Sunday, November 22, 2026

Rosstat to Survey Russians on Their Plans for Having Children Every Three Years rather than Every Five

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 18 – Apparently intending both to supply the Russian government with more timely information and to serve as yet another means of encouraging Russians to have more children, Rosstat, Moscow’s statistical arm, has announced that it will survey Russian families about their intentions for having children every three years rather than every five.

            Putin asked in February of this year that Moscow track the plans for Russians on this issue more frequently; and now Rosstat has responded (kremlin.ru/events/councils/79141, meduza.io/news/2026/11/18/rossiyan-budut-sprashivat-o-planah-po-rozhdeniyu-detey-kazhdye-tri-goda and mel.fm/novosti/5362498-rosstat-sokrashchayet-interval-mezhdu-oprosami-rossiyan-o-planakh-na-detey.)

            The survey will involve the collection of data from a representative sample, something that by itself will give the Russian government more timely information; but results will likely become the basis for a new push for Russians to plan on having three children, something Putin has said should be the norm (en.kremlin.ru/acts/news/73292).

            Currently, Russians in large cities typically have a single child or none at all, and even those in rural areas have no more than two and typically less, all figures far beyond the replacement level of 2.2 children per woman per lifetime. 

Russian Government Wants to Allow Bankruptcy Filers to Keep Some Assetsh if They Agree to Fight in Ukraine

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 20 – The Russian government has come up with an additional enticement to get men to sign up to serve in Putin’s war in Ukraine: it has proposed a law that will allow those who have sought and been given bankruptcy protection to keep up to ten million rubles of property.

            Given that as many as a half million Russians are currently getting bankruptcy protection each year, the number of men who may be tempted to protect assets in this way could be in the tens of thousands (meduza.io/cards/vlasti-prodolzhayut-zamanivat-rossiyan-na-voynu-v-obmen-na-kontrakt-s-minoborony-im-razreshili-ostavlyat-za-soboy-dorogoe-imuschestvo-pri-bankrotstve).

            This proposed law, which will almost certainly be adopted, is yet another indication of Moscow’s desperate search for men to fill the rapidly depleting ranks of its army in Ukraine and also of the difficulties it is facing now that many federal subjects are beginning to cut back on the bonuses they had been offering at Moscow’s insistence. 

            Whether this exemption will apply only to existing debt or whether it will include debt assumed after the law is passed remains unclear, with the Medusa news agency reporting that it is entirely possible that if the measure works as intended, it will be extended to the latter, even though that will cost those who have extended loans to such people even more.

Compensation Rules Set by Moscow have Serious Political Consequences in Federal Subjects

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 18 – In response to Ukrainian drone attacks, Moscow has set country-wide rules governing the compensation of those whose property has been damaged; but this federal program has serious political consequences in the federal subjects because it is they who must implement it on site, three Russian experts on regional affairs say.

            The Regional Comment portal has reported their reactions to the impact both short-term and long-term on compensation policies Moscow sets without much regard for regional differences and the way in which regional officials have been compelled to deal with the problems that creates (regcomment.ru/regions/rossiya/federalnaya-mera-s-regionalnymi-posledstviyami-kto-otvetit-za-podderzhku-biznesa/).

            Valery Prokhorov, a political scientist who is deputy director of the Center for Applied Research and Programs, says that problems for regional leaders have arisen because there is a federal program that they must follow regardless of differences in their situations and resources, putting them on the defensive in dealing with local businesses who have suffered losses.

            This means that some businesses will not get the help they need, and regional officials will be on the front line as far as explaining why this is even if they and the businesses are both constrained by policies that have ignored local conditions and instead are based on the assumption that one size fits all.

            Pavel Pryannikov, founder of two widely cited telegram channels, says that what Moscow has done is “a half measure” and that businesses need to look beyond both Moscow and regional governments and seek to ensure that their facilities are ensured adequately via the marketplace rather than wait for help after damages. Regional officials can’t now do much about that.

            And Yaroslav Ignatovsky, head of the Politgen agency, says that what the Kremlin is doing on this issue may look like a one-time action but in fact, it is becoming a separate and distinct area of regional policy as far as both the center and the various federal subjects are concerned.

            In this situation, he says, “responsibility for the consequences of the attacks falls on the regional authorities, although their financial and administrative capabilities are limited, and key security issues are beyond their authority. Therefore, the governors must simultaneously demonstrate control over the situation and explain the boundaries of their own possibilities.”

Expelling Immigrants Not Enough to Prevent Survival or Even Growth of Ethnic Enclaves, Shustov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 18 – Russian officials regularly suggest that their increasing expulsion of Central Asians represents a solution to the problem of the formation and growth of ethnic enclaves, but expulsions alone are not enough to protect Russia from that outcome, Aleksandr Shustov says.

            The Russian nationalist commentator says that if Moscow is going to get really serious about doing so, without going back to a system of residence permits like the one that existed in Soviet times, it will be necessary to change two other arrangements  (ritmeurasia.ru/news--2026-11-18--kak-ne-dopustit-pojavlenija-etnicheskih-anklavov-v-rossii-91703).

            On the one hand, Shustov says, Russia must cancel the 1996 agreement that allows Tajiks to take Russian citizenship without giving up their Tajik citizenship, something that guarantees they will continue to move back and forth between the two countries and will live as a group when they are in the Russian Federation.

            And on the other, he argues, rules allowing citizens of Commonwealth of Independent States members to acquire Russian citizenship via the simplified rules governing the return of compatriots will have much the same impact, bringing in people who are culturally and linguistically dissimilar to Russians who will want to live together.

            Taking either of these steps and especially the latter would further fragment the post-Soviet states, alienating many especially in Tajikistan and other Central Asian countries who have gotten used to current arrangements; but unless this is done, Shustov says, what may appear a temporary problem will become permanent, regardless of how many immigrants are expelled.

Released from Prison to Fight in Ukraine, Three Men Found Guilty of Murdering Boris Nemtsov are Now Living as Civilians in Chechnya, ‘Project Media’ Reports

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 16 – Moscow has now found a new use for its program to grant convicts in its prison system release in exchange for commitments to serve in Putin’s war in Ukraine: it has allowed some imprisoned for crimes the Kremlin wanted committed to avoid military service and instead live as civilians in lawless Chechnya.

            That is the conclusion of an investigation carried out by researchers at the independent Project Media group who determined that three men convicted for their parts in the murder of opposition figure Boris Nemtsov had used that tactic and are now living as civilians in Chechnya (proekt.media/investigation/ubiytsy-nemzova-na-svobode/).

            According to Project Media, the three have been told to lead “a quiet life” in order to “avoid attracting attention” and threatened with a return to prison if they do not. Alternatively, the men might be sent on to fight in Putin’s war and put in the front lines where they might be killed.

            It is extremely likely that others now behind bars for carrying out crimes that those around Putin back may be offered similar deals, although the crimes involved may not have been as high profile as the killing of Nemtsov. At the very least, both Russians and those who track Russian politics should be alive to that possibility and seek to track them down.

            That is because such actions by the Putin regime confirm the suggestions of others that Russia is increasingly converging with Nazi Germany in having two kinds of law, one for most people most of the time and another for others who are treated on basis of what regime wants (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2026/08/putins-russia-embodiment-today-of.html).

Moscow to Help Tehran Restart Iranian Oil Drilling in the Caspian that has Been Stalled for 30 Years

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 16 – Iran indicated a year ago that it planned to restart its oil drilling program in the Caspian Sea, a program that for political and logistical reasons had been stalled since the 1990s (spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/crude-oil/050925-iran-renews-oil-drilling-activities-in-caspian-sea-after-30-year-halt-minister).

            Last month, Russian officials met with their Iranian counterparts to discuss how their two countries might cooperate in helping Iran to do so (en.mehrnews.com/news/248470/Iran-Russia-officials-discuss-oil-exploration-in-Caspian-Sea).

            And now Tehran officials have announced that they have come up with what they say will be an “intensive” Iranian drive “for oil and gas exploration and production in the Caspian Sea” (casp-geo.ru/iran-razrabotal-intensivnuyu-programmu-po-razvedke-i-dobyche-nefti-i-gaza-na-kaspii/).

            While details of this program are still uncertain, two things are clear: On the one hand, Russia will be an active participant in what Iran is doing, further cementing the alliance between the two countries; and on the other, Iran’s effort to develop offshore oil and gas sites are likely to create new conflicts with the two neighboring littoral countries, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan.

            The latter is likely precisely because while the five littoral countries have agreed on the surface delimitation of the Caspian, they have yet to reach an accord on the seabed – and the lack of an agreement on that is likely to become an obstacle to Iran’s plans and to set Baku and Ashgabat at odds with Tehran and its Moscow backers. 

Saturday, November 21, 2026

Two-Thirds of Russian Men under 40 East of the Urals who Passed Away Last Year Died Fighting in Ukraine

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 17 – More than half of all Russian men under the age of 40 who died last year did so while fighting in Putin’s war in Ukraine, with 76,790 dying from that cause while 62,420 died from all other causes, a human tragedy with enormously negative consequences for Russia’s demographic future because it removes so many potential fathers.

            But because the Kremlin tried to hide this by recruiting more men from distant and often non-Russian regions, the difference in the share of such war-related deaths between the capitals and these regions was especially shocking, activists who hacked Rosstat’s files say (ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/11/17/bolee-polovini-umershih-v-rossii-muzhchin-mladshe-40-let-pogibli-na-voine-s-ukrainoi-a211530).

            In Moscow, the share of combat deaths among all deaths among those under 40 was 30 percent; and in St. Petersburg, it was 21 percent, but in Siberia and the Russian Far East, the war was responsible for the deaths of more than two-thirds of all deaths in that age group, Belarus’ Cyberguerillas and the Ukrainian Silent Crow report. 

            That pattern will not only make it almost impossible for Moscow to achieve the demographic goals it has for the portion of Russia east of the Urals but mean that birthrates among many non-Russian nations from whom Moscow drew its soldiers will decline, further reducing their share of the population in the future.

            The impact of deaths in Moscow and St. Petersburg will be less because in those two Russian capitals, fertility rates have already fallen to one child per woman per lifetime, less than  half the replacement level of 2.2. Elsewhere, where fertility rates are higher, the decline in demographic growth will be proportionately greater.