Norwegian Justice Ministry Overrules Norwegian Court Decision Allowing for Seizure of Russian Ship in Svalbard to Satisfy ICC Appeal by Ukraine

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 19 – Three weeks ago, a Norwegian court allowed for the seizure of a Russian ship in Svalbard in fulfillment of a 2023 decision of the ICC to compensate a Ukrainian company for Russian seizures of its assets. Putin expressed outrage, and now the Norwegian justice ministry has overruled that court decision.

            The ministry said that the special status of Svalbard means that countries signatory to the treaty governing use of that land must have confidence they can supply their citizens on the island, a not unreasonable position but one that Norwegian experts say Moscow will treat as a retreat by Oslo and a victory by Russia over what Moscow called “state terrorism.”

            The justice ministry’s action means that Svalbard court’s decision will be declared valid at the time it was made but that the ministry’s action means that the seizure will be reversed and future seizures of that type, regardless of the status of the court which ordered them, will not be allowed.

            (For the original action, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2026/09/with-norwegian-s.eizure-of-russian-ship.html; for Norway’s retreat in the face of Russian protests, see ru.thebarentsobserver.com/novosti/norvegia-usloznila-ukraine-vozmoznost-arestovyvat-rossijskie-suda-na-svalbarde/458379.)

            What makes this course of events worrisome is that it is likely to encourage Russia and its supporters to believe they can get Western countries to vacate ICC decisions by Moscow’s protests and that they will continue to test the limits of Western tolerance by further raising the stakes.

            Given Moscow’s current moves against NATO countries and especially against European islands in the North Atlantic like the Svalbard archipelago, what Norway has done may cause the Kremlin to expand its subversive activities to a point that Western countries will find it impossible to accept.

            That scenario is now increasingly likely and could mean that a war between Russia and NATO could in fact be triggered by a sequence of events like this one, a possibility that had been suggested by some analysts earlier. (On that, see jamestown.org/moscows-first-move-against-nato-could-take-place-in-norways-svalbard-archipelago/.)

Western Predictions about Who Will Succeed Putin Missing the Main Thing, ‘Important Theme’ Portal Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 19 – Western analysts constantly propose possible successors to Vladimir Putin and even seek to handicap them in much the same way they do possible future leaders in other countries, the Important Theme portal says; but in adopting that approach, they almost invariably miss “the main thing.”

            These analysts and commentators “do not see that the Russian government is no the sum of positions but a living system that during transit finds as its leader not someone who will be appointed but rather someone who can be the expression of the objective interests of the state in its current historical cycle” (temaglavnoe.ru/russia/32272/).

            By employing for Russia the optic they use in analyzing political transition in other countries, the portal’s authors continue, they “lose sight of the deep tectonic processes that determine the real architecture of the Russian state, the political culture of the state, its historical experience and the mentality of its people.”

            The portal’s authors list eight failngs of Western analyses of the upcoming transition in Russia in this regard:

·       First, these analysts “do not see the role of informal networks and personal relationships” that are so critical in Russia … invisible threads of personal obligation, long-standing friendships, joint experiences of study or service and unspoken arrangements, all of which are often more important” than any superficial set of views and responsibilities.

·       Second, these analysts “ignore historical memory and cultural codes … The figure of the successor there should not just be ‘fit into parameters;,’ it must resonate with the deep expectations of the elites and society.”

·       Third, Western analysts “do not take into account the factor of randomness and unpredictability,” critical because “the transfer of power iw not a planned operation but often a chaotic process in which unforeseen circumstances play a decisive role” and mistakes in the course of this can transfer a frontrunner to an also ran very quickly.

·       Fourth, such analysts typically “overlook the role of ideology and values” and thus they don’t recognize that “a technocrat without an ideological agenda won’t be able to consolidate elites at this time of crisis.”

·       Fifth, these analysts “ignore the regional factor and the diversity of Russia.” Russia is far more than Moscow however little attention Western analysts give to Russai outside of Moscow. More generally, they ignore society, a mistake because “even in an authoritarian system, popular legitimacy is important.”

·       Sixth, most Western analysts treat the security services as a monolithic whole and do not understand the tensions among its component parts. Those aren’t always visible in public but they are always present and in a succession crisis, each will want the best for itself.

·       Seventh, most of these analysts make the same mistake about the business community. It too is fragmented rather than being a unified whole and won’t act the way these analysts appear to think.

·       And eighth, these analysts generally accept “the myth” of the Russian “princes,” forgetting that “in Russia the status of ‘prince’ exists only as long as their fathers are a resource and that “power isn’t inherited.

And lying behind all of these errors is another fundamental one: “In personalist regimes, the transit of power is not so much a struggle for this or that position but a search for a figure capable of maintain and intra-elite balance.” Without that, there will be turbulence, something almost all of those involved want to avoid.

When the looming transition occurs, the portal says, “at the top of the power will be not  the one who simply ‘agree’ with the clans and not the richest ‘businessman.’ Instead, the system will put forward someone who can ensure a tight balance of interests by becoming a figure acceptable to competing corporations -- and also able to impose his will on that balance.”

More than Half of Russian Households have a Cat and a Fifth a Dog but All Too Often Lose These Pets to the Streets, Russian Experts Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 19 – Russians are very proud of the fact that their country is a world leader in terms of the number of families which have cats. Some 59 percent of households there have at least one cat. At the same time, just over 20 percent of Russian households have dogs.

            But experts are concerned that far from all families are taking adequate care of their animals and often dispose of them by turning them lose on the streets. The experts say 98 percent of dogs and cats on Russian streets are former pets, creating an issue tha divides the country (petcarecenter.ru/docs/vserossijskaya_perepis_bezdomnykh_zhivotnykh_2025 and svoboda.org/a/rossiya-stala-mirovym-liderom-po-chislu-semey-gde-zhivut-koshki/33859491.html).

            Homeless animals have become an explosive issue in many parts of the country, with some politicians now calling for a massive euthanasian campaign and others demanding that the government put more money into refuges for these animals and increase the share of Russia’s pets who are neutered so as to bring the population down without killing the animals.

Russian Forces Responsible for 89 Percent of Rapes and Sexualized Violence in Course of Putin’s War in Ukraine, UN Monitoring Mission Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 19 – Between February 24, 2022 and July 31, 2025, Russian forces fighting in Ukraine were responsible for 892 of the 1004 cases of rape and sexualized violence there – some 89 percent of the total -- according to the UN Monitoring Mission, which concedes that its figures are incomplete.

            The victims have been overwhelmingly male, the mission says, with 725 of the 892 cases of sexualized violence committed by Russian soldiers against Ukrainian men likely serving in the Ukrainian army. There may have been many more because Russian officials refused to cooperate with the UN body (novayagazeta.eu/articles/2026/09/19/oon-rf-otvetstvenna-za-89-zafiksirovannykh-sluchaev-seksualizirovannogo-nasiliia-vo-vremia-voiny-news).

            While undboutedly incomplete and certain to be denounced by Moscow because it found that Ukrainian troops were responsible for only 11 percent of such crimes, it is the most comprehensive one so far, based on confidential interviews “with hundreds of those who have suffered, the materials of court cases, and official records.”

Moscow is Actively Recruiting Russians Abroad to Serve as ‘Fifth Column’ against Countries Where They Live, Lea and Taskin Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 19 – Russian operatives are actively recruiting members of Russian communities abroad to provide intelligence now and to serve as “a fifth column” in a future war between Moscow and the West, a development and a threat that Western countries have not wanted to address, Aaron Lea and Borukh Taskin say.

            The two Israeli analysts of Russian background acknowledge that they don’t have precise data on how large this effort is but say that recent exposes in Germany show that it is ongoing and warn that it will expand if Western governments don’t change their approach (kasparovru.com/material.php?id=6AAE6C5F180ED&utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=facebook).

            Western governments are loathe to treat any diaspora as collectively responsible for such actionitss given that to do so is to violate some of the most basic principles of their regimes. Moscow is exploiting this; and that should force these governments to face up to the threat and work to counter the problem.

            Given what has come out in German courtrooms in recent weeks, there is little doubt that the phenomenon Lea and Taskin  are pointing to is a very real one; but there is an aspect of this situation that they do not address but undoubtedly is part of the calculations of Russian officials in Moscow.

            That is this; Most governments make plans only for their operations to succeed; but the Russian government has a long history, going back at least to the 1920s, of planning for failure in such a way that the failures will give the Kremlin benefits even if its main goal is not achieved in that particular case.

            Thus, it is entirely possible that Moscow is not entirely unhappy that some of its actions with the Russian diaspora in Germany are being exposed. Such coverage will undermine unity in Germany and thus make it easier for Moscow to divide Germans and thus weaken them in advance of any future Russian action.

            For background on such Russian calculations, especially with respect to diasporas and minorities,  see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/12/just-like-century-ago-moscows.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2022/09/emigre-anti-putin-opposition-at-risk-of.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2020/07/moscow-using-operation-trust-style.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2017/01/putins-active-measures-achieve-second.html.

Lukashenka Says He and Putin Often Argue ‘Jokingly’ over Who is ‘Bigger Dictator’

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 19 – Alyaksandr Lukashenka, long identified by many in the  West as “the last dictator in Europe,” told a Belarusian youth conference that he and Russian President Vladimir Putin often argue “jokingly” with one another as to which of them is now “the bigger dictator.”

            The issue shouldn’t be the occasion for levity but rather one for more serious reflection about how the meme that Lukashenka was “the last dictator in Europe” served the interests of both him and Moscow and kept many in the West from recognizing the larger dictatorship Putin has put in place (echofm.online/news/lukashenko-rasskazal-o-shutochnyh-sporah-s-putinym-o-tom-kto-iz-nih-bolshij-diktator).

            Lukashenka, of course, benefited from this moniker because in many cases, it was the only thing that Western commentaries mentioned about Belarus and kept both Lukashenka and his country in the news. Putin benefited because it kept people from focusing on how the Kremlin leader was building a dictatorship far more thorough-going than Lukashenka’s.

            And it hurt the West not only because it prevented many from seeing what was happening in Russia but also elsewhere in the post-Soviet state, keeping alive the notion that as long as leaders didn’t call themselves communists or celebrated and sought to keep alive or revive the Soviet past, everything was fine.

            It is thus no wonder that Lukashenka and Putin were joking about this identification; but it is virtually certain that the real reasons they were laughing were not the ones Lukashenka implied but rather the benefits both dictators have received because others failed to look at their two regimes and those in some other  post-Soviet states with the attention they deserved.

Russian and Ukrainian Drone Strikes Won’t Bring Peace Closer from Position of Strength or that of Weakness but Rather Give Rise to Anger that Will Prolong the War, Pastukhov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 18 – Many assume that drone attacks by Russia against Ukraine or Ukraine against Russia will bring peace closer from a position of strength or one of weakness, Vladimir Pastukhov says; but in reality, only a change in the military situation on the front line or a revolution in one or the other capital can do that.

            Indeed, the London-based Russian commentator suggests, the drone attacks and the damage they do to infrastructure and human life will exacerbate feelings on both sides and make the achievement of peace more difficult because each side will feel compelled to take revenge for what is feels has been done to it (opinions.glavred.info/prekratit-voynu-sposobny-tolko-front-i-revolyuciya-obyasnyaet-pastuhov-10797608.html).

            The reason is simple, Pastukhov continues. “Pain and suffering are much more likely to lead to anger rather than to compassion” and lead people on both sides to conclude that our side must “win, no matter how much time and effort that takes,” exactly the opposite of what the most enthusiastic advocates of drone warfare suggest.

            Terror against populations in the rear won’t change the situation at the front or the likelihood of a revolution in the capital. Instead, they will harden positions on both sides and thus “will not bring peace to anyone. Not in the near future nor in the distant one,” however popular drone strikes against the opposing side are now in both Russia and Ukraine.