Paul
Goble
Staunton, July 1 – Given the Kremlin’s
ability to mobilize the population via Moscow television, Vladimir Putin could “at
any time” refuse to cooperate” with the West on Ukraine “and receive the
support of society,” according to a lead article today by the editors of “Nezavisimaya
gazeta.”
That reality, the editors say,
dramatically increases the risk that the Ukrainian crisis could quickly get out
of hand and raises the question as to “why the Russian authorities are not
reducing the temperature” in their television reporting about what is going on,
the editors say (ng.ru/editorial/2014-07-01/2_red.html).
They note that
91 percent of Russians, according to the Levada Center, get their news about
Ukraine from television, and that a majority of them think Moscow should “actively
support ‘pro-Russian forces’” in Ukraine and regard the participation of
Russian “volunteers” in that conflict as a good thing.
Given the kind of
coverage of Ukrainian events that has been on Russian television, it would be
strange, the editors say, if the population had any other views, especially
given that few use the Internet or other sources to find out what is going on.
But at the same time, it is striking
that Moscow television coverage continues to echo “the line of Boroday and
Strelkov” even though the Russian government “has limited itself to statements
that it ‘respects’ the choice of the residents ofDonetsand Luhansk [and]
condemns the force operations of the Ukrainian authorities.”
The pro-Russian leaders in eastern
Ukraine have “publicly criticized the Kremlin” for its failure to do more, “accusing
it of sabotage and the betrayal of Russians.” In these circumstances, the paper
says, Moscow television has been forced to move back and forth between the two
positions.
At one level, “the Russian ruling
elite, enjoying a real monopoly on television can form public opinion
practically on any question.” But the Russian population, even as its opinions
are being shaped by that source, “balances itself between indifference and
various types of radicalism, moral, left-wing and so on.”
Consequently, the Kremlin can push
things more easily in some directions than in others. “When the authorities want to adopt liberal
or take a decision potentially popular in the West,” the editors say, “public
opinion isn’t interested.” When the Russian leadership pushes “conservative,
anti-liberal and anti-Western” ideas, it can count on public support.
That pattern, of course, increases
the risk of any such conflict getting out of hand because the Kremlin knows
that a more radical approach will win it more support at home than a more conciliatory
one, and because that is so, Putin and his regime are likely to be inclined to
the more radical one, all the more so because choosing guarantees popularity, at
least in the short term.
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