Many Countries Became Stronger after Defeats and Weaker after Victories and Russian has and Can Again Do So, Russian Blogger Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 18 – Russians must recognize that the claims the Putin regime and z bloggers are making are fundamentally wrong and that “anyone who wants a good future for Russia should not only wish for its speedy military defeat but also do whatever he or she can to ensure that outcome,” Dmitry Chernyshov says.

            Many countries, including Russia, “have become stronger after defeats and weaker after victories, the blogger writes on his Facebook account in words that have been picked up by EchoFM (echofm.online/opinions/mnogie-strany-stanovilis-silnee-posle-porazhenij-i-slabee-posle-pobed).

            Those who know the history of Russia and other countries already know this, Chernyshov continues; but those who don’t need to overcome the propaganda messages from the Kremlin and its allies.  Seeing how wrong three claims these sources routinely make is a first step in that direction.

            First of all, Russians must see that those who say that whether what Putin is doing in Ukraine is right or wrong, it is still their country. But it isn’t, the blogger says. “It is a country of chekists and bandits, not yours … nothing depends on you and you cannot choose or change power.”

            Second, Russians must reject the idea that since the war has started, it must be won. “Who told you such nonsense?” Don’t you see how much the war has cost in blood and treasure and that “by supporting the war, you become its accomplices?” That has to be recognized and acted upon.

            And third, following from that, Russians must see how absurd it is to say that one mustn’t change horses or leaders in the middle of things. That is precisely when you have to change horses/leaders if you want to change direction. Russians must thus stop equating the country and the state. “These are different things.

It is time to “understand that only defeat gives hope for changes in the country. The country will not cease to exist, but the power of the Chekists and bandits can.” And history shows that matters: “After the defeat in the First Crimean War, serfdom was abolished in Russia.”

With “a defeat in the Second Crimean War, there is a chance that the serfdom [Putin has put back in place] can be ended as well.

That Russia can benefit from defeat is something opposition politicians and commutators have been talking about for some time. Chernyshov’s post is an example of how their more abstruse discussions are coming down to the popular level and is thus particularly important for that reason.

Putin Regime Now Views Those It Persecutes ‘Not as Ordinary Criminals but as Enemies of the State’ and Punishes Them Accordingly, Memorial Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 17 – Since Putin launched his expanded war against Ukraine in 2022, the Russian authorities have changed the way they view anyone who opposes them. Such people, the regime now views “not as ordinary criminals but as enemies of the state” who must be opposed with ever more severe punishment so as to intimidate the rest of the population, Memorial says.

            According to the human rights organization, those being “persecuted for political reasons” are being given sentences almost twice as long as was the case for the same actions in 2021, 11 years behind bars rather than six years, seven months and not let off with fines or suspended sentences (memopzk.org/analytics/vragi-a-ne-prestupniki).

            The war in Ukraine contributed to this development in two ways, the organization says. On the one hand, the authorities faced more opposition; and on the other, “the war unleashed the authorities and allowed them to increase control over society with minimal costs to themselves. This combination could not but lead to increased political repression.”

             A key aspect of this trend is that the powers that be in Moscow have decided that they can achieve their goals of intimidation not by radically increasing the number of people put behind bars, although that has risen, but rather by acting “as cruelly and demonstratively as possible,” so that those not yet attacked will decide not to continue their opposition.

            To that end, Moscow has increased the number of laws governing political cases and increasingly used others in an expansive way so as to be able to act unexpectedly and then viciously against opponents. Moreover, prosecutors have added to the number of charges any individual may face and imposing harsher sentences for the same ones as well.

            Memorial concludes its report with the following observation: “It is important to note that court sentences are only part of the activity of the repressive machine, the most noticeable and officially recorded. Other instruments of repression are more bleak and more hidden from public attention.”

Veterans Groups Becoming Shock Troops for Putin’s Whitewashing of Stalin’s Crimes

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 17 – The impact on Russian life of the returning veterans of Putin’s war in Ukraine has attracted a great deal of attention, but one aspect of this influence is only now emerging as especially important: the way in which these veterans are helping the Kremlin dictator to whitewash the crimes of Stalin.

            It is now being widely reported that a memorial in Vorkuta to victims of Stalin’s GULAG was demolished by local officials “at the request of veterans of the special military operation” who objected to the fact that among the 33 prisoners named there were several who had participated in resistance to the restoration of Soviet power in Ukraine.

            On this, see nemoskva.net/2026/06/17/v-vorkute-po-prosbe-veterana-svo-demontirovali-pamyatnik-pogibshim-v-gulage/, ru.thebarentsobserver.com/novosti/v-vorkute-po-trebovaniu-ucastnikov-svo-demontirovali-pamatnik-zertvam-gulaga/452671 and svoboda.org/a/v-vorkute-demontirovali-pamyatnyy-znak-zaklyuchyonnym-gulaga/33782984.html.

            This situation might be dismissed as a special case in that it involved the issue of memorializing in the Russian Federation Ukrainians who had resisted Stalin, but the fact that the objection was a collective one by veterans of Putin’s war and was responded to positively by local officials strongly suggests that it is the opening salvo in a much larger operation.

            To the extent that is so, the most serious impact of returning veterans may not be their contribution to a rise in crime or to the formation of paramilitary support groups for the Russian Community by as adjuncts in Putin’s efforts to whitewash the crimes of Stalin and thus make it even easier for him to restore a totalitarian system.

90 Percent of Russians Say They’d Back Law against Domestic Violence Something Putin Did Away with in Name of Traditional Values

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 17 – A new poll by the Russian Field organization is important in its own right and also for highlighting something that is even more important. Despite Kremlin hype, Russians are far less enamored by the idea of traditional Russian values that Putin promotes and the actions he takes to promote those values.

            The new poll shows that 90 percent of Russians surveyed say they would support a law in Russia providing punishment for those who engage in violence within families (russianfield.com/protivnasiliya and novayagazeta.eu/articles/2026/06/17/90-rossiian-podderzhalo-by-poiavlenie-zakona-o-domashnem-nasilii-russian-field-news).

            Given the rising tide of violence against women and children by family members in the Russian Federation today (t.me/novaya_europe/62044 and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2026/05/feminist-anti-war-resistance-documents.html), this is a welcome sign that Russians are horrified by that trend and want to see something done about it.

            But it is more than that: it is a vote against the Putin regime’s policies in this area. Until 2017, Russia had laws against violence in the home; but in that year and with the support of the Moscow Patriarchate and in the name of promoting traditional values, the Kremlin leader decriminalized such attacks.

            In the years before Putin launched his expanded war against Ukraine, various commentators, activists and Duma members called for new laws against domestic violence, but these efforts failed because of opposition from the Orthodox Church and the Kremlin. Last year, the Russian government reiterated its opposition to such a law.

Moscow Hopeful UN will Soon Approve Its Claims to Enormous Segment of Arctic Shelf

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 15 – Aleksandr Alimov, Russian deputy foreign minister, says that he believes there are “good prospects” that the United Nations will soon recognize Russian claims to extended boundaries of its continental shelf in the Arctic, an action that would dramatically change the geo-economics and geo-politics of the northern polar region.

            Alimov says that “our submission [regarding Arctic shelf boundaries] is currently under review, and the outlook [that the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf to extend Russian control beyond the 200-nautical mile zone] is promising” (ria.ru/20260615/arktika-2098925848.html and arctic.ru/20260616/1537774.html).

            If the Russian diplomat is correct, that would bring to an end of 25-year-long effort by Moscow to gain such recognition and give the Kremlin an enormous victory because it would give the Russian authorities the whip hand in dealing with development of mineral resources and the passage of ships in the region.

            Shortly after Putin became Russian president, Moscow submitted such a claim; but it was rejected by the UN authorities because it lacked the needed topographic studies and maps. In 2015, it submitted a revised shelf claim, expanding Russia’s claims by nearly 1.2 million saquare kilometers (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/08/moscow-again-makes-expansive-claims-to.html).

            Other Arctic powers objected, although the US, which has never ratified the Law of the Sea Treaty, has had limited influence on this  situation. But in 2022, in the wake of Putin’s launch of his expanded war in Ukraine and the collapse of the Arctic Council, the possibility of approval appeared dead in the water (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2022/12/moscows-pursuit-of-international.html).

            Moscow has been furious about the delays in approving its claims, and some Russian analysts have suggested that the Kremlin should act unilaterally if the UN doesn’t approve its claims  (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2020/11/moscow-should-act-unilaterally-if-un.html).

            Now, however, Alimov’s upbeat interview suggests that Moscow thinks it is going to achieve what it has long sought and get the UN to go along. If so, that would give the Kremin an enormous victory at a time when it is in retreat on a variety of fronts and open the way for Russia, with China in support, to dominate the Arctic in the coming decades. 

In a Continuing Act of Genocide, Russia has Been Attacking Ukrainian Cultural Sites since 2014

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 15 – People and officials around the world have been shocked and outraged by Moscow’s attack on the Kyiv-Pechorsk Lavra church center in the Ukrainian capital, but many of them have failed to recognize that this barbaric act is not something new but rather continues a policy Russian forces have been pursuing not just since 2022 but since 2014.

            Yegor Mostovshchinkov, an independent journalist who is preparing a book on this subject, says that Moscow has been “waging a systematic war on Ukraine’s cultural heritage since 2014, destroying monuments, museums and churches” and taking “more than 1.7 million cultural exhibits” to Russia (novayagazeta.eu/articles/2026/06/15/rossiiskaia-armiia-nanosit-udary-po-ukrainskomu-kulturnomu-naslediiu).

            Ukraine’s culture ministry says that “Russia has destroyed 1783 cultural heritage sites and 2540 cultural infrastructure sites throughout the country, including cultural centers, libraries, art schools, museums, galleries, theaters, and music centers; and Mission Eurasia reports Russian forces have damaged or destroyed at least 737 churches.”

            Such Russian actions, obviously intended to destroy the culture of the Ukrainian people fall well within the internationally accepted definition of acts of genocide and are in sharp contract to Ukrainian actions which are directed exclusively at infrastructure and individuals involved in making war on Ukraine.

            As welcome as outrage about the Russian attacks on the Kyiv-Pechorsk Lavra are,  all people of good will need to recognize that what Moscow has done there is part of a broader policy of genocide against Ukrainians and do what they can to ensure that those responsible, from Putin on down, are brought to trial in international courts for this and other crimes.

Central Asian Populations Continue to Look to Russia Because of Transfer Payments but Governments and Business Increasingly Look to China because of Beijing’s Investments

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 14 – According to the Eurasian Development Bank, China has surpassed Russia and become the largest direct foreign investor in the countries of Central Asia; and as a result, businesses and governments increasingly look to China rather than Russia.

            But at the same time, the importance of transfer payments home by Central Asian migrant workers who remain several orders of magnitude greater in the Russian Federation than they are in China mean that in many of these countries the population and especially its poorer rural segment continue to look to Moscow.

            Consequently, experts in the region say, the shift to China by Central Asians is often overstated both in the Central Asian media and beyond because the existence of the migrant worker factor remains extremely important even as Russian direct investment falls (svoboda.org/a/biznes-estj-biznes-kitay-obgonyaet-rossiyu-v-tsentraljnoy-azii/33777438.html).

            This has a large number of consequences in the politics of the Central Asian countries, but two are especially noteworthy. One the one hand, because migrant workers and their transfer payments are so important, the shift from Russia to China as the dominant foreign direct investor remains less than many have suggested.

            And on the other, if Moscow does reduce the number of migrant workers from Central Asia in Russia dramatically as some in the Russian capital would like to do, that could change this equation and lead to a far more dramatic turn in the policies of Central Asian countries away from Russia and toward China.

            Concern about that possibility is thus likely to be part of Moscow’s calculus on just how many Central Asian migrant workers to allow into the Russian Federation. If the Russian government reduces that number too fast or if it shows itself too hostile to such people, Moscow would almost instantly see its influence in Central Asia decline and that of China rise.