‘Even a New Mobilization Won’t Allow Russia to Achieve Victory in Ukraine, Rogov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 25 – Russia’s core offensive strategy has been its ability to mobilize vast reserves of manpower together with a popular tolerance for casualties, but “Ukraine’s ‘wall of drones’ appears capable of grinding down virtually any quantity of enemy manpower,” Kirill Rogov says.

            As a result, the émigré Russian political analyst who directs the Re: Russia project,  argues, “even another ‘partial’ mobilization is highly unlikely to bring about a turning point in the conflict” and lead to a Russian victory. Instead, it may lead to an outcome like the one Russia suffered at the end of World War I (re-russia.net/analytics/0429/).

            Even with such a mobilization, Rogov continues, its “manpower reserves would be ground down within a matter of months without yielding a victory that could in any way justify such a cost; and it is precisely that prospect which poses such extremely high risks for the Putin regime.”

            In 2022, Russia’s failure to take Kyiv was viewed by many as the result of tactical mistakes rather than underlying problems. More recently, the same observers have argued that in any war of attrition, Russia must eventually win because of it larger size and greater resources.

            That view, he says, “remained unshaken right up until 2025 when Donald Trump … made it the central pillar of his negotiating strategy” and insisted that Kyiv “has no choice but to make concessions to Moscow,” a position that its supporters defended as a case of “’military realism.’”

            But now the situation has changed. Last year, “the war of attrition began to look like a challenge facing both sides equally” given that “Russia was compelled to expend significantly greater economic and human resources on its offensive operations than Ukraine had to in defense but nonetheless failed to achieve any meaningful results.”

            Now, Ukrainian drone strikes deep into Russia are further calling into question both Russian calculations and the judgments of those who say Kyiv must yield. Indeed, Rogov argues, “the situation today is moving toward a point at which Ukraine’s ‘wall of drones’ will be capable of grinding down virtually any number of enemy troops.”

            If Putin mobilizes more troops, he might achieve some small but temporary gains and only at a cost of increased casualties with domestic consequences for his regime. Moreover now unlike in 2022, Russians recognize that the Kremlin’s strategy is based on “piling up corpses” of its soldiers rather than on anything else.

            Thus a new mobilization might very well end as did the Brusilov Offensive in the summer of 1916, a breakthrough that soon failed and that changed the war Russians viewed the war and came to the conclusion that their government had to get out of it or be changed so that the conflict could end.

According to Rogov, “the consequences of Russia’s failure—in the face of a drone army—to leverage its advantage in manpower as a resource for victory in a war of attrition will not be confined solely to the scope of the conflict with Ukraine. This may well mark the dawn of a new era in Russia’s history and in its relations with its neighbors.”

Russians Getting Paid the Most in Their Thirties or Even Earlier and Not Just Before Retirement as is True Elsewhere, Rosstat Data Show

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 23 – In most industrialized countries, the income of workers rises throughout their careers, peaking just before retirement; but in Russia, Rosstat data show, the pattern is different. There workers’ incomes peak much earlier, especially for women but for men as well, the To Be Precise portal says.

            The reasons for that tell a lot about the nature of gender inequality, the failure of the Russian system to support the continuing education of workers, and the increasingly stratified nature of that country’s workforce, the portal suggests (tochno.st/materials/zarplata-rossiiskix-zenshhin-dostigaet-pika-v-25-let-u-muzcin-na-10-let-pozze).

            On average, Rosstat data show, the portal says, that “in Russia pay rises until 30 to 34 years of age … but after that point, gradually falls,” with hourly pay falling 38 percent from what it had been at its highest level, a pattern that sets Russian apart from other industrialized countries and that feeds anger among aging workers.

            Rosstat data show that incomes for men reach their highest point between the ages of 35 and 39, while women reach their highest incomes much earlier, between 25 and 29, after which their pay practically doesn’t grow at all: Those 65  and older get paid only 18 percent more than the very youngest workers” and much less than that from those in the highest paid cohorts.

            Russian researchers at Moscow’s Higher School of Economics explain the gender difference as a penalty for maternity. “After the birth of children, the incomes of women as a rule fall, at a time when men, in contrast receive what can be called ‘a premium for fatherhood.’ In 2010-2018, the pay of fathers was 25 percent higher than that received by childless men.”

            The To Be Precise portal pointed to a series of other facts of life as far as pay and age are concerned, including the following:

·       “The higher the role of experience and promotion in professions, the longer pay grows and the more significant are the differences between the genders.”

·       “Unqualified workers have a career trajectory as far as pay is concerned that is almost the diametric opposite of this.” Both men and women have their highest pay by age 30 and after that time see their pay fall.

·       “For highly qualified specialists, the peak of pay both among men and among women occurs between the ages of 35 and 39, and subsequent declines are smaller and occur more slowly than is the case of others.”

The portal notes that these conclusions are a snapshot of the workforce today and reflect the different experiences of various generations rather than the pattern any particular worker will encounter. But they suggest that shortcomings in continuing education, healthcare and the like mean that the experiences of individuals may very well follow the same trajectory with time.

 

Erzyan Whose Family Denied Their Nationality More Angry at Russians who were Indifferent to Attacks on Her than Those who Did the Attacking

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 23 – The Horizontal Russia portal runs a feature every few weeks in which a non-Russian who has lived with a lie about their nationality eventually comes to realize who they really are, often experiencing denials by those close to them and attacks by fellow students and Russians encountered in the streets.

            The latest in this series is about Varvara, a 23-year-old from Nizhny Novgorod, who grew up thinking she was an ethnic Russian because that is what her parents insisted upon and only came to recognize that she was an Erzyan, one of the two subgroups of the Mordvin super-nation (semnasem.org/articles/2026/05/19/nerusskij-mir-varvara).

            As is often the case with this series, which is illustrated comic book style, her words about her experiences provide insights into how ethnicity works in the Russian Federation that are richer and perhaps even more important than polls can reveal even if some would dismiss her words as anecdotal.

            Varvara says she was born and grew up in Nizhny Novogorod oblast and while she recognized from childhood that she didn’t look like most of her ethnic Russian fellow pupils and was attacked for that, she defined herself as a Russian because that is what her parents insisted upon and filled in Russian on all official documents.

            When she reached the age of 17, she was a regular web surfer and once posted a sharp criticism of Russian bloggers who called for confining non-Russians to concentration camps and killing them as Hitler had killed the Jews. When she objected, they responded by saying they knew where she lived and would send her to such camps eventually,

            Three years later, her brother told her that one of her grandparents was a Mordvin and that led her to begin exploring her genealogy. Her mother refused to talk about this, insisted that she was a Russian and that in her view, Mordvins were “ugly” and “backward” and in general people she didn’t want to be exposed to, let alone be thought part of.

            As this was happening, she was verbally abused by a drunken Russian for being a Mordvin; but Varvara says that what really disturbed her were not such attacks but the fact that no one came to her defense when they were made. That made her feel that she remained at risk.

            Her story ends happily: she found a job where her insistence that she is an Erzyan did not provoke negative comments but only interest and respect for the fact that she found her true nationality despite the actions of family members and others, including fellow pupils and Russians on the street. 

Russian Reformers Must Call for Different Kind of Strong State or Risk Continuation of Despotism, Bursygina and Filippov Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 25 – Those who want to see Russia become a democratic and law-based state after Putin must make it clear they are calling for is “not a weak state after a strong autocracy” but rather another kind of strong state based on politics and law but capable of enforcing common rules for all, Irina Bursygina and Mikhail Filippov says.

            Otherwise, these two Russian analysts who now teach at Harvard and SUNY Binghampton respectively say, the widespread fear among Russians that what the democrats seek is a weak state unable to hold the country together and will continue to support autocracy (ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/05/25/silnii-tsentr-kak-nedostayuschii-element-demokraticheskoi-alternativi-a196196).

            Putinism, Bursygina and Filippov say, “offers a politically understandable answer to Russian fears of a weak center and more broadly of a weak state,” but “this answer not only destroys political freedom but has other destructive consequences.” Consequently, those who want democracy in Russia must offer a different but clear and understandable answer.”

            That answer, they argue, must call for the creatio questionn of a strong state “together with politics and not instead of that;” and a failure to come up with this answer and promote it will leave the democrats without the allies they would otherwise have and ensure that the supporters of autocracy will have more support than they should.

            This view is held not just by Putin but by a large number of Russians as a result of the events of the last 35 years. It is widely held because it is convincing … “The weakening of the center is thus equated by supporters of the status quo as a weakening of the state as such,” and therefore even many who don’t like Putin’s approach don’t see an alternative.

            What those who want to see a law-based state with democracy and real federalism need to convince such people of is that it is possible to make the government responsive to the people and the laws institutions formulate but at the same time not making is weak, something many Russians do not yet accept.

            Byrsygina and Filippova say that “a strong state after reforms is not a state which controls all political and economic processes. Rather it is a state capable of maintaining a common space of rules, ensuring the carrying out of decisions, resolving conflicts among major interest groups, and not becoming a hostage to more powerful coalitions.”

            Putinism by its authoritarianism and suppression of politics addresses these problems in its own way and appears to many to be “a practical resolution” of them. But it not only fails to do that but creates a situation in which the state, however powerful it may appear, in fact suffers from serious problems, they continue.

            Having suppressed political activity, they continue, the Russian state in its Putinist variant “loses not only accountability but the capacity for self-correction” given that “institutions deprived of autonomy ever more poorly send up bad news and correct mistakes,” and the supposedly strong center operates increasingly blind to what is happening.  

            “The war against Ukraine, Bursygina and Filippov argue, “is the most vivid manifestation of this defect, a failure of the Putin model even when judged by its own criteria.” Indeed, the Kremlin’s unwillingness to listen to anything but echoes of itself has resulted in “a monumental error” with far-reaching consequences.

            Those who want to see democracy and rule of law come to Russia not only must overcome the fears of many Russians that moves in that direction will result in a weakened rather than strengthened state, the two continue; and that as a result, what reforms are calling for will open the way to the disintegration of the state followed by a recrudescence of authoritarianism.

            There are, of course, reasons for such fears. The restoration of democracy requires that new players enter the political sphere; but many of them will do so without the constraints that limit such players in established constitutional systems – and as a result, there is a danger that they will go too far at a time when the state has not evolved in ways to limit such outcomes.

            “This dilemma,” the two analysts argue, “is most clearly evident in the relationship between the central government and the regions” and in Russian fears about federalism undermining the state. In fact, “federalism doesn’t equal a weak state: on the contrary, federalism requires the simultaneous existence of a strong central authority and strong regional elites.”

            That is the lesson that can be drawn from existing successful federations; but it is not one that most Russians have accepted. They believe just the opposite. “Politically speaking,” Bursygina and Filippov say, “the extent to which these fears are rational is of little consequence; what matters is their persistence.”

“Consequently, any federalization initiative that fails to articulate the nature of a strong, democratic central government inevitably narrows the coalition of support for reform from the start: regional elites fear regulatory uncertainty; business fears asset redistribution; the bureaucracy fears a loss of governability; and the general public fears a return to chaos.”

What is critical then is that the advocates of democracy, rule of law and federalism need to change the way the question about the future of the country is posed. “The dispute is not taking place between a strong authoritarian government” as Putin would have it “and a weak democratic one. It must be between two models of a strong state.”

Unless the debate is reframed in that way, those advocating democracy and rule of law are likely to find the battles ahead far more difficult to win; and those who want something like the Putinist status quo will find it far easier to mount a defense against any change either now or when Putin leaves the scene.

Belarus Both Spies on Russia and Spies for Russia, BelPol Project Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 24 – The Belarusian special services operating under diplomatic cover both spy on Russia at Minsk’s embassy and consulates in the Russian Federation and for Russia in Belarusian missions in other countries, according to a new BelPol investigation.

            The anti-Lukashenka group said that Belarusian spies are in Minsk’s diplomatic missions not only in EU and NATO countries but around the world, helping Moscow as this Belarusian assistance is not widely recognized (echofm.online/news/proekt-belpol-opublikoval-rassledovanie-o-predpolagagemoj-seti-belorusskih-speczsluzhb-pod-diplomaticheskim-prikrytiem).

            But BelPol found that “the largest concentration of Belarusian agents is found in Russia” where the total number of spies in the embassy and consulates “exceed those of any other Belarusian diplomatic post abroad, a reflection of the fact that “Luashenka does not fully trust Russia as an ally.”

Feminist Anti-War Resistance Documents Increasing Repression of Women in Russia

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 25 – The Feminist Anti-War Resistance movement has been releasing annual reports on the impact of Putin’s war in Ukraine on the lives of Russian women at home. It has just released the latest for 2026, and its contents have been reported by the Important Stories portal, which also talked to some of the report’s compilers who spoke on condition of anonymity.

            Among the report’s key findings (istories.media/stories/2026/05/25/kak-izmenilos-polozhenie-zhenshchin-v-rossii-vo-vremya-voini/), all of which confirm the increasingly negative situation Russian women currently find themselves in because of Putin’s war are the following:

·       The Russian authorities, working closely with the Russian Orthodox Church and nationalist groups like the Russian Community, are making it ever more difficult to get an abortion in many parts of the country and sparking a rise in abortion tourism for those who can afford it.

·       New school textbooks and programs have eliminated discussions of the possible futures of Russian women to only two things: the mother of children and patriots who join the military to defend their country. All other careers are now discussed as if they are for men only.

·       The disproportionate rates of mobilization and mortality in Russia’s ethnic republics and remote regions are forcing women in those places to “shoulder tasks that in traditional communities are historically considered men’s work.

·       The influence of informal associations like the Russian Community are “on the rise across the country. As a result, these groups have effectively taken on the functions of ‘a morality police and migration control bodies.” As a result, ethnically motivated attacks against women” have continued to rise.

·       “More than a thousand women have become victims of violent crimes committed by military personnel” over the last year. Often the perpetrators face no punishment and instead of going to prison return to the war zone.

·       And “over the course of 2025, the volume of calls regarding domestic violence to the All-Russian Helpline for Women surged by 40 percent,” and in more than 60 percent of cases where domestic violence actually reaches the courts, the perpetrator receive only minimal penalties such as a five of 5000 rubles (75 US dollars).”

All this means that the violence veterans and soldiers are committing now will continue and lead to an increasing spiral of attacks against Russian women in the future, this year’s FAR report says.

Tatarstan Brings Its Nationality Policy Strategy Document Closely into Line with Moscow’s

Paul Goble

               Staunton, May 19 – From the end of Gorbachev’s time until now, Tatarstan invariably adopted nationality strategy documents that focused on the republic and its titular nationality and were to a greater or lesser extent at odds with Moscow’s. Now that has changed, and Kazan has promulgated one that is now tightly aligned with Moscow’s.

            The republic’s new nationality policy strategy, which was signed off on by republic head Rustam Minnikhanov on May 16, was drafted by scholars and officials in Kazan; but there can be little doubt that they were under orders to come up with a new document echoing on all key issues the November 2025 all-Russian document of the same kind.

            On the one hand, it seems clear as well that many in Kazan will be unhappy with the new provisions and will work to oppose the policy implications of the new declaration; but on the other, these declarations common to the Moscow and Kazan documents likely point to some of the directions the Putin regime is likely to pursue in the coming months and years.

            That makes a new article in Kazan’s Business-Gazeta by two Tatarstan journalists, Anna Skryp and Ivan Skryabin, who compare the language of the republic and all-Russian strategy documents, important not only for their republic but for other republics and nationalities and also for Moscow as well (business-gazeta.ru/article/702544).

            They lead off with the following conclusion: “the republic’s strategy has been brought into alignment with the federal strategy adopted in November 2025, especially with regard to the equalization of Russian and Tatar languages as native, the challenges identified – neo-Nazism rather than religious extremism – and the creation of adaptation centers for migrants.

            Even more, the two write, “the primary objective of the strategy” Tatarstan has signed off on “is the preservation of the state unity and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, the bolstering of internal stability, and the formation of a pan-Russian civic identity” rather than any ethno-national one.

            Among the other changes the new coordinated Tatarstan nationality policy strategy document makes from its predecessors are the following:

·       The new document makes no reference to the task of safeguarding the constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens whereas the previous Tatarstan one did.

·       The new document specifies that it is a priority to strengthen the unity and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, something the previous strategy document did not.

·       The new document makes no reference to a central plank of the earlier one, “strengthening Tatarstan as the historically established form of the Tatar people's statehood."

·       The new document refers to both Russian and Tatar as native languages, something the earlier version did not.

·       The new document specifies that Kazan must seek to “ensure the use” of Russian but makes no similar demand as far as Tatar is concerned. The earlier version spoke only of Tatar in this regard.

·       Throughout, the new program speaks about “risks” rather than “problems” and specifies that these come from abroad. The older program did not do either.

·       And the new version speaks of the ethnic Russians as “a state-forming people,” something the earlier Tatarstan version did not.