Paul
Goble
Staunton, July 1 – In the wake of
the Crimean Anschluss, many Russians have predicted and many Ukrainians have
been fearful that Ukraine could disintegrate as a country as a result of the
actions of the Russian government and its agents in Eastern Ukraine. Exactly
how that might happen and thus what Ukraine should do to prevent it, however,
have been less widely discussed.
Yesterday, in an article on
Kavpolit.com, Nikolay Protsenko, the deputy editor of “Ekspert-Yug” in Rostov,
discuses five ways in which that might occur, an enumeration useful for
clarifying the issues involved and for thinking about the challenges that
Ukraine will be facing for some time (kavpolit.com/articles/ukraina_2014_stsenarii_raspada-6609/).
He presents five different models
which he calls respectively the Bosnian, the Chechen Ichkerian, the Karabakh,
the Abkhazian or Kosovan, and the Southern Sudanese or more distantly the
Confederacy of the South. In each case, he discusses the model, its
applicability to Ukraine, and the calculations of those involved.
According to the Rostov analyst, the
first scenario is the Bosnia one, “a divorce within the framework of a
confederation.” After the Yugoslav civil
war, Bosnia and Herzegovina was divided into the Republic Serbska and the
Muslim-Croation Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
While nominally a confederation,
Protsenko says, this arrangement did little to allow the new republic to unite,
and it remains “one of the most backward countries of Europe.”
“From the very beginning, the conflicts
in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the east of Ukraine were considered ‘a clash of
civilizations,’” with each side enjoying the support of outside supporters of
one or the other, he says. For Moscow,
this outcome would be “the most preferable” because it would keep Ukraine as a
united but weakened state.
But Kyiv appears unlikely to agree,
Protsenko says, because it is unwilling “to recognize the Donetsk Peoples
Republican the Luhansk Peoples republic as equal participants in negotiation
about the future of the country and to support their right to take within the
framework of ‘a new Ukraine’ ‘as much sovereignty as they cans swallow.”
Moreover, this scenario suffers from
another limitation, he continues. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, there were territories
of compact settlement of the major ethnic groups,” something achieved at the
price of genocide and ethnic cleansing.
But “in Ukraine, the border of the conditional ‘Russian world’ extends
significantly to the west of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.”
“This means,” he points out, “that
the self-determination of these regions (at a minimum within the framework of a
confederation would not stop the disintegration of the country but only
exacerbate" the process. Moreover,
Protsenko adds, one must not forget about the territorial claims by European
countries on western portions of Ukraine.
Protsenko’s second scenario is the
Chechen-Ichkerian one, a state unable to support itself. Although Russia de facto lost the first
post-Soviet Chechen war, the Chechens were unable to use the opportunity “to
create stable and functioning government institutions.” Instead, that republic
became a place where in fact “there was no state” at all.
According to the Rostov analyst, “today
the Ukrainian siloviki are repeating in the eastern regions of the country the
very same mistake which at one time [Russia’s] federal authorities made having
decided on introducing forces in Chechnya.”
The introduction of forces both now and then attracted new fighters on
both sides.
But it is “premature” to say that “the
Donetsk Peoples Republic and the Luhansk Peoples Republic are consolidated
political structures,” he adds.
From Moscow’s perspective, “the
negative consequences of the appearance on the southern borders of Russia of
ungoverned territories with an armed population are obvious.” Such a turn of events would be “the worst” of
all, and therefore “Moscow will devote all possible efforts that it doesn’t
happen.”
The third scenario Protsenko
discusses is the Karabakh variant, or “fusion without swallowing.” As a result of the war between Armenia and
Azerbaijan, Karabakh became a republic with close ties to Armenia but has not
been recognized de jure by Yerevan or anyone else. Moreover, no settlement of
the conflict appears possible despite 20 years of a ceasefire.
“The difference between ethnic
Russians living in the eastern regions of Ukraine and the Ukrainians,
especially from the western oblasts of the country is not as diving as that
between Armenians and Azerbaijanis,” the analyst writes. But there are two
factors which make these situations more similar than many suspect.
On the one hand, Protsenko says, for
many ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraiine “Rostov is much closer than Kyiv” and
will remain so. And “the idea of ‘a divided people’ has great potential to
mobilize the masses, as at one time the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh
demonstrated.” That will contribute to a sense of community regardless of where
the official border is.
And on the other, such territories
and their leaders could be a problem for Russia as a whole just as Karabakh has
been for Armenia. They will be a
continuing source of nationalism, and it is not surprising, the Rostov analyst
says, that the last two presidents of Armenia are from and associated with
Karabakh.
At the same time, however, there is
a factor that limits the possibilities for such a scenario. Eastern Ukraine is simply too big and has too
much industry to be treated as Karabakh has been. It will either want statehood
or an enhanced status in Ukraine rather than remaining in an undefined situation.
The fourth scenario is the Abkhazian
or Kosovan one, “partial recognition.” As
is the case with both of those breakaway states, some countries recognize them
while others do not. Indeed, they are
often spoken of as “partially recognized states.” But again, Protsenko says, eastern Ukraine is
too large and important to remain that way for long.
But he says that “one should not
exclude a Somalian scenario in which on paper Ukraine continues to exist as a
UN member state but in fact is transformed into a conglomerate of opposed
territories which do not recognize one another de jure.” International
recognition of the Somalian government has not ensured that the state controls
all the territory.
And Protsenko’s fifth scenario is
that of Southern Sudan, “complete secession” recognized by the international community.
After Sudan gained its independence in 1956, the south sought to secede.
Finally, Protsenko points out, it gained international recognition, but only in
July 2011.
The Rostov analyst appends to this a
suggestion that in some ways, the secession of Eastern Ukraine resembles the
American civil war of 1861-1865, with this major and perhaps fateful different.
In North America, the North was an industrial powerhouse while the South was
agrarian, and that allowed the one to defeat the other.
But in Ukraine now, the east is the industrial
powerhouse and the central and western portions of the country are increasingly
agrarian. If that pattern holds, he
implies, the secessionists could win, but only if the rest of Ukraine does not
build up its economic and hence security capacities.
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