Paul Goble
Staunton,
June 9 – For the last three decades, Anastasiya Koskello, says, the Moscow
Patriarchate “has steered political processes in the Caucasus through key allies,
the Armenian and Georgian churches as well as via its own branches, the Baku and
Yerevan dioceses, and church structures in Abkhazia and South Ossetia that are
de facto linked to Moscow.”
But
that system, the Moscow Institute of European Studies graduate student says,
which “allowed officials to act as if the collapse of the USSR had never
happened has now collapsed across the South Caucasus and ceded the influence of
Christianity on politics there to Islam (ng.ru/ng_religii/2026-06-09/7_9513_christianity.html).
The
death of longtime Georgian Patriarch Iliya last month, the defeat of
pro-Russian political forces in Armenia this week, and tensions between Moscow
and Baku mean that the Russian church can no longer act with the effectiveness
it did earlier, something that affects both the church itself and Russian policy
more generally.
This
weakening of Moscow’s position via the Armenian and Georgian Orthodox churches
is already clear, Koskello says; what is now increasingly “in doubt is the
position of the ROC MP’s dioceses in Yerevan and Baku where the governments
view them as ‘organizations’ controlled from abroad.’”
As
a result, the Moscow scholar says, “it is possible that in the foreseeable
future, they will face the same fate as the Estonian Church of the Moscow Patriarchate”
and be ordered by the courts to change their subordination from Moscow to the Ecumenical
Patriarchate in Turkey.
That
is especially likely in Azerbaijan where Russian Patriarch Kirill has offended
local officials by his insistence that he does not need to seek a compromise
but can continue to act as he has in the past, a position that has only made Baku
increasingly angry.
According
to Koskello, “the fate of the unrecognized church structures in Sukhumi and
Tskhinvali also hangs in the balance: local elites have grown weary of the
long-standing ecclesiastical games played between Russia and Georgia, and of their
attempts to turn Abkhaz and Ossetian Orthodoxy into a bargaining chip.”
“In
religious terms,” Koskello says, “the outcome of all these processes is the same:
a weakening of the position held by all forms of Christianity in the South
Caucasus,” something that has opened the door to the near certainty that “Muslim
Azerbaijan is destined to become the leading political force in the coming
decades.”
Indeed,
she concludes, “the influence of Islam is growing in every single South
Caucasian republic, including even in South Ossetia where historically not a
single mosque had ever existed. And that in turn further serves to strengthen
the influence of the Turkish-Azerbaijani bloc in the region.”