Russia’s Muslim Leaders Support Tokayev’s Proposal for Russia to Become Associate of Organization of Turkic States

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 6 – At the Organization of Turkish States summit in Ankara on October 30, Kazakhstan President Kasym-Jomart Tokayev proposed having the Russian Federation participation in an associate capacity with the OTS, something Russia’s Muslim leaders welcomed but that a senior Turkish official has questioned because of language requirements.

            Tokayev’s proposal (akorda.kz/en/kassym-jomart-tokayev-addresses-the-13th-summit-of-the-organization-of-turkic-states-319348) drew immediate support from the leaders of Russia’s senior Muslim Spiritual Directorates who clearly view the idea as something that would elevate their status (altyn-orda.kz/rossijskie-musulmane-podderzhali-ideyu-tokaeva-o-vstuplenii-rossii-v-tyurkskij-soyuz-chto-zayavili-v-moskve/).

            But a senior Turkish political official questioned the idea given that the OTS requires that its members speak a Turkic language, something those in power in Russia clearly do not do, a reaction that makes it unlikely Tokayev’s call will gain traction (timesca.com/turkish-official-questions-tokayevs-proposal-of-ots-observer-status-for-russia/).

            This back and forth recalls both the ongoing debate in Turkish nations over whether Pan-Turkism should be “large” or “small” (cronos.asia/news/bolshoy-i-malyy-pantyurkizm-pochemu-raskalyvaetsya-tyurkskiy-mir/) and the presentation to Turkish President Erdogan in November 2021 of a map showing the Turkic peoples of Russia as part of the Turkic world (caucasuswatch.de/en/news/nationalists-presented-erdogan-map-of-turkic-world-with-regions-of-southern-russia.html).

The appearance of that map provoked a violent response by Russian commentators who declared that even if the OTS expanded, it would never include nations like the Republic of Sakha in the Russian north (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2022/01/greater-turan-will-never-include.html).

Moscow TV Film Describes Portion of Norway’s Svalbard Archipelago as ‘a Russian Enclave Beyond the Arctic Circle’

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 6 – A 52-minute NTV film entitled “Svalbard. The Coal Archipelago” being shown in Moscow this week simultaneously suggests that Russia already has an “enclave” there and that Norway is militarizing the islands in violation of international law, according to Denis Zagorje of The Barents Observer.

            The film itself is available at rutube.ru/video/410a40573261fa50d530c6c02f587b3e/. The Barents Observer journalist’s report about it is at ru.thebarentsobserver.com/novosti/na-ntv-pokazali-film-pro-svalbard-cto-s-nim-ne-tak/461421.

            According to Zagorje, the film creates “the impression that there is a territory under Russian sovereignty in the archipelago” by stating that those who view it will see “how they live and work in the Russian enclave beyond the Arctic Circle,” a falsehood given that there is no such thing as a Russian enclave there. All the territory is under Norwegian sovereignty.

            But that is not the only false message of the film, he continues. Most of the movie is devoted to attacking Norway for militarizing Svalbard, even though the pictures the film claims show that are of military exercises elsewhere and the attacks against Oslo are at a minimum tendentious and more to the point outrageously false.

            This is the latest and most public example of Moscow’s effort to prepare Russians for the possibility of a move against Svalbard and thus NATO. For background on that possibility, see jamestown.org/moscows-first-move-against-nato-could-take-place-in-norways-svalbard-archipelago/ and jamestown.org/moscow-using-svalbard-to-test-natos-readiness-and-resolve/.  

Unlike Belarusians who Left Their Country in 2020, Russians who Left Theirs in 2022 have Not Formed a Unified Political Community, Konstantin Ivanov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 8 – For three major reasons, Konstantin Ivanov says, the Belarusians who left their country in 2020 after Lukashenka stole the election have formed a unified political community while the Russians who left theirs in 2022 because of Putin’s expanded war in Ukraine have not formed one and appear unlikely to do so, Konstantin Ivanov says.

            For any mass exodus to lead to the formation of such a community, the commentator says, three things are necessary: a common event which provides a point of reference for all involved, a vision of the future within which people can argue, and horizonal institutions where individuals can become participants.

            The Belarusians, Ivanov continues, “have all of these; while the Russians have none of them.” And thus it should surprise no one that the Belarusian diaspora has become a political community while the Russian diaspora has not and does not appear likely to do so anytime in the future (ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/11/08/nenastupivshaya-diaspora-a210728).

Had Bolsheviks Not Seized Power, Russia Would have Been Reduced to the Size of Muscovy Shortly After October 1917, Shirokorad Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 7 – A major reason Russian patriots should be glad that the Bolsheviks seized power in October 1917 is that they prevented their country from being reduced to the size of Muscovy, something that would certainly have happened, Aleksandr Shirokorad argues on the anniversary of the Bolshevik coup d’etat.

            Indeed, the Russian military commentator says, “without the Bolsheviks, the Russian sate in the best case would have been transformed into the Muscovite principality with borders of the 15^th century;” and “whether one likes it or not, only the Bolsheviks could hold the Power in the borders of 1917” (svpressa.ru/post/article/539737).

            At a time when people from many regions and republics are talking about independence for themselves and reducing the state centered on Moscow to that of Muscovy alone, what Shirokorad says is important. The center would not have held the rest of the country together had anyone but the Bolsheviks taken power.

            Instead, it would have likely fallen apart into many pieces, even if the largest one was a predominantly ethnic Russian core without significant access to the seas or control over much of what Russians today think of as their historically determined state extending from the Baltic to the Pacific and from the Arctic to the south.

            For a discussion of how a future disintegration of Russia might occur and why it could be limited by a Bolshevik-type strategy in Moscow, see my discussion of this issue a year ago at windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/11/future-disintegration-of-russian-state.html.

Russian Federal Subjects Putting Homeless Dogs to Sleep Form Deadly New ‘Archipelago’

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 6 – Since the end of 2023 when the governments of Russia’s federal subjects were authorized to kill homeless animals, a relatively small number of these regions and republics have put to death almost 16,000 dogs, thus forming what Takiye Dela journalist Aleksey Semyonov describes as a deadly new “dog archipelago” in Russia.

            Almost half of these deaths have taken place in Astrakhan Oblast, another 3300 dogs were put to sleep in Stavropol Kray, 1500 in the Tyva Republic, and 667 in Penza Oblast, he writes, with significantly fewer in other regions and republics (takiedela.ru/notes/arkhipelag-sobak/).

            Semyonov says he examined data from the 34 federal subjects where regional governments have adopted laws allowing the authorities to capture and then put down homeless dogs.  He notes that officials have been chary about releasing such data and acknowledges that these figures are almost certainly far from complete.

            Prior to the issuance in 2023 of  the federal law allowing the killing of stray dogs, regional officials were required to catch, then sterilize, vaccinate and release the dogs, an arrangement that did little to reduce the number of strays or the number of complaints of dog attacks by Russian residents.

            Even since then, about two-thirds of the federal subjects which have adopted laws allowing the killing of homeless dogs typically tried to find other means of getting the dogs off the streets, including adoption and dispatch to pounds and zoos. But in ten cases, the journalist says, the authorities have chosen execution as the primary means of control.

            According to Semyonov, the killing of dogs has done little to reduce the number of bites reported. Indeed, in nine regions where dogs were killed in significant numbers in 2025, only two showed declines and small ones at that regarding the number of bites that residents had suffered from homeless dogs.

            Animal rights activists are seeking to overturn these inhumane laws and hope that as people see that killing dogs doesn’t give them the results they want, they will be willing to support other measures to deal with what has long been a problem in Russia (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/05/if-duma-enacts-putin-regime-backed.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2026/09/more-than-half-of-russian-households.html).

A Political Nation is Emerging in Russia But One that isn’t Conscious of Itself but is Both Something the Kremlin Doesn’t Want and that Many Should Fear, Shelin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 6 – Putin has consistently worked hard to “ensure that Russia has no civil society, no ‘nation’ of citizens,” Sergey Shelin says; but the first signs of such a political nation, “albeit one that is deformed and quasi-fascistic, have emerged” in response to the Kremlin leader’s war in Ukraine.

            When Putin talks about national unity, he means something very different than the unity of the people of his country as a citizenry; and he has limited its rise. But despite his efforts, there is clear evidence that ever more Russians are identifying with and supporting what they view as their “own” army (ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/11/06/natsiya-kotoraya-sebe-neponyatna-a-rezhimu-nezhelatelna-a210600).

            In many countries people begin to think of themselves as a political nation when they are at war and focus on the need to help their “own” soldiers win; and as they do that, they come over time to view themselves as a political nation. That is beginning to happen in the Russian Federation, although the process is far more advanced in Ukraine, the commentator says.

            When Russians were asked an open-ended question by VTsIOM about what they consider the basis of “the unity of their people,” 25 percent pointed to a shared territory, nine percent to a shared history, and eight percent a shared pride in their country, Shelin says. Only three percent mentioned shared interests or civic values.

            Other more exact closed-end polls in which respondents were asked to choose among a list of unifiers found the same thing. Again and again, the commentator says, Russians “themselves failed to identify any sense of civic-mindedness within themselves,” despite a war that has now lasted almost five years and requires some support “from below.”

            And such support exists. Indeed, “voluntary or at least semi-voluntary assistance to the army is not uncommon in the Russian Federation,” Levada Center surveys show, although there are very few such people in Moscow and other large cities and far more in the regions and republics which have provided the most soldiers for the war in Ukraine.

            For Russia as a whole, the share of people regularly involved in volunteer work in support of the army is perhaps only two or three percent, but “it is nonetheless quite significant for a population which has shown a traditionally limited capacity for collective action” on its own, Shelin argues.

            Indeed, according to him, “voluntary and active solidarity with "one's own" army—an army currently attempting to seize another country—is clearly present in Russia, even if it does not encompass the majority. Even more to the point, there are no other visible forms of collective civic engagement.”

            Shelin says that this is “the Z sector in the provinces” and consists of people “acting on their own initiative and not by order from above.” In fact, “the regime does not encourage them particularly effectively or skillfully, and, for the most part, they do not hold the regime in any great affection.”

“It is here—not in the capitals or among the intelligentsia—that we see the first living shoots of a Russian political nation, whether we like what it looks like or not,” Shelin says, noting that “personally, I do not like them given their proto-fascist character and the lack of any real self-consciousness of themselves as a nation.”

“But it is precisely these forces that will emerge and claim the right to speak first once Putin is gone—when the screws are loosened, or perhaps even torn off entirely,” he concludes. And they will matter because “neither those who have emigrated nor the ‘interna’" émigrés pose any real competition to them.”

Variations in Spending on Artificial Intelligence Deepening Gap Between Moscow and Federal Subjects, ‘Club of Regions’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 3 – The gap in incomes between Moscow, on the one hand, and the federal subjects beyond the ring road, on the other, continues to expand, the latest reason being the vastly different amounts of money being devoted to the development of artificial intelligence (AI) in the two places.

            Last year, the Club of Regions says, Russian spending on AI increased by 95 percent, but almost all of that went to Moscow where the largest businesses and government bureaucracies are located, leaving the regions ever further behind on  this metric (club-rf.ru/news/65522).

            Of the 176.1 billion rubles Russia spent on AI last year, only 14.3 billion – less than ten percent – was invested in the regions, the portal says, a figure that means they will fall even further behind the capital than they now are because of the increasing importance of this factor in development. 

            In some federal subjects such as Ingushetia and the Jewish Autonomous Region, spending on AI was less than one million rubles – about 13,000 US dollars – and in three – the Komi Republic, the Nenets AD and the Chukchi AD – there was no investment in AI at all during 2025.