Putin Turning to Fascism Not Because He Prefers But to Maintain His Power at Home and Project Power Abroad, Shmulyevich Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, March 1 – Faced with the current economic and social crisis in Russia, Avraam Shmulyevich says, “Putin would prefer to do nothing but rather choose a slow transition via stagnation … putting off any serious decisions” until he has left the scene at some point that he hopes will be in the distant future.

            “But this variant,” the Israeli analyst argues, “may entail the rapid and unexpected collapse of the regime since there exist too many possible challenges which the Russian ruling elite will have to respond to and this would be simply impossible within the paradigm of stagnation” (region.expert/fascization/).

            Consequently, confronted by this situation and by other members of the elite who fear collapse as well, the most likely thing Putin will do is to continue to follow the course which he has been following and promoting, one involving accelerated moves toward transforming Russia into a full-blown fascist state.

            Modernization via a democratic transition would be more effective, the Israeli analyst says; but that would entail changes that Putin and his entourage do not want. Consequently, the pursuit of modernization via “a mobilizing dictatorship” is preferable compared to the alternative especially since doing nothing will clearly lead to disaster.

            “Historically, the population of Russia has been inclined toward authoritarian ideology, and it will hardly choose the path of a democratic transition,” Shmulyevich says. But there is another factor at work as well. “Unlike in the majority of present and past dictators, no one seized power in Russia.”

            “In the 1990s, there was in the country a sufficiently free society, free media, free economy, and a parliamentary system. And all this, Putin took back into his hands over a few years without any resistance. He didn’t need mass arrests or political repressions.” He simply acted and the population acquiesced.

            The reason he could do so, Shmulyevich says, is the extraordinary centralization” of Russian political and economic life and Putin’s success in promoting the idea that any shift away from that would lead to “’the disintegration of Russia.’” Centralization made it easier for him to take power, and these fears have helped him keep it.

            But it is no longer the case that all Russians either want such centralization or fear that any decentralization will lead to the demise of the country. Many are demanding greater local control and do not see that as inevitably leading to the fragmentation of the country. Instead, many recognize that decentralization may save the country’s territorial integrity.

            Such demands for decentralization, however, are not yet clearly defined “and not completely recognized either by the broad masses or the intellectual elite,” the Israeli analyst says. And this means Russia will continue to move along its current course toward fascism and the creation of an effective dictatorship that can modernize the country.

            Putin’s own desire to restore the greatness of Russia “militarily and territorially” in the 19^th century way is also contributing to this trend. “What we are observing in Russia is nothing other than the restructuring of the military and economy for a major conventional war” and also the rearranging of the state apparatus and government propaganda to support that.

            The territorial expansion of Russia has been going on since 2008, and thus, it is likely to continue, possibly growing into World War III – or at least, the Kremlin is “actively preparing for that.”  History shows that “if an authoritarian state builds a powerful army, most likely this army will be used for attack.”

            That is especially likely because Putin is convinced that the major Western powers will not respond with nuclear weapons unless they are directly attacked; and that has the effect of dispelling the taboo against using nuclear weapons for more limited purposes, “a taboo which existed even in Soviet times.”

            Toward that end, Putin is also promoting an autarkic economy. But he faces one serious obstacle: “the horrific quality of the ruling elite in Russia.” Even at the center, it is of low quality, and there are “at a minimum” two major Russian regions “where the leading positions are occupied by former professional prostitutes.”

            Moreover, in the elite now are many bandits who haven’t given up their earlier behavioral tendencies.  All this, Shmulyevich says, argues for “a total purge of the elite.” Such a move is clearly needed but it hasn’t happened “because the Russian ruling stratum instinctively understands the threat handing over it and sabotages any radical changes.”

            Will Putin nonetheless act? He “isn’t afraid to shed the blood of his own people or that of citizens of other countries, but he, as experience shows, isn’t prepared to sacrifice the ruling class which brought him to power.” But if he is replaced by someone else, the new, younger and more decisive leader without such feelings could decide on a purge comparable to Stalin’s in 1937.

            At the very least, such a new leader won’t be a peacemaker. He will first purge his own regime and “after that, there will be a major war.” If the West were to stand up to him, something that now looks improbable that might change, but at present, “Putin sees that the West although it doesn’t approve his actions in words, it de facto is ready to make peace with him.”

            Such a conjunction of factors, Shmulyevich says, clearly opens the way to fascism in Russia and a major war between Moscow and the West.