Paul Goble
Staunton, May 13 – Had Putin ended
his ‘special military operation” in Ukraine in the summer of 2022, he might
have been able to present it as a Russian victory, Vladislav Inozemtsev says;
but the longer he continues his war there, the less likely it is that Russia
will exit with its face saved or with Putin himself still in office.
That conclusion reflects four
lessons that wars in recent centuries teach, lessons that do not indicate when
a war will end but give a remarkably prescient description of what their
results will ultimately be for the country that launches such a campaign, the
Russian commentator says (ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/05/13/konets-ne-blizkii-no-yasnii-a195126).
The first lesson, Inozemtsev says,
is that in recent times, the longer any war lasts, the greater the dangers for the
aggressor and its government. The second is that modern wars are fought and won
on the basis of large coalitions and any country that tries to go it alone will
lose in the end.
The third lesson, he argues, is that
“modern wars – especially unsuccessful ones – become a critically important
catalyst for the restructuring of the political systems within the nations
involved,” something that means it will be very hard for Putin to convince
Russian’s he has won in Ukraine if he so obviously hasn’t.
And the fourth lesson involves the economics
of war. Conducting wars is increasingly expensive; and with each passing month,
the bill both now and the future rises, something that the population of the
aggressor country can ever more easily see and is ever more likely to act
against those, their own leaders, who are imposing it.
“None of this implies that Russia’s
war in Ukraine is likely to end anytime soon,” Inozemtsev says. But together
these reasons mean that “the longer the conflict
drags on, the less room there remains for doubt that the Kremlin stands no
chance—not only of achieving victory but even of exiting the conflict
"with its face saved."
The Russian commentator concludes with words that deserve
to be quoted in extenso: “Russia had already reached the absolute limit of what it
could hope to gain from a war with Ukraine back in the summer of 2022—before
Putin was forced to declare a "partial mobilization" and subsequently
pivot to his "death-onomics."
And also “before the full force
of sanctions took effect and Europeans began to sever energy ties; before the
West began supplying Ukraine with substantial quantities of modern weaponry and
before Ukraine itself began laying the groundwork for establishing a modern
domestic defense industry.”
Since that time, Inozemtsev
continues, “the Kremlin has done
nothing but sink ever deeper into a futile confrontation—one it is now openly
beginning to lose. This reality will become increasingly self-evident with
every passing month.
No one today can predict with any precision how this war will ultimately
end; however, the notion of Russia acquiring four (or six, or eight) Ukrainian
regions is now entirely out of the question.” But at the same time, “the
prospect of Putin remaining at the helm of a humiliated and bankrupt Russia
looks increasingly improbable.”
