Forced Confession and Draconian Sentence of Adygey Activist a Warning to All Circassians that Moscow will Repress Them for Any Independent Thought, Kik Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 17 – Russia’s Southern Military District Court sentenced Ibragin Nagoyev, an Adygey activist, to 11 years in prison after forcing him to confess to invented charges that he had been working with the émigré group, the Council of United Circassia, that Moscow has identified as a terrorist organization.

            Prosecutors claimed Nagoyev had operated an internet page in which he posted materials from the Council and that he had been behind efforts in 2025 to mark the 161^st anniversary of the expulsion of the Circassians from the Russian Empire, an action Circassians view as an act of genocide (oc-media.org/circassian-activist-from-adygea-sentenced-to-11-years-on-terrorism-charges/).

            Responding to the case and the sentence the Russian court passed down, Kase Kik, chairman of the Council of United Circassia, said that both the case and the sentence have nothing to do with justice but are “an outright act of political violence carried out by the repressive machine of the Russian occupation state” (unitedcircassia.org/arrest-in-maikop).

            Nagoyev’s “only ‘fault,” the Circassian organizer says, “is his interest in the fate of his people and their right to think freely.” The charges against him were invented, including the prosecutors’ claims that he was a member of the United Circassian Council movement, Kik continues. That was not and is not true.

“The policy of our organization categorically excludes any involvement of people located on the territory of the Russian Federation. We are well aware that under the current regime, even minimal contact or sympathy for our activities automatically makes a person an object of persecution. We would never, under any circumstances, put our compatriots in such danger.”

​            “I am convinced,” Kik adds, “that the guilty plea was obtained under duress, including through the use of torture. This is a typical practice that has been repeatedly documented in relation to politically motivated cases. In such cases, the Russian judicial system does not act as an organ of justice, but as an instrument for legitimizing violence.”

            And the chairman of the United Circassian Council concludes that Nagoyev’s conviction “is not just a sentence for one person: it is a signal to all of Circassian society: for any manifestation of consciousness, for any word, for any though, punishment will follow. This is a policy of intimidation and suppression.”

            “Silence in such a situation is tantamount to complicity,” Kik says, adding that “we will seek publicity for this case and continue to fight for the rights of our people, despite pressure, threats and repression.”

            There are three reasons for drawing attention to this case. First, it is a sign of just how repressive the Russian government has become with regard to the Circassians and other non-Russian groups. Second, that in turn is a sign of just how fearful the Kremlin is of their growing influence on their co-ethnics.

            And third – and this may be the most important immediate lesson – it is a sign of how carefully émigré groups must interact with their co-ethnics within the current borders of the Russian Federation lest they create problems for the latter. As Kik’s statement shows, the Circassians understand that. Other non-Russian groups must do so as well.    

 

In the Fifth Year of Putin’s War in Ukraine, ‘No Russian Region Can Feel Safe,’ Shoigu Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 17 – As Putin’s expanded war in Ukraine enters its fifth year, Sergey Shoigu, Russian Council Secretary says, not a single Russian region “can feel safe” from Ukrainian drone attacks or from terrorist attacks and sabotage now being organized by 56 countries.

            In a speech in the Urals Federal District, the former defense minister, says that earlier Ukrainian drones could not reach much of the country but that today they can and that other countries have expanded their actions against Russia (httnovayagazeta.ru/articles/2026/03/17/shoigu-na-piatyi-god-svo-ni-odin-region-rossii-ne-mozhet-chuvstvovat-sebia-v-bezopasnosti-protivnik-kovaren-56-stran-gotoviat-protiv-rossii-terakty-i-diversii-news). 

            Shoigu says that Ukraine and its allies are “using the internet to influence ‘marginalized groups’” within the Russian Federation to commit such crimes. And he stresses that “underestimating the level of the threats or any slowness in the elimination of existing vulnerabilities could lead to tragic consequences and undermine socio-economic stability.”

            This is the clearest indication yet that the Kremlin now recognizes that the war Putin launched and has tried so hard to keep from affecting the lives of most Russians has very much come home and is now calling into question the stability of the country. But it is also a sign that Moscow intends to expand repression in an effort to prevent that from happening. 

Internet Shutdowns Highlight that Moscow is Again Part of Russia, Orekh Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 16 – Especially since launched his expanded war in Ukraine in 2022, Vladimir Puitn has sought to shield Moscow from the greatest impact of that conflict on Russian society, arranging things so that the hardest hit groups were marginal ones typically far from the Russian capital.

             But with his attack on the internet, Anton Orekh says, Moscow is “now Russia” again, something which has profound consequences for Muscovites given their sense of apartness from the rest of the country and for the stability of the Putin regime given its sensitivity to how people in the capital think (novayagazeta.ru/articles/2026/03/16/moskva-teper-rossiia).

            “We Muscovite live not in Russia,” the commentator says. “We sometimes visit it, but we know this country more in theory” than in practice. Indeed, Russians in Moscow [except for those with professional responsibilities involving the periphery] are more likely to have travelled abroad than to visit the oblasts, krays, and republics of the country.

            This creates a powerful divide: Muscovites ignore what is happening beyond the periphery unless there is some crisis there; while people in the federal subjects are kept up to date on what is happening in Moscow even if there is little or no prospect that they will ever visit the capital, Orekh continues.

            People in many federal subjects have had to make do without the internet, but until now Muscovites have been protected. Now however what has been happening in the rest of the country is happening to them as well. And that means that Muscovites must now again “feel themselves part of Russia.”

            “The Moscow-centric nature of our country was also explained by the central government’s particularly solicitous attitude toward the capital. The government itself is entirely based here, and it understands that if unrest were to flare up in any other region, it wouldn't pose a major problem” as the Khabarovsk events showed.

            Instead, the Kremlin’s “main priority was simply to ensure that everything remained calm in Moscow. In 1991, it took merely a few tens of thousands of Muscovites gathering outside the White House to bring about the collapse of the USSR.” No one among the powers that be wants to risk that again.

            For its rulers, “the capital had to remain content; it was best left undisturbed unless absolutely necessary. Even when the "special military operation" began, the federal leadership turned a blind eye to the fact that Muscovites were rarely being deployed to the front lines; instead, their quotas were filled by newcomers—migrants and visitors—willing to take up arms.”

“In Moscow,” Orekh writes, “much like in the fabled Baghdad, everything has been calm. The recent episode involving the internet, however, demonstrated that even the capital can be jolted out of its comfort zone. That entails a willingness to risk the tranquility of both the capital itself and the authorities.”

              What comes next may be something truly fateful, the crushing even of Moscow, Orekh says; or it may be the transformation of Russia as far as the Internet is concerned into North Korea or Iran, a development which would have its own consequences for Moscow and the regions. Which it will be and which would be worse remains to be seen.

Economic Problems and Never-Ending War in Ukraine Upsetting Russians’ Psychological Well-Being, Academy of Sciences Study Finds

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 16 – The Institute of Psychology of the Russian Academy of Sciences says that mounting difficulties in the Russian economy and the dashed hopes for a quick end to the war in Ukraine have led to a significant worsening of the psychological state of the Russian people.

            The study (available at ecfor.ru/publication/kvartalnyj-prognoz-vvp-vypusk-69/ and discussed at ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/03/16/-33-a189844) found that this deterioration had affected all socio-economic groups, with 42 percent of Russians saying they were depressed and 27 percent indicating that they had experienced anxiety that they found difficult to control.

            Residents of major cities, young adults, lower income groups, and private-sector workers were the most likely to report such problems.  More than 80 percent suffer as a result of rising prices and job insecurity, and 60 percent say the war in Ukraine is most likely to continue throughout 2026, up by seven percentage points from their assessment in December 2025.

            Perhaps most seriously, only 39 percent of those surveyed said they were confident their children will have better lives than they do, and 42 percent said that they expected the Russian economy to be in trouble over the next five years.

Russia’s Federalization Requires Weakening of Moscow Because Federal Subjects are Too Diverse to Form Alliance among Themselves, Busygina Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 15 – The federalization of Russia will be extremely difficult but it won’t happen at all unless there is a significant weakening of Moscow since the federal subjects beyond the ring road are too diverse to form an alliance among themselves and the leaders of most will adapt to the rules Moscow sets as long as Moscow sets them, Irina Busygina says.

            The Russian expert on federalism at Harvard’s Davis Center argues that “the regions aren’t victims; they are agents of the Kremlin. They are integrated in this pllitical system, and tey have learned to live by its rules” (idelreal.org/a/chto-voyna-menyaet-v-otnosheniyah-kremlya-i-regionov-obyasnyaet-ekspert-iz-garvarda-irina-busygina/33702106.html).

            What is especially important, Busygina says, is that “any alternative [to the existing system] is more dangerous and more risky than the current status quo. Therefore, this status quo will be preserved” in the absence of some serious shock. The current system can’t be modified; it can only be demolished and a new one put in its place, a difficult task.

            “All projects for the future transformation of Russia call for federalism,” she continues, a system which requires democracy and thus requires Russia to escape from its authoritarian paradigm. And that in turn requires a change in how relations between the center and the regions are viewed.

            Most Russians see the issue being one of a strong center or strong regions; but in fact, Busygina argues, they both must be strong and must achieve that by negotiations and an agreement, something no one at this point of time is in a position to call for in any serious way let alone achieve.

            The biggest obstacle is that Moscow is for the time being a personalist dictatorship in which one man balances the interests of various political groups in the capital and in which the regions are too diverse to come together because it is easy for Moscow to play one or more of them off against the others.

            As a result, the construction of real federalism while possible and desirable for Russia is “more complicated than in another country.” It requires a shock to the center in which the leader loses the ability to play the role of arbiter and to the federal subjects which can then develop ties with one or another group in the capital.

            When the center is weakened, “the regions must cease to be a conservative force which are are now. They must formulate their own interests together as a coalition and not as a sinel region distancing themselves from Moscow because doing that is simly political suicide and perhaps, even not political but physical.”

            “In Russia, there is a great deal of imperial heritage, but Russia undoubtedly is not a classic empire,” Busygina suggests. “But it uses ‘empire-like’ institutions. The absence of horizontal coordination among the subjects of the federation, among the territories, is a typical sign of empire.”

            As she and her co-author Mikhail Filippov argued in a 2024 article, she argues, the Putin system has suffered a certain “erosion” since Putin began his expanded war in Ukraine. Governors can no longer be simple technocrats but must become public politicians to explain things to their people. That is a breeding ground for a new kind of regional leader.

            But even such leaders continue to play by the rules because that is the only “rational” strategy,” Busygina contends. Only if Moscow weakens will there be a real chance for change. And even Putin’s departure may not be sufficient to cause that to happen because “this sytem cannot be reformed – it can only be dismantled.”

Russian Company on Svalbard Hoists Soviet Flag to Welcome First Russian Passenger Vessel to Visit the Norwegian Archipelago This Year

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 13 – In a provocative move intended to test the resolve of Oslo and NATO, the Russian coal company operating on Norway’s Svalbard archipelago erected an enormous Soviet flag over its buildings to mark the arrival of the first Russian passenger vessel there in 2026.

            Kari Aga Myklebost, a specialist on Russia at the Arctic University of Norway, sees “the flag’s use as part of a broader effort to assert Russia’s presence on Svalbard through symbols and actions” and testing the limits of what Norway and for that matter NATO may do in response, The Barents Observer says (ru.thebarentsobserver.com/sovetskij-flag-vstrecal-na-svalbarde-pervyj-passazirskij-rejs-iz-murmanskanbsp/446978).

            Russian firms on the islands have been hoisting the Soviet flag over the its coal mining operations since 2024, a means to asserting that in Moscow’s interpretation, Russian firms there have special rights – their workers don’t need visas or residence permits, for example, as established by the 1921 treaty governing this Norwegian archipelago.

            For background on such Russian actions there and their increasing frequency, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/11/putins-special-envoy-for-svalbard-says.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2026/01/russia-has-every-right-to-expand-its.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2026/02/moscow-increases-its-focus-on-two-north.html.

Caspian Sea Water Level has Fallen to Lowest Level in Last 400 Years, Moscow Scholars Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar.15 – The water level of the Caspian Sea has now fallen to the lowest level at any time in the last 400 years, inflicting serious ecological, economic and even political consequences on the littoral states, according to Sergey Zhiltsov of the Diplomatic Academy and Andrey Kostyanoy of the Institute of Oceanology of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

            The decline which is now taking place between nine and 35 centimeters a year has hit the northern portions of the sea and thus affected the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan especially hard, but it is now so large that it is affecting the southern littoral countries of Azerbaijan, Iran and Turkmenistan (ng.ru/dipkurer/2026-03-15/11_9453_problem.html).

            These countries have seen the access to their ports and shorelines change dramatically for the worse, reducing their ability to make use of the Caspian as they had in the past. The gulfs of these three countries have declined in size from 30 to as much as 95 percent of what they were in the past, declines that exceed the ability to reverse the situation by dredging. 

            But the falling water levels of the Caspian have affected more than just the littoral states, the two Moscow scholars say. They have had a direct impact on the ability of other countries to use north-south shipping corridors, something that has had a major impact on Russian-Iranian commerce.

            In addition, as the water level has fallen, so too has the ability of all these countries to extract oil from the seabed. As a result, all of the countries directly concerned are now focusing on projects to slow the decline of the level of the sea and to invest more heavily in the updating of port facilities so as to be able to maintain links even as the waters fall.

            Current projects of the Caspian Sea water levels are currently extremely pessimistic, the two scholars say, with most hovering between a decline of the sea’s level by 20 to 21 meters (65 to 70 feet) by the end of this century. If that happens, most of the sea’s ports now will be far inland and not able to function.

            For background on this issue, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/03/caspian-seas-declining-water-levels.html,  windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/09/caspian-sea-dying-with-catastrophic.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/09/caspian-seas-declining-water-level.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/07/falling-caspian-water-levels-cuts-into.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/06/drying-up-of-caspian-hitting-kazakhstan.html and the sources cited therein.