Local and Regional Media in Russia Play Major Role in Promoting Putin’s War in Ukraine as ‘a Given’ and Entirely ‘Normal,’ ‘NeMoskva’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 26 – When people talk about propaganda on the war in Ukraine, they typically focus on outrageous statements of Moscow TV personalities; but the NeMoskva portal suggests that local and regional media play a major role in delivering the message that the Kremlin now wants, that the war is “a given” of Russian life and entirely “normal.”

            The portal examined more than 200 outlets in regions and localities across the country and spoke with numerous experts on the Russian media scene and said that the propaganda in this part of the Russian scene is less propagandistic and often isn’t even recognized as such by viewers and readers (nemoskva.net/2026/02/26/propaganda-dlya-normisov/).

            That is because local and regional media do not cover the war as such and seek to include stories about those from the region who have been touched by it within the normal flow of coverage about life more generally. That encourages Russians to think about the war as something “entirely normal” and more simply “a given.”

            In reporting the study and especially its conversations with media experts who appear to be in universal agreement, NeMoskva says there are a number of ways in which these outlets are promoting such a view: They talk about how the area is “making its own contribution;” their main hero is “the local soldier, ‘one of us;” they celebrate as “another hero the regional volunteer;” they “heroize those who have died” in the conflict; and they either “idealize” or at least minimize the problems of veterans coming home.

            Such messaging is calmer and more reassuring that the comments of Moscow figures like Vladimir Solovyev and thus corresponds to the way most Russians want to think about it: “They simply want to live their own lives” and see the war as something in the background, according to several commentators.

            One of these commentators pointedly notes that “the regional media do not ‘sell’ the war directly but ‘combine’ it with the whole information flow.” That gives the media at the local and regional levels a kind of “therapeutic effect,” one that makes the war something very much like the weather: it just is – and no one needs to do more than support it.

            And NeMoskva concludes: “Regional propaganda integrates into normalcy and creates a context that becomes acceptable to the audience. All of this, taken together, "holds together the social fabric" in the face of prolonged conflict and helps people feel at least some sense of support.”

As a result, for the consumers of this media, “the fighting becomes a backdrop and that helps the authorities achieve both of their goals: ensuring an influx of people and resources and preventing people from thinking that what is going on in Ukraine is an all-out war” that is going to radically change their lives or even force them to do more than they are doing now. 

Russia’s Far Right Using Denunciations as Primary Weapon to Attack Minorities, Memorial and ‘NeMoskva’ Portal Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 27 – The extreme right in Russia has begun using denunciations on the internet as its primary weapon to attack both migrant workers and ethnic minorities because by putting up charges online extremist groups are able to attract the attention of law enforcement personnel who then pick and choose among those against whom to bring charges.

            That trend has been documented by the NeMoskva portal which tracks developments outside of the Russian capital and by the Memorial human rights organization (nemoskva.net/2026/02/27/ohota-na-bryunetov/ and sova-center.ru/en/xenophobia/reports-analyses/2025/02/d47102/).

            Indeed, these two sources say, the far right and the police are working ever more closely together. The far right sees its attacks being confirmed by official action and has increased its chances of getting it by increasing adopting police language in the internet denunciations they issue. Indeed, it is clear that the police and not others are their intended audience, the two say.

            And the police are only too pleased to have the far right groups bring to their attention actions or reported actions by migrants and minorities so that police and prosecutors can choose among those denounced rather than having to engage in any investigations on their own especially when their political bosses point them in that direction.

            This convergence of the far right and police has been going on since the 1990s but the internet has only exacerbated that trend. Memorial’s Stefaniya Kulayeva in fact cites the words of prominent human rights activist Sergey Kovalyev that the Russian police “aren’t catching bandits but ‘brunettes,” a reference to the darker hair of many minorities.

            Among the extremist Russian nationalist groups which use this tactic the most often are the Russian Community and the less well-known Man’s State, which NeMoskva described as “an internet community based on misogynistic and nationalist discourse, “formally” in defense of traditional values but in fact oppression, women, journalists, LGBT people and migrants.

Could Russia ‘Repeat’ Equivalent of Khrushchev’s De-Stalinization after Putin Leaves the Scene?

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 25 – On the 70^th anniversary of Khrushchev’s secret speech to the 20^th CPSU Congress in 1956, a round date that has occasioned much commentary about what Khrushchev achieved and didn’t, Sergey Medvedev has asked the most important question: Could Russia “repeat” with something similar after Putin leaves the scene?

            The answer is not simple not only because Khrushchev’s attack on Stalin was strictly limited, did not last and now has been largely reversed by Putin, some of whose supporters want Khrushchev denounced for his attacks on Stalin, the Radio Liberty commentator says (svoboda.org/a/razoblachenie-kumira-povtoritsya-li-v-rossii-hh-sezd/33687275.html).

            At the end of a lengthy discussion with Russian historian Yury Pivovarov and Russian political scientist Aleksandr Morozov about Khrushchev’s secret speech, what it achieved and what it didn’t , Medvedev asks pointedly: “is a new 20^th Congress and a new thaw after Putin possible?”

            Morozov suggested that “the 20th Congress as such cannot be repeated, but some form of revision of Putinism's political legacy is inevitable. The question is what form it will take and in what direction it will develop.” But because elites in the 1950s and elites now benefited as well as suffered from what had happened, any changes are likely to be partial and even reversible.

            Putinism is likely to be revised in three main ways, the political scientist continues, including a further consolidation of the bureaucracy, a revision of past foreign policy choices, and a loosening of censorship which clearly has gone too far under Putin and offends even many of his otherwise unquestioning supporters.

            A more radical transformation would occur only if there is a serious domestic conflict, likely between civilian parts of the bureaucracy with access to the means of violence and the siloviki who dominate that area. Clashes between these two forces are conceivable, since they have resources and rely on resources. But will this happen? That's a completely open question.”

For Four Reasons, Putin’s ‘Insane’ War in Ukraine Now New Normal in International Affairs, Inozemtsev Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 25 – Few now have any doubt that Putin launched his expanded war against Ukraine in 2022 “not only as the result of the ideology of the new Russian fascism but also as a result of the phenomenal miscalculations of both the fuehrer himself and all his entourage,” Vladislav Inozemtsev says.

            But what needs to be confronted now, the Russian economist and commentator argues, is “why and to what extent this insane war in Europe now taking place at the beginning of the 21^st century has become something normal that the world has grown quite accustomed to” (ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/02/25/bezumie-stavshee-normoi-a188010).

            According to Inozemtsev, there are four main reasons why “this insanity as become the norm” for so many. First of all, as the first proxy war in Europe, few if anyone can see the way clear for its end and thus believe that they must adapt themselves and their own behavior to what is going on because it is going to last for a long time to come.

            Second, Inozemtsev says, “too many beneficiaries have appeared over the course of the four years of this war,” including not only powers not directly involved but even in the two frontline states; and even including many Russians and Ukrainians who have fled abroad but live in a world in which the war forms an important part of their lives.

            Third, the war has now lasted so long that it has become background noise for almost everyone especially as the front doesn’t move very war in either direction and because Kremlin relied on paying men to fight rather than on any broader political reason and thus avoided having to mobilize massively, something that could have triggered resistance.

            And fourth, neither side is prepared or even able to defeat the other side completely. Russia can’t deploy sufficient resources to end all resistance, and “the West isn’t interested in escalation which could lead to a nuclear war” and recognizes that now it is “impossible” to defeat Russia as other aggressors in Europe were defeated in the past.

            According to Inozemtsev, the war can come to an end in only two ways, which in fact collapse into one: “the departure from the historical arena of the madman who initiated the war and subordinated Russia to its conduct.” The “more radical” option is to promote “some form of regime change in Russia.”

            The other “allows for an immediate end to the conflict on Russia’s terms, with the consolidation of Ukraine’s support system, the restoration of its economy and its incorporation into Western structures, with implicit non-recognition of new borders and boundaries … and the expectation of inevitable future changes in Russia after the natural death of the dictator.”

            Neither of these options, the Russian commentator continues, “should presuppose the restoration of relations with the aggressor country before a change of political regime as that would completely legitimize aggression” and even ensure that Putin would launch more wars in the future.

            But “the saddest circumstance” of this war as it enters its fifth year is not only the continued losses it entails but “also the continued coexistence of the ‘civilized’ world with this brutal reality, a coexistence which itself becomes an additional factor in the continuation of the war” and “widens the gap between what consumes us and what should be our moral compass.”

Many Russian Liberals have Gradually Shifted Their Views on Putin’s War toward ‘a Partial Acceptance of an Interpretation' Close to the Kremlin’s, Snegovaya Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 24 –Over the course of the four years of Putin’s expanded war in Ukraine, a segment of Russian liberals, both in the emigration and at home, have gradually shifted their views about that conflict in the direction of accepting an interpretation of that conflict close to Kremlin’s, Mariya Snegovaya says.

            The Russian post-doc at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. argues that this has happened because the liberals involved want to preserve their civic identity as Russians as well as out of the conviction that “we Russians can’t be wrong about everything” (echofm.online/opinions/chetyre-goda-vojny-i-transformacziya-liberalnogo-diskursa-v-rossii).

            According to Snegovaya, this adaptive process has gone through nine stages beginning with denial about the war through expectation of popular resistance to personalization of the issue, acceptance of a variety of false equivalences to a rationalization of what has occurred as being the fault of the West even though Russia was the side that took action.

            She argues that this evolution can be explained as “a mechanism of identity-protective cognition, that is, an inclination to interpret reality so as to preserve a positive view of one’s own group” even though it requires the acceptance of the notion that Russian society at present lacks any ability to influence the situation.

            For many liberal Russians, Putin remains “the instigator of the war” but “the West is increasingly held responsible for its continuation,” even as Russian society is depicted as virtually incapable of influencing events. Thus, the question of whether Russians coud have changed the course of events is not even raised!”

            “As a result,” Snegovaya concludes, “a narrative is formed that simultaneously acknowledges the fact of the war and minimizes the degree of collective involvement of Russians,” a point of view that “over time … facilitates a convergence with narratives close to the Kremlin.”

Kremlin Ready to Tolerate Those Expressing Even Nazi Views as Long as They Back Putin’s War in Ukraine, Russian Experts Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 24 – Radical Russian nationalists including those who express neo-Nazi views have become increasingly vocal since the start of Putin’s expanded war in Ukraine, according to Vera Alperovich of the SOVA Center which monitors such things (sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/publications/2025/07/d52000/?sphrase_id=3960697).

            According to another Russian expert speaking on condition of anonymity, “the war itself ahs not made such views, the Nazi ones in particular, more widespread, but it has made people feel more like expressing them publicly” (themoscowtimes.com/2026/02/24/while-russia-says-it-is-denazifying-ukraine-far-right-groups-are-fighting-for-moscow-a92033).

            That is because, he says, “the state is generally willing to tolerate almost any view as long as the person actively supports the war.”  Meanwhile, a third Russian expert, Nikolay Mitrokhin of the University of Bremen agrees. He says “the Kremlin does not like openly declared Nazis, but it does cooperate with pro-government far-right radicals.”

            What makes the Kremlin’s willingness to cooperate with those expressing extreme right positions as long as they support Putin’s war is that the Kremlin leader has always claimed that he is fighting Nazism in Ukraine, event though he is clearly not doing so at home at least among the politically loyal.

            This has had an impact at home, Alperovich argues. “Nationalist ideas once considered marginal have moved closer to the mainstream,” she argues, “while support for the war in Ukraine serves as ‘a source of legitimacy for nationalists and often serves as a license for their other activities.’”

            Despite that development, Mitrokhin points out “the pro-Kremlin far right ‘has never had any real significance on the battlefield” as Moscow’s efforts to make use of nationalist military formations like Espanola have “largely failed.” The real problem with the neo-Nazi resurgence on the battlelines is elsewhere.

            The real problem, he says, and one that may come home if and when the war ends is that “among Russian military personnel, especially GRU Spetznaz and airborne troops, far-right views and a culture of violence and sadism are widespread,” attitudes the Kremlin isn’t trying to root out but instead is “encouraging.”

 

Non-Russian Activists Now Focusing on Telling the World Russia is an Empire which Must Be Decolonized, Latypova Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 25 – Many of the most active groups in Russia since Putin began his expanded war in Ukraine were anti-war organizations in the non-Russian republics from which the Kremlin has drawn a disproportionate number of soldiers to fight and die in that war, Leyla Latypova says.

            But the failure of these groups to force an end to the war combined with repressions at home and the forced emigration of the leaders of these organizations, The Moscow Times who specializes on the non-Russian republics says, has prompted these groups to change their focus (themoscowtimes.com/2026/02/25/russias-exiled-anti-war-movements-are-learning-to-play-the-long-game-a92049).

            While none of them has dropped its opposition to Putin’s war, ever more of them are focusing on cooperating with each other and promoting the view that Russia is an empire and will continue to threaten its own people and the world until it is fully decolonized, another uphill struggle because many in the West assume everything will be fine once Putin leaves.

            Latypova draws this conclusion on her observations of and conversations with the leaders of non-Russian groups in the emigration, including those from Tyva, Sakha, and Buryatia. She notes that some ethnic Russian emigres have also made that shift, but overwhelmingly, Russian émigré groups still focus on the war in Ukraine rather than on the need for decolonization.

            The shift The Moscow Times journalist points to is important for three reasons. First, it is a sign that Putin’s effort to suppress non-Russian groups has backfired because it has made them more nationalistic than they ever were before. Second, it has deepened the divide between these non-Russian groups and their ethnic Russian counterparts, making cooperation more difficult.

            And third – and this is by far the most important – it has become the basis for a new unity among the non-Russian movements and likely among non-Russians themselves who now see their task as the dismantling of the Russian empire rather than just stopping the war and who are working to reach out to governments around the world to deliver that message.