Putin’s Attacks on the Internet Likely to Depress Russia’s Fertility Rate Still Further, Studies Suggest

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 19 – Russians who have high-speed internet access at home and thus are able to work at least part of the time there have significantly higher fertility rates than do those without such access or the willingness of employers to allow them to work at home, the To Be Precise portal reports on the basis of demographic research.

            What this means, of course, is that Putin’s attack on the internet and thus on among other things the ability of many to work at home is going to lead to lower birthrates, exactly the reverse of what he seeks (tochno.st/materials/rozdaemost-u-par-rabotaiushhix-na-udalenke-na-14-vyse-ostalnyx-k-takomu-vyvodu-prisla-mezdunarodnaia-gruppa-ucenyx).

            The portal draws these conclusions on the basis both of recent international research and on a 2020 Moscow State University study which made this link between internet access and fertility rates in Russia abundantly clear (cyberleninka.ru/article/n/vliyanie-vysokoskorostnogo-interneta-na-reproduktivnoe-povedenie-v-rossii/viewer).

A Real Generational Gap has Emerged in Russia Between Those Born before 1981 and Those Born after 1991, Makarkin Says Polls Show

Paul Goble

Staunton, Mar. 18 – A new VTsIOM poll conducted on the 35^th anniversary of the referendum on preserving the USSR has found a distinct and even deep generational divide between those born before 1981 and those born after 1991, Moscow political technologist Aleksey Makarkin says.

Even the youngest members of the first group express nostalgia for the USSR, something many observers had not expected, while large majorities of the second don’t, treating 1991 not as the personal tragedy those in the first group do but simply as an historical event in their country’s history (BuninCo/4911 resposted at  echofm.online/opinions/pokolencheskij-razryv).

The differences among the first group’s age cohorts are slight, ranging from 79 percent among those born before 1947 to 72 percent among those born after 1968. There are two reasons that the youngest felt much the same as their elders, Makarkin argues, common socialization and the impact of the 1990s on the lives of the younger ones.

Among younger age groups, nostalgia for the USSR and regret about its collapse are far lower. Among those born after 2001, only 14 percent regret the collapse of the Soviet Union. Among those born between 1992 and 2000, this figure is 24 percent; while among those born just before the collapse (1982 to 1991, the figure is in between at 43 percent.

What this means, Makarkin continues, is that “the ‘transitional’ generation, the one which harbors nostalgia for the USSR, consists of older millennials” and that for younger Russians, “the USSR is gradually fading from collective consciousness, a process that is inherently both difficult and painful.”

            Intriguingly, the Moscow analyst says, what nostalgia there is “is not accompanied by any acknowledgement of responsibility for the collapse of the USSR. Only two percent of the entire sample and none of the thaw generation admit to having voted against preserving the USSR in the 1991 referendum while the actual figure in the RSFSR was 26.4 percent.

            Moreover, those interviewed by VTsIOMsaid that responsibility for the collapse of the USSR lies with the government rather than the people. Twenty-four percent blamed the regime, while only two percent blamed the people. At the same time, a third – 33 percent – said they found it hard to identify anyone as responsible.

Russia’s Zoomers like ‘the Raznochintsy’ Two Centuries Ago Likely to Turn to Revolutionary Ideas, Semyonov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 18 – Many of the rising generation of Russians, the so-called Zoomers resemble the raznochintsy of the nineteenth century, increasingly convinced that they have no future in their own country, Aleksandr Semyonov says, and thus willing to adopt radical ideas from the streets and turn them into a revolutionary ideology.

            The Ryazan political scientist who now works as a consultant there says that allowing the younger generation to repeat that trajectory “would be extremely dangerous,” not immediately as long as the war in Ukraine and standoff with the West continues but when those things end and young people begin asking what their own future will be (club-rf.ru/interview/558).

            According to Semyonov, Russia was confronted by “the same phenomenon in the 1970s and 1980s among street gangs in working-class neighborhoods. Where did they come from? They looked at the rather unappealing lives their parents led; and on on the streets, they found simple answers to the question of how to navigate through life.”

            “If we don’t start taking action right now,” he continues, “we risk losing yet another generation.” The Putin regime understands the problem and has taken some positive steps, Semyonov says; but far more needs to be done because it is important not to “force everyone into the Procrustean bed of a single monolithic ideology, something that is now simply impossible.”

            Instead, what is needed is “genuine and open discourse that allows for the organic emergence of new ideologies,” just as was the case in the 20^th century. But that century’s ideologies have failed. Unfortunately, the political scientist says, there aren’t any examples of successful ideologies being developed anywhere.

            According to Semyonov, “the old ideologies have all died out, and nothing new has emerged anywhere. And there is thus the risk that in 15 to 20 years, something external, something developed ‘over there,’ will find its way to us” in Russia just as happened in the last two centuries.

            It is likely that new ideologies will seek to answer some fundamental questions that weren’t asked as insistently in the past.” One of the most critical of these, he continues, is this: “what constitutes a human being? Currently, a massive global challenge in that regard is posed by artificial intelligence and genetic engineering.”

            “I believe the future will be shaped around these issues, as they are already transforming the labor market and society—and doing so at a breakneck pace” and in debates rather than imposed by some fiat, Semyonov concludes. Only if Russia recognizes that reality and adapts itself to it will it avoid losing the younger generation and perhaps far more besides.

Putin’s Moves against the Internet Showing Russians He Wants to Repress Everyone and Everything and Not Just Selected Groups, Kolesnikov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 19 – “The vast majority” of Russians assumed until recently that the Kremlin’s authoritarianism was “strictly a matter concerning liberals and other troublemakers and that democracy was merely a high-fallutin’ word with no relevance” to themselves, Andrey Kolesnikov says.

            But Putin’s moves against the Internet are convincing ever more of them that Putin has no plans to stop and that his prohibitions and use of force “concerned all of them and not simply liberals who oppose him,” according to the Novaya Gazeta observer (novayagazeta.ru/articles/2026/03/19/vechernii-zvon-zvonit-po-tebe).

            “A repressive state machine doesn’t stop,” Kolesnikov says; “it has no reverse gear.” For it, “prohibitions and violence have a viral nature, and there is no end to this pandemic,” if “the vaccine –human rights and democracy – remain under lock and key” and the state retains the overwhelming means of repression.

            Now this repressive drive “has even reached the point of destroying the internet, the natural habitat of the modern urban resident, under the pretext of peddling ‘security’ wholesale and retail” again people “who had hoped to hunker down in their homes and ride out the hard times by retreating into private life. But there is no private life left.”

            According to Kolesnikov, “The state had been probing the limits of the possible, and it ultimately concluded that nothing is impossible;” and that means that “the fetish of security has metastasized” to the totalitarian view that everything belongs to the state and that its security depends on constantly seeking new areas to repress.

            For the rulers of such states, “regimes of violence are the norm; brief interludes of human freedom are deviations from that norm, and those leaders who allowed society a moment to breathe are loathed. Unfreedom becomes sacred; the State becomes an idol—one to be worshipped, and one for which it is deemed absolutely essential to die on a regular basis.”

“All of this has happened before,” the commentator continues. Khrushchev, Gorbachev and Yeltsin tried to stop it from above, apparently the only way it could be. “But society remained dissatisfied with them for it proved unable to handle its newfound freedom and never truly grasped that the punishing hand is not the same as the feeding hand.”

And so, Kolesnikov concludes, “send not to ask for whom the bell tolls – it tolls for thee,” something ever more Russians are recognizing but have not yet figured out how to respond in a way that stops this cancer on their lives and futures.

Far From All Russian Orthodox Priests Support Putin’s War in Ukraine, ‘Cherta’ Investigation Finds

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar.17 – While Moscow Patriarch Kirill’s support for Putin’s aggressive war in Ukraine undoubtedly defines the position of most of the ROC MP’s priests, far from all of the religious leaders of the Russian people take that line and many are speaking out against the war, despite the risks, according to an investigation by the Cherta portal.

            Just how many are breaking with the patriarch and the Kremlin on the war is unknown, but the fact that an apparently growing number of parish priests are following the principles of the faith rather than the dictates of the Patriarchate and the Kremlin is a hopeful sign both for the future of the church and the future of Russia (cherta.media/story/antivoennye-svyashhenniki/).

            The news service cites the words of Russian journalist Kseniya Luchenko, who apparently for her work on dissidents in the church has just been sentenced in absentia to eight years in prison (svoboda.org/a/zhurnalistku-luchenko-prigovorili-k-vosjmi-godam-kolonii-zaochno/33714192.html).

            She says that many Russian Orthodox Church priests reject the position of Kirill and the Kremlin on the war and hold services privately “for especially trusted members of their congregations and pray for peace.” Sometimes these services take place in private apartments because young people don’t want to go churches known to support the war.

            Father Oleg, an anti-war priest who fled to Georgia in 2022, says that those priests who carry out such services have an overwhelmingly loyal audience but that there is always the risk that someone will turn them in, an action which he said “in general, to put it mildly is neither Christian nor human.”

            He says that he and his fellows who have been forced abroad make use of telegram channels to reach those who need their message of peace rather than war, although the Putin regime is working hard to block these means and there may be fewer opportunities in the future at least for a time.

            Dozens of ROC MP priests have left the priesthood or fled abroad since 2022, Luchenko says. To help them, several senior priests now in emigration have set up an organization called “Peace for All.” The group has helped more than 90 priests and their families now in emigration, but perhaps its most important contribution is providing a chance for them to continue to serve.

            The project publishes their homilies and prayers against the war, reaching the large number of Russians who have stopped going to church since 2022 because of the extreme militarism that the Moscow Patriarchate has imposed on parishes whose priests it is in a position to dictate to without fear of dissent

            Father Oleg sees those priests speaking out against the war both in Russia and in the diaspora as playing “a big role,” because by opposing the war against the wishes of the patriarchate they are offering an alternative and truer image of what the church should believe and how it should be organized.

            Calling for peace is a Christian duty, he says; but insisting that the church is a confederation of parishes each with its own interests rather than part of some power vertical of the patriarchate or the president is important too. If people recognize that, then there may be hope for the revival of a truer Orthodoxy in Russia at some point in the future.

Moscow Media Referring to ‘Pro-Russian Underground’ in Ukraine Far Less Often Now than in the Past, ‘Vot-Tak TV’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 17 – After frequently speaking about the supposed existence in Ukraine of a pro-Russian underground during the first two years of Putin’s war in Ukraine, Russian media have cut back their references dramatically with the number falling by half between 2024 and 2025 and continuing to fall during the first quarter of 2026, Vot-Tak TV reports.

            In the first three months of this year, the independent television network says, there were only 47 news reports about the supposed existence of “a pro-Russian underground” in Ukraine, less than a third of the 161 references to such a phenomenon during the same period in 2025 (vot-tak.tv/92131398/propaganda-prorossiiskoe-podpolie).

            Ukrainian intelligence officials say that such Russian reportage is intended to legitimize what Putin’s invasion force is doing, draw parallels with the resistance to the Nazis in World War II, and sow panic within the Ukrainians about their ability to defend themselves against the Russian army.

            But they and other experts say that there is no way to say how many people in Ukraine are really part of any such underground, although most express confidence that it is far smaller than Moscow has ever claimed, a judgment that Moscow media now appear to agree with given the decision to give such stories less space.

            It is also the case, although Vot-Tak TV doesn’t mention this possibility, that as the war drags on, the credibility of such stories is declining given that Ukrainians are still able to defend their country effectively and even in places to advance into areas Russian forces had once occupied, hardly evidence there is much support for Moscow anywhere in Ukraine.

Majority of Russians Really Tired of War but Expect It to Continue Anyway, ‘Novaya Gazeta’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 17 – Whenever any pollster has suggested that Russians are tired of war, the conflict’s supporters insist that isn’t the case because in their view those not involved at the frontlines or in regions subject to heavy attacks can place the blame for their tiredness on the war itself.

            But the Laboratory of the Future of Novaya Gazeta working with the Levada Center has now conducted a poll which makes such objections irrelevant. Its survey asked its representative sample what they think are the attitudes of other Russians to the war as well as what they personally feel (novayagazeta.ru/articles/2026/03/17/sindrom-khronicheskoi-voennoi-ustalosti).

            This sampling of Russian public opinion found that only nine percent feel that those around them are “enthusiastic” about the war, five percent say people are indifferent, while 73 percent say they are tired of the conflict. The remaining 14 percent say they find it difficult to answer that question.

            With regard to the first question, the paper says, “the ‘enthusiasm’ option was chosen most frequently by men, affluent individuals, Moscow residents, managers at various levels, and readers of newspapers and magazines.” The “indifferent” one was selected “most often by young people, students, entrepreneurs and residents of the Urals.”

            “’Fatigue,’ however was selected by practically all groups and demographics with remarkable uniformity,” Novaya Gazeta reports.

            Strikingly, it continues, “even among those who believe the country is currently moving in the right direction—and that Vladimir Putin is doing a good job—nearly two-thirds of respondents still selected the "fatigue" option.”

            Concerning how people themselves feel about the war, “the results turned out slightly different but on the whole they reflected the same overarching trend. Twenty-six percent chose the enthusiastic option, seven percent the “don’t care” one. But 52 percent chose the option which declared “’I am fed up with all of this.’”

            That confirms wat other polls have found, the paper says; and it shows that “people are weary, they desire peace negotiations but they don’t expect to be heard or anticipate that their aspirations will ever be realized.” Consequently, they are tired of what is going on and presumably will become even more tired the longer it does.