Paul
Goble
Staunton, May 31 – Most analysts
speak of Ramzan Kadyrov as a Chechen politician and Vladimir Putin as a Russian
one, implicitly suggesting whether they intend to or not that each speaks for the
nation he ostensibly heads, Avraam Shmulyevich says. But in fact, neither
represents his nation but rather the totalitarian state machine centered on
Moscow.
First of all, the Israeli specialist
on the North Caucasus says, “one must clearly understand that Ramzan
Akhmatovich Kadyrov represents the Chechens in exactly the same degree that
Putin represents the Russians, Matviyenko the Ukrainians of Shoygu the Tuvins.”
That is, not at all (afterempire.info/2018/05/31/chechnya/).
Kadyrov today is
simply “a highly placed official of the Russian powers that be,” Shmulyevich
says. He is “not ‘a Chechen politician,’ but rather one of the most influential
of Putin’s ‘courtiers.’” He doesn’t make
proposals or act in any way that the Kremlin has not directed him to or at
least approved in advance.
He is thus “only an element of the Russian
siloviki system; and as to the
struggle with enemies of the regime, he acts as a subcontractor” to whatever
needs the Kremlin has. “Moscow gives him some assignments, and he fulfills them.”
Despite having his own siloviki
units, “Kadyrov remains part of the Russian terrorist system.”
субподрядчик.
Chechnya today in fact is “an
occupied country. Formally, neither a Chechen power nor Chechen siloviki exist. There everything is
Russian. These are Russian soldiers and Russian FSB officers of Chechen nationality,”
Shmulyevich continues. They should not be ascribed to Chechens or the Chechen people
blamed.
By violence and war, Moscow
suppressed the Chechen drive for independence and resubordinated Grozny to its
will. It allowed Chechen leaders somewhat more independence because they fought
and might fight again, but that does not change the fundamental reality that
all power in Chechnya is Russian, including that of Kadyrov.
“De
facto, Chechnya now is a feudal vassal state, one that it is difficult to
say lies within the legal field of the Russian Federation,” Shmulyevich argues.
“But in all this, the power of Kadyrov as vassal is maintained only by the
presence of an enormous grouping of the rusisan army. Everything that takes
place on this territory does so with Putin’s permission.”
Again, “how
can one suggest any of this has any relationship to the Chechen people?” That
people is “under the toughest pressure of a totalitarian regime,” one where human
rights are at the level of Turkmenistan or North Korea than is the case in
other regions of the Russian Federation.
Those Chechens who can have fled,
although they continue to be pursued by Grozny and Moscow’s agents. Those who
can’t leave are being subjected to a new wave of Russification. Many hate the
regime, but some give it lip service either out of fear or out of the belief
that that is the best course of action under the circumstances.
But there is a lesson here Moscow
does not yet seem to have learned: “Every time when the empire has decided that
it has completely pacified the Chechens, the fortress of Russian power has
fallen apart like a house of cards, and the suppression of Chechnya and the
Caucasus has had to begin again, each time with a new wave of bloodshed.”
This cycle will not continue for eternity,
Shmulyevich says, adding that “today’s circle is the last” because “after almost
200 years of war, Russia finally will have to leave both the Chechen Republic
Ichkeria and then the entire Caucasus.
And this will be only for the good of both the Russians themselves and
all Caucasians.”
