Saturday, November 21, 2026

Two-Thirds of Russian Men under 40 East of the Urals who Passed Away Last Year Died Fighting in Ukraine

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 17 – More than half of all Russian men under the age of 40 who died last year did so while fighting in Putin’s war in Ukraine, with 76,790 dying from that cause while 62,420 died from all other causes, a human tragedy with enormously negative consequences for Russia’s demographic future because it removes so many potential fathers.

            But because the Kremlin tried to hide this by recruiting more men from distant and often non-Russian regions, the difference in the share of such war-related deaths between the capitals and these regions was especially shocking, activists who hacked Rosstat’s files say (ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/11/17/bolee-polovini-umershih-v-rossii-muzhchin-mladshe-40-let-pogibli-na-voine-s-ukrainoi-a211530).

            In Moscow, the share of combat deaths among all deaths among those under 40 was 30 percent; and in St. Petersburg, it was 21 percent, but in Siberia and the Russian Far East, the war was responsible for the deaths of more than two-thirds of all deaths in that age group, Belarus’ Cyberguerillas and the Ukrainian Silent Crow report. 

            That pattern will not only make it almost impossible for Moscow to achieve the demographic goals it has for the portion of Russia east of the Urals but mean that birthrates among many non-Russian nations from whom Moscow drew its soldiers will decline, further reducing their share of the population in the future.

            The impact of deaths in Moscow and St. Petersburg will be less because in those two Russian capitals, fertility rates have already fallen to one child per woman per lifetime, less than  half the replacement level of 2.2. Elsewhere, where fertility rates are higher, the decline in demographic growth will be proportionately greater. 

Russian Officials Alarmed by Explosive Growth in Home Schooling to Avoid War Propaganda

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 17 – Under Russian law, parents have the right to decide to home school their children at any point through the first 11 years of schooling, but so many are now choosing to do so in order to reduce the exposure of their children to the Kremlin’s war propaganda that some officials are demanding restrictions.

            Almost 100,000 Russian children are now being homeschooled, a figure that rose by nearly 17,000 between 2025 and 2026. Many are homeschooled because of physical or mental handicaps that ordinary Russian schools are not equipped to handle; but at increasing share are the product of parental concern about the schools being used to spread war propaganda.

            Many parents, Current Time TV says, are alarmed by the normalization of war now occurring in schools and by the fact that their children are coming home from schools in tears because their future as soldiers, many of whom will die, is promoted as the most desirable one (currenttime.tv/a/dvizhenie-perehoda-na-domashnee-obuchenie-rossiyane/33899733.html).

            In Tatarstan, where the number of pupils being homeschooled jumped by 50 percent over the last year, some officials are worried that the propaganda the Kremlin wants promoted isn’t being spread as effectively and have called on Moscow to tighten restrictions on those parents and their organizations who want to homeschool their children.

            If restrictions are formally imposed, that will generate real anger among many parents and likely transform their desire to protect their children from the pro-war propaganda now on offer into open opposition to the war itself, at least in places like Tatarstan where homeschooling is now experiencing explosive growth.

            For background on homeschooling in Russia and its relationship to the war and other political issues, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2026/02/ever-more-russians-homeschooling-their.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2021/09/educational-experiences-of-russian.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2019/11/tatar-parents-urged-to-take-education.html.

Both Moscow and Foreign Partners Must Evaluate Arctic Projects Not One by One as Now but in Terms of Their Regional and Even World Impact, Arctida Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 13 – Up to now, both the Russian government and foreign governments and firms have evaluated Arctic projects individually rather than considering each in terms of their broader impact on the region, its peoples and indeed the entire world, according to researchers at Arctida.

            That must change, the representatives of the Arctic rights group say in a detailed analysis of the actual impact of 15 projects in the Russian north. (For the 44-page report, see https://cdn.sanity.io/files/tsza235h/production/9c426ffc75a110d5106ee034e5bf58657942edf1.pdf; for a discussion of its key conclusions, see arctictoday.com/reassembling-the-arctic/.)

            One of their number, Alesiya Sashkova, says that now policy makers in Moscow and elsewhere consider each project in isolation but that it is critically important to change that because “the Russian Arctic must be understood as an integrated infrastructure and political-economic system and not as a collection of isolated projects.”

            “Russian oversight authorities,” she continues, “should apply the same approach, assessing projects together with all their supporting infrastructure rather than artificially dividing assessments among individual facilities and legal entities;” and all foreign governments and businesses involved with Russian Arctic projects should do the same.

            What is unfortunate both for the environment and the indigenous populations of the Russian North is that sanctions have only intensified this project-by-project approach because they have increased the role of the Russian state in all projects; and by inertia, this has meant that the broader impacts of these projects are typically understated or even completely ignored.

Activism by Non-Russians in Support of Their Languages May Not Save Them, Latypova Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 16 – Leyla Latypova, who follows ethnic and regional developments in the Russian Federation for The Moscow Times, says activism by non-Russians in support of their languages is increasing and has attracted widespread attention but that it may not be enough to save them from extinction.

            At present, she points out, only two of the languages of the Russian Federation – Russian itself and Russian sign language – are not at risk of dying out because the Russian government has deprived them of many of the institutions languages need to survive (themoscowtimes.com/2026/11/16/russias-indigenous-languages-are-dying-can-a-new-wave-of-activism-save-them-a94259).

            Many of the most committed defenders of the minority languages have fled abroad where they continue to promote their languages but can do little except via the Internet to help them at home, a place where the Russian government has reduced instruction in them and use in the public sphere in the name of Russianizing the country.

            Latypova quotes Khandama Tudebey, a Buryat language activist, to the effect that “language preservation cannot be separated from questions of power, access to education, cultural autonomy and a community’s right to determine its own future,” things that the non-Russians within the current borders of Russia do not have.

            Unless these things change either because of a change of heart in the Kremlin over how to treat non-Russians or their escape from the Russian empire and its powerful Russianizing influence, there is little chance that most of the non-Russian languages there will cease to play much of a public role a generation from now, however committed their activists now may be. 

Putin’s War has Hurt Middle Class which Never Liked Him Very Much while Helping Russia’s Super Rich and Poorest Strata, Inozemtsev Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 16 – Putin’s expanded war in Ukraine has imposed direct expenditures and material losses of more than 70 trillion rubles since 2022, an “astronomical” figure but one that has not brought the Russian economy to its knees, according to Russian economist Vladislav Inozemtsev.

            While the standard of living for many Russians has now begun to decline, he says, Russians overall “have not had to endure the hardships traditionally associated in the post-Soviet consciousness with wartime” and “the main losses have fallen on the middle class in large cities, precisely those not enamored” with Putin even before 2022 (ridl.io/ru/vojna-bez-benefitsiarov/).

            Middle class Russians who did not flee abroad have suffered the most and miss the freedom, foreign travel and foreign goods they had been accustomed to, Inozemtsev says. In contrast, “the position of groups on which Putin has relied throughout his time in power – the wealthy elite and the poorer strata of society has not formally changed so dramatically.”

            The wealthiest corporations have suffered only small declines in their profits and some harassment from the government but not enough yet to shake them, although as the war continues they are likely to be. And the poorest have received bonuses for service in Ukraine even though they have lost the lives of relatives and friends.

            The longer the war continues, the more the position of these two groups on whom Putin has long relied is certain to change, Inozemtsev says; but if the war ends relatively soon, he will likely retain such support into the future. Given his focus on keeping himself in power, that may now be part of his calculations.

Estonians can Finally Go from One Part of Their Country to Another without Driving Through Russian Federation Twice

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 14 – When it came to infrastructure like roads, the Soviet government showed little respect for union republic borders, often building them so that people who wanted to travel from one part of their republic to another had to pass through part or even parts of another.

            Among the most appalling example of this, given the attitudes of Russians and Estonians toward each other is what has been known as the Saatse Boot in southeastern Estonia where residents of that republic had to pass through two small segments of the Russian Federation in order to drive from one part of Estonia to another.

            The distances Estonians had to travel through Russia were relatively small, 40 meters in one case and 400 meters in the other; but they continued to be the roads of choice for Estonians up through last year, when Russian security forces appeared on them and appeared set to impose border controls, something that had been absent in the past.

            In response, the Estonian government blocked travel on these roads and committed itself to building new roads that would bypass Russian territories and allow Estonians to drive from one part of Estonia to another without the indignity of having to travel through the Russian Federation and the risk that Moscow would shut off a portion of Estonia by imposing controls.

            That effort which began last spring (news.err.ee/1610004400/work-to-begin-on-saatse-boot-bypass-road-next-month) has now been completed (err.ee/1610196340/estonia-s-saatse-boot-bypass-opens-ending-drive-through-russia); and Estonians are pleased, although some in the region feel isolated (news.err.ee/1609840575/saatse-boot-bypass-gives-locals-freedom-of-movement-but-isolation-remains).

            The timing of this achievement is especially important now given that Estonia has announced that it is closing the land borders between it and the Russian Federation on December 1 following Russian attacks on Estonian defense factories. Had this bypass not been in place, Moscow almost certainly would have blocked Estonian traffic on the road through Russia.

Friday, November 20, 2026

Nearly 6,000 People in Estonia who had Identified as Russians Changed Their Identity to Estonian Last Year

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 14 – In 2025, 5782 people who had identified as Russians in the past changed their identity to Estonian, while during the same period 1060 who had identified as Estonians changed their identity to Russian, according to Estonian government sources as reported by Tallilnn’s Maaleht weekly.

            That means there was a net change in the direction of Estonians of almost 5,000 people during a single year, an identification that people can make online and that does not necessarily relate to citizenship status but one that most Estonian commentators see as evidence of interest in integration in Estonian life by people who had identified as Russians.

            Others see it as the result of the desire of those in Estonia who had identified as Russians to improve their chances of employment and promotion or to show to Estonians that they do not wish to be identified with Russia given Putin’s war against Ukraine (maaleht.delfi.ee/artikkel/120623374/venelasest-saab-uhe-hiireklikiga-eestlane-mullu-muutis-oma-rahvuse-eestlaseks-5782-venelast).

            But at a time when relations between Estonia and Russia are at one of their lowest points in decades, it is striking that people who had identified as ethnic Russians in the past are now choosing to change their identity to Estonian, an indication that Moscow cannot hope to have much support from those on whom it has long counted.