Sunday, November 22, 2026

Expelling Immigrants Not Enough to Prevent Survival or Even Growth of Ethnic Enclaves, Shustov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 18 – Russian officials regularly suggest that their increasing expulsion of Central Asians represents a solution to the problem of the formation and growth of ethnic enclaves, but expulsions alone are not enough to protect Russia from that outcome, Aleksandr Shustov says.

            The Russian nationalist commentator says that if Moscow is going to get really serious about doing so, without going back to a system of residence permits like the one that existed in Soviet times, it will be necessary to change two other arrangements  (ritmeurasia.ru/news--2026-11-18--kak-ne-dopustit-pojavlenija-etnicheskih-anklavov-v-rossii-91703).

            On the one hand, Shustov says, Russia must cancel the 1996 agreement that allows Tajiks to take Russian citizenship without giving up their Tajik citizenship, something that guarantees they will continue to move back and forth between the two countries and will live as a group when they are in the Russian Federation.

            And on the other, he argues, rules allowing citizens of Commonwealth of Independent States members to acquire Russian citizenship via the simplified rules governing the return of compatriots will have much the same impact, bringing in people who are culturally and linguistically dissimilar to Russians who will want to live together.

            Taking either of these steps and especially the latter would further fragment the post-Soviet states, alienating many especially in Tajikistan and other Central Asian countries who have gotten used to current arrangements; but unless this is done, Shustov says, what may appear a temporary problem will become permanent, regardless of how many immigrants are expelled.

Released from Prison to Fight in Ukraine, Three Men Found Guilty of Murdering Boris Nemtsov are Now Living as Civilians in Chechnya, ‘Project Media’ Reports

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 16 – Moscow has now found a new use for its program to grant convicts in its prison system release in exchange for commitments to serve in Putin’s war in Ukraine: it has allowed some imprisoned for crimes the Kremlin wanted committed to avoid military service and instead live as civilians in lawless Chechnya.

            That is the conclusion of an investigation carried out by researchers at the independent Project Media group who determined that three men convicted for their parts in the murder of opposition figure Boris Nemtsov had used that tactic and are now living as civilians in Chechnya (proekt.media/investigation/ubiytsy-nemzova-na-svobode/).

            According to Project Media, the three have been told to lead “a quiet life” in order to “avoid attracting attention” and threatened with a return to prison if they do not. Alternatively, the men might be sent on to fight in Putin’s war and put in the front lines where they might be killed.

            It is extremely likely that others now behind bars for carrying out crimes that those around Putin back may be offered similar deals, although the crimes involved may not have been as high profile as the killing of Nemtsov. At the very least, both Russians and those who track Russian politics should be alive to that possibility and seek to track them down.

            That is because such actions by the Putin regime confirm the suggestions of others that Russia is increasingly converging with Nazi Germany in having two kinds of law, one for most people most of the time and another for others who are treated on basis of what regime wants (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2026/08/putins-russia-embodiment-today-of.html).

Moscow to Help Tehran Restart Iranian Oil Drilling in the Caspian that has Been Stalled for 30 Years

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 16 – Iran indicated a year ago that it planned to restart its oil drilling program in the Caspian Sea, a program that for political and logistical reasons had been stalled since the 1990s (spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/crude-oil/050925-iran-renews-oil-drilling-activities-in-caspian-sea-after-30-year-halt-minister).

            Last month, Russian officials met with their Iranian counterparts to discuss how their two countries might cooperate in helping Iran to do so (en.mehrnews.com/news/248470/Iran-Russia-officials-discuss-oil-exploration-in-Caspian-Sea).

            And now Tehran officials have announced that they have come up with what they say will be an “intensive” Iranian drive “for oil and gas exploration and production in the Caspian Sea” (casp-geo.ru/iran-razrabotal-intensivnuyu-programmu-po-razvedke-i-dobyche-nefti-i-gaza-na-kaspii/).

            While details of this program are still uncertain, two things are clear: On the one hand, Russia will be an active participant in what Iran is doing, further cementing the alliance between the two countries; and on the other, Iran’s effort to develop offshore oil and gas sites are likely to create new conflicts with the two neighboring littoral countries, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan.

            The latter is likely precisely because while the five littoral countries have agreed on the surface delimitation of the Caspian, they have yet to reach an accord on the seabed – and the lack of an agreement on that is likely to become an obstacle to Iran’s plans and to set Baku and Ashgabat at odds with Tehran and its Moscow backers. 

Saturday, November 21, 2026

Two-Thirds of Russian Men under 40 East of the Urals who Passed Away Last Year Died Fighting in Ukraine

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 17 – More than half of all Russian men under the age of 40 who died last year did so while fighting in Putin’s war in Ukraine, with 76,790 dying from that cause while 62,420 died from all other causes, a human tragedy with enormously negative consequences for Russia’s demographic future because it removes so many potential fathers.

            But because the Kremlin tried to hide this by recruiting more men from distant and often non-Russian regions, the difference in the share of such war-related deaths between the capitals and these regions was especially shocking, activists who hacked Rosstat’s files say (ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/11/17/bolee-polovini-umershih-v-rossii-muzhchin-mladshe-40-let-pogibli-na-voine-s-ukrainoi-a211530).

            In Moscow, the share of combat deaths among all deaths among those under 40 was 30 percent; and in St. Petersburg, it was 21 percent, but in Siberia and the Russian Far East, the war was responsible for the deaths of more than two-thirds of all deaths in that age group, Belarus’ Cyberguerillas and the Ukrainian Silent Crow report. 

            That pattern will not only make it almost impossible for Moscow to achieve the demographic goals it has for the portion of Russia east of the Urals but mean that birthrates among many non-Russian nations from whom Moscow drew its soldiers will decline, further reducing their share of the population in the future.

            The impact of deaths in Moscow and St. Petersburg will be less because in those two Russian capitals, fertility rates have already fallen to one child per woman per lifetime, less than  half the replacement level of 2.2. Elsewhere, where fertility rates are higher, the decline in demographic growth will be proportionately greater. 

Russian Officials Alarmed by Explosive Growth in Home Schooling to Avoid War Propaganda

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 17 – Under Russian law, parents have the right to decide to home school their children at any point through the first 11 years of schooling, but so many are now choosing to do so in order to reduce the exposure of their children to the Kremlin’s war propaganda that some officials are demanding restrictions.

            Almost 100,000 Russian children are now being homeschooled, a figure that rose by nearly 17,000 between 2025 and 2026. Many are homeschooled because of physical or mental handicaps that ordinary Russian schools are not equipped to handle; but at increasing share are the product of parental concern about the schools being used to spread war propaganda.

            Many parents, Current Time TV says, are alarmed by the normalization of war now occurring in schools and by the fact that their children are coming home from schools in tears because their future as soldiers, many of whom will die, is promoted as the most desirable one (currenttime.tv/a/dvizhenie-perehoda-na-domashnee-obuchenie-rossiyane/33899733.html).

            In Tatarstan, where the number of pupils being homeschooled jumped by 50 percent over the last year, some officials are worried that the propaganda the Kremlin wants promoted isn’t being spread as effectively and have called on Moscow to tighten restrictions on those parents and their organizations who want to homeschool their children.

            If restrictions are formally imposed, that will generate real anger among many parents and likely transform their desire to protect their children from the pro-war propaganda now on offer into open opposition to the war itself, at least in places like Tatarstan where homeschooling is now experiencing explosive growth.

            For background on homeschooling in Russia and its relationship to the war and other political issues, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2026/02/ever-more-russians-homeschooling-their.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2021/09/educational-experiences-of-russian.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2019/11/tatar-parents-urged-to-take-education.html.

Both Moscow and Foreign Partners Must Evaluate Arctic Projects Not One by One as Now but in Terms of Their Regional and Even World Impact, Arctida Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 13 – Up to now, both the Russian government and foreign governments and firms have evaluated Arctic projects individually rather than considering each in terms of their broader impact on the region, its peoples and indeed the entire world, according to researchers at Arctida.

            That must change, the representatives of the Arctic rights group say in a detailed analysis of the actual impact of 15 projects in the Russian north. (For the 44-page report, see https://cdn.sanity.io/files/tsza235h/production/9c426ffc75a110d5106ee034e5bf58657942edf1.pdf; for a discussion of its key conclusions, see arctictoday.com/reassembling-the-arctic/.)

            One of their number, Alesiya Sashkova, says that now policy makers in Moscow and elsewhere consider each project in isolation but that it is critically important to change that because “the Russian Arctic must be understood as an integrated infrastructure and political-economic system and not as a collection of isolated projects.”

            “Russian oversight authorities,” she continues, “should apply the same approach, assessing projects together with all their supporting infrastructure rather than artificially dividing assessments among individual facilities and legal entities;” and all foreign governments and businesses involved with Russian Arctic projects should do the same.

            What is unfortunate both for the environment and the indigenous populations of the Russian North is that sanctions have only intensified this project-by-project approach because they have increased the role of the Russian state in all projects; and by inertia, this has meant that the broader impacts of these projects are typically understated or even completely ignored.

Activism by Non-Russians in Support of Their Languages May Not Save Them, Latypova Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 16 – Leyla Latypova, who follows ethnic and regional developments in the Russian Federation for The Moscow Times, says activism by non-Russians in support of their languages is increasing and has attracted widespread attention but that it may not be enough to save them from extinction.

            At present, she points out, only two of the languages of the Russian Federation – Russian itself and Russian sign language – are not at risk of dying out because the Russian government has deprived them of many of the institutions languages need to survive (themoscowtimes.com/2026/11/16/russias-indigenous-languages-are-dying-can-a-new-wave-of-activism-save-them-a94259).

            Many of the most committed defenders of the minority languages have fled abroad where they continue to promote their languages but can do little except via the Internet to help them at home, a place where the Russian government has reduced instruction in them and use in the public sphere in the name of Russianizing the country.

            Latypova quotes Khandama Tudebey, a Buryat language activist, to the effect that “language preservation cannot be separated from questions of power, access to education, cultural autonomy and a community’s right to determine its own future,” things that the non-Russians within the current borders of Russia do not have.

            Unless these things change either because of a change of heart in the Kremlin over how to treat non-Russians or their escape from the Russian empire and its powerful Russianizing influence, there is little chance that most of the non-Russian languages there will cease to play much of a public role a generation from now, however committed their activists now may be.