Leading Opposition Figures in Kabardino-Balkaria Denounce Call to Strip from Republic’s Constitution Guarantees of Its Territorial Integrity

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 10 – Ten leading opposition figures in Kabardino-Balkaria have called on the republic parliament to reject a call by the republic procuracy to take out of the republic constitution all references to the right of the republic and its people to guarantee the territorial integrity of Kabardino-Balkaria.

            On June 2, the republic procuracy called on the parliament to remove from the republic constitution five provisions which specified that the republic and its people are guaranteed the right to the territorial integrity of their republic (semnasem.org/news/2026/06/11/pravozashitniki-prizvali-ne-udalyat-iz-konstitucii-kabardino-balkarii-punkt-o-territorialnoj-celostnosti).

            The parliament agreed to take up this appeal, and that sparked ten leading opposition and public figures in the republic to warn that agreeing to the procurator’s demand to bring the republic into correspondence with the Russian basic law could backfire and threaten the country as a whole (zapravakbr.ru/kollektivnoe-zayavlenie-k-glave-i-deputatam-kbr-protiv-trebovaniya-prokuratury/).

            According to the declaration of the ten, “The decision adopted by the Parliament is deeply flawed and poses a danger to the future of the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic as a constituent entity of the Russian Federation. We insist on preserving the constitutional guarantees of the republic’s statehood and territorial integrity.”

            It continues: “While the President of the Russian Federation ensures the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation as a unified federal state, this does not preclude constituent entities from enshrining guarantees of their territorial integrity—as an integral part of the unified state—within their own constitutions.”

And therefore, the authors say, “Removing the provisions establishing the principle of territorial integrity from the Constitution of the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic is the most destructive aspect of the proposed amendments. If the provision regarding the inviolability of the republic's territory is eliminated, the federal center would gain the legal authority to alter the republic's borders unilaterally.”

“Such a turn of events could lead to the following consequences:the transfer of territories—inhabited for centuries by Kabardians, Balkars, and other peoples—to neighboring constituent entities of the Russian Federation;  the abolition or redrawing of historically established national districts under the guise of ‘the interests of the Federation;’ and the loss of the republic's final constitutional safeguard against arbitrary changes to its territorial structure at the discretion of the federal center.”

The authors of the appeal say that “we cannot allow the Basic Law of Kabardino-Balkaria to remain silent on the issue of the inviolability of the republic's territory. This is not a matter of legal technicality, but a question of the republic's very existence as a national-territorial community.”

Moreover, they write, “The intention to remove the aforementioned provisions from the Constitution of the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic (KBR) is not an isolated event but part of a systematic effort by the federal center aimed at dismantling the special status of the republics within the Russian Federation—a strategy observed over the past 25 years.”

In support of their argument that this is just the latest and perhaps the penultimate step of Moscow’s campaign since Putin came to power to destroy federalism in Russia and the republics and other federal subjects who make it up, they offer the following chronology:

2001 – The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation invalidated provisions of the Federal Treaty that enshrined the sovereignty of the republics. Consequently, the Declarations of State Sovereignty adopted in the 1990s effectively lost their legal force;

From 2005 onwards – Heads of the republics ceased to be elected by direct popular vote. The people ceased to be the actual source of power, even though this remains proclaimed in the constitutions of both the Russian Federation and the KBR. Thus, the republics were deprived of the right to political self-expression within their own constituent entities of the Federation;

2018 – Abolition of the mandatory study of national languages ​​in schools, dealing a blow to the cultural foundations of statehood, despite the fact that the Russian Constitution grants the state languages ​​of the republics equal status with Russian within those republics;

2020 – Constitutional reform aimed at establishing a "unified system of public authority," which effectively subordinated regional bodies to federal structures;

2021–2022 – A ban on using the title "President" for the heads of the republics, eliminating a political symbol of statehood;

2023 – Constitutional courts—a key institution of statehood—were finally abolished in all the republics;

And now – the republic's parliament has accepted a protest from the KBR prosecutor regarding the removal of key provisions concerning statehood and territorial integrity from the republic's Constitution.

In short, the declaration of the ten argues that “the 1992 contractual model of the federal structure—is being systematically dismantled. We urge that this process be halted while there is still time.” And its authors urge that the deputies remember that “their primary duty is to take decision that don’t infringe on the interests of their native republic.”

Russian Laws Against Animal Cruelty are Tough but Seldom Enforced by the Authorities or Followed by the Population, ‘Kedr’ Portal Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 10 – Russian law allows for punishing those found guilty of cruelty to animals to be sentenced to up to five years behind bars, but these provisions of the criminal code are seldom enforced by the authorities and do little to limit often sadistic treatment of dogs, cats and other animals by the Russian population, the Kedr Media portal says.

            The most recent statistics released by the Russain Supreme Court show that in 2024, only 14 of the 199 Russians charged with animal cruelty were sentenced to any jail time, 21 received suspended sentences, and the remaining 164 were fined or ordered to perform community service of one kind or another (kedr.media/stories/zhivoder-obyknovennyj/).

            These figures dramatically understate just how much cruelty Russians inflict on animals. According to the government itself, 25 of the country’s federal subjects don’t release any information at all regarding animal cruelty and in them, Kedr says, the police often refuse to register cases even when someone reports what is going on.

            Animal rights activists say that the problem is widespread, although given the lack of statistics, they aren’t in a position to say whether the situation in the Russian Federation is significantly worse than in other countries. But psychologists warn that the tolerance by the authorities and the population for such cruelty has a far broader social impact.

            Those who live in families where cruelty to animals is viewed as normal and something the state should not intervene to prevent often normalize cruelty as such and then treat other family members, friends and relatives, and other people more generally in the same way, making the society far more cruel not just to dogs and cats but to people as well.

            Consequently, these psychologists say, Russians and others have a compelling interest not just in eliminating cruelty to animals because of the suffering it inflicts on beings often incapable of defending themselves but also because it contributes to attacks by those who tolerate or even encourage it on people, something most but tragically far from all oppose.

Some Russian Libraries May See as Much as 70 Percent of Their Books Removed Because of Moscow’s Laws on ‘Foreign Agents’ and ‘Undesirable Organizations’

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 10 – Rsusia’s Ministry of Digital Development says that new laws may require libraries across Russia to remove from their shelves from 15 to 70 percent of their books so that the don’t run afoul of regulations about handling those by “foreign agents” or “undesirable organizations.”

            The hardest hit, the ministry continues, will be municipal public libraries, whereas academic libraries are likely to suffer the smallest number of removals (nemoskva.net/2026/06/10/do-70-knig-mogut-izyat-iz-bibliotek-rossii-iz-za-zakonov-ob-inoagentah-i-nezhelatelnyh-organizacziyah/).

            And it warns that unless the laws are changed or simply not enforced, even Russian classics like Lermontov and Pushkin may find books of their works published by “undesirable organizations” among those taken from the shelves and thus away from public circulation among Russians.

            On the one hand, the ministry report appears to be directed at getting the laws changed; but on the other, the fact that it had to be prepared and has now been released shows just how much of a crackdown the Putin regime is carrying out on its libraries, one as absurd as those the Soviet authorities did earlier.

Kyrgyzstan’s Lake Issyk-Kul May Die as Aral Sea has Unless It Gets More Water from River in China, Bishkek Experts Say

Paul Goble

              Staunton, June 10 – The rapid melting of glaciers in the mountains of Kyrgyzstan has seriously reduced the flow of water into Lake Issyk-Kul and put it on course to follow the Aral Sea into oblivion, according to Kyrgyz scholars. The only salvation they see is to get more water from a river whose waters now go almost exclusively into China.

              Diverting some of the flow of the Sary-Dzhas river is an idea that arose “already in Soviet times,” these experts say. Indeed, at that time, “a detailed plan” was worked up but never carried out (ritmeurasia.ru/news--2026-06-10--kirgiziju-vserez-trevozhit-sudba-ozera-issyk-kul-88266).

              “Today,” they suggest, “this initiative again is being considered as one of the most effective means of resolving the problem” of Lake Issyk-Kul’s falling water levels, with experts saying dams could be build and the electricity generated sent to China in exchange for the water.

              Whether China will agree to that is not clear, but unless Bishkek and Beijing can reach some sort of agreement, it seems likely that the water levels of Lake Issyk-Kul will continue to fall – and the amount of water

Pechenga on Border with Finland and Norway Seeks Status of a Russian Closed Military Town

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 9 – Pechenga, a municipality on the border with Finland and Norway, is joining as the 29^th member the Russian Association for the Promotion of the Development of Closed Military Towns and thus benefit from the military investment that other such sites now enjoy.

            But Atle Staalesen of The Barents Observer says that Moscow adopted a list of such locations in 2001 and Pechenga is not on it and thus may be a member of the association without getting the benefits others do (ru.thebarentsobserver.com/novosti/pecenga-prisoedinaetsa-k-gruppe-zakrytyh-voennyh-gorodov/452283).

            Moreover, there are two reasons to think that it isn’t going to get the injection of military money local officials hope for. On the one hand, the actual number of troops there has fallen since 2022, the result of many units being sent to fight in Ukraine and then now returning to Pechenga. (On those losses, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/11/closed-military-towns-in-russian-north.html.)

            And on the other, satellite photography does not show the kind of construction one might expect if more troops were going to be brought in soon, although this may be deceptive if Moscow wants to build up and then use expanded military units for a campaign against one or both of its neighbors.

            For background on Russia’s closed cities and what goes on in them, see the discussion of an unusual study of them as discussed at windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/11/closed-military-towns-in-russian-north.html.

Russians have Little Interest in Books about Putin’s War in Ukraine, Publishers Tell ‘Vyorstka’

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 10 – Since Putin launched his expanded invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russian publishing houses have released 259 books about that situation; but most in extremely modest print runs of 3,000 copies or fewer because Russians aren’t that interested in such books and publishers don’t see such books as a profit center.

            That is what publishers, speaking on condition of anonymity, told the Vyorstka portal (verstka.media/kto-v-rossii-pishet-i-chitaet-knigi-o-vojne-v-ukraine), a report that has now been discussed by The Moscow Times (ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/06/10/rossiyane-otkazalis-chitat-patrioticheskie-knigi-o-voine-protiv-ukraini-a197844).

            Indeed, the only way publishers can make money on such books is by selling them to schools or public libraries which likely feel compelled to buy them, although there is little likelihood that Russians read such books even when they are on the shelves of such public institutions.

Moscow Patriarchate and Christianity More Generally Losing ‘Commanding Heights’ in South Caucasus to Islam, Moscow Scholar Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 9 – For the last three decades, Anastasiya Koskello, says, the Moscow Patriarchate “has steered political processes in the Caucasus through key allies, the Armenian and Georgian churches as well as via its own branches, the Baku and Yerevan dioceses, and church structures in Abkhazia and South Ossetia that are de facto linked to Moscow.”

            But that system, the Moscow Institute of European Studies graduate student says, which “allowed officials to act as if the collapse of the USSR had never happened has now collapsed across the South Caucasus and ceded the influence of Christianity on politics there to Islam (ng.ru/ng_religii/2026-06-09/7_9513_christianity.html).

            The death of longtime Georgian Patriarch Iliya last month, the defeat of pro-Russian political forces in Armenia this week, and tensions between Moscow and Baku mean that the Russian church can no longer act with the effectiveness it did earlier, something that affects both the church itself and Russian policy more generally.

            This weakening of Moscow’s position via the Armenian and Georgian Orthodox churches is already clear, Koskello says; what is now increasingly “in doubt is the position of the ROC MP’s dioceses in Yerevan and Baku where the governments view them as ‘organizations’ controlled from abroad.’”

            As a result, the Moscow scholar says, “it is possible that in the foreseeable future, they will face the same fate as the Estonian Church of the Moscow Patriarchate” and be ordered by the courts to change their subordination from Moscow to the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Turkey.

            That is especially likely in Azerbaijan where Russian Patriarch Kirill has offended local officials by his insistence that he does not need to seek a compromise but can continue to act as he has in the past, a position that has only made Baku increasingly angry.

According to Koskello, “the fate of the unrecognized church structures in Sukhumi and Tskhinvali also hangs in the balance: local elites have grown weary of the long-standing ecclesiastical games played between Russia and Georgia, and of their attempts to turn Abkhaz and Ossetian Orthodoxy into a bargaining chip.”

“In religious terms,” Koskello says, “the outcome of all these processes is the same: a weakening of the position held by all forms of Christianity in the South Caucasus,” something that has opened the door to the near certainty that “Muslim Azerbaijan is destined to become the leading political force in the coming decades.”

Indeed, she concludes, “the influence of Islam is growing in every single South Caucasian republic, including even in South Ossetia where historically not a single mosque had ever existed. And that in turn further serves to strengthen the influence of the Turkish-Azerbaijani bloc in the region.”