Paul Goble
Staunton,
October 15 – Both supporters of the Putin regime and its opponents share a belief
that a hyper-centralized state is the only basis for Russia’s survival, with
the first thinking that the way things are being done now will ensure that
outcome and the latter certain that with new rulers such an outcome will be
possible, Vladimir Pastukhov says.
Such
an assumption, however, the London-based Russian historian argues, is not only
wrong but dangerous because it is leading both defenders and opponents of the
all-powerful state in directions that will ultimately put the survival of Russia
and the Russian nation at risk or at the very least marginalize both (mbk.sobchakprotivvseh.ru/sences/kak-nam-pereuchredit-rossiyu/).
This
faith in the all-powerful state keeps people from facing up to the real
challenges, leaving them wallowing in nostalgia or dreaming about utopias that
will never happen. “What frightens me today in Russia most of all, Pastukhov
says, is “the lack of courage of thought, of a wealth of imagination and of a
depth of fantasy.”
According
to the historian, the challenges Russia today face “cannot be called unprecedented
either in their nature or their extent.”
Russia has had to face them in the past, but then unlike now, Russian
elites had sufficient strength and courage to try to change directions. Now, on the most important characteristic of
the state, they don’t.
“The
problem is hardly in the size of the challenge but in its uniqueness when makes
impossible the application to Russia of ready-made decisions.” Russia has to
come up with its own approach, and it has done that more than once. “But not now: present-day Russian elites seek
answers” either in something in the country’s past or from other countries so
different as to make these answers irrelevant for Russia.
Those
who look to the Russian past for models “are inclined to explain the
civilizational catastrophes of the past by accidental circumstances, most often
by the subjective mistakes of leaders,” Pastukhov continues. “Those how operate on ‘European innovations’”
in fact do the same, blaming failures on the fact that this or that leader did
not finish the job of reforms.
“In
both cases,” he says, “the depth of ‘analysis’ of the past collapses down to
the level of primitive conspiracy thinking and suggestions for the future” are
based on recommendations to act forcefully either to defend what exists or to
introduce something else, with no reduction in centralization or state power.
Trapped
in this paradigm, neither side gets it right, Pastukhov says, because neither
is willing to face up to more fundamental problems lest they have to do
something about them. In reality, he
argues, “Russia has exhausted itself as an empire, having ceased to be competitive
in that regard a century ago even when it tried to adopt Western approaches.
That
is because, Pastukhov suggests, “there are no recipes in the experience of
Western democracy which could help easily to transform an enormous continental empire,”
that is extremely diverse and includes extensive colonies, “into a contemporary
nation state. But there are no such
recipes in the archaic experience of old Russia either.”
That
means that Russians must come up with something really new rather than continuing
to rely on approaches that have compromised themselves in the past and even
now. But “neither the powers that be,
nor ‘the reformers,’ nor ‘the preserves’ seem ready to do that,” the historian
says.
“Russian
society lacks the courage to imagine something different” and thus escape from its
current sad state – and this lack is reflected in the fact that all parts of
the political spectrum have made the super-centralized all-powerful state into “a
holy cow” whose continued existence cannot be questioned.
The
only difference is the color of that cow, Pastukhov says. “The ‘imperialists’ are proud that their cow
is ‘black,’ while the liberals believe that it can be pained a different color
and then it will be ‘white and fuzzy.’ In this sense,” he continues, “’the imperialists’
are even preferable because their views ae less utopian.”
“As
long as Russia remains
bound to the wheel of a hyper-centralized power, it cannot be other than a more
or less qualitatively covered autocratic empire. The rejection of ‘the single
channel’ of the power vertical is thus the moment of truth for present-day
Russian society,” the historian says.
According to Pastukhov, “if society preserves
such a vertical, then it will along with preserve all its ‘autocratic’
derivatives.” Those who think otherwise and believe that the state can be “humanized”
or “Europeanized” or “democratized” are engaged in “a dangerous act of
self-deception.”
“Either autocracy ‘as it is’ or the
decentralization of power and the transition …to a consistent federalization [of
their country] is the only real strategic choice which the Russian people must
make in the 21st century,” the Russian historian argues. No compromise is possible despite what both
those who support authoritarianism and those who say they are against it say.
Neither the autocrats nor the
democrats “believe that Russia can exist without the Kremlin holding things together.
The only difference is that “’the autocrats’ consider this binding ideal while ‘democrats’
believe that it can be cleaned up and polished by democracy.” But neither really wants to break with the
past: both are afraid they could lose everything.
But, Pastukhov insists, “the
salvation of Russian civilization lies in the creation of a new civilization.
It is senseless to pray to gods which have died. Neither imperial nor Soviet Russia
is going to be reborn. They died because in a natural way, they both completely
exhausted their possibilities.”
At the same time, however, no
imported idea, be it from Europe or China, will help Russia because Russia is
too big, too diverse, and too conflicted for any of those ideas to work without
being transformed into something they are not, a pattern that has all too often
occurred in Russian history.
To move forward,
Pastukhov argues, Russia must break with the idea that a hyper-centralized
state is the only way to save Russia and recognize that such a state will in
fact lead to the country’s decay or even demise. And then, it must courageously move to create
a genuine federation, however wrong or risky that may seem to current
elites.
That won’t be easy. It is likely to
take decades and to be marked by many false starts, the historian says. “It is
not excluded that the Russian federation at some point will begin to remind everyone
of an asymmetric confederation like the project to which the European Union has
striven but not been able to realize.”
Pursuing such a goal is risky – it could
lead portions of the country to depart on their own, “but it is the single
possible path for the social and historical creativity” that could lead to the
appearance of a new but “great” civilization in Russia, Pastukhov argues. But
this pursuit is made even more difficult by the fact that in the end, Russians
have no other choice.
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