Thursday, July 23, 2026

Russian Women who Left in 2022 More Often than Men Driven by Political Considerations, Kartushina Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 22 – While there are no comprehensive statistics about the flight of Russians from their country after Putin began his expanded war against Ukraine and there are no reliable data about the number of women and the number of men in this flow, it is still possible to draw some important conclusions about their differences, Kristina Kartushina says.

            The Posle journalist has interviewed four women who left Russia at that time and concludes that women were “usually driven by political conviction alone” whereas men were often motivated by “the immediate threat of being drafted into military service” (posle.media/article/politics-work-and-care-in-womens-exile).

            Kartushina says that many observers have suggested that women who have left remain “politically disengaged after relocating” and that those who did leave “typically” did so with a financially secure partner.” But neither of these stereotypical images holds up upon examination.

            On the one hand, both before leaving and after doing so, she continues, women have tended to be more politically active than men; and on the other, they often are “more economically vulnerable, face greater obstacles in the labor market, and have narrower professional opportunities” than men.

            Her conversations with the four dispel the myths and show that the women of the latest Russian emigration are quite different than the men as far as their experiences before and after leaving Russia are concerned and that they merit closer observation because of these distinctions.

Russian Hostility Makes Tatar Woman More Attached to Her Own Nation and More Sympathetic to Other Non-Russians

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 21 – In the latest story in its continuing reporting on what is happening among non-Russians, the Horizontal Russia portal tells the story of a young Tatar woman who insisted she was a Russian but who was treated as someone alien by ethnic Russians and only came to accept her own nationality at the age of 25.

            Her experience of parental denial and then hostility from and discrimination by ethnic Russians had two effects, she says. On the one hand, it ultimately led her to identify even more strongly with her own nation than might otherwise have been the case; and on the other, it caused her to be more sympathetic to other non-Russians and less to ethnic Russians (semnasem.org/articles/2026/07/21/nerusskij-mir-alisa).

            Alisa grew up in a family where her father insisted that she was a Russian even though she looked Tatar because he was convinced that “’non-Russian’ means something bad.” When she was a child, she accepted that; but growing up, she experienced such hostility from Russians that she came to recognize she wasn’t one of them.

             Her father was an ethnic Russian who viewed all non-Russians with disdain, while her mother was half German and half Tatar. The girl herself looked like her mother, and her classmates in school not only laughed at her appearance but looked down at her as something less than themselves.

            Alisa says she became ashamed of her looks and tried to do everything to pass as an ethnic Russian to meet the demands of both her father and her fellow pupils. But that didn’t help and she grew up ashamed of what she was and what she apparently would never be able to fully become.

            When she got a job, her coworkers asked her what her nationality was. She suggested they guess. They offered a variety of suggestions but never got it right that she was a Tatar. As a result, Alisa says, she “understood” that they “associated her with all nationalities except Russian” – and she began doing the same thing.

            That led her not only to take pride in being a Tatar but to feeling closer to and identifying with all non-Russians. At the same time, Alisa says, she has come to feel less close to and is less inclined to identify as Russian because so many Russians are hostile to all non-Russians and lump anyone they don’t identify as Russian in that group. 

‘Belarus isn’t Russia’ But Rather a Country ‘Five Minutes Away from Totalitarianism,’ Poczobut Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 22 – Andrzej Poczobut, a Belarusian journalist and activist for the Polish minority in that country who has received a Sakharov Prize in 2025 for his steadfast commitment to freedom despite repeated jailings by the Lukashenka regime, says that “Belarus isn’t Russia” but rather a country “five minutes away from totalitarianism.”

            The activist offered those observations at a meeting in Vilnius this week, his first visit there since his release from a Belarusian prison in April and a session during which he said he is working on a new book about his captivity and his plans to continue to fight for freedom in Belarus (gazetaby.com/post/andzhej-pachobut-belarus-ne-rasiya/215392/).

            Poczubut said that he will return to Belarus because it is belief that while that country today is “five minutes away from totalitarianism,” the actions of Belarusians against the dictatorship have the chance to push that back to ten or even 15 minutes and must view any progress in that direction as a victory.

            Obviously, he continued, what happens in Belarus will depend not only on the Belarusians but on “how the war in Ukraine will develop, how it will end, and what the balance of power in our region will be.”  Given Lukashenka’s recognition that he might lose if he took part in the war, at least the opening of a second front against Ukraine is less likely.

            Lukashenka’s regime consists “mostly” of pro-Russian officials who are prepared to follow Moscow’s line, Poczubut says; but he adds that it is his impression that “Belarus is geographically located in Europe and Politically in Asia, closer to countries like Turkmenistan which has a 100 percent dictatorship.”

            The West needs to recognize that and not to be taken in by Lukashenka’s occasional faints in its direction and must never forget that “Belarus is not Russia and not part of Russia” but a country with its own traditions, interests and needs and will be far better off after Lukashenka passes from the scene. 

Not All Heads of Russia’s MSDs are Muftis with Right to Issue Fetwas, Kazan Mufti Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 21 – One of the sources of confusion among Muslims in the Russian Federation is that the heads of Muslim Spiritual Directorates are typically called muftis even though they are not and do not have the right that those recognized as such have to issue legal opinions or fetwas, Kazan Mufti Samigullin says.

            In the course of a wide-ranging interview with Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Samigullin says that people need to remember that “mufti means ‘he who gives fetwas’” and only those recognized by scholars are such and also that this has been somewhat obscured because nearly all MSD heads are called that even if they don’t have the necessary authority (ng.ru/ng_religii/2026-07-21/7_9542_rel01.html).

            The faithful should check things out concerning fetwas just as they would get a second opinion from doctors in the case of a possible operation, the Kazan mufti says; and they should certainly recognize that there is absolutely no possibility that artificial intelligence will issue fetwas now or in the future.

              Among the other points Samigullin made, the following are especially noteworthy:

 ·       Islam came to Russia before Christian Orthodoxy and thus is not some new arrival but a core part of the country.

 ·       The institution of councils of elders works with the MSDs to block efforts by officials to interfere in the life of the Muslim community in Russia.

 ·       It would be good to have a single MSD for the entire country and that could happen if the state would agree to the convention of a single all-Russian Muslim congress.

Wednesday, July 22, 2026

Trump’s Captive Nations Week Proclamation Focuses More on Threats in US than on Those Elsewhere

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 20 – Since the US Congress in 1959 required that the president declare the third week of July Captive Nations Week, the content of those declarations have evolved as the world has changed and as US policy has as well. Up until the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the USSR, they focused on peoples being repressed by communist governments there.

            Then, since the victories over communism in 1989 and 1991, these proclamations focused in the first instance on the often tragic situations of peoples living in the remaining communist countries, in particular China. But in the last several years, these presidential messages have moved in two new and very different directions.

            In 2022, then-president Joe Biden broadened the targets of the message from those who continue to call themselves communist to all those who act as the communists have mindful that communism is evil not because of its name but because of its action (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2022/07/biden-reinvigorates-captive-nations.html).  

In his proclamation Biden made three key points: First, Captive Nations Week is not about anti-communism per se but rather against repression, regardless of what the states carrying it out call themselves. Only three of the regimes he lists among the world’s most repressive are communist – Cuba, North Korea and the People’s Republic of China.

            The other six are either former communist countries or have never been communist – Russia, Iran, Belarus, Syria, Venezuela, and Nicaragua – and it is no accident that the US president listed Russia first among all these countries, not because of its communist roots but because of its continuing imperialist and repressive behavior.

            Second, Biden was explicit that governments which repress their peoples at home as all nine of these countries do seek to repress others abroad through various kinds of repression. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is only the most obvious case of this; and it is no surprise in the current environment that the American president focuses on that.

            And third, and this may be the most important aspect of his message, Biden made it clear that Americans can’t remain unconcerned about such repressive be it within countries or between them and their neighbors. They must “stand in solidarity with the brave human rights and pro-democracy advocates around the world.”

            In his proclamation this week, President Donald Trump goes in a different direction. He does not mention a single country communist or not for attention with one singular and unprecedented exception. He says that the American commitment to the cause of liberty must “hold firm” not just abroad but “at home as well” (whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/07/captive-nations-week-2026/).

            “Today,” President Trump says, “communism remains the gravest threat our Nation faces, and my Administration is confronting it with relentless determination.  Under my leadership, we are defending the sacred rights at the heart of our Republic:  life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, and the freedom to worship Almighty God without fear.”

“That same promise drives us to usher in a new Golden Age of prosperity, safeguarding the free market that fuels our greatness and unleashing the boundless abundance of our economy for every citizen,” Trump continues, arguing that by “preserving these blessings, America offers hope to every captive people who dream of sharing in them and to the nations yearning to be free.”

 President Trump continues: “For over 250 years, our Nation has stood as the world’s beacon of liberty, and during Captive Nations Week, we vow never to forget the oppressed suffering under communist regimes.  America will never be a communist country, and we will never bow to socialism or the evil ideologies that seek to destroy the essence of who we are as a people and what we stand for as a Nation.”

And he concludes: “We stand with all who yearn to breathe free, are imprisoned for speaking truth, punished for their faith, and denied the abundance that liberty alone can bring.  Together, we will continue to champion peace, prosperity, sovereignty, religious liberty, and human dignity around the world – and as long as America stands, the cause of freedom will never be extinguished.”

Moscow Now Targeting Ukrainian Publishers and Books as Part of Effort to Destroy Ukrainian Culture, Butchenko Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 21 – In the midst of the horrific destruction of Ukrainian cities wrought by Russian rockets, few have noted that among Moscow’s targets are publishers of Ukrainian books, Maksim Butchenko says; but in the last month alone, Russian missiles have destroyed many printing presses and at least 1.4 million books.

            The NV journalist says that Russia is doing this  not by accident as some might think but as part of a concerted effort to destroy Ukrainian national culture; and he calls on all people of good will first to recognize this threat and then work to counter it (nv.ua/opinion/obstrel-kieva-19-iyulya-rossiya-unichtozhaet-ukrainskie-knigi-za-mesyac-utracheno-1-4-mln-ekzemplyarov-50625849.html).

            “When four key objects of book infrastructure burn in less than 30 days” as a result of Russian attacks and when among the ashes are new textbooks on the history of Ukraine,” Butchenko says, no one should dismiss this as an accident of the kind that often happens in wartime.

            According to the journalist, “Russia is fighting not only against our army – it is fighting against our memory. Moscow exported museum funds from Kherson, burned libraries in the occupied territories, threw Ukrainian books out of schools, replacing them with its own methods. Strikes on printing houses simply continue the same logic, but in other ways.”

            And he is blunt in his assessment of where things stand now: “The front of this cultural war is not marked on any battle map; but it exists and we are now losing it.”

            Government support for rebuilding publishing houses and book stores is as important as rebuilding housing. Indeed over the longer haul, it may be even more important because it is about saving not just this or that family but about saving the cultural heritage of Ukraine.

            “If we want the Ukrainian book to survive this war,” Butchenko concludes, “we can’t wait until after victory or until the next budget year. Instead, we must act now while the heart of culture is still beating.” Otherwise, Russia will gain a victory larger than on any other battlefield.

Globalization, Not Just Russianization, Leading Young Tatars to Stop Using Their Language, Shaykhin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 20 – The Moscow-orchestrated Russianization of the Tatars has been going on since the 1930s, Aydar Shaykhin says; but in recent decades, that process has been compounded by globalization and the ways in which information is disseminated via the world wide web especially among the young.

            Between the last two censuses alone, the head of the Kazan Museum of the History of Tatar Literature says, the number of people claiming to speak Tatar declined by a million from 4.3 million to 3.3 million, with most of the losses coming among the young outside the republic rather than inside and in Kazan rather than outside the republic (evening-kazan.ru/obshhestvo/articles/meynstrim-predpolagaet-postepennoe-umenshenie-nositeley-tatarskogo-yazyka).

            What that means, Shaykhin, who also serves as the vice president of the World Forum of Tatar Youth, continues, is that the struggle to save Tatar as a widely used language must proceed on two fronts, not only against Moscow’s longstanding Russianization efforts but also against the impact of globalization.

            Many people talk about the former but neglect the latter, he suggests; but that needs to change and Tatars who want their language and nation to survive must now work to make Tatar a language that is at home on the Internet and that Tatar young people can use when they go online.

            That is a battle, he suggests, the Tatars can win; but to do so, they must first recognize that the challenge from globalization may now be as great or even greater than from Muscovite Russianization. Unless that happens and soon, the falloff in the use of Tatar will accelerate still faster.