Almost Half of Russian Victims of Crime Don’t Report This to Police, St. Petersburg’s Institute of Law Enforcement Problems Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 29 – Between 2020 and 2024, 13 percent of Russians were victims of fraud, assault, theft, robbery or violent robbery, but only 55 percent of them reported these incidents to police and 10 percent did not tell anyone about what happened, according to St. Petersburg’s Institute of Law Enforcement Problems.

            What this means, the Institute says on the  basis of surveys conducted since 2018 is that “the police remain unaware of a vast number of crimes” and that the information they do have is systematically distorted as some crimes are far more likely to be reported than others (tochno.st/materials/skolko-liudei-stanoviatsia-zertvami-prestuplenii-i-kakaia-cast-prestupnosti-ne-ucityvaetsia-v-oficialnoi-statistike).

            These surveys have found that different age groups report even violent crimes at different rates. Among victims of assault over 65, 91 percent of women and 76 percent of men turn to the police, but among the 18 to 24 cohort, these figures are only at 43 percent for women and 26 percent for men.

            Online crime, so-called “victimless” crimes like drug possession, and family violence are less likely to be reported, the surveys found, with police completely unaware of at least 60 percent of online crimes involving fraud and financial loss, the Institute says. Far more Russians are thus victims of crime than the police know or act on or that official statistics report.

With Russian Birthrate Continuing to Plummet, Putin Orders Reproductive Health Screenings for Wide Swath of Population

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 28 – With Russian birthrates continuing to plummet despite all the Kremlin’s efforts to reverse that trend, Vladimir Putin has directed the health ministry to conduct more medical check-ups to assess the reproductive health of the population and thus the ability of both men and women to have children (ehorussia.com/new/node/34486).

            According to Health Minister Mikhail Murashko, such screenings have already begun and are proving “highly popular,” but these have been voluntary and relatively few in number. It is unclear how Russians will respond especially if they are compelled to undergo such examinations and if the authorities use the outcomes to direct them to have more children.

            Moreover, it is unclear who will conduct these tests in many parts of the country because Putin’s healthcare “optimization” program has resulted in the shuttering of many medical points or how the regime will pay for such tests. Indeed, they may become yet another unfunded liability imposed on the regions.

            The most likely use of data collected from such tests, however widespread they prove to be, will be a government effort to shift the blame for the plummeting birth rates away from Putin policies to the physical conditions of Russians. But such efforts are likely to backfire because many will recognize such physical problems are typically the result of social ones.

Desertification of Southern Russia and Kazakhstan In Part Result of Cancellation of Stalin’s Plan to Transform Nature There, ‘Rhythm of Eurasia’ Commentator Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 29 – In the last years of Stalin’s rule, the Soviet dictator made plans to “transform nature” by among other things rerouting the flow of water in Russian rivers. Those plans were cancelled by his successors; but the problems this program was designed to fix remain – and Stalin’s ideas remain relevant and should be revisited, Aleksey Chichkin says.

            The Rhythm of Eurasia analyst says that in 1948 Stalin announced plans for reforestation of areas along these rivers and other means to redirect and save Russia in the southern portions of the RSFSR and the Kazakh SSR (ritmeurasia.ru/news--2026-04-29--stalinskij-plan-preobrazovanija-prirody-otmenen-v-1953-m-no-aktualen-ponyne-87368).

            “Had this program been fully implemented” – and Stalin suggested it would take until 1966 -- Chichkin continues, “it would have enabled this vast region to boost natural soil fertility, while minimizing the extent of soil degradation and desertification, the impact of dry winds, the frequency of droughts, and other associated climatic and environmental extremes.”

            As a result of the cancellation of Stalin’s program by his successors, the situation has gotten worse with forests along riverways being cut down, erosion and water loss increased, and all the other problems that his program would have addressed earlier when it was easier are now much larger, the commentator says.

            Consequently, it is long past time for Moscow to consider reviving the Stalin-era plan regarding the most effective means of fighting desertification in the south of Russia and in the adjoining regions of Kazakhstan. Indeed, unless it does so, these problems almost certainly will continue to expand and may become too large to address at all.

            What makes this argument worth noting is that it represents an attempt, one that is now far from alone, to present Stalin not only as the victor in the Great Fatherland War but a thoughtful statesman concerned about the well-being of his country and thus someone who should be emulated rather than condemned.

Finnish Paper Suggests Hungarians Ashamed of Their Finno-Ugric Origins

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 28 – It has long been common ground that three Finno-Ugric peoples – the Estonians, the Finns and the Hungarians – have independent statehood and that they are the first nations that those Finno-Ugric peoples still living under Russian rule look to for help and support.

            But a Finnish newspaper is now suggesting that the Hungarians are somehow “ashamed” of their Finno-Ugric roots and prefer instead to stress their ties to the Huns, something that helps explain why Hungary has been far less focused on the Finno-Ugric nations within the borders of the Russian Federation.

            (The article, “Hungarians: Finnish is No Longer a Related Language and That is the Issue,” appeared in Finnish in Helsinki’s Ilta-Sanomat (is.fi/ulkomaat/art-2000011934420.html) and is discussed in Russian in Tallinn’s Mari portal (mariuver.eu/2026/04/28/vengry-stesnjajutsja-svoego-finno-ugorskogo-proiskhozhdenija/.)

            The article cites the conclusions of University of Budapest linguist Marta Csepregi who says that “especially in the 21^st century,” ever more Hungarians are insisting that “Hungary does not belong to a common language family with Finland,” a reflection of their conviction that Hungarians real origin lies with the Huns and that they are closer to the Turks.

            “Despite all this,” the Finnish article says, “for the average Hungarian, Finland remains closer than Sweden or Norway, and Marta Csepregi hopes that the Finns will consider Hungary closer than these countries which it neighbors.”

            There is no question that Finns and Estonians feel closer to each other and to the other Finno-Ugric peoples than do the Hungarians who live further away, do not have Finno-Ugric neighbors, and have a language which is more distant from other Finno-Ugrics than are Estonian and Finnish.

            But the difference in attitudes about Finno-Ugric languages and peoples between Estonians and Finns, on the one hand, and Hungarians, on the other, helps to explain why the Finno-Ugric peoples within the Russian borders who are subject to intense assimilationist pressures are less likely to find support in Budapest than in Helsinki and Tallinn.

Ethnic Russians Still in Central Asia will Assimilate to Local Populations in Future Unless Moscow Works to Repatriate Them Now, Shustov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 29 – Most Russians operate on the assumption that while non-Russians may assimilate to Russians, ethnic Russians will not assimilate to non-Russian nationalities even if they live among them.  That has never been true, of course, despite Moscow’s best efforts; but it is seldom acknowledged even as a possibility.

            That makes a new article by Aleksandr Shustov, a Russian commentator who specializes on ethnic issues, especially important. He says Moscow must try to repatriate ethnic Russians from Central Asia or else those Russians will be assimilated by the titular nationalities there in a few decades and lost to the Russian world (ritmeurasia.ru/news--2026-04-29--repatriacija-iz-srednej-azii-vostrebovana-russkimi-iz-za-ugrozy-assimiljacii-87395).

            Russia already has a repatriation program which exists alongside but is fundamentally different from the resettlement of compatriots. Unlike the latter, repatriants can live wherever they like in the Russian Fedeation. Over the last two years, some 10,000 ethnic Russians have taken advantage of this program (vedomosti.ru/society/articles/2026/04/15/1190464-repatriantov-pereselilis).

            A recent study by experts at Moscow State University and the Russian Academy of Sciences suggests that the potential number of repatriants could be much larger (jour.fnisc.ru/index.php/population/article/view/11063/10726), and Shustov argues that Moscow should act to get as many of them back as possible.

            Otherwise, the commentator suggests, they will be lost to Russia entirely with many dying out and others eventually becoming part of the titular nationality                     

Moscow Doesn’t Recognize Young Russians Aren’t Having Children Because They’re ‘Afraid’ to Do So, Khazin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 28 – Moscow is seeking to encourage young Russians by offering various incentives and benefits; but that approach won’t work, Mikhail Khazin says, because the real reason young people in the Russian Federation aren’t having children is because they are afraid to given the structure of the economy they must operate within.

            The Russian economist and commentator says that “it is no secret that our country’s birthrate is low because starting a family entails a whole host of problems; and young people are afraid” (province.ru/society/4494276-molodej-boitsya-mihail-hazin-otkrovenno-nazval-prichiny-pochemu-rossiyane-malo-rojayut/).

            Young Russians are afraid that they could lose out if they have children before they earn enough money to buy an apartment. But that doesn’t happen until they are 40 or 45; and by that time, they are too old to start a family and thus don’t, something that has sent the fertility rate down to 1.4 children per Russian woman per lifetime or lower.

            Fear of not being able to own an apartment and have a good life if they have children is thus the primary reason why young Russians are putting off having children and then in all too many cases not having children at all, Khazin says; and that is not only a demographic tragedy but the root cause of Russia’s labor shortage.

            Obviously, going back to a system in which young married couples lived with their parents isn’t an option: it is simply too difficult for them to do that and the housing in which their parents live is typically old and even decaying. And consequently, Moscow must face up to this and seek new ways to eliminate the not unreasonable fears young people have. 

            There is no question that Khazin is on to something: various surveys have shown that Russians who have children early as the Kremlin wants on average see a decline in their standard of living, something many potential parents aren’t willing to risk given all the other problems in Russian live now.

            But having identified the problem, Khazin offers no easy way out except to suggest that the widespread use of AI might be a way, although he acknowledges that the experience of other countries, including the US, suggest that artificial intelligence can be a two-edged sword, bringing benefits but also a variety of new problems.

A Rubicon has Been Crossed: No One in Russia No Matter How Distant from Ukraine Can Feel Entirely Secure, Shoigu Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 27 – Since the start of 2026, Ukrainian drones have hit targets in almost a third of Russia’ federal subjects, many like those in the Urals far from the frontline of Putin’s war in Ukraine. As a result, Sergey Shoigu says, “not one Russian region is a secure location” anymore, a sign that the distinction between front and rear has been obliterated.

            The words of the former Russian defense minister and current secretary of the Russian Security Council show that a Rubicon has been crossed. For more than four years, most people in Russia were content to accept the Kremlin’s false claims that the war did not threaten them directly, but that has now become impossible.

            That undermines the Kremlin’s claims and raises questions about the way in which the war has come home to Russia like “a boomerang,” and it unsettles Russians who live far from the battle lines in Ukraine and had thought that however many burdens they had to bear, they were at least safe (novayagazeta.ru/articles/2026/04/27/effekt-bumeranga).

            While one could hope that Russians could force Putin to make peace so that they could recover a sense of being invulnerable, the more likely result, given Putin’s personality and policy preferences is that the Kremlin leader will use this sense of uncertainty to justify even more radical moves against Ukraine – and quite likely against Russians as well.