Paul
Goble
Staunton, June 30 – Olga Kryshtanovskaya,
head of the Center for the Study of Elites at the Academy of Sciences Institute
of Sociology and Russia’s most distinguished student of elites and their
rotation, says that “Putin’s successor is already in his closest entourage” and
that Putin may even decide who it will be.
In an interview taken by Vladimir
Rudakov and published today on Profile.ru, the sociologist says that despite
Putin’s high ratings, it is far too early to say whether he will run in 2018 or
decide to become a Russian version of Deng Xiaoping (profile.ru/rossiya/item/83582-preemnik-putina-uzhe-nakhoditsya-v-ego-blizhajshem-okruzhenii).
Indeed, she
suggests, the Ukrainian crisis, depending on how it plays out, may determine
whether the Kremlin leader remains in power or chooses to go. While those closest to Putin are putting on a
brave face, they are unhappy about restrictions on their travel to the West,
their access to property there, and the ability of their children to study
there.
A slightly broader part of the elite
is suffering a bit from the sanctions, she continues, but “if the West will be
able to convince its own business and a serious outflow of capital from Russia
begins, the borders are closed, and credit card arrangements are disrupted ...
this will affect not only the elites but also the middle class.”
So far, the sociologist says,
ordinary people are backing Putin because of patriotism and because sanctions
don’t affect them. In most cases, she continues, the population “can hardly
calculate” how sanctions are already affecting the country and are pleased to
float along with “a romantic wave of patriotism.”
But if first those closest to Putin
and then broader groups start to hurt, Kryshtanovskaya says, opposition to the
Kremlin leader could increase because “no one wants to reduce his standard of
living, even for the high goals of patriotism.” Such a situation would be very
dangerous, and parts of the elite could begin making their own calculations
about the future.
She points out
that “if the events in Ukraine had taken place somewhat earlier, in 2011-2012, they
might have divided the political class instead of uniting much of it as now. At
that time, Kryshtanovskaya says, “there were signs of the fragmentation of the elite,”
between Putin’s “conservative majority” and Dmitry Medvedev’s “small group of
liberals.”
Putin was able to “consolidate the
political class and neutralize the opposition,” and those around him who might
have become his opponents were overwhelmed by the patriotic “wave” that has
swept the country since the annexation of Crimea and sent Putin’s ratings
through the roof.
Of course, she continues, “there is
a danger that [today’s] euphoria will be replaced by depression. And this will
happen if nothing is done. Fine,” people
will say, “you took Crimea. Hurrah! But what next? Enormous costs? A decline in the standard of
living? If so, then depression will come.”
Putin and his entourage certainly
understand this. He and his people “understand
it and are thinking how not to allow it to happen. Initially, they will continue to point to what could
happen to Russia and its stability if it were to follow the Ukrainian
path. No one wants that, Kryshtanovskaya
says.
“Ukraine has given Russia a lesson
about what not to do. To lose stability
and push one’s country into chaos.” That is easy to do, she continues, but
escaping from chaos is “difficult.” Putin has made his career by presenting
himself as the guarantor of stability, and how he has added to that someone who
has given Russians a reason for pride.
“People want to be proud of their
country!” But attitudes can change and the 2018 presidential elections are a
long way off. At present, all polls show
that “the population does not see an alternative to Putin.” And neither does
the elite. But this means less than some
may think because “in all authoritarian regimes, it is that way: there is no
alternative to the leader.”
Were things to continue exactly as they are, Putin
could win without any difficulty. But they are unlikely to. And that in turn raises the question: “Does
Putin himself want to serve another term as president? Or will he prefer to
play the role of a kind of Deng Xiaoping,” an eler statesman who doesn’t have
to deal with day to day problems.
Putin is “intelligent and is
[undoubtedly] considering various possibilities,” Kryshtanovskaya says. “It is possible that he will consider that
for the preservation of the stability of the system, it will be better to go
into the shadows, to find ‘successor No. 2,’ and to help him win his own
authority in the elections.”
The sociologist does not say this,
but such a strategy not only represents a recapitulation of the way in which
Putin himself came to power but could allow him to have a far longer influence
over the future of the country than might be the case if he has to face the
inevitable problems that any Kremlin leader would.
“If that scenario is realistic,” she
says, “then such a successor is already in the immediate entourage of the president.”
And it may be, Kryshtanovskaya concludes, because “Putin has more than once
demonstrated that he is capable of the most unexpected and out of the ordinary
steps.”
And that in term means, the elite
specialist concludes, that “intrigue about his true plans will be preserved
until the very end.”
