Wednesday, August 19, 2026

‘Main Geopolitical Outcome’ of Putin’s War in Ukraine May Be More Freedom of Action for Neighboring Countries, Kazakhstan Portal Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 17 – Given the losses Russia has already suffered in Ukraine and the likelihood that it will not achieve Putin’s war goals, “the main geopolitical outcome” of the war there may prove to be that “the countries of Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Eastern Europe wil have even more space for independent foreign policies,” the Altyn-Orda portal says.

            That is because in their capitals, the independent outlet says, “the Russian army will cease to be perceived as an almost insurmountable military force, and the Kremlin’s ability to impose its decisions on its neighbors will be significantly reduced” (altyn-orda.kz/esli-rossiya-proigraet-vojnu-chto-budet-s-nej-posle-porazheniya-v-ukraine/).

            Thus, Altyn-Orda continues, a military action which Putin began almost five years ago to restore Russian dominance of the former Soviet space is likely to prove to have exactly the opposite effect; and that will be true regardless of whether Russia in face “loses” the war as some are now predicting.

            The portal reaches that conclusion after reviewing what are the three main conclusions Western analysts have drawn: that losses in Ukraine may lead Moscow to become more repressive at home and more aggressive abroad, that Russia itself will suffer some territorial losses of its own, or that Moscow will radically change course after Putin leaves the scene.

            In the view of Altyn-Orda, the first may happen but Moscow’s resources at least with regard to foreign actions have been reduced, Russia may lose some territories but will remain a large and important country, and efforts by Moscow to reintegrate in the international community may occur but may or may not prove sustainable.

            Seen from this perspective, Putin’s misadventures in Ukraine may best be seen as another step in the continuing collapse of the Russian empire, something that is all too often in the West viewed mistakenly viewed as something that happens quickly and could be stopped or reversed easily.

Tuesday, August 18, 2026

As Dire as Ukraine’s Demographic Problems are, They Won’t Restrict Kyiv’s Ability to Field an Army Anytime Soon, Moscow Scholar Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 17 – Russian commentators frequently point to and with more than a little schadenfreude even celebrate what they hope is the demise of the Ukrainian nation; but Vladimir Kotov, a scholar at the Russian University of Friendship of the Peoples, says that as dire as Ukraine’s demographic situation it, it won’t prevent Kyiv’s ability to field an army anytime soon.

            After surveying the decline in Ukraine’s population since the 1990s, the fall in fertility rates there to well below replacement levels, massive emigration, and the increase in mortality rates as well, Kotov argues that this does not mean that Kyiv will not be able to maintain the size of its military well into the future (ng.ru/vision/2026-08-17/5_9561_ukraine.html).

            Specifically, he says that Ukraine’s “human potential for continuing military actions all the same still remains significant” because the government has reduced the mobilization age and is talking about the possibility of the greater use of women in various parts of the military where they have not been used up to now.

            Kotov’s words are thus a warning to Russians in general and the Kremlin in particular that Moscow can’t count on the demographic collapse of Ukraine to force Kyiv to sue for peace but rather than the Ukrainian authorities despite all their country’s demographic problems can find ways to form and support a significant military force.

Moscow has Cut Poverty Rate in Russia Now from 9.1 Percent to 6.7 Percent by Statistical Sleight of Hand

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 17 – Moscow officials and commentators are celebrating what they say has been the halving of the poverty rate in Russia over the last five years to only 6.7 percent. But this decline is largely the result of a sleight of hand by the Russian government’s statistical agency, the To Be Precise portal says.

            This year the portal which investigates Russian statistical data on various questions points out that Rosstat changed the way it counted poverty. Had it used the same approach that it had used earlier, the poverty level would have been 9.1 percent and not 6.7 percent, a decline from 12.4 percent in 2019 but a much less impressive reduction than the one Moscow is claiming (tochno.st/materials/bednost-v-rossii-sokratilas-vdvoe).

            “Until 2021,” the To Be Precise portal says, “Rosstat classified individuals as poor if their income fell below the subsistence minimum—the cost of a minimal basket of essential food, goods, and services. But in 2021, it adopted a new metric: the poverty line,” a threshold set in 2020 to the subsistence level and indexed since that time.” By making this change, the agency was able to claim the greater decline.  

Moscow’s 1520 mm Railway Gage ‘Empire’ Long a Source of Influence Losing Ground to China Inside Russia Itself

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 16 – Moscow officials and Russian nationalists have long referred to the 17 countries – the 12 former Soviet republics, the three once-occupied Baltic states, Finland and Mongolia – which use the Russian railway gage of 1520 mm rather than the international gage of 1435 mm as “the 1520 Empire.”

            Moscow commentator Igor Shumeyko is the latest to do so and like others points that that this special “empire” ties these countries together and sets them apart from others who must change carriages when they cross its border (fondsk.ru/news/2026/08/16/imperiya-1520-rossiyskaya-zheleznodorozhnaya-koleya.html).

            He notes that from the beginning in the 19th century, Russian leaders have viewed this “empire” as something which helps Russia both economically and in terms of national security and that despite all the political changes in 1991 and thereafter, these countries have remained within it because it is enormously expensive to change the gage of railways.

            Finland and the three Baltic countries have taken some steps in the direction of moving away from the Russian gate to the international one but mostly remain on the Russian standard (euroweeklynews.com/2025/05/07/finnish-railway-gauge-to-be-changed-to-that-of-sweden/ and ft.com/content/0fe9d0fb-23a8-4935-a2e9-2637f444c8ba?syn-25a6b1a6=1).

            The former Soviet republics also remain on the Russian standard and thus allow Moscow to speak of the “1520 Empire,” Shumeyko says. But some of these countries are under pressure from China to lay international standard width tracks within existing Russian standard lines to ease trade.

            But the biggest current threat to this “empire” is from China and it is within the Russian Federation itself.  A decade ago, Moscow bowed to Chinese pressure and agreed to build a international gage track between the Chinese border and a Russian port (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2016/04/bowing-to-china-moscow-for-first-time.html).

            And earlier this year, Russia again made a special concession to China on the gage of a new track in the Russian Far East to increase trade and reduce costs of having to change the carriages of trains at the border (tkrus.pro/jd-koleya-china-russia/?ysclid=msxrniep1416903527, объясняем.рф/articles/news/rossiya-i-kitay-dogovorilis-o-stroitelstve-zheleznoy-dorogi/ and railjournal.com/freight/russia-and-china-increase-cross-border-capacity/).

            As Russia gives ground to China on this issue, the other countries which still use the Russian gage undoubtedly will become more ready to do the same thing and for the same reasons. If they do, Moscow may eventually have to stop talking about the “1520 mm Empire” its railroads have helped it build and maintain even when political borders change.

Monday, August 17, 2026

At Least 50 Russian Women who have Gone to Fight for Putin in Ukraine have Been Killed, New ‘Vot-Kak’ Investigation Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 17 – Russian women have joined the army to fight in Ukraine for the same reasons that Russian men have – simple patriotism, getting bonuses and high pay, and being pardoned and then released from prison – as well as to take revenge for the loss of men in their lives; and at least 50 of them have died, the Vot-Kak portal says.

            The number of women involved is not something that Russian officials have been willing to make public, and the Vot-Kak investigation does not provide information on that but rather details the experiences of women in the military with whom its journalists spoke in a 5500-word report (vot-tak.tv/94855630/rossijanki-yhodyat-na-voinu-i-pogibaut).

            Knowing that most Russians in uniform would be reluctant to speak to someone identifying as a journalist especially of an independent outlet, the journalists of the portal represented themselves instead as students of film making, an identity that undoubtedly gave them more access than they would otherwise have had.

            Obviously, the details of what they found are interesting; but their four general conclusions are especially noteworthy: First, Moscow has exploited the same motivating factors with women that it has with men and increasingly sought to recruit women given the losses Russian forces have suffered in Ukraine in the last several years.

            Second, the women are rarely put in women-only units or restricted to a narrow list of jobs but instead integrated into regular army units where men are the majority and treated as far as one can tell much as the men are, assigned to play combat roles on a regular basis and not just serve as nurses or in the rear.

            Third, the data the Vot-Kak investigation gathered show that at least 50 women have died – these include those for whom the journalists have names and death dates – and that the overrepresentation of non-Russian republics and poorer ethnic Russian oblasts and krays is clearly reflected in the list of those who died.

            In addition, the journalists say, Russian women are not only likely to be guilty of the same war crimes as Russian men but they are also likely to become disillusioned with what they are doing and even desert. How large these phenomena are, however, is something this investigation was not able to establish.   

Silting Up of Caspian Irreversible and Littoral Steps Must Adapt to that Reality, Baku’s Senior Official for Water Use Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 15 – The process of the silting up of the Caspian is irreversible and countries along its coastline or using its waters need to adapt to that reality rather than continuing to debate whether this is happening or suggest that nature itself will reverse it, Aliaga Azizov says.

            The head of the State Service for the Supervision of the Use and Preservation of the Water Resources of Azerbaijan puts Baku at odds with some in Moscow who continue to deny the obvious and makes it more likely that Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan will now feel free to say the same thing (casp-geo.ru/protsess-obmeleniya-kaspiya-neobratim-schitayut-v-baku/).

            Whether Moscow will change course now that someone as senior as Azizov has made this declaration is unclear, as is the question of whether Tehran, which is currently closely allied with Russia on this and other questions, is also up for grabs. But it does suggest that reality is winning even as Russia is taking a beating on this issue.

            According to the Azerbaijani government official, “the level of the Caspian, over the last five years has fallen by approximately one meter, over the past ten years by 1.5 meters, and over the last 30 years by 2.5 meters. This exceeds the speed of the rise of the world ocean by several orders of magnitude.”

A Quarter of Moscow Residents Ready to Move to St. Petersburg, Another Quarter to Russia’s South, and Only a Fifth Say They Won’t Ever Do So, New Survey Finds

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 15 – According to the results of a new survey of Moscow residents conducted by a development company, 27 percent of Muscovites are ready to move to St. Petersburg and its adjoining areas, 23 percent want to move to the southern portion of the Russian Federation, and only 20 percent say they would not move “in principle.”

            This interest in leaving the place many in Russia seek to move reflects both the impact of covid pandemic experiences with distant working, the desire for more space and less congestion among those with experience in the city, and the fact that the cost of living in Moscow continues to rise faster than incomes there, experts say (svpressa.ru/society/article/527558/).

            Large majorities say they are less influenced by the amount of income they can expect than the possibility of having larger residences and less congestion; and of course, those who wistfully talk about moving aren’t necessarily going to depart. Dreaming about leaving is one thing; actually doing it is quite another.

             But the survey found one intriguing pattern that could have a major impact on Russian life in the future: Native Muscovites, those whose parents and grandparents have lived in the city, are far less likely to say they are ready to move elsewhere than are those who have come in recent years.

            The reasons for that are multiple, including the fact that many of the former have far better residences than do the latter given that many of them having housing inherited after the distribution of housing after the fall of Soviet power. But the fact that so many of those who do want to leave are recent arrivals points to something else.

            Not only are recent arrivals in the city more likely to leave because of costs and memories of what life was like elsewhere, but they are certain to return to regions and republics beyond the ring road with negative attitudes about the Russian capital and thus deepen the divide between Moscow and what Muscovites often dismiss as “the provinces.”