Suppression of Demographic Data Leading to Serious Policy Errors, ‘To Be Precise’ Portal Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 15 – As Moscow has stopped publishing data on more and more demographic trends, Russian government agencies have had to base their figures on the last such figures Rosstat had released or on their own estimates, either of which leads to mistakes in the numbers and contributes to policy errors, the To Be Precise portal says.

            In 2024, Rosstat stopped publishing data on causes of death and regional life expectancy; and in April of this year, the statistics agency stopped providing up-to-date data on total population size. Without such data, the portal says, “it is impossible to accurately compare different regions with each other or to track changes over time” (tochno.st/materials/v-rossii-zakryty-dannye-po-cislennosti-naseleniia-teper-zabolevaemost-oxvaty-uslugami-i-pokazateli-prestupnosti-scitaiut-po-ustarevsim-dannym).

            That in turn, To Be Precise says, “affects highly practical decision-making by determining for instance how many doctors a region requires, whether specific performance targets have been met or whether disease rates are in fact on the rise” or may be falling relative to population changes.”

            Moreover, it continues, “population size serves as the denominator for dozens of key indicators: morbidity and mortality rates, birth rates, service coverage levels, the number of traffic accidents per thousand residents, and much more.” If government agencies use outdated population figures, their estimates of these will be incorrect.

            In the absence of new data, To Be Precise says, the use of outdated data is both logical and inevitable; but “the longer access to this data remains restricted, the greater the discrepancy will become between the actual population size and the calculated estimate” both logic and experience demonstrate.

            For the next few years, the impact of such forced errors may be relatively small; but over the longer haul, it will lead to policy mistakes and even disasters – and likely spark more demands from officials as well as the population for the release of updated data.

Guns Flooding into North Caucasus from Putin’s War, Sparking Rise in Crime and Re-Energizing Militant Underground inside Russia

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 14 – Since the start of Putin’s expanded war in Ukraine, guns have been flooding back into the Russian Federation, fueling a rise in violent crime across the country as more Russians acquire guns and in the North Caucasus re-energizing the militant underground as weapons are now much easier to get.

            For background on this, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/04/illegal-arms-sales-possession-and-use.html windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/12/weapons-flooding-into-bandit-formations.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/07/serious-crime-in-north-caucasus-rises.html.

            The FSB and other Russian force structures have sought to block this influx of weaponry and the underground armories which service such guns and explosives (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/08/fsb-raids-underground-armament-firms-in.html).

            But stories coming out of the Caucasus in particular suggest that the siloviki are fighting a losing battle, with Russian force structures finding underground armories after closing others in earlier raids. The latest cases are in Ingushetia and North Ossetia (https://www.kavkazr.com/a/u-zhiteley-ingushetii-i-severnoy-osetii-izyali-oruzhie/33756732.html).

            If and when Putin’s war in Ukraine ends, what has been a steady flow of guns back to Russia is likely to become a torrent; and while Moscow is most worried about a rise in violent crime, it may soon face a revival of the militant underground in the North Caucasus that Putin has claimed such credit for suppressing in the past.   

Time Zones Becoming a Problem for Russia as Moscow Scholars Set Online Conferences at Times Convenient Only for Them

Paul Goble     

            Staunton, May 15 – From Soviet times on, Russians have been proud of just how many time zones their country includes, but now, with the spread of online conferencing, the multiplicity of those time zones is becoming a problem as Moscow scholars organize conferences at times convenient for them but not for their counterparts in Russian far east.

            Diana Vasilyeva, a journalist from that region, surveyed 40 scholars east of Lake Baikal about how they feel about having to stay awake in the middle of the night when they want to take part on online conferences organized in Moscow (mostmedia.org/ru/posts/hozjain-barin-pochemu-dalnevostochnye-uchenye-rabotajut-po-nocham-radi-moskovskih-konferency).

            Some of the respondents said they had no choice but to go along despite the harm it was inflicting on their health and lives given that the Muscovites could hardly be expected to change something they were used to. But others said this pattern was harming their work and even prompting them to think about leaving the country.

            According to Vasilyeva, for her colleagues in the Far East, the problem Moscow organizers present is larger than that caused by conference organizers elsewhere because the center is behind more such meetings than anyone else. But elsewhere, it is also a problem, although organizers there are generally more sensitive to the issue and adapt.

Moscow Struggling to Find Extra-Budgetary Funds to Complete Already Announced Icebreakers

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 15 – Moscow often announces that it is going to build more enormous icebreakers to ensure Russia controls the Northern Sea Route, but these are seldom completed on time or even at all, the result of problems with Russian yards and increasingly budgetary stringencies imposed as a result of Putin’s war in Ukraine.

            Now to secure money to fund the construction of two nuclear icebreakers already announced, the Leningrad and the Stalingrad, Moscow is considering imposing tariffs on cargoes passing through the NSR or Russian ports (regionvoice.ru/na-ledokoly-po-kaple-vlasti-rf-obsuzhdayut-novye-portovye-sbory/).

            Two tariff arrangements are now under discussion. One would impose tariffs by the ton on cargo carried on the NSR rising now and then falling a few years from now, while the other would impose a single cargo tariff per ton of cargo on all ships using Russian ports. It is unclear whether it would be phased out or not. 

            Rosatom, the government agency overseeing such projects, says the discussion of imposing such tariffs has been under discussion since 2019, an indication that powerful shipping interests are opposed even though many in the Russian capital want to see the icebreakers completed as a matter of national pride.

Russian Siloviki Increasingly Opening Political Cases against Women in North Caucasus and Elsewhere, Lawyer Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 14 – Until Putin launched his expanded war against Ukraine in 2022, Russian force structures generally avoided bringing political charges against women, treating them as being under the control of the men in their lives and thus not appropriate subjects for political charges, a lawyer in the North Caucasus speaking anonymously says.

            But since that time, he continues, the Russian force structures have changed their attitude and now are ready to arrest women who engage in political activity ever more often and now close to the same rates as the men in their regions and republics (storage.googleapis.com/snaplink/RWv3P.html).

            This change in approach has helped push up the share of women among all those incarcerated in Russia, but perhaps more importantly, it is a sign that women, especially in the North Caucasus, are playing an ever greater role among activists and that the Kremlin has decided that it has to crack down hard lest the situation get out of hand. 

Russian Civilians Now Dying from Ukrainian Drone Attacks at Rate of 41 a Month, 2.4 Times that of a Year Ago, Sokolova Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 13 – Since the start of Putin’s expanded war in Ukraine some 1406 Russian civilians in 27 federal subjects have died, mostly from drone attacks; and the rate of such losses is increasing. So far this year, 41 Russian civilians have died in each of the first four months of the year, nearly 2.5 times as many as for the same period in 2025.

            These losses are documented by Alesya Sokolova, who is a researcher with the Cedar organization and works as a data journalist for Novaya Gazeta Europe in a heavily footnoted 15,500 word article (novayagazeta.eu/articles/2026/05/13/za-vremia-voiny-v-rossii-pogiblo-bolee-1400-mirnykh-zhitelei).

            She says that the real numbers of such losses may be far higher because Russian officials do not always provide information about them, but even the figures their reporting does allow show that Putin’s war in Ukraine is now coming home to Russia in the most serious way ever.

As Result of Putin’s War in Ukraine, Russia Now ‘More Isolated’ than at Any Time Since Bolshevik Revolution, Nina Khrushcheva Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 15 – Nina Khrushcheva, the adoptive granddaughter of former Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev and now a professor at New York’s New School, says that Putin’s war in Ukraine has left Russia “more isolated” than at any time since the first years after the Bolshevik revolution in 1917.

            “Putin believed that invading Ukraine would restore Russia’s status as a great power, diminish Western influence and accelerate the transition to a multipolar international order,” she writes (project-syndicate.org/commentary/ukraine-war-has-left-russia-isolated-and-weakened-by-nina-l-khrushcheva-2026-05 reposted at nv.ua/opinion/putin-teryaet-vseh-nina-hrushcheva-rasskazala-kakie-strany-vyshli-iz-pod-vliyaniya-rf-50608052.html).

            Instead, Khrushcheva says, “the invasion has shattered the Kremlin’s credibility as a partner and ally. Russia still has nuclear weapons, a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and vast energy reserves; but his war has severely weakened he country, stripping it of the ability to project power or influence global affairs other than by threatening war.”

            Indeed, as the war grinds on in its fifth year, “North Korea has likely emerged as Russia’s most steadfast ally.” But “even this relationship remains strictly transactional in nature, grounded in a shared sense of vulnerability and mutual hostility toward the West” rather than any larger purpose.