At Least 50 Russian Women who have Gone to Fight for Putin in Ukraine have Been Killed, New ‘Vot-Kak’ Investigation Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 17 – Russian women have joined the army to fight in Ukraine for the same reasons that Russian men have – simple patriotism, getting bonuses and high pay, and being pardoned and then released from prison – as well as to take revenge for the loss of men in their lives; and at least 50 of them have died, the Vot-Kak portal says.

            The number of women involved is not something that Russian officials have been willing to make public, and the Vot-Kak investigation does not provide information on that but rather details the experiences of women in the military with whom its journalists spoke in a 5500-word report (vot-tak.tv/94855630/rossijanki-yhodyat-na-voinu-i-pogibaut).

            Knowing that most Russians in uniform would be reluctant to speak to someone identifying as a journalist especially of an independent outlet, the journalists of the portal represented themselves instead as students of film making, an identity that undoubtedly gave them more access than they would otherwise have had.

            Obviously, the details of what they found are interesting; but their four general conclusions are especially noteworthy: First, Moscow has exploited the same motivating factors with women that it has with men and increasingly sought to recruit women given the losses Russian forces have suffered in Ukraine in the last several years.

            Second, the women are rarely put in women-only units or restricted to a narrow list of jobs but instead integrated into regular army units where men are the majority and treated as far as one can tell much as the men are, assigned to play combat roles on a regular basis and not just serve as nurses or in the rear.

            Third, the data the Vot-Kak investigation gathered show that at least 50 women have died – these include those for whom the journalists have names and death dates – and that the overrepresentation of non-Russian republics and poorer ethnic Russian oblasts and krays is clearly reflected in the list of those who died.

            In addition, the journalists say, Russian women are not only likely to be guilty of the same war crimes as Russian men but they are also likely to become disillusioned with what they are doing and even desert. How large these phenomena are, however, is something this investigation was not able to establish.   

Silting Up of Caspian Irreversible and Littoral Steps Must Adapt to that Reality, Baku’s Senior Official for Water Use Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 15 – The process of the silting up of the Caspian is irreversible and countries along its coastline or using its waters need to adapt to that reality rather than continuing to debate whether this is happening or suggest that nature itself will reverse it, Aliaga Azizov says.

            The head of the State Service for the Supervision of the Use and Preservation of the Water Resources of Azerbaijan puts Baku at odds with some in Moscow who continue to deny the obvious and makes it more likely that Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan will now feel free to say the same thing (casp-geo.ru/protsess-obmeleniya-kaspiya-neobratim-schitayut-v-baku/).

            Whether Moscow will change course now that someone as senior as Azizov has made this declaration is unclear, as is the question of whether Tehran, which is currently closely allied with Russia on this and other questions, is also up for grabs. But it does suggest that reality is winning even as Russia is taking a beating on this issue.

            According to the Azerbaijani government official, “the level of the Caspian, over the last five years has fallen by approximately one meter, over the past ten years by 1.5 meters, and over the last 30 years by 2.5 meters. This exceeds the speed of the rise of the world ocean by several orders of magnitude.”

A Quarter of Moscow Residents Ready to Move to St. Petersburg, Another Quarter to Russia’s South, and Only a Fifth Say They Won’t Ever Do So, New Survey Finds

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 15 – According to the results of a new survey of Moscow residents conducted by a development company, 27 percent of Muscovites are ready to move to St. Petersburg and its adjoining areas, 23 percent want to move to the southern portion of the Russian Federation, and only 20 percent say they would not move “in principle.”

            This interest in leaving the place many in Russia seek to move reflects both the impact of covid pandemic experiences with distant working, the desire for more space and less congestion among those with experience in the city, and the fact that the cost of living in Moscow continues to rise faster than incomes there, experts say (svpressa.ru/society/article/527558/).

            Large majorities say they are less influenced by the amount of income they can expect than the possibility of having larger residences and less congestion; and of course, those who wistfully talk about moving aren’t necessarily going to depart. Dreaming about leaving is one thing; actually doing it is quite another.

             But the survey found one intriguing pattern that could have a major impact on Russian life in the future: Native Muscovites, those whose parents and grandparents have lived in the city, are far less likely to say they are ready to move elsewhere than are those who have come in recent years.

            The reasons for that are multiple, including the fact that many of the former have far better residences than do the latter given that many of them having housing inherited after the distribution of housing after the fall of Soviet power. But the fact that so many of those who do want to leave are recent arrivals points to something else.

            Not only are recent arrivals in the city more likely to leave because of costs and memories of what life was like elsewhere, but they are certain to return to regions and republics beyond the ring road with negative attitudes about the Russian capital and thus deepen the divide between Moscow and what Muscovites often dismiss as “the provinces.”

Armenia's Pursuit of Equal Treatment for All Members of Russian-Led Groupings Threatens Moscow More than Its Own Exit Would

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 16 – Any individual, group or country which is part of a larger structure created by others which have done so to give only themselves advantages has two options: exit or changing the nature of those structures so that all taking part are treated equally.

            Those seeking exit always attract more attention; but those seeking to transform such structures may achieve more for themselves and for other members and thus represent an even greater threat to the pretensions of the original creators than the departure of one or another.

            This situation and that possibility is highlighted by what Armenian leader Nikol Pashinyan has demanded as a condition for Yerevan remaining in the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union and the impact of his demand on other members of that organization (altyn-orda.kz/eaes-ne-dolzhen-byt-soyuzom-s-privilegiyami-dlya-moskvy-armeniya-potrebovala-ravnyh-pravil/).

            As Kazakhstan’s Altyn-Orda portal observes, “Armenia is ever more sharply raising the question of what the Eurasian Economic Union should be: a combination of equal states or a structure where Russian in fact has special possibilities.” He wants Armenia to be an equal, implying that if that isn’t possible, then Yerevan may leave the grouping altogether.

            It would be one thing if Armenia left. That would deprive the union of one member and might lead others to think about doing so. But it would not, as Altyn-Orda suggests, change the nature of the Eurasian Union. It might be smaller but it would still be as now dominated by Moscow.

            By demanding equal treatment for his country and for other members, however, Pashinyan is threatening Russia will the loss of something more than Armenian membership: he is calling for a new deal among the members, one that will give all the non-Russian members greater rights and Russia fewer.

            And if other members move to make similar demands and thus act as Armenia is, that could weaken Russia far more than Armenia’s departure would, given that unless Moscow is prepared to accept new rules of the game which give the others more rights and itself less, it would be more likely to lose influence across the board in the post-Soviet region. 

Scholars Offer Ten Perspectives about Russian Colonialism, Orlova Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 14 – In the course of a length essay on “how Russian colonialism works,” Vasilina Orlova says that discussion of Russian colonialism has exploded since Putin launched his expanded war against Ukraine in 2022 and that scholars and activists have now offered at least ten perspectives or what she calls theories  about its nature.

            The Belarusian anthropologist who now lives in New York says that it is especially important to understand the nature of Russian colonialism if one is to consider how Russia might be decolonized in the future (wschody.net/okkupacziya-i-dekonstrukcziya-kak-rabotaet-rossijskij-kolonializm/).

            The ten perspectives are:

·       The first focuses on the differences between Russia which expanded by land rather than across the ocean, making it “impossible to draw a clear line between Russia and the colonies” and prompting Russians to view their acquisitions as “’natural parts’ of Russia itself.” Among the leading advocates of this approach are Aleksandr Etkin, Andreas Cappeler and Dominique Lieven.

·       The second is the theory of internal colonialism, which holds that “Russia has been colonized not only along the periphery but also within its own Russian population. Those who hold to this theory suggest that it makes the Russian colonial model “unique among large empires. Among those who have discussed it most frequently is Aleksandr Etkind.

·       The third theory, that of settler colonialism, has grown in influence in the last decade. According to its tenets, “Russian colonization of Siberia, the North Caucasus, Crimea and parts of Ukraine shares many of the classical features of settlement colonialism elsewhere.” Among those promoting this theory are Lorenzo Veracini and Kate Brown.

·       The fourth holds that “the main difference” between the Russian empire and others is “not economic exploitation but rather Russification” and in particular the spread of the Russian language and Russian Orthodoxy.

·       The fifth holds that Russia is an empire which has developed “without a racial ideology “ although as this idea has been discussed, it has been “replaced by the understanding that instead of biological racism, civilizatioinal, religious and cultural hierarchies acted and that the ideas of ‘savagery’ and ‘backwardness’ of the colonized remained.”

·       The sixth theory focuses on the idea that the Russian empire not only was one of constant expansion but that this expansion was “perceived as a natural condition of the state” that could not dispense with this notion lest it collapse itself.

·       The seventh is that Russian colonialism has become so important to its population and elites because it has always been justified not as a form of economic benefit but as a necessary component of providing the state with security and the need for buffer zones between the core people and the rest of the world.

·       The eighth theory holds that Russia is a “hybrid” empire, one that combines elements found in each of the others and is sui generis as a result.

·       The ninth theory regarding Russian colonialism is “apophatic,” that is, it arises from the view that “Russian colonialism does not exist; and if it does, it is essentially cultural and gentle.

·       And the tenth focuses on the idea that the colonizer is the chief victim, that is has been the Russians rather than anyone else who have paid the price for having an empire and that they should be compensated for that fact. 

In Only Three of the 47 Numerically Small Peoples in Russia, Do a Majority Now Speak Their Native Languages, ‘Vedomosti’ Reports

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 9 – To mark the International Day of the World’s Indigenous Peoples, Moscow’s Vedomosti newspaper feature a statistical description of the 47 nationalities Moscow recognizes in the Russian Federation, groups which together number approximately 315,000 or 0.2 percent of that country’s population.

            Among the most significant of the numbers the paper reports are the following (vedomosti.ru/society/articles/2026/08/09/1219585-korennie-malochislennie-narodi).

·       Only three of the 47 of the numerically small indigenous peoples in Russia have a population in which the majority of members speaks the native language of the group. Moreover, four of the five with the highest percentage of native language speakers showed a decline in that figure since 2002.

·       Fifteen of the 47 now have fewer than 1,000 members – a few have less than 100 members -- and thus are at risk of extinction in a generation or so, while one, the Nenets, with 49,800 as of 2021 may be dropped from the list because Russian law specifies that such groups must be smaller than 50,000.

·       Between the censuses of 2002 and 2021, only 13 of these groups increased in numbers, while 29 of them declined, with the five others remaining the same.

·       With only a few exceptions, urbanization is playing a key role in the decline of the size of these nations, whose members are more likely to assimilate to others when they leave rural areas and move into cities.

Forest Fires Now a Political Problem in Russia Because Bloggers Cover Them More Quickly than Officials Do and Set the Terms in Which They are Discussed, Russian Analyst Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 14 – Forest fires are rapidly becoming a major political problem in Russia because independent bloggers can get to the scene and report far more quickly than officials do and thus set the narrative in which those fires will be discussed, putting officials increasingly on the defensive, Valery Prokhorov says.

            In an Octagon Media post, the Russian commentator says that this problem is especially glaring in the case of forest fires where officials have been especially slow to react and then come up with an official version they can disseminate and set the terms of discussion (octagon.media/istorii/pochemu_lesnye_pozhary_v_rossii_prevratilis_v_politicheskij_faktor.html).

            Prokhorov, a political scientist who is a member of the Russian Association of Political Consultants, says that officials must respond far more rapidly in order to “reduce the time between the emergence, detection, management decision and public explanation.”

            “The shorter this gap,” Prokhorov says, “the less space remains for sensations, politically charged interpretations of what is happening and the trivial guidance of the shadow of a wicker by idle commentators.” Otherwise, the political weather in Russia will be set not by officials but by bloggers who are more fleetfooted than they.