Violence Spreading and Intensifying in Russian Schools

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 11 – For decades, Russians expressed confidence that their country would never suffer the kind of school violence that Americans have and even adopted the toponym “Columbine,” the site of a 1999 school shooting in the US, that Russians felt was typical of that country but would never happen in their own.

            But a spate of school violence, including more than a half dozen cases in the last month alone, and its increasing lethality as students use not just knives but guns, is forcing Russians to recognize that they now have a problem similar to that in the US and to discuss how they can best respond.

            Perhaps not surprisingly, Russians are alarmed and are casting about for explanations as why this has happened and what is to be done. Natalya Savitskaya, an observer for Moscow’s Nezavisimaya Gazeta, provides a useful survey of these reactions and these proposals (ng.ru/kartblansh/2026-02-11/3_9435_kb.html).

            She says that Russians from the highest to the lowest levels are worried and fear that they are at the start of a trend that may be even worse than the one that has scarred the life of Americans. In 2025, there were 25 armed attacks on schools; this year, if the current trend continues at the same rate, there could be a hundred or more in 2026.

            Aleksandr Bortnikov, the director of the FSB, says that clearly “prophylactic work with young people is insufficiently effective” and calls for efforts to improve things to prevent more violence. Other Russians are simply frightened and say they fear that their country’s schools are suffering “a mental epidemic” and blame teachers, pupils, and the country’s broader problems.

            Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin asked the readers of his telegram channel whether they support his plan “to defend citizens from the destructive content” on video games, something that he says is particularly affecting young people. Seventy percent of his readers, he says, support such a move.

            The Duma is currently considering proposals to deal with the problem of bullying in the schools, something that many observers believe is behind the current uptick in violence. But other Russians place the blame on rising tensions in society as a whole, teachers blame parents, and parents blame teachers for what is happening.

            Russian educational experts want more psychologists in the schools. There is currently only one psychologist for every 300 pupils, a number that everyone concedes is too few but that cannot be improved upon because Moscow is spending what money it has on Putin’s war in Ukraine and doesn’t have the funds to address the problems in the schools.

            But even if Moscow did more to address this problem, Russian experts say, it might not prevent more outbursts of increasingly lethal violence because the teenage years are among the most difficult of life’s stages when young people are driven by hormones to set themselves apart from their parents, feel isolated and often try things that they wouldn’t later. 

New Kazakhstan Constitution Puts Russian ‘Alongside’ rather than ‘On Par’ with Kazakh, a Change Angering Some in Both Countries

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 11 – The new draft constitution of Kazakhstan changes the words used to designate the status of the Russian language. The current constitution specifies that Russian exists “on par” with Kazakh while the new one says that Russian exists there “alongside” the state language of the republic.

            Russian media have accurately reported this change but Russian commentators have attacked it as an insult to Russia, while in Kazakhstan, few have expressed concern except for some Kazakh nationalists who are upset that the new basic law doesn’t go far enough in reducing the role of Russian in their country (novgaz.com/index.php/2-news/4130-прикусили-язык).

            The change in wording reflects both the increasing importance of Kazakh in the life of Kazakhstan and the sense that the role of Russian will decline naturally and without conflicts on its own and the approach of Kazakh’s government to avoid getting into unnecessary conflicts with the Kremlin while insisting on Kazakhstan’s role as an independent country.

            But according to Kazakhstan government experts, the change in law will have some immediately consequences – consequences that many Russians will say go too far while many Kazakh nationalists will insist do not go far enough (vlast.kz/novosti/68303-v-proekte-novoj-konstitucii-izmenili-formulirovku-ob-ispolzovanii-russkogo-azyka.html).  

            Under the current language, officials are obligated to give any information they release in equal amounts in Kazakh and Russian; but under the new constitutional language, they will have to supply it in Russian only on the request of the citizen involved in the proceeding or application process.

            That will intensify the general shift away from Russian to Kazakh over time, but it is not the kind of change that by itself represents the threat to relations with Moscow that some Russian commentators fear or a failure to take the kind of action against the use of Russian in Kazakhstan that Kazakh nationalists hoped for.

Bride Kidnapping has Largely Disappeared in North Caucasus but Remains Widespread in Some Parts of Central Asia, Moscow Expert Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 10 – Bride kidnapping, in which a man seizes a woman and then makes her his wife against her will, is a practice that was widespread in rural areas of the North Caucasus until a decade or so ago but has been largely wiped out there by the combined efforts of civil authorities and Muslim leaders, Nikita Mendkovich says.

            But unfortunately, it remains widespread in rural areas of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Karakalpakstan, according to the Moscow expert on Central Asia who suggests that as many as one marriage in three in those areas may involve real bride kidnaping or the acting out, with the agreement of the participants, of this practice which has its roots in nomadic traditions.

            Mendkovich’s comments about the North Caucasus (stanradar.com/news/full/59183-pohischenie-nevest-v-xxi-veke-v-srednej-azii.html) may be overly optimistic and intended to make Russian-controlled regions look better in comparison. (On the continuing impact of bride kidnapping in the North Caucasus, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/10/oppression-of-north-caucasian-women-now.html). 

            But however that may be, bride kidnapping remains a serious problem in Central Asia as evidenced by the statement Kazakhstan’s president Kasym-Jomart Tokayev made following a recent scandal involving that practice which Mendkovich quotes extensively at the beginning of his article.

            According to Kazakhstan’s president, bride kidnapping is both “dangerous” and “inflicts harm on the reputation of our nation” because the practice “inevitably leads to tragedies Always.” Consequently, Kazakh law enforcement personnel must step up their efforts to wipe out this plague.

            Unfortunately, the Russian expert says, this is not always the case not only in Central Asia but in parts of Russia to which Central Asians have come to work. What he doesn’t mention is that the Central Asian countries have laws against this practice, however poorly enforced, but the Russian Federation does not, preferring to prosecute under other paragraphs of the law.

Residents of Regions Lagging Economically Often Happier than Those in Places Doing Better on that Measure, ‘Rabota’ Survey Reports

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 10 – The residents of regions in the Russian Federation that are not doing well according to economic statistics often say they are happier than do their counterparts in places where the economic statistics are better, according to a survey of Russians across that country conducted by the Rabota portal.

            Given that many people expect the reverse to be true and that many leaders conduct themselves and especially their electoral campaigns on the basis of false assumption, it is important that everyone understand this “happiness paradox” (press.rabota.ru/issledovaniye-gde-zhivut-samyye-schastlivyye-rossiyane commented upon at club-rf.ru/theme/640).

            There are three key reasons for the divergence between objective economic measures and subjective personal assessments of happiness, all of which need to be understood by political leaders perhaps especially when they are involved in election campaigns, like the one beginning for deputies to the Duma.

            First of all, the survey shows that the main sources of happiness for people in Russia are their families and their personal ties with others, approximately twice as large a share as those saying that infrastructure is important to their happiness, however much they may complain about this or that shortcoming.

            Second, when leaders promote the economic achievements of their regions frequently as is the case in regions where things are going well as far as those are concerned, then residents are likely to be more unhappy if the situation in their everyday lives involving such things as road quality and health care lag behind.

            And third, in many federal subjects of the Russian Federation, those regions that are doing well as measured by economic figures often are achieving that because of sectors like oil refining or the military-industrial complex that do not touch most residents most of the time, thus leading to a gap between economic statistics and the happiness people say they feel.

Kazakhstan Must Rely on Technology rather than Partisans for Defense, Kazakh Journal Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 10 – Since Vladimir Putin launched his expanded war in Ukraine, Kazakhstan’s Altyn-Orda says, “Kazakhstani public discourse increasingly discusses the scenario of future war as a guerrilla confrontation—a long, grueling struggle based on the numbers and endurance of people -- but this approach is dangerously outdated.”

            “Real wars,” the portal argues with an obvious eye to what has been happening in Uraine, “show that their outcome is determined not by the masses or the ability to endure but by the speed of control, the quality of communication, and the technological maturity of the state” (altyn-orda.kz/pochemu-v-vojnah-xxi-veka-pobezhdayut-tehnologii-a-ne-partizanskaya-logika-i-chto-eto-znachit-dlya-kazahstana/).

            “For Kazakhstan” – and implicitly for all other post-Soviet states – “this is not some abstract theory but a question of strategic choice: Guerilla logic is a bet on human survival, but technological logic in contrast is a bet on ensuring that the people defending their state don’t have to die at all.”

            Altyn-Orda says that Ukraine represents an obvious example of how the rise of technology has reduced the importance of calculations based on guerilla war. “With limited demographic resources, that country has managed to maintain and shift the balance of power through technology.”

            This has allowed for “rapid decision-making and the coordination of actions at various levels,” and it reflects the importance of “the domestic technological eco-system: the network of small and mid-sized manufacturers, engineering teams and rapid testing and implementation cycles.”

            In contrast to the Russian invader, Kyiv “hasn’t locked innovation into a single hub but has allowed the system to learn and adapt faster than its opponents. That experience in turn demonstrates that it’s not the sheer number of people that matters but the system’s ability to think and change.”

            For countries like Kazakhstan, “the key lesson is that AI and defense technologies don’t start in the military but in the economy and the educational system. They can’t be ‘bought quickly;’ instead, “they emerge from universities, engineering schools, the IT sector, industrial automation and a data culture.”

            Thus, Altyn-Orda continues, “a state which invests in education, applied science and digital infrastructure simultaneously is investing in its own security And that in turn means that “romanticizing guerilla logic is a throwback and an admission of systemic weakness.” Those countries which recognize this will be secure; those that don’t won’t.

Conflicts over Water Intensify in Southern Russia, Threatening Moscow’s Plans for North-South Corridor

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 8 – Moscow, Kalmykia and Russian regions along the Volga are increasingly at odds over water, with no obvious solution that does not leave one or more of these aggrieved and spread anger to neighboring areas and thus threaten Moscow’s plans for a north-south corridor to Iran via the Caspian.

            Moscow is worried by the impact of global warming and the increasing use of water by the people and economies in regions adjoining the Volga-Don Canal that is leading to the siltification of its waters and those of the Caspian and thus limiting the ability of larger vessels to pass from central Russia southward to Iran and the Indian Ocean.

            Kalmykia, 93 percent of whose population doesn’t have access to potable water and whose agricultural areas are increasingly subject to desertification, wants a canal from the Volga to bring it more water even though that would reduce the Volga’s flow still further and it has also been pushing for a new trans-Caucasus canal from the Caspian to the Sea of Azov.

            And Russian regions in the Volga and Caspian watersheds which want to continue to take more water from these waters are alarmed by both Moscow’s focus on the Volga-Don Canal rather than the entire water space and Kalmykia’s desire to take even more water from that channel which feeds the Caspian.

            These conflicts are just some of “the problems and prospects” of Moscow’s plans for a north-south water corridor that Strategic Culture Foundation analyst Aleksey Chichkin surveys in his latest articles, problems that have the potential to delay or even kill that project (fondsk.ru/news/2026/02/08/vodnyy-marshrut-sever-yug-problemy-i-perspektivy.html).

            Not surprisingly, the Russian writer spends much of the article attacking Kalmykia’s plans for bringing water to that parched republic; but he does not address the ways in which the serious shortages of potable water there are likely to provoke widespread illness, emigration, and political anger in that Buddhist republic.

            Indeed, if Moscow continues its current course, it is likely to find that it will have provoked a new conflict in the North Caucasus of which Kalmykia is a part and may even further anger predominantly ethnic Russian regions adjoining the Volga and Caspian as well, thus triggering new conflicts and undermining its own plans. 

Russian Economy Consists of ‘Islands of Growth in an Ocean of Stagnation,’ Prokofyev Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 9 – Russia’s economy has transitioned “from a model based on the export of raw materials and integrated into the global chains of the consumer market” into “a model of centralized and mobilized administration of resources where the priorities are defined not by market forces but by the logic of government priorities.,” Dmitry Prokofyev says.

            The economics editor of Novaya Gazeta says that the result is not simply slowed growth across the board but the division of the economy “into two parallel but weakly connected economic subsistems which show diametrically opposite trends” (novayagazeta.ru/articles/2026/02/09/arkhipelag-rosta-v-okeane-stagnatsii).

            One, which enjoys the support of the government, continues to grow relatively well because of subsidies, while the other, which doesn’t, shows declines, thus forming “islands of growth in an ocean of stagnation,” something that is obscured by figures for the economy as a whole, like measuring the average temperature in a hospital. 

            Once this pattern is recognized, the economist says, it is quite easy to understand what is going on; but if one doesn’t recognize the pattern or refuses to do so because of pressure from the powers that be or the impact of regime propaganda, then nothing makes sense – and one falls victim to Kremlin claims that the economy is doing better than most people feel.

            In a 4500-word article, Prokofyev documents this divide, something that allows him to conclude with the following damning observation: “Rosstat data for 2025 do not record a temporary aberration or cyclical slowdown, but the final consolidation and institutionalization of this architecture.”

In fact, he continues, “the division of the national economic mechanism into two economies—one for the state and the elites serving it, and one for the rest of the population—has ceased to be a trend and has become a systemic, fundamental, and integral quality of the Russian economic model.”

And that means this: “future dynamics will be determined not by market forces, consumer optimism, or private investment, but solely by the volume and efficiency of resource use, which the state is willing and able to continually redistribute from the "continent of stagnation" to the "archipelago of growth" and to the "islands of stability" to maintain a fragile, but, as the figures show, still sustainable, balance between these two worlds.”

“This balance,” Prokofyev says, “is both the main achievement and the main challenge of Russia's new economic reality in 2026.”