If Mobilization Occurs without Bonuses, Moscow will Have a Deeply Divided Military, Inozemstev Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 7 – If the military conducts a mobilization without providing bonuses to the new soldiers, Moscow will find itself with an army “in which 500,000 people are fighting for money and another 500,000 are fighting for an idea which they don’t have,” Vladislav Inozemtsev says.

            “It is impossible to imagine” how anyone could expect that to work, the Russian economist and commentator says, given that members of each of these groups would look at those who are members of the other with suspicion or disdain and not cooperate (echofm.online/video-dnya/hvatit-li-u-vlasti-deneg-na-novuyu-mobilizacziyu-vladislav-inozemczev).

            He says that there is a way out: Moscow could cut back on signing bonuses and even more on death benefits and raise the pay for those soldiers who are sent to the front lines. Most men entering military service don’t expect to die, but they would be far more enthusiastic about doing so if they were paid depending on whether they fought at the front or not.

            But that may be too rational a move for the Kremlin given its confidence that money can solve everything and that now Russians are becoming more patriotic as the war with Ukraine extends into its fifth year, two illusions for which the Russian leadership may very well have to pay dearly in the future.

Only ‘About 15 Percent’ of Orthodox Priests in Russia Support Putin’s War, Mitrokhin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 8 – Many assume that Moscow Patriarch Kirill’s  regular statements of support for Putin’s war in Ukraine set the weather for Orthodox priests and laiety in the Russain Federation, Nikolay Mitrokhin says; but that is not the case: Indeed, “only about 15 percent” of Orthodox priests there actively support the expanded Russian invasion.

            Kirill’s delarations, the scholar at the University of Bremen says, are not so much directed at the priests and believers to get them to accept his position – in Orthodoxy, even a patriarch doesn’t have that right – as a sign to the Kremlin that the Patriarchate as such is loyal to Putin (vot-tak.tv/94741767/rpc-voyna).

            Mitrokhin notes that “Patriarch Kirill is often perceived by analogy with the Pope or Ayatollah Khomeini - as a figure whose words automatically encourage believers to act. However, in Orthodoxy in general and in the ROC in particular, there is no direct connection between the rhetoric of the top leadership and the behavior of ordinary laity.”

            Kirill’s words, he points out, “are addressed primarily to the state power, as a demonstration of loyalty. Their practice influence ends at the church pulpit where the speech was made and the real administrative powers of the patriarch are limited to the boundaries of the Moscow diocese alone,” where Kirill is bishop.

            Most priests avoid talking about the war to avoid sparking conflicts within their parishes, and the Patriarchate does not encourage them to travel to Ukraine or to serve in the ranks of the Russian army. It decided on that course when priests who did early in the expanded war began to die, forcing the Patriarchate to take a public position it preferred not do so, Mitrokhin says.

            Few Russian parishes are enthusiastic about the war or actively involved in getting people to serve there either from their own faithful or more generally, although many more are quite prepared to collect money and goods for humanitarian assistance, something they see as a Christian duty but not an indication of support for Putin’s political goals. 

FSB Tells Circassian Repatriant He’ll Be Sent to Fight and Die in Ukraine Unless He Stops Searching for His Son who Already had Been and was Killed There, ‘Kavkaz-Uzel’ Reports

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 7 – Kalid Qaraf, a Circassian repatriant from Syria who now lives in Kabardino-Balkaria, says he was called by the FSB and told he would be sent to fight in Ukraine unless he stopped searching for his son who had been and was killed there and talking about the travails of the Circassians inside Russia, according to Kavkaz-Uzel.

            The news agency said it did not have independent confirmation, but both Kavkaz-Uzel and Circassian outlets said it was plausible given the way in which the KBR authorities have put pressure on returning Circassians to fight for Russia and keep quiet about their own aspirations (kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/425525, oc-media.org/repatriated-circassian-reportedly-threatened-by-fsb/ and personal communication from editor of Justice for the North Caucasus).

            Kalid Qaraf’s story is particularly heart-breaking. He returned to the North Caucasus homeland with his family. Then his son announced he was moving to Moscow, but he never got there, with Qaraf assuming he had and the Moscow friends that he had not yet come. When Kalid learned that, he tried to find out what had happened, even turning to Russian officials for help.

            The official response was to tell him to stop his propaganda campaign and then to inform him that his son had already fought and died in Ukraine and that unless Kalid shut up, he too would be sent to fight in Ukraine, put on the front lines and suffer a similar fate, a threat that they expected would silence him but that has had the opposite effect. 

            Russian propagandists have now taken up the issue and pointed out to all who will listen that many Circassians who have returned are proud to fight for Moscow in Ukraine. Among them was the son of Kalid Qaraf. Moreover, these outlets insist that all the things that Kalid has said are untrue and politically motivated.

Northern Sea Route Saves Only Half as Much Time for Ships to Travel Between China and Europe as Moscow Claims, Russian Captain Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 7 – One of the reasons so many people around the world look to the Northern Sea Route as a replacement for the Suez Canal is that Moscow routinely claims that the travel time of ships travelling between China and Europe is 20 days less than that of vessels going via the Suez Canal.

            But that isn’t true, Vadim Alekseyev, a retired Russian sea captain says, pointing out that because ships using the NSR operate at slower speeds, the actual saving in time is ten days rather than the 20 the Moscow media claim and that many others accept as plausible and even true given the shorter distances involved (svpressa.ru/business/article/526509/).

            Because of ice conditions and safety requirements, he says, “the average travel speeds on the NSR are lower [than those on the routes through the Suez Canal], about 15 knots versus 20 on the southern routes.” That means that savings in time and fuel “turn out to be less significant” than many think.

            But that is only one reason that the NSR still carries only a tiny percentage of the cargo that passes through Suez, Alekseyev continues. Even with global warming, “unrestricted navigation for standard, that is, non-ice-class vessels is currently possible for only three to four months a year.

            Icebreakers can extend this season but only at much higher costs. And one should not forget, “there are vessel requirements: large capacity contain ships optimized for the Suez Canal are unsuitable for the NSR,” something that “limits the pool of potential participants” via the Arctic route.

            Russia’s existing and planned icebreakers can handle projected cargo volumes on the NSR through 2030, Alekseyev says; but “However, if the NSR begins to attract significant numbers of foreign transit vessels, the strain on icebreakers will increase many times over.”

            But there is an even larger “bottleneck,” he indicates, on the development of the NSR: the state of Russian ports. They lack the capacity to handle significantly larger cargo loads than they do now, not having sufficient docks, repair facilities, dredging operations, and worst of all rail and road links from them to other transportation networks. 

Four European Countries Warn Moscow Against Annexing South Ossetia

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 7 – On the 18^th anniversary of Russia’s war against Georgia as a result of which Abkhazia and South Ossetia became partially recognized states, Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy have warned Moscow against annexing South Ossetia, something that has appeared increasingly likely in recent months.

            The four warn that such a step “will not remain unanswered” and demand that Russia live up to the ceasefire agreement that ended the 2008 war and withdraw its military forces from South Ossetia and Abkhazia (echofm.online/news/evropejskie-strany-zayavili-ob-ugroze-polnomasshtabnoj-anneksii-yuzhnoj-osetii-rossiej).

            This move has less to do with the anniversary of the Russian-Georgian war than with the fact that in May, Russia and South Ossetia took steps which many observers around the world view as moves that will result in the annexation of South Ossetia, a step that appears to have become more possible given what has happened in Ukraine since that time.

            The four also welcome the decision of the Naoero Republic as Nauru has been officially known since June to end its recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. After its decision, only three other countries – Nicaragua, Venezuelaand Syria – besides the Russian Federation continue to recognize the two North Caucasian republics as independent.

            For background on Russia’s decision not to annex South Ossetia up to now, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2026/06/even-though-moscow-has-not-yet-annexed.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/06/russian-military-base-in-south-ossetia.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/08/both-moscow-and-tsinkhval-have-reasons.html.

Moscow Planning to Build Dredging Fleet to Support Northern Sea Route But Likely to Have to Turn to China for Help as It has on the Caspian and the Volga

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 7 – Global warming and expanded human use have forced Moscow to turn to China and Iran for help in dredging portions of the Caspian and major Russian rivers, but now officials say it will build its own “fleet of dredging vessels” to clear portions of the Northern Sea Route and access to ports in the Russian North adjoining it.

            Russia does not now have such ships; and they will have to be either ice-capable or escorted by icebreakers, making this an enormous and expensive task especially given all the problems Russian ship building in general now has, a situation that may force Moscow to turn to China once again.

            But despite that prospect, Yury Trutnyev, the presidential plenipotentiary for the Far Eastern FD and point man for Moscow’s policies on the NSR, says that Moscow is planning to create its own national “dredging fleet” and that Putin will be signing off on that soon  (prochukotku.ru/news/ofitsialno/dnouglubitelnyy_flot_sozdadut_dlya_raboty_na_severnom_morskom_puti/).

            The task Moscow faces both with regard to the need to dredge along the Northern Sea Route is enormous and was outlined by Rosatom earlier this year. It said that the amount of deposits needed to be dredged and removed will reach 60 million cubic meters over the next five years (en.portnews.ru/news/385647/).

            Rosatom at the time acknowledged that Russia doesn’t have the domestic capacity to handle such an amount, making it likely that Moscow will once again turn to China and that China will thus gain more leverage over Russian policy in the north as siltification increases (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/10/as-russia-falters-in-north-china.html).  

Russia’s Federal Subjects Expand Use of Bounty Hunters to Meet Military’s Manpower Needs, ‘Moscow Times’ Reports

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 7 – In the past year, the number of Russia’s federal subjects using bounty hunters to sign up contract soldiers for Putin’s war in Ukraine has almost doubled from a year ago to 56 now and the amount these bounty hunters are paid had increased by as much a 1000 percent, The Moscow Times reports.

            Of those regions and republics employing this method of boosting recruitment, the paper says, 38 are doing so by the actions of  government agencies, while in the 18 others, these payments are handled privately through recruitment agencies” (ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/08/07/esli-verbovka-ne-srabotaet-budet-mobilizatsiya-dve-treti-rossiiskih-regionov-nachali-platit-ohotnikam-za-kontraktnikami-a202907).

            This system allows the governors to say that there is no federal money being spent and that even the amount of regional money is relatively small; but there is no question that the federal subjects are under enormous pressure to spend it even if they have to cut other spending and that the leaders of these subjects are now pressuring businesses to bear some of the burden.

            This system varies from one region to another, the paper continues. “Some offer a reward to anyone who brings in a contract soldier while others do so only if public sector employees are involved” – and in some places such rewards go only to employees of the siloviki.

            On the one hand, The Moscow Times suggests, this effort highlights the Kremlin’s increasing difficulty the government is having in raising enough men to replace the thinning ranks of Russian forces in Ukraine and the ways the regions have been roped in to ensuring that the flow of men continues.

            But on the other, despite the enormous amount of money sometimes mentioned, experts with whom the newspaper spoke say that even the hard-pressed regions have enough money to continue this arrangement for some time, even to the point of increasing rewards to bounty hunters and the soldiers themselves.