Sunday, April 5, 2026

For Demographic, Business and Financial Reasons, Average Age of Job Seekers in Russia Rising Fast and May Hit 50 by 2030, Russian Experts Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 2 – At present, the average age of job seekers in the Russian Federation is 41, a number that is rising fast and is likely to reach 50 by the end of this decade, Russian experts say, pointing to demographic problems, the convenience of businesses and the financial needs of Russians facing an impoverished retirement.

            In most countries, the average age of job seekers is relatively young as new people enter the working-age cohort at greater numbers than those already in it change jobs. But Russia’s demographic collapse and the war in Ukraine mean there are few of the former and more of the latter, Russian experts say.

            (For documentation of these and other factors and the predictions about the future rise of average age of job seekers, see iz.ru/1910549/olga-anaseva/trudovoj-vozrast-predpensionerov-stali-vdvoe-chashche-zvat-na-rabotu, ura.news/articles/1053082535 and svpressa.ru/society/article/509191/.)

            The demographic factor is perhaps the most important warning sign given that without new people entering the workforce Russia won’t be able to meet its economic goals; but it is far from the only factor at work on a figure that is seldom noted in public discussions of Russia’s economic problems.

            Two other factors are also at work. On the one hand, many businesses now prefer to hire older workers because they are more experienced and less demanding, thus saving the businesses money. And on the other, as pensions fall relative to working-age incomes, more Russians in their 50s are seeking to retain or improve their positions by seeking new work.

Regions with Greatest Budget Problems No Longer Dying Rural Areas but Industrially Developed Ones as Result of Moscow’s Tax Policies, Grozovsky Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 2 – Because poor and declining agricultural regions have long received federal transfers and because industrial federal subjects haven’t but have had to rely more on their own resources, the latter are now “the most problematic regions” when it comes to budgetary problems, Boris Grozovsky says.

            That is a function of federal policies, the commentator from the Events and Texts telegram channel says, policies that mean industrial oblast and kray governments are expected to get the taxes they need from industry  (istories.media/opinions/2026/04/02/problemi-na-mestakh-chast-ekonomicheskikh-trudnostei-skrita-v-byudzhetakh-regionov/).

            Consequently, they have suffered far more in the last two years as industrial production has slowed or even gone into negative territory, while the historically impoverished agricultural regions – and many of these are non-Russian republics – have not because Moscow continues to give them more subsidies.

            Grozovsky documents how this difference has not only emerged but is intensifying in his article, one that suggests the Russian government may soon face more strikes as industry declines and governments in industrial regions cannot compensate for that at affordable rates – while the situation in the poorer regions may remain quieter in comparison.

Putin’s Efforts to Dismantle Internet Designed to Prevent Formation of Horizontal Ties among Russians, Martynov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 4 – Most criticism of Putin’s moves to block various parts of the Internet focus on how he is denying access to information, but a far more important reason he is doing this, Kirill Martyonov suggests, is that the Kremlin leader wants to “strip people of the sense that they are not alone” but rather members of groups other than those created by the state.

            This highlights an important but often neglected reality: Russians like people elsewhere are using the Internet not just to get information but to find others who share their views and thus are part of communities other than those defined as acceptable by the state (novayagazeta.eu/articles/2026/04/04/razrushenie-interneta-eto-popytka-otniat-u-liudei-chuvstvo-chto-oni-ne-odni).

            Because that is so and because the formation and growth of such groups would block Putin from achieving his atomization of Russian society, he is likely to continue to try to subvert the Internet in various ways even if he has to retreat in some areas because blocking the Internet hurts his goals and those of his business and military allies.

 

FSB Increasing Its Role in Russian Life in 2026 Far Faster than Ever Before, ‘Agents’ Media Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 1 – Since the start of 2026, the Agents media portal says, the FSB has “sharply increased its influence on the lives of Russians” and at a rate far faster than earlier, highlighting Putin’s approach to rule in which he first tests the waters with limited moves and then builds on them, a tactic that suggests his rule will only get more repressive.

            “In just the first three months of 2026, the portal says, “the FSB’s powers have been expanded five times,” exceeding the total number of expansions in its powers” in either one of the entire two previous years (agents.media/s-nachala-goda-fsb-rezko-narastila-vliyanie-na-zhizn-rossiyan/).

            The Agents portal provides a footnoted list of all known expansions in each of these years to make its point that Putin is increasingly using the FSB to expand repressions and that this trend is likely to continue as long as he remains in power. – and perhaps even beyond because the FSB will have amassed so much power that no one will be able to challenge it effectively.   

Putin’s Destructive ‘Deathonomics’ Doomed to Failure, Lea and Taskin Argue

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 2 – The term “deathonomics,” introduced by Vladislav Inozemtsev to describe the way in which Putin has used monetary payments to get Russians to die for him in Ukraine not only is far more pernicious than many assume but is doomed to failure, according to Aaron Lea and Borukh Taskin.

            The two Israeli analysts of Russian background say that Putin’s deathonomics is “rooted in the GULAG and not merely as a metaphor but through an actual economic genealogy. The GULAG was the core of the Stalinist economy, a system in which death was embedded within the production plan as depreciation (kasparovru.com/material.php?id=69CE4433B2723).

“Stalin, at least, feigned the construction of a civilization—canals, factories, mines,” the two analysts argue; but “Putin creates nothing save for the short-term consumption of the payouts issued for death. Operating within the Russian Federation today is the GULAG motto: ‘You die today; I’ll die tomorrow.’"

This represents the quintessence of an ethics of survival at the expense of others—a mindset in which the present feeds upon the future. Varlam Shalamov understood that the Gulag’s primary product was the elimination of the "inner witness"; for a person who survives through complicity or silence loses the capacity to bear witness against the system.”

In Putin’s Russia, they point out, “a family which accepts a death payout has effectively silenced not only its own voice but also the very question of meaning; the "coffin money" has purchased their consent, rendering their conscience an inconvenient burden.” But this transaction does more than that.

“When death becomes a private contractual arrangement between the state and a contractor, the very space of shared existence—what the ancient Greeks termed the polis—is abolished. Deathonomics supplants political will with a market transaction, thereby rendering collective refusal structurally impossible while engaging in an act of demographic cannibalism.”

As economists have shown, Lea and Taskin observe, this process costs “the economy 30 to 40 years of potential labor, tax revenue, and innovation for every person killed—replacing long-term human capital with short-term inflationary demand, and effectively transforming into a financial pyramid scheme where the interest is paid in the lives of those yet unborn.”

But as it does that, it also dooms the Putin system because that system “rests on a temporal arbitrage as the Kremlin pays more for death than a life is worth. Yet this reosurce is finite, the labor market is overheated, and wages on the home front are rising even as the pool of individuals for whom contract payouts exceed lifetime earning potential falls.”

And that means, the analysts say that “Putin has fallen into the trap of escalating subsidies: lower the payouts, and recruitment collapses; raise them, and budgetary ruin accelerates. The true civilizational tragedy lies not in the fact that this pyramid scheme will eventually collapse, however, but in what will be left in its wake.”

Russian society, of course, “will survive deathonomics, but it will continue with a rewritten moral code, one in which the price of a human life having been established, ‘the inner witness,’ the moral compass within [that survivors of the GULAG talked about] has been abolished.”

“Consequently,” Lea and Taskin argue, the era of "Post-Putinism" will not usher in a new, democratic Putin figure; rather, it will entail the absolute dominion of the security services over a population that has unlearned how to be human.” But even that is not the most serious consequence of Putin’s innovation.

Whatever some think, “deathonomics is not the cause of the economic catastrophe” now facing Russia. Rather I is the very embodiment of the maxim, ‘you die today and I’ll die to tomorrow,’ an invoice for centuries of the systemic devaluation of the individual, now being presented for settlement which generations yet unborn will be obligated to pay.”

Putin Using Talks to Extend the War But They’re ‘Nonetheless Generating Expectations’ for Change in Russia, Morozov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Apr.1 – It is entirely possible that Putin is using the talks about a settlement in Ukraine to prevent any agreement anytime soon by leading Western leaders to think that the Kremlin leader wants a settlement and that therefore they should not do anything that might prolong the conflict, attitudes that help the Kremlin achieve what it really wants.

            But however that may be, the negotiations that have taken place, “however peculiar their format and despite having yielded no concrete results” last year “have nonetheless generated expectations” in the Russian population, according to Aleksandr Morozov (ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/04/01/prizrak-normalizatsii-a191480).

            At present, the Russian commentator who lives in the Czech Republic says these expectations have manifested themselves “as a palpable sense of ‘war fatigue,” and have been “compounded by frustration over the continuously escalating restrictions [being imposed by the Kremlin] which are encroaching upon ever-wide spheres of daily life.”

            “A protracted war yielding meager results is as a result pushing the Kremlin down the path of ‘the securitization of everyday life,’ something which is intensifying across various segments of the population a clear and distinctly articulated sense of ‘abnormality’” has raised questions about “what constitutes ‘the norm’ and how to return to it.”

            That has led to a sharp debate over what normality consists of ranging from Putinism without a war to a democratic Russia with greater federalism, a debate that Morozov describes in his article; but none of the participants has specified exactly how such a normality would be achieved or what groups would come together in order to get Russia to that state.

            Consequently, while talk of normality is certainly a sign of the distress of the Russian people because of Putin’s war and repression, it has not yet produced any roadmaps that could lead to whatever form “the normal Russia of the future” should take and thus represents more a cry of despair than an advance toward such an understanding.

 

Saturday, April 4, 2026

Lukashenka Loves Being Called a Dictator but Hates Being Laughed At, Khalip Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 1 – In an essay for Novaya Gazeta Europe, journalist Irina Khalip says that “Lukashenka loves it when he is demonized and called ‘a bloody dictator’ but he hates it when people laugh at him,” something the Belarusian people have been doing with increasing frequency during his long but often absurd reign.

            It would be truly “strange,” however, she continues, “if Belarusians didn’t come up with jokes about Lukashenka.” They began even before he came to power and have continued despite repression for the 30 years since, often being only lightly modified or updated (novayagazeta.eu/articles/2026/04/01/luka-mudishchev-prezident-i-drugie-neofitsialnye-litsa).

            Khalip offers the following classics:

·       Lukashenko and his sons are flying in a helicopter over Belarusian. Down in the fields, collective farmers are toiling away. Lukashenko’s eldest son throws a banknote down: "Let one person have something to be happy about." The middle son throws down two: "Let two people be happy." The youngest throws five: "Let five people be happy." Then, the pilot—unable to hold back any longer—shouts: "Why don't you just throw that guy with the mustache overboard? Then ten million people could be happy!"

·       God summons Trump, Putin, and Lukashenko to His presence and says: "The world is coming to an end tomorrow, so go warn your respective nations." In his address to the American people, Trump says: "I have two pieces of news for you—one good, and one bad. The good news: God exists. The bad news: the world is ending tomorrow." Putin says: "I have two pieces of bad news for you. The first: God exists." "The second: tomorrow is the end of the world." Lukashenko says: "I have two pieces of good news for you! The first: I paid an official visit to God. The second: I will be your president until the end of time."

·       Lukashenko sits by the phone, speaking slowly and with pauses into the receiver: "Good... Bad... Good... Bad..." Then, turning to his aide: "What kind of people have I ended up with? They can't even sort through their own potatoes!"

·       OMON officers grab a passerby during a protest, drag him into a paddy wagon, and begin beating him. He screams: "Why are you doing this to me? I actually voted for Lukashenko!" The OMON officers, beating him even harder, then say: "You're lying, you bastard! Nobody voted for him!"

There are of course many more and some have even been catalogued on the Internet (e.g., maximonline.ru/entertainment/luchshie-anekdoty-pro-aleksandra-lukashenko-id516760/), but the full range of these, which perhaps reached a highpoint in 2020 but continues to this day can be seen in numerous internet portals where they are featured.

That shouldn’t surprise anyone, Khalip argues. “In Belarus, reality is shuffled together with absurdity—not only in satirical Telegram channels but in real life as well. Yet there are things that remain unshakable. One of them is laughter. A tyrant can banish a person from the country. Or half a million people.”

“He can throw them in prison,” she writes. “He can even kill them. But he is powerless to destroy their capacity to laugh. And as long as Belarusians laugh at the tyrant, they remain immortal—unlike him, even if he has been ruling for more than 30 years.”