has on the Nevsky Cathedral in central Tallinn, triggering a  debate about what should happen to it. Some Estonians favor relocating it, others demolishing, and still others integrating in more closely with Estonian culture.

            There is no question that the cathedral, one of Tallinn’s most iconic monuments, belongs to the Estonian government which since 2001 has leased it to the Estonian Christian Orthodox Church as the Russian church in Estonia is now known (news.err.ee/1610088106/tallinn-s-nevsky-cathedral-may-be-sold-demolished-or-made-into-a-museum).

            The Estonian news agency presents a survey of opinion among experts and political figures in Tallinn. Most of the people think that Taro has provoked a discussion that could get out of hand given how difficult it would be to move the church and  how counterproductive it would be for Estonia to demolish it.

            As a result, while this discussion is taking place in the final months before the ECOC must break all ties with Moscow, it does not seem likely that the Estonian government will accept the most radical proposals. Instead, it will certainly seek to stay within the law and with an eye to how Russia and others would react if it went further. 

            Indeed, it seems likely that if the ECOC does take all the steps that Estonian law requires as far as breaking with the Moscow Patriarchate, that church will probably be able to continue using the facility on Toompea hill for some time to come, although possibly being compelled to share it with others and thus become “more Estonian.”

In New Independent States, Most People Clearly Distinguish a Rejection of Moscow’s Actions in Ukraine and a Dislike of Russia and Russians, Kazakh Political Scientists Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 28 – Many Russians see any criticism of what Moscow is doing as a manifestation of Russophobia, but that is wrong, two Kazakhstan political scientists say. In their country, as in other former Soviet republics,  not all of the many who reject Kremlin actions in Ukraine or elsewhere dislike Russia and Russians as such.

            That means, Gaziz Abishev says, that Russophobia isn’t on the rise in Kazakhstan or in the other countries.  Instead, “the war in Ukraine has had a negative impact on the international image of Russia and the Russians” but that alone is not Russophobia (spik.kz/2666-rusofobija-v-kazahstane-mif-realnost-ili-instrument-manipuljacij.html).

            His colleague, Talgat Ismagambetoc says that what is going on is often “not about Russophobia and its obsessions about the Russian people but rather a negative response to Kremlin policies.” Not surprisingly, Moscow’s moves against Ukraine led many in those countries to “distance themselves from the Russian authorities.”

            The appearance of Russophobia in the classical sense in Kazakhstan and the others, both suggest, reflects Russian commentaries which people in the former Soviet space can read because they share the Russian language. If Moscow had invaded a Spanish-speaking country, for example, that kind of influence would not exist.

Unfortunately, Isagambetov says, “the position of part of Russian politicians, including opponents of the existing power in the Russian Federation” has an unfortunate impact in Kazakhstan. It certainly appears that such Russians “often are not sufficiently sentives to the itnersts, culture and languages of the post-Soviet republics.”

And such attitudes, he says, leads some Kazakhs to extend their anger about Kremlin moves in Ukraine to the Russians as such, a development that could have the most negative impact on public life in Kazakhstan if that continues, a danger people in both countries should be alive to.