Saturday, November 21, 2026

Both Moscow and Foreign Partners Must Evaluate Arctic Projects Not One by One as Now but in Terms of Their Regional and Even World Impact, Arctida Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 13 – Up to now, both the Russian government and foreign governments and firms have evaluated Arctic projects individually rather than considering each in terms of their broader impact on the region, its peoples and indeed the entire world, according to researchers at Arctida.

            That must change, the representatives of the Arctic rights group say in a detailed analysis of the actual impact of 15 projects in the Russian north. (For the 44-page report, see https://cdn.sanity.io/files/tsza235h/production/9c426ffc75a110d5106ee034e5bf58657942edf1.pdf; for a discussion of its key conclusions, see arctictoday.com/reassembling-the-arctic/.)

            One of their number, Alesiya Sashkova, says that now policy makers in Moscow and elsewhere consider each project in isolation but that it is critically important to change that because “the Russian Arctic must be understood as an integrated infrastructure and political-economic system and not as a collection of isolated projects.”

            “Russian oversight authorities,” she continues, “should apply the same approach, assessing projects together with all their supporting infrastructure rather than artificially dividing assessments among individual facilities and legal entities;” and all foreign governments and businesses involved with Russian Arctic projects should do the same.

            What is unfortunate both for the environment and the indigenous populations of the Russian North is that sanctions have only intensified this project-by-project approach because they have increased the role of the Russian state in all projects; and by inertia, this has meant that the broader impacts of these projects are typically understated or even completely ignored.

Activism by Non-Russians in Support of Their Languages May Not Save Them, Latypova Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 16 – Leyla Latypova, who follows ethnic and regional developments in the Russian Federation for The Moscow Times, says activism by non-Russians in support of their languages is increasing and has attracted widespread attention but that it may not be enough to save them from extinction.

            At present, she points out, only two of the languages of the Russian Federation – Russian itself and Russian sign language – are not at risk of dying out because the Russian government has deprived them of many of the institutions languages need to survive (themoscowtimes.com/2026/11/16/russias-indigenous-languages-are-dying-can-a-new-wave-of-activism-save-them-a94259).

            Many of the most committed defenders of the minority languages have fled abroad where they continue to promote their languages but can do little except via the Internet to help them at home, a place where the Russian government has reduced instruction in them and use in the public sphere in the name of Russianizing the country.

            Latypova quotes Khandama Tudebey, a Buryat language activist, to the effect that “language preservation cannot be separated from questions of power, access to education, cultural autonomy and a community’s right to determine its own future,” things that the non-Russians within the current borders of Russia do not have.

            Unless these things change either because of a change of heart in the Kremlin over how to treat non-Russians or their escape from the Russian empire and its powerful Russianizing influence, there is little chance that most of the non-Russian languages there will cease to play much of a public role a generation from now, however committed their activists now may be. 

Putin’s War has Hurt Middle Class which Never Liked Him Very Much while Helping Russia’s Super Rich and Poorest Strata, Inozemtsev Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 16 – Putin’s expanded war in Ukraine has imposed direct expenditures and material losses of more than 70 trillion rubles since 2022, an “astronomical” figure but one that has not brought the Russian economy to its knees, according to Russian economist Vladislav Inozemtsev.

            While the standard of living for many Russians has now begun to decline, he says, Russians overall “have not had to endure the hardships traditionally associated in the post-Soviet consciousness with wartime” and “the main losses have fallen on the middle class in large cities, precisely those not enamored” with Putin even before 2022 (ridl.io/ru/vojna-bez-benefitsiarov/).

            Middle class Russians who did not flee abroad have suffered the most and miss the freedom, foreign travel and foreign goods they had been accustomed to, Inozemtsev says. In contrast, “the position of groups on which Putin has relied throughout his time in power – the wealthy elite and the poorer strata of society has not formally changed so dramatically.”

            The wealthiest corporations have suffered only small declines in their profits and some harassment from the government but not enough yet to shake them, although as the war continues they are likely to be. And the poorest have received bonuses for service in Ukraine even though they have lost the lives of relatives and friends.

            The longer the war continues, the more the position of these two groups on whom Putin has long relied is certain to change, Inozemtsev says; but if the war ends relatively soon, he will likely retain such support into the future. Given his focus on keeping himself in power, that may now be part of his calculations.

Estonians can Finally Go from One Part of Their Country to Another without Driving Through Russian Federation Twice

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 14 – When it came to infrastructure like roads, the Soviet government showed little respect for union republic borders, often building them so that people who wanted to travel from one part of their republic to another had to pass through part or even parts of another.

            Among the most appalling example of this, given the attitudes of Russians and Estonians toward each other is what has been known as the Saatse Boot in southeastern Estonia where residents of that republic had to pass through two small segments of the Russian Federation in order to drive from one part of Estonia to another.

            The distances Estonians had to travel through Russia were relatively small, 40 meters in one case and 400 meters in the other; but they continued to be the roads of choice for Estonians up through last year, when Russian security forces appeared on them and appeared set to impose border controls, something that had been absent in the past.

            In response, the Estonian government blocked travel on these roads and committed itself to building new roads that would bypass Russian territories and allow Estonians to drive from one part of Estonia to another without the indignity of having to travel through the Russian Federation and the risk that Moscow would shut off a portion of Estonia by imposing controls.

            That effort which began last spring (news.err.ee/1610004400/work-to-begin-on-saatse-boot-bypass-road-next-month) has now been completed (err.ee/1610196340/estonia-s-saatse-boot-bypass-opens-ending-drive-through-russia); and Estonians are pleased, although some in the region feel isolated (news.err.ee/1609840575/saatse-boot-bypass-gives-locals-freedom-of-movement-but-isolation-remains).

            The timing of this achievement is especially important now given that Estonia has announced that it is closing the land borders between it and the Russian Federation on December 1 following Russian attacks on Estonian defense factories. Had this bypass not been in place, Moscow almost certainly would have blocked Estonian traffic on the road through Russia.

Friday, November 20, 2026

Nearly 6,000 People in Estonia who had Identified as Russians Changed Their Identity to Estonian Last Year

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 14 – In 2025, 5782 people who had identified as Russians in the past changed their identity to Estonian, while during the same period 1060 who had identified as Estonians changed their identity to Russian, according to Estonian government sources as reported by Tallilnn’s Maaleht weekly.

            That means there was a net change in the direction of Estonians of almost 5,000 people during a single year, an identification that people can make online and that does not necessarily relate to citizenship status but one that most Estonian commentators see as evidence of interest in integration in Estonian life by people who had identified as Russians.

            Others see it as the result of the desire of those in Estonia who had identified as Russians to improve their chances of employment and promotion or to show to Estonians that they do not wish to be identified with Russia given Putin’s war against Ukraine (maaleht.delfi.ee/artikkel/120623374/venelasest-saab-uhe-hiireklikiga-eestlane-mullu-muutis-oma-rahvuse-eestlaseks-5782-venelast).

            But at a time when relations between Estonia and Russia are at one of their lowest points in decades, it is striking that people who had identified as ethnic Russians in the past are now choosing to change their identity to Estonian, an indication that Moscow cannot hope to have much support from those on whom it has long counted.

Moscow’s New Moves Against Circassians and Their Tough Response Makes New Book Essential Reading

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 13 – At the end of October, the Russian foreign ministry organized a meeting in Moscow between Russian officials and experts and representatives of Russian-controlled Circassian organizations under the title of "Through the Centuries, Hand in Hand with Russia, Toward Achieving Honor and Glory."

            This propagandistic effort is part of a broader Russian campaign against Circassians, 90 percent of whom live abroad because of Russia’s genocidal expulsion of their ancestors in 1864. Many of them and many of the 10 percent who live in Russian-controlled areas want to return but who continue to be denied that opportunity by Moscow.

            Independent Circassian groups who continue the fight against Russian oppression have denounced the falsehood of the image of Russian-Circassian relations that Moscow is now using in the face of increasing activism by the Circassians mostly but not exclusively abroad (justicefornorthcaucasus.info/?p=1251686508, memorialcenter.org/ru/news/diaspora-protiv-kruglogo-stola-v-mid-rossii, justicefornorthcaucasus.info/?p=1251686534#more-1251686534, justicefornorthcacasus.info/?p=1251686528#more-1251686528 and habze.life/совместное-заявление-черкесских-кав/).

            These articles contain many details about both the Russian effort to continue to suppress Circassian efforts to achieve justice and the restoration of their state in the North Caucasus, but they are supplemented in an important new book that provides a useful guide to what is going on and why Moscow’s intensified efforts against the Circassians are backfiring and set to fail.

            Entitled The Rising of Circassia: The Quest for Justice, it can be described as a guidebook to the Circassian movement and how Moscow continued to try without success to suppress it. Written by Adel Bashqawi, the author of three previous works on the Circassians and editor of the Justice for the North Caucasus portal, it is now available on Amazon and elsewhere.

To get some idea of what the book contains, see the detailed summary of its contents Bashkawi has published on his portal (justicefornorthcaucasus.info/?p=1251686513). For anyone concerned about Russia’s policies toward the North Caucasus and the reasons why those policies are failing, Bashqawi’s new book provides the best available summary.

This book, even more than his earlier three (Circassia: Born to Be Free (2017), The Circassian Miracle (2019) and Circassia and Ukraine: Two Nations Even Russian Genocide Can’t Destroy (2023)) deserves a wide readership.

Thursday, November 19, 2026

Tallinn Setting Up a Cloud-Based Digital System to Run Estonia if It is Occupied and Set the Stage for Its Ultimate Recovery of Independence

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 16 – The Estonian government, which in 2007 became the first state subject to a country-wide cyber attack by Moscow, is creating a cloud-based digital system to allow it to govern from abroad in the event of a physical occupation and set the stage for its ultimate and rapid restoration of independence.

            That effort has been described by the US publication, Politico, whose coverage of what Tallinn has done so far is now being picked up by publications in Europe and Russia (politico.eu/article/estonias-digital-preppers-have-a-doomsday-backup-plan/  and readovka.news/news/251967/).

            By basing copies of its computer files abroad and by thinking about what Politico describes as a “doomsday” scenario, Estonia is proceeding as it has since the Russian cyber attack of almost 20 years ago, relying on building computer capability abroad rather than assuming that its security requires it to pull back everything to within its national borders.

            But probably the most important signal this news sends is just how worried Estonians now are about the possibility of a Russian move against them, a move that they intend not only to resist as it happens but to create structures that will allow them to break the occupation and win back the independence they recovered earlier.

            For background on what Estonia has been doing and why other governments in the regions should recognize that Tallinn is showing the way for them, see in particular Joel Burke’s detailed study based on his experience as a former Estonian official, Rebooting a Nation: The Incredible Rise of Estonia, E-Government and the Startup Revolution (London: Hurst, 2025).