Veterans from Regions which have Provided the Most Soldiers for Putin’s War have Least Access to Treatment for PTSD, Veterans, Their Families and Psychologists Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 21 – Twenty percent of veterans returning from Putin’s war in Ukraine suffer from often debilitating PTSD, Moscow officials admit. The Russian government has finally set up programs in Moscow for such men but done far too little to help those in the non-Russian republics and poorer Russian regions which have sent the most soldiers to fight.

            That pattern is reported by both veterans and their families and by Russian psychologists working in the field in comments to Takiye dela journalist Alena Ilyina in a survey of the human suffering this Kremlin approach is producing (takiedela.ru/2026/09/kak-budto-s-nim-ottuda-prishlo-chto-to/).

            Three things make this pattern especially worrisome. First, it means that many who need help won’t get it even while Russian propagandists talk about psychologist programs in the city of Moscow which has provided far fewer soldiers per capita than many non-Russian republics and poorer predominantly ethnic Russian oblasts and krays.

            Second, it means that the impact of the flood of veterans returning from the war will be greatest in precisely the areas where the least among of treatment is available, an arrangement that means the shadow of the Ukrainian war will be darkest and last longest beyond the ring road than within it.

            And third – and this may prove to be the most important consequence – it is likely that Moscow officials and many Muscovites as well will blame the victims of the war in Ukraine, seeing the situation in regions outside the capital as being to blame for the continuing impact of PSTD rather than the real problem – the lack of help there.

            If that happens, and history suggests that it is likely, then not only will ever more people from the republics and poorer regions suffer longer, but there will be growing hostility to them, with Moscow blaming them for the rise of crime rather than taking responsibility for that trend on itself.

Decolonization in the Case of Russia Isn’t the Same Thing as Disintegration, Orlova Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 22 – Many Russians, when they hear the word “decolonization,” think that it is the same thing as the disintegration of their country, Vasilina Orlova says; but that is a misconception:  disintegration can occur without decolonization; and decolonization can take place without disintegration.

            “In reality,” as the experience of Russia shows, the Russian scholar currently studying anthropology at the University of Texas says, the center may “retain the entire array of colonial mindsets and continue to base its imperial policies on them” even if it has lost much or even all of its empire (wschody.net/chto-stoit-za-slovom-dekolonizacziya/).

            And “conversely,” Orlova says, “decolonization without a breakup is possible” as other former empires have shown after they “abandoned their colonial ambitions” but succeeded in remaining intact as states and the same could hold true for Russia” in the future it its rulers and people gave up their current imperial mindsets.

            It is generally the case that the latter process is easier if the state consolidated before acquiring an empire and if the empire it established was separated from the core state by great distances and especially bodies of water. But even if, as has been the case with Russia, the polity became an empire before it became a self-standing state, decolonization is still possible.

            Orlova continues that she studied Russians in Siberia and found that they believe they contributed all kinds of positive things to what had been up to then a vacant and backward space; and thus for them, “decolonization as a threat to their traditional way of life” and opposition to it entirely justified.

            Such Russian attitudes are especially widespread and strong concerning the numerically small peoples of the north, Siberia and the far east; and these nations thus “remain the most vulnerable” to imperial attitudes and actions. That in turn means that those who support these nations must be very clear about what decolonization is about.

            These numerically small peoples must be allowed to make decisions for themselves,” she continues; and “the Russian democratic opposition must learn to listen to and recognize the independent organizations of such nations such as the International Committee of the Indigenous Peoples of Russia, the Batani Foundation, and the like as equal interlocutors.”

            Such recognition requires something else: these issues must be discussed now and not after some cataclysm happens. As Orlova points out, “no one discussed the collapse of the USSR in advance, and the price of that has been paid in Karabakh, Transnistria, Chechnya and now Ukraine.”

            “The less we talk about decolonization,” as some Russian democrats are urging, ”the greater the likelihood that the transition after Putin, whatever form it takes, will be especially painful and protracted and cost many lives.”  All those who care about the fate of these numerically small nations must keep that ever in mind.

More than 500 Million Cubic Meters of Radioactive Waste in Dumps around Russia, Almost All of It Poorly Contained and Now Threatening People Living Nearby -- Even in Moscow

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 22 – Rossatom, the Russian agency for overseeing its nuclear industry, says that as of the end of last year, 573 million cubic meters of nuclear waste had been stored in Russia; but independent experts say that the storage is inadequate because the half life of some elements in the waste measures in billions of years.

            Many in Russia and abroad assume that the problems are limited to Soviet-era dumps and to places far from Moscow; but both assumptions are wrong, according to Aleksey Orzharovsky, one such expert, who says that in some ways the situation has gotten worse since 1991 and affects the Moscow area (kedr.media/stories/po-sledam-atoma/).

Until the end of Soviet times, officials treated radioactive trash in many cases as no different from ordinary trash and did not take measures to protect the environment from it, he says. But while concerns mounted after 1991, many firms gave up land where they had dumped nuclear waste earlier; and now no one feels responsible for doing it.

Russian media have talked about the problems of the leakage of radioactivity mostly in places far from the Russian capital lest residents there become alarmed; but Ozharovsky and others have documented that radioactivity is leaking throughout the region in and around the capital.

According to them, radiation is already leaking into the underground water supply often without anyone sounding the alarm; and even where officials are trying to contain the nuclear waste, they do not have the technology to protect against waste that will still be dangerously radioactive thousands or even billions of years from now.

As Muscovites become aware of this, they are likely to protest and to demand more than the simple shifting of newly developed trash to regions and republics far from the capital that the powers that be have promoted as a solution. It isn’t and an entirely new approach needs to be adopted for controlling something far longer into the future than anyone can now imagine.

Putin Tried to Run Duma Elections as If They Weren’t Taking Place – and Largely Succeeded, Shaburov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 22 – Vladimir Putin was happy with the way the Duma was configured and acted before the elections and so set as his task in the just-completed vote to minimize any real debate about issues and to ensure that the new Duma would look and act like it predecessor,  Aleksey Shaburov says. In this, the Kremlin leader largely succeeded.

The editor of Yekaterinburg’s Politsovet portal notes that Moscow did what it could to ensure that no real debate would occur in the course of the run-up to the vote and then did what ever it had to do, including outright falsification of the results, to get a new Duma much like the old (politsovet.ru/88648-vybory-kotoryh-ne-bylo.html).

According to Shaburov, “the specific plan for the elections was announced in early 2026 by Vladimir Yakushev, secretary of United Russia’s general council. He suggested that his party had to receive 55 percent of the vote,” something that would suggest growing support for it without overturning its relations with other parties.

As a result, the commentator continues, “the Duma will remain exactly the same as it was dominated by United Russia while will retain its respectful attitude towards the systemic opposition. The remaining parliamentary parties will receive several committees and vice-speakers.” In short, no change.

Because that was Putin’s goal, there was no need to have an active campaign or mobilize the population. Rather the reverse. Candidates from all parties were less active because they knew they need not be or could not change things if they became more active and spent less for that reason and because there was less money to spend.

As a result, many people in Russia barely recognized that a campaign was going on, exactly the attitude that Putin and his regime hoped for and likely will maintain into the future, Shaburov says. There were two bumps on this road, the possibility that Yabloko could take part and the risk and Just Russia might not get enough votes to have deputies in the Duma.

The Kremlin addressed these by administrative measures, forcing Yabloko candidates off the ballot and adding via falsification votes to Just Russia’s total to ensure it would get in the Duma and there wouldn’t have to be any redistribution of role there or even the discussion of such a possibility.

For all these reasons, Shaburov continues, there was much less need for or even talk of administrative mobilization than had been the case with Duma elections before. And now Putin can look forward to at least three years of peace at least on this front given current plans for a presidential election in 2030 and another Duma vote in 2031.

2026 Duma Election will Be Remembered for Seven Things, ‘Horizontal Russia’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 21 – There have been so many stories about the 2026 Duma elections in Russia that it is hard to know where to begin in talking about them. Most are repetitive, but a few contain new information. In its review, the Horizontal Russia portal offers a way forward and suggests that there are seven things that the just-completed vote will be remembered for.

            According to the portal, which is devoted primarily to developments beyond the ring road circling Moscow, despite all the noise, there are only a few things most Russians will remember about this vote, most of which are just continuation of trends that began earlier in the Putin years (semnasem.org/articles/2026/09/21/nichego-novogo).

            It singles out seven in particular:

·       First, “the Central Election Commmission declared open war on observers,” limiting their access more than ever before and thus hiding what officials were doing from the public.

·       Second, the real war was for finding ways to boost reported participation because the share of Russians who voted was smaller than the Kremlin wanted.

·       Third, competition among parties and candidates “fell by several orders of magnitude” as the government excluded candidates by one means or another to ensure that anyone who really wanted to protest would have no one to choose.

·       Fourth, places of employment, private as well as governmental, “became mobilization points” with bosses telling their workers whom they expected the latter to vote for.

·       Fifth, “voters found themselves in an online ghetto,” with nearly a third forced to vote electronically and thus opening the way for still more falsification.

·       Sixth, the election machinery was so poorly organized in so many places that ballots weren’t available and whole areas weren’t able to vote at all.

·       And seventh, protests shifted from active steps to “symbolic” ones like putting apples on the tables of election officials.

Duma Elections Increased Putin’s Dominance Now But Also Set the Stage for More Serious Problems when He Leaves the Scene, Portal Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 21 – Putin sought to use the just-completed Duma elections to demonstrate the legitimacy of his system and its stability at a time of geopolitical confrontation and to unite society around the federal center and himself personally, the Main Theme portal says.

            At one level, he has achieved both; but the way he has chosen to do so while elevating his position within the Russian political system still further guarantees that Russia will face more problems when he passes from the scene and a new leader has to be chosen, it argues (temaglavnoe.ru/russia/32285/).

            Instead of allowing the elections to be the occasion for a reset of the political agenda by allowing for new groups to gain a larger voice at the cost of a lesser one for those now dominant, Putin used a variety of means including massive falsification and repression to keep things just as they were, with United Russia even stronger and outsiders still outside.

            That works for the Kremlin leader now because his system is based on arrangements in which he is the arbiter of disputes between different groups, none of which can directly challenge him because to do so would be to call the entire existing system into question and threaten their own positions and power.

            But a system that doesn’t allow for evolutionary change faces the possibility of revolutionary change when the key actor passes from the scene. So what appears to many to be a new consolidation in fact is at best a temporary phenomenon and opens the way to deeper fragmentation when Putin goes.

            That must worry the current Kremlin leader; but it certainly worries him less than the prospect that his own power will be diminished while he is still in office and thus lead to a situation in which one or another group among Russian elites may conclude that he has become weak enough to challenge directly.

Whether Russia Can Be Other than a Threat to Others and Itself for All but Short Intervals Remains ‘Fundamental Question,’ Pastukhov Says

Paul Goble

             Staunton, Sept. 21 – Whether Russia can be other than an authoritarian and aggressive country for more than short intervals remains to this day “a fundamental question,” one for which there are powerful arguments both for and against, according to Vladimir Pastukhov, one of the most thoughtful Russian commentators, says.

             Based in London, Pastukhov argues that this question is important not only theoretically but for intensely practical reasons. On the answer depends how Western countries and  Russians themselves should evaluate what is happening and decide whether some kind of Putinism is the only Russian path (echofm.online/opinions/sushhestvuet-li-alternativa-dlya-rossii).         

             The Russian commentator says he isn’t prepared to offer his own “final answer” to this question, although he currently “leans towards a version [of an answer] that allows for the existence of ‘an Alternative for Russia’” but looks forward to hearing from those who now have the opposition view.

             Pastukhov offers five reasons for his own position:

 ·       First, “the fifth year of a war started by Russia is not the best time to objectively assess the nature of Russian society and power.” At such times, he says, there is an inevitable tendency to focus on trends leading to repression and aggression rather than others which have set the weather during other periods.

 ·       Second, while it is true that “the Russian historical tradition is truly anti-democratic, imperial and militaristic,” it is also the cases that this is something true of “all global empires” and that each of them “has overcome in its own way at some stage and almost nowhere has that been completed.” Perhaps, Pastukhov suggests, “Russia simply hasn’t had enough time.”

 ·       Third, “the Russian political tradition is not only imperial and militaristic.” It has featured “humanistic and democratic” elements as well over the last two centuries” and its willingness to allow much of its former empire to fall away at the end of the 20th century without much violence should not be ignored.

 ·       Fourth, it is impossible to judge the state of Russian opinion on this and related questions because people there go along with the current propaganda efforts of the regime even if they don’t share them because it is easier and less dangerous to do that than to do otherwise.

 ·       And fifth, Russian elites are almost certainly more inclined toward a more western view than the Russian people as a whole; and in a transition they may be more inclined to push for a turn back to the West because it corresponds not only to their views but their interests. This time that turn could last longer than it did earlier.