Central Muslim Spiritual Directorate Rejects Suggestions Its Imams are Promoting Extremism

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 8 -- Nearly three weeks after Russian officials charged more than a dozen senior Muslim leaders with various crimes, an action Russian commentators said reflected the Central MSD’s promotion of extremism, that body which is headed by Ravil Gainutdin has responded with a public declaration denouncing all these charges and suggestions.

            (On the arrests and commentaries in May, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2026/05/moscow-arrests-ten-senior-muslim.html and jamestown.org/moscows-arrests-of-muslim-spiritual-directorate-officials-likely-to-backfire/; for the Central MSD’s response, see dumrf.ru/upravlenie/documents/26455 and agents.media/duhovnoe-upravlenie-musulman-vpervye-prokommentirovalo-kampaniyu-po-presledovaniyu-islamskih-bogoslovov/.)

            The Central MSD declared that “we categorically reject assertions made in certain media reports and by bloggers alleging that the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of the Russian Federation is linked to extremism, radicalism, foreign influence, or inter-ethnic discord.”

“On the contrary,” it continues, “since its inception, the Spiritual Administration—representing a significant portion of Russia’s Muslims—has operated within the framework of Russian law and in the interests of inter-ethnic, interfaith, and civic harmony; it conducts religious-educational and social activities aimed at fostering the unity of all the peoples of our country.”

            Consequently, “attempts to portray the Spiritual Administration of Muslims as a source of extremism serve not to protect society, but rather to fuel mistrust between state institutions and believers, as well as among the peoples of Russia. Amidst external pressure on the country, such a campaign plays into the hands of its adversaries by undermining internal unity and eroding trust in traditional religious institutions.”

            And it concludes: “the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of the Russian Federation considers it unacceptable to turn isolated, controversial incidents into a campaign aimed at discrediting a traditional religious institution of Russian Muslims. Such a campaign risks stoking inter-ethnic and interfaith tensions, undermines confidence in legitimate religious organizations, and distracts state authorities from addressing genuine threats.”

            In short, the Central MSD and its leader Mufti Ravil Gainutdin have not been intimidated by the arrests and are coming out swinging as it were in defense of themselves and those who have been charged by the state authorities, a response that may make the government think twice about pursuing this campaign or face the consequences of resistance by Muslim leaders.

Russia’s Conflict with the West will Last ‘Decades’ and be Both Hot and Cold, Bezrukov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 6 – Andrey Bezrukov, an MGIMO professor with close ties to the Russian intelligence services, says that Russia’s current conflict with the West will last “decades” and involve both “hot” and “cold’ periods, thus throwing cold water on many in Russia and the West that the situation will improve radically after Putin leaves the scene.

            In comments to the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, the foreign policy expert said that everyone must be ready for two generations that are going to live in a situation that will be “practically at war” and that Moscow must “be ready for this” and modify the economy and the state budget to support that situation (nakanune.ru/articles/124733/).

              Other Russian experts at the meeting disagreed, but Bezrukov’s words stand out not only because he is known to be extremely influential and has ties with those close to Putin but because what he is saying about changing Russia to put it in a position to continue to fight the West is consistent with Putin’s line.

‘To Intimidate a Thousand Russians, One Need Punish Only One,’ Rights Activists Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 8 – To intimidate a thousand residents of the Russian Federation, the organs need punish only a few, often young people who are arrested and charged with serious crimes like terrorism as a result of provocations carried out by the police or the security services Memorial, OVD and other Russian human rights groups and experts say.

            In reporting this unanimity, Nataliya Kildiyarova, a North Caucasus broadcaster at Radio Liberty, provides the number these groups and experts point to and the way actions against individuals affect their families, friends, and then larger groups (svoboda.org/a/chtoby-zapugatj-tysyachu-dostatochno-nakazatj-odnogo-podrostkov-na-yuge-i-severnom-kavkaze-presleduyut-za-terrorizm/33775795.html).

            Perhaps the most striking fact she advances comes from Russian sociologist Dmitry Dubrovsky who points out that “the number of known cases of prosecuting minors in the republics of the North Caucasus appears to be smaller than in neighboring regions of the south of Russia.”

            The scholar says he isn’t surprised because the strength of family ties in the North Caucasus is so strong that families can be intimidated just by suggestions that charges might be brought against one of their number whereas elsewhere, where families are less strong, that is not the case and the authorities have to bring charges to achieve their goals.

            What that confirms, although the sociologist is not explicit on this point, is that there are more real crimes by young people in the North Caucasus than elsewhere and than are being reported and that the reason the authorities are going after young people is first and foremost to intimidate others.

            Where the organs don’t have to bring charges to achieve that end, they are less likely to; but where they have to bring charges or the population will not be intimidated.

Putin Tells Shipbuilding Corporation Head There Must Not Be Further Delays in Building Icebreakers

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 8 – Vladimir Putin told Andrey Puchkov, head of Russia’s United Shipbuilding Corporation, that there must not be any delays in the building of icebreakers lest such delays allow the West to challenge Russia’s position on the Northern Sea Route and block Russia’s access to products and technologies.

            This meeting and Putin’s blunt message calls attention not to the successes Russia has had in the construction of icebreakers but precisely to its failure to meet plans, something that is often passed over in silence (newizv.ru/news/2026-06-08/pomeshat-budet-slozhno-putin-ukrepil-liderstvo-rossii-v-ledokolnom-flote-440447).

            And the failures of Russia to produce enough icebreakers are all too real. Despite Putin’s repeated interventions, Russia has built only one icebreaker since the start of his expanded war in Ukraine (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/09/russia-has-built-only-one-icebreaker.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/10/ukrainian-war-costs-forces-moscow-to.html).

              Moreover, the current projects in the yards both regarding construction and refitting are lagging behind, even as climate change and Russia’s needs to modernize its fleet to handle both its riverine needs and growing ice problems in the eastern portions of the NSR that frequently trap Russian and foreign ships and embarrass the Kremlin.

Fate of Ethnic Finns in USSR Detailed in New Book and Electronic Data Base

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 8 – The Finnish National Archives has released its final report on The Fate of Finns in the Soviet Union 1917-1964 (in Finnish) in the form of both a book by Alexi Manio and an interactive data base with information on some 38,000 Finns (mariuver.eu/2026/06/08/sudby-finnov-v-sovetskom-sojuze/).

            (The full text of the itself book is available in full in Finnish online at drive.google.com/file/d/19_FRE2rQs9HgBG7JE0HoAe9p3OtfOyBq/; the electronic data base also in Finnish can be found at  kohtalonaneuvostoliitto.kansallisarkisto.fi/index.php.)

            These new publications are especially valuable for the light they shed on the number of ethnic Finns who fell victim to Stalinist repression and to the very different ways these repressions hit the various waves of Finnish migration into the Russian Empire and then the USSR.

            These waves of migration included  “the "old" Finns, who lived in St. Petersburg before the revolution, the "red refugees" who left Finland after the Civil War of 1918 and the American Finns who came to Karelia from the USA and Canada fo find work during the depression of the 1930s,” Mari El reports in its review of the book and data set.

In Online Vote, 4,000 Karelians ‘Like’ a Post Calling for Ouster of Their Republic’s Leaders

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 8 – The Internet is transforming things, not least of which are public opinion polls and even elections, given that individuals can go online and  express their opinions in ways that officials in many countries, including prominently the Russian Federation don’t want them to.

            An intriguing example of this is taking place in Karelia now. There in the space of less than 24 hours, 4,000 people have chosen to “like” a post calling for the ouster of the Moscow-appointed head of the republic, Artur Parfenchikov, and his prime minister, Irina Kolykhmatova (nemoskva.net/2026/06/08/bolee-treh-tysyach-zhitelej-za-noch-podderzhali-trebovanie-ob-otstavke-rukovodstva-karelii/ and ru.thebarentsobserver.com/novosti/post-za-otstavku-glavy-karelii-za-sutki-nabral-cetyre-tysaci-lajkov/452158).

            In addition to these “votes,” more than 700 people have left commentaries on the post, overwhelmingly sharing the original author’s position and adding new details of what people feel about the regime of the two officials, already known to be extremely unpopular by the population of that republic.

            Obviously, the Kremlin isn’t going to accept the results of this “vote” and replace one or both of these officials; but such a vote matters in at least two important ways. On the one hand, Moscow officials will certainly take note of such expressions of anger at their agents in the federal subject and are likely to view such voting as a black mark on the latter.

            And on the other – and this is both far more likely and far more important – people in Karelia who are angry about what their Moscow-imposed rulers are certain to be energized by this expression of solidarity in opposition to the exiting regime, something that may matter even more if such a tactic spreads to other regions and republics in the Russian Federation.

Samizdat and Tamizdat Today Different from What They were in Soviet Times, Klots Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 8 – In Soviet times, there were three kinds of literature – gosizdat published with the imprimatur of the communist authorities, samizdat which was issued by people who wanted to communicate with others but couldn’t get or didn’t want official qpproval, and tamizdat which was published abroad and smuggled back in.

            Yakov Klots, a scholat at Hunter College who runs the Tamizdat Project there, says that “gosizdat in its pure Soviet form does not exist in Russia today” as publishing houses there now are privately owned however much government controlled (novayagazeta.eu/articles/2026/06/08/my-perevodim-knigi-ne-dlia-togo-chtoby-razvlech-zapadnogo-chitatelia-skazkami-ob-uzhasakh-putinskoi-tiurmy).

            But both samizdat and tamizdat have changed. “Samizdat has acquired a new technological dimension,” with online electronic forms now dominating the scene and able to reach their audiences “thousands of times better” than was the case in Soviet times with handwritten or typed documents.

            Despite that difference, however, Klots continues, there is “a paradox” in that “digital samizdat retains a key property of its Soviet ancestor: it has a limited, hermetic, and niche audience living inside a certain information bubble.”

            Tamizdat, he continues, is both similar and different from its Soviet antecedent. It is, of course, “a phenomenon that is directly oppose that of émigré literature, as the key distinguishing feature of tamizdat is that the text crosses the state border while its quthor remains within the metropolis where this text cannot be published.”

“If we look at the present day through this lens, Klots continues, “we will see that the real tamizdat is alive. There are many authors who, for various reasons, stay inside Russia, write there, but send their texts for publication to foreign independent publishing houses, often under pseudonyms or anonymously.”

“But, as before, the "new tamizdat" is dominated by authors who have already emigrated, that is those who have for some time now found themselves in the same jurisdiction and geography where their books are published,” a difference that sometimes leads to confusion.

The Hunter College scholar notes that “the role of paper has also changed. If Solzhenitsyn's Gulag Archipelago had been released simply in epub or Print on Demand format today, it would not have become the tectonic shift it was in 1974. Today's Gulag Archipelago would only be an event if it was released as a series on Netflix.”

And that in turn helps to explain why tamizdat and even samizdat issued now seldom has the same impact that they did in Soviet times.