Bacteria and Viruses Released by Melting of Permafrost Unlikely to Trigger a Widespread Pandemic but Will Infect Northern Peoples, Sakha Scholar Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 22 – It has long been known that the melting of the permafrost is releasing into the atmosphere varieties of bacteria and viruses hitherto unknown in the modern world that would trigger a widespread pandemic because people today have no defenses against such organisms.

            Some Russian writers have even suggested that this process could lead to epidemics in Russia, given that permafrost underlies 65 percent of the territory of that country and ultimately lead to the extinction of human life on earth (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2019/04/the-ice-will-melt-and-we-will-all-die.html).

            But a specialist on permafrost from Sakha, unnamed because of the sensitivity of this issue, says that such outcomes are unlikely because if these bacteria and viruses had that capacity, they would already almost certainly have produced such outcomes in the past (kedr.media/stories/my-tolko-chut-chut-poskrebli-po-poverhnosti/).

            But if such apocalypses are unlikely, the Sakha permafrost specialist says, they are far more likely to affect local populations in the Russian north, a development that will require both intensify investigation and the expansion of medical facilities in that region or indeed many there will become sick and even die from the release of such bacteria and viruses.

            There is little evidence that Moscow is prepared to spend the money necessary; and so yet another threat to the survival of the numerically small peoples of the North and Far East is emerging, one from the very soil on which they and their ancestors have lived for many centuries.

Half of Tajiks Who’ve Returned Home from Russia Say They will Seek Work Abroad Again, IOM Study Finds

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 24 – Because economic conditions in Tajikistan are so dire, a third of those who have returned home from working abroad, mostly in the Russian Federation, say they will seek work abroad again, most likely in that country, according to the latest report by the International Organization for Migration.

            The IOM report, based on surveys of more than 2,000 returnees, found that the average income of returnees fell from over 900 US dollars a month when they were working abroad has fallen to just 309 US dollars a month since they returned (tajikistan.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl2216/files/documents/2026-07/iom-tajikistan-annual-report-2025.pdf).

            Those plans mean that many Tajiks who have left Russia often because of official pressure are going to try to come back, creating a serious problem for the Russian authorities and meaning that those Russians who have viewed expulsion as a solution are almost certainly going to be disabused of that idea.

            The income differences and the desire of Tajiks to return to the places of foreign employment, most prominently the Russian Federation, mean that there is no quick solution to this socio-political problem and that Tajiks are likely to find ways to return especially if Russian employers, including the state, need additional workers.

Putin Purging Russia’s Libraries But in a Way that Means the Same Book May Be Treated Very Differently Depending on Who Published It

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 24 – Those who studied the Soviet Union years ago read, will certainly remember Bertram Wolfe’s classic 1969 Survey article, “Krupskaya Purges the Peoples’ Libraries,” an essay that tells the story of how Lenin’s wife imposed an ideological straight jacket on Soviet libraries in the 1920s. And they now have reason to recall that tale

            Putin has been moving against Russia’s libraries as well but ostensibly for different reasons – efficiency and cost effectiveness in the first instance – and has been closing them at the rate of approximately 1,000 a year (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2022/12/under-putin-russia-has-been-closing.html).  

            And now that his agents are going after specific books, Putin has adopted a policy that is anything but ideologically consistent, frequently treating one and the same book differently depending on who published it rather than what the book contains, according to librarians (ru.thebarentsobserver.com/novosti/prokuratura-komi-iset-v-bibliotekah-nepravilnye-knigi/454599).

            One from the Komi Republic says that this is happening throughout the Russian Federation now, leading to a crazy quilt pattern of library collections. Someone whose local library may no longer have a book published by groups like the Soros organization can find a copy in another library if it is issued by an approved domestic publishing house.

            This frequently happens, the librarian says, because many pre-1917 books and even some issued after that time have been printed multiple times by a variety of publishers and so what is “harmful” and what is “not harmful” in Putin’s Russia as far as libraries are concerned depends as much or even more on publisher than on content. 

Putin Seeking to Reduce Nations to Folklore Alone

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 22 – In the summer months, festivals of various kinds are held throughout the Russian Federation with different ethnic and regional communities showing off their cultural traditions, actions that in almost every case enjoy the enthusiastic support of the Kremlin.

            Many are inclined to accept this arrangement as an indication that Moscow is supporting such groups; but in fact what is going on is something very different: the central authorities are boosting folklore  as part of a general effort to demobilize and strip political subjectivity from these groups.

            Under Putin, regional and ethnic groups have lost much of the political power they had had in the 1990s; and his support for these folkloric extravaganzas has served as a reliable cover as  he has moved against all efforts by these groups to exercise the authority they had earlier.

            (For some of the dozens of recent examples of this process, see nazaccent.ru/content/45737-v-irkutske-bolee-850-artistov-sorevnovalis-v-masterstve-ispolneniya-folklora/, mariuver.eu/2026/07/23/rasken-ozks-v-show/#more-86177, indigenous-russia.com/archives/49123 and arctic.ru/20260722/1620247.html.)

            As a propaganda tactic, what Putin has been doing has worked exceedingly well – many accept that the holding of folkloric events whose he is supporting minorities when in fact he is acting in exactly the opposite way – but there is a danger for him that this process may ultimately backfire.

            Not only do these folkloric events bring together people who may then ask more political questions than he intends, but their appearance reminds even those who aren’t prepared to act at present in defense of the interests of their nations or regions that these communities exist – and ultimately lead them to take action to protect and advance them.

            Thus like so many of Putin’s initiatives, folklorization is a strategy that promises short-term victories for the Kremlin leader but may end by leading to the rise of forces that will result in the defeat of what he is trying to do.

Russia Can Change Itself Not by Changing Policies Alone but Only by Changing the Mechanisms by which Its Policies are Chosen and Implemented, Kovalyev Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 23 – Russia has repeatedly fallen into the same set of traps because it has sought to change this or that policy rather than seeking to change the mechanisms and institutions by which policies are adopted, according to economist and commentator Sergey Kovalyev.

            That has meant, he continues, that after a new regime announces its new policies, the country more or less rapidly returns to the situation that produced the earlier ones, leaving the country with “a high concentration of power, weak institutions and limited political competition” (ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/07/23/vosem-lovushek-v-kotorie-vsegda-popadaet-rossiya-i-kak-iz-nih-vibratsya-a201566).

            According to Kovalyev, this reflects the fact that Russia continually falls into what he identifies as “eight traps” that prevent it from making and institutionalizing real changes. These are:

First, he says, there is “the historical dominance of the state over society,” a pattern very different from most European countries and one that means the state rather than society is “traditionally viewed as the main subject of history rather than as an instrument of citizens.
· Third, the country’s economy is a rentier one in which the state because most of its income comes from the sale of natural resources abroad is “significantly less dependent on the taxes paid by citizens and businesses,” a pattern that weakens the ability of the population to control the government.
· Fourth, there is a lack of horizontal trust and “informal ties continue to dominate,” something that means that institutions themselves remain weak.
· Fifth, Russia lacks “a coherent image of the future” and continues to argue “not only about the goals of development but also about its own identity.” This “lack of agreement on the rules of political coexistence turns each new course into the denial of the one that went before it.”
· Sixth, Russia is a country of “mobilization modernization,” one that has “repeatedly shown the ability to concentrate resources to achieve major goals” but not to institutionalize these methods when the emergency has ended.
· Seventh, Russia’s political system “traditionally has been built around the personality of the leader much more than around sustainable procedures.” As a result, Russians often seek to find a new strong leader rather than to create “a system in which no leader can destroy what other institutions do exist.
And eighth, Kovalyev continues, Russia’s diversity “does not require administrative uniformity, but an effective distribution of powers and responsibilities between the center, regions and local self-government. Until this happens, federalism remains a form of administrative structure rather than a mechanism of development.”

            What all this means, the analyst says, is that “the future modernization of Russia should not begin with another economic program or the search for a new leader. Rather, it should begin with the design of a constitutional architecture that will make a return to personalized power as impossible, regardless of political conjuncture.

Minority Parties in Duma Succeeding in Getting Their Own Bills Passed and Modifying United Russia Ones, New ‘Club of the Regions’ Report Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 22 – Especially in the period since Putin launched his expanded war in Ukraine, few have paid much attention to the role of minority parliamentary parties in advancing their own agenda given that they too have rallied round the flag and generally supported the ruling United Russia Party’s program.

            But a new report by Pavel Skryuanchuk, founder of the Club of the Regions, says that the minority parties are still able to get many of their ideas adopted either by securing the passage of bills they have proposed or modifying government measures in ways that reflect their parties’ agendas (club-rf.ru/detail/7947).

            At the very least, that makes their presence in the Duma more important than many now suspect and at the same time means that any change in their share as may very well occur after the September elections important, this new report, entitled “The Power of the Small,” in fact suggests.

            Dmitry Nechayev, one of Skyanchuk’s colleagues, acknowledges that “in recent years, the subject of small parties in the academic agenda has almost disappeared,” a trend that makes the appearance of this report “an important reminder that these parties are quite involved in legislative work.”

            Dmitry Elovsky, another colleague, goes further. He says that what the new report shows is that “the opposition is learning how to win,” both by security the passage of bills its members produce and modifying legislation offered by the government and United Russia.

            These experts add that the minority parties express their opposition to government measures less by voting against them but by not voting at all. Thus, the share of non-participation in a vote is a far more important indicator of opposition than many suppose. The LDPR leads in using this tactic, with its members not voting in 36 percent of the cases.

More than Half of Russia’s 250,000 KM Oil Pipelines Worn Out and Leaking or at Risk of Doing So in the Near Term, ‘Arctida’ Analyst Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 21 – More than half of Russia’s network of 250,000 km of oil pipelines are worn out and have leaked or are at risk of leaking significant amounts of oil into the environment, according to Raya Levashova. In the case of some Russian companies, those with pipelines leaking or threatening to leak is as high as 80 percent.

            In 2023, the last year for which data on leaks are available, the Arctida analyst who focuses on climate and the environment, says that there were 14,716 oil pipeline ruptures which spilled oil into the surrounding environment, a figure that likely has risen since that time as pipelines have aged still further (arctida.io/en/projects/oil-pipeline-on-thin-ice).

            Oil leaks from ships onto beaches in the southern part of the Russian Federation have attracted a great deal of attention in the past year as have a series of pipeline disasters elsewhere. But the number of such leaks is set to skyrocket as Rosneft pushes to create a new 9,000 km network in the Russian Far North, Levashova says.

            The company says it will begin its first shipments in the Taymyr peninsula in September, although that date may not be met. It has laid only 700 km of track so far. Moreover, the project is over-budget, and it faces special problems because of the melting of the permafrost layer and the distance from services that could ensure protection in he case of spills.

            In 2020, Levashova reports, “the Russian Arctic accounted for 19 percent of all Russian oil production,” a share that Rosneft plans to increase to 26 percent as fields come on line there and pipelines become available to carry the oil from the fields to foreign markets. That build up means there are likely going to be more spills along the way, the analyst says.

            Environmentalists like herself, the Arctida researcher says, are worried that as the project proceeds, the risk of leaks will go up and harm the incredibly fragile eco-systems of the High North.  And they note that the line now being built is based on the assumption environmental conditions will stay as they are. That is clearly wrong and a recipe for disaster, Levashova says.

            Global warming is not only leading to the melting of the permafrost and the increasingly shaky ground across which pipelines pass but also to a decline the difference in temperature between soil and air on which thermosyphons now being installed work less well because they rely on far larger differences than are the case even now.

            As a result, Levashova continues, “at current rates of warming, localized engineering solutions can no longer guarantee the safety and stability of industrial pipelines; the risks of deformation and loss of containment are rising in step with the climate crisis. And that crisis is being worsened in part by the oil being burned after traveling through these pipes.”

            She says that the Russian government has failed to impose the kind of fines that would discourage Rosneft and others from cutting corners and making pipelines more secure. At present, in fact, “it is often more cost-effective for Russian oil companies to pay fines and compensate for damage than to invest” to prevent such disasters.