More than Half of Russia’s 250,000 KM Oil Pipelines Worn Out and Leaking or at Risk of Doing So in the Near Term, ‘Arctida’ Analyst Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 21 – More than half of Russia’s network of 250,000 km of oil pipelines are worn out and have leaked or are at risk of leaking significant amounts of oil into the environment, according to Raya Levashova. In the case of some Russian companies, those with pipelines leaking or threatening to leak is as high as 80 percent.

            In 2023, the last year for which data on leaks are available, the Arctida analyst who focuses on climate and the environment, says that there were 14,716 oil pipeline ruptures which spilled oil into the surrounding environment, a figure that likely has risen since that time as pipelines have aged still further (arctida.io/en/projects/oil-pipeline-on-thin-ice).

            Oil leaks from ships onto beaches in the southern part of the Russian Federation have attracted a great deal of attention in the past year as have a series of pipeline disasters elsewhere. But the number of such leaks is set to skyrocket as Rosneft pushes to create a new 9,000 km network in the Russian Far North, Levashova says.

            The company says it will begin its first shipments in the Taymyr peninsula in September, although that date may not be met. It has laid only 700 km of track so far. Moreover, the project is over-budget, and it faces special problems because of the melting of the permafrost layer and the distance from services that could ensure protection in he case of spills.

            In 2020, Levashova reports, “the Russian Arctic accounted for 19 percent of all Russian oil production,” a share that Rosneft plans to increase to 26 percent as fields come on line there and pipelines become available to carry the oil from the fields to foreign markets. That build up means there are likely going to be more spills along the way, the analyst says.

            Environmentalists like herself, the Arctida researcher says, are worried that as the project proceeds, the risk of leaks will go up and harm the incredibly fragile eco-systems of the High North.  And they note that the line now being built is based on the assumption environmental conditions will stay as they are. That is clearly wrong and a recipe for disaster, Levashova says.

            Global warming is not only leading to the melting of the permafrost and the increasingly shaky ground across which pipelines pass but also to a decline the difference in temperature between soil and air on which thermosyphons now being installed work less well because they rely on far larger differences than are the case even now.

            As a result, Levashova continues, “at current rates of warming, localized engineering solutions can no longer guarantee the safety and stability of industrial pipelines; the risks of deformation and loss of containment are rising in step with the climate crisis. And that crisis is being worsened in part by the oil being burned after traveling through these pipes.”

            She says that the Russian government has failed to impose the kind of fines that would discourage Rosneft and others from cutting corners and making pipelines more secure. At present, in fact, “it is often more cost-effective for Russian oil companies to pay fines and compensate for damage than to invest” to prevent such disasters.

As Restaurants Close and Economy Worsens, Another Revenant of Soviet Past Appears – the Stolovaya

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 21 – Now that economic conditions are worsening and restaurants are closing or becoming ever more inaccessible to impoverished Russians, a Soviet-era institution that many had thought was gone forever is making a return, the stolovaya or canteen in which poorer Russians can get cheap food.

            Dmitry Akkerman, an analyst for the Siberian Economist, says the return of the stolovaya is especially widespread in Siberia and the Russian Far East because prices for the fresh fruits and vegetables regular restaurants need are going up far more quickly than prices of cheaper things stolovayas provide (sibmix.com/?doc=22119).

            That is because these regions grow few of their own fruits and vegetables and have to bring them in from elsewhere often at increasing expense. The situation is a little better in Russian regions along the Chinese border which can get such products from there; but that source of supply, while increasing, is subject to disruptions.

            Russians still want to eat out or are forced to do so at lunchtimes, Akkerman says; but they can no longer afford restaurants. Those are closing. In the capitals, fast food chains are taking their place because their prices are lower; but elsewhere and especially each of the Urals, stolovayas are.

            Akkerman suggests that this pattern is likely to continue well into the future, something that means among other things that Russians will experience a decline in the quality of the food they consume given that stolovayas as in the Soviet past make price rather than quality the centerpiece of their business plans. 

Moscow’s Policies about Books in Prisons Unwittingly Radicalizing Convicts

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 22 – Prior to 1917, many Russians who became political radicals described tsarist prisons and camps as their “universities,” places where they were able to acquire knowledge about politics. Now, once again, Russia’s detention centers and prison camps are playing a similar role.

            That is because prisoners and former prisoners say, penal policies in Russia today mean that inmates have access to far more books than anyone had suspected. Not only are there prison libraries but books sent to one prisoner remain in his or her cell to be read by others when he or she is moved on.

            As a result, there is always an abundance of reading matter, including some things the authorities may not recognize as a force for radicalism and ones that pass from hand to hand as it were because of the authorities increasing proclivity to move the incarcerated population about and at each stage are forced to leave their books behind.

            With the passing of time, many cells become remarkably large libraries; and many of the books in them by virtue of their own content or the underlining or notes of earlier readers lead a new generation of the incarcerated to get ideas that the authorities beyond doubt would prefer them not to acquire.

            That is just one of the conclusions  one can draw from a remarkable article by activist and journalist Irina Khalip about the state of reading among Russians behind bars, a story that has rarely been told but certainly deserves more attention given its impact on those who eventually leave Russia’s jails and camps (novayagazeta.eu/articles/2026/07/22/a-chto-tam-u-tebia-za-kniga-byla-chto-vse-menty-v-akhere).

Russian Women who Left in 2022 More Often than Men Driven by Political Considerations, Kartushina Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 22 – While there are no comprehensive statistics about the flight of Russians from their country after Putin began his expanded war against Ukraine and there are no reliable data about the number of women and the number of men in this flow, it is still possible to draw some important conclusions about their differences, Kristina Kartushina says.

            The Posle journalist has interviewed four women who left Russia at that time and concludes that women were “usually driven by political conviction alone” whereas men were often motivated by “the immediate threat of being drafted into military service” (posle.media/article/politics-work-and-care-in-womens-exile).

            Kartushina says that many observers have suggested that women who have left remain “politically disengaged after relocating” and that those who did leave “typically” did so with a financially secure partner.” But neither of these stereotypical images holds up upon examination.

            On the one hand, both before leaving and after doing so, she continues, women have tended to be more politically active than men; and on the other, they often are “more economically vulnerable, face greater obstacles in the labor market, and have narrower professional opportunities” than men.

            Her conversations with the four dispel the myths and show that the women of the latest Russian emigration are quite different than the men as far as their experiences before and after leaving Russia are concerned and that they merit closer observation because of these distinctions.

Russian Hostility Makes Tatar Woman More Attached to Her Own Nation and More Sympathetic to Other Non-Russians

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 21 – In the latest story in its continuing reporting on what is happening among non-Russians, the Horizontal Russia portal tells the story of a young Tatar woman who insisted she was a Russian but who was treated as someone alien by ethnic Russians and only came to accept her own nationality at the age of 25.

            Her experience of parental denial and then hostility from and discrimination by ethnic Russians had two effects, she says. On the one hand, it ultimately led her to identify even more strongly with her own nation than might otherwise have been the case; and on the other, it caused her to be more sympathetic to other non-Russians and less to ethnic Russians (semnasem.org/articles/2026/07/21/nerusskij-mir-alisa).

            Alisa grew up in a family where her father insisted that she was a Russian even though she looked Tatar because he was convinced that “’non-Russian’ means something bad.” When she was a child, she accepted that; but growing up, she experienced such hostility from Russians that she came to recognize she wasn’t one of them.

             Her father was an ethnic Russian who viewed all non-Russians with disdain, while her mother was half German and half Tatar. The girl herself looked like her mother, and her classmates in school not only laughed at her appearance but looked down at her as something less than themselves.

            Alisa says she became ashamed of her looks and tried to do everything to pass as an ethnic Russian to meet the demands of both her father and her fellow pupils. But that didn’t help and she grew up ashamed of what she was and what she apparently would never be able to fully become.

            When she got a job, her coworkers asked her what her nationality was. She suggested they guess. They offered a variety of suggestions but never got it right that she was a Tatar. As a result, Alisa says, she “understood” that they “associated her with all nationalities except Russian” – and she began doing the same thing.

            That led her not only to take pride in being a Tatar but to feeling closer to and identifying with all non-Russians. At the same time, Alisa says, she has come to feel less close to and is less inclined to identify as Russian because so many Russians are hostile to all non-Russians and lump anyone they don’t identify as Russian in that group. 

‘Belarus isn’t Russia’ But Rather a Country ‘Five Minutes Away from Totalitarianism,’ Poczobut Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 22 – Andrzej Poczobut, a Belarusian journalist and activist for the Polish minority in that country who has received a Sakharov Prize in 2025 for his steadfast commitment to freedom despite repeated jailings by the Lukashenka regime, says that “Belarus isn’t Russia” but rather a country “five minutes away from totalitarianism.”

            The activist offered those observations at a meeting in Vilnius this week, his first visit there since his release from a Belarusian prison in April and a session during which he said he is working on a new book about his captivity and his plans to continue to fight for freedom in Belarus (gazetaby.com/post/andzhej-pachobut-belarus-ne-rasiya/215392/).

            Poczubut said that he will return to Belarus because it is belief that while that country today is “five minutes away from totalitarianism,” the actions of Belarusians against the dictatorship have the chance to push that back to ten or even 15 minutes and must view any progress in that direction as a victory.

            Obviously, he continued, what happens in Belarus will depend not only on the Belarusians but on “how the war in Ukraine will develop, how it will end, and what the balance of power in our region will be.”  Given Lukashenka’s recognition that he might lose if he took part in the war, at least the opening of a second front against Ukraine is less likely.

            Lukashenka’s regime consists “mostly” of pro-Russian officials who are prepared to follow Moscow’s line, Poczubut says; but he adds that it is his impression that “Belarus is geographically located in Europe and Politically in Asia, closer to countries like Turkmenistan which has a 100 percent dictatorship.”

            The West needs to recognize that and not to be taken in by Lukashenka’s occasional faints in its direction and must never forget that “Belarus is not Russia and not part of Russia” but a country with its own traditions, interests and needs and will be far better off after Lukashenka passes from the scene. 

Not All Heads of Russia’s MSDs are Muftis with Right to Issue Fetwas, Kazan Mufti Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 21 – One of the sources of confusion among Muslims in the Russian Federation is that the heads of Muslim Spiritual Directorates are typically called muftis even though they are not and do not have the right that those recognized as such have to issue legal opinions or fetwas, Kazan Mufti Samigullin says.

            In the course of a wide-ranging interview with Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Samigullin says that people need to remember that “mufti means ‘he who gives fetwas’” and only those recognized by scholars are such and also that this has been somewhat obscured because nearly all MSD heads are called that even if they don’t have the necessary authority (ng.ru/ng_religii/2026-07-21/7_9542_rel01.html).

            The faithful should check things out concerning fetwas just as they would get a second opinion from doctors in the case of a possible operation, the Kazan mufti says; and they should certainly recognize that there is absolutely no possibility that artificial intelligence will issue fetwas now or in the future.

              Among the other points Samigullin made, the following are especially noteworthy:

 ·       Islam came to Russia before Christian Orthodoxy and thus is not some new arrival but a core part of the country.

 ·       The institution of councils of elders works with the MSDs to block efforts by officials to interfere in the life of the Muslim community in Russia.

 ·       It would be good to have a single MSD for the entire country and that could happen if the state would agree to the convention of a single all-Russian Muslim congress.