Paul
Goble
Staunton, July 3 – Russian Orthodox “fundamentalists”
have formed their own armed units and provided both military and ideological
support for pro-Moscow secessionists in eastern Ukraine. By so doing, they have
radicalized opinion among the latter by calling for a “crusade” not just in the
east but against all of Ukraine.
In the issue of “NG-Religii”
released yesterday, that publication’s commentator Vladislav Maltsev cites the
judgment of Valentin Nalivaychenko, head of the Ukrainian Security Service,
that such “Orthodox fundamentalism” is “the greatest threat” which those
engaged in aggression against Ukraine could come up with (ng.ru/ng_religii/2014-07-02/5_novorossia.html).
This addition of religious ideas to
what many view as a secular ethno-national or geo-political conflict
contributes to the radicalism of the latter, convincing its followers that God
is on their side but that they must never compromise but rather be prepared to
fight to the death against those they believe are not just political opponents
but the embodiment of evil.
Perhaps recognizing this danger, the
Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate has condemned “so-called
political Orthodoxy” and the use “in the struggle for the achievement of earthy
goals religious rhetoric and symbols” and publicly worried about what could
happen if a religious “component” is added to “a geopolitical conflict.”
But if the hierarchy has denounced
this group, there have been frequent reports about the participation of priests
in it and even of combat deaths among them, reports that have been disputed or
may reflect the participation of priests from the Russian Federation rather
than from Ukraine.
In his article, Maltsev says that an
armed group going by the name of the Russian Orthodox Army had been formed or
arrived in the Donbas by May 3 when a video clip of its members appeared on the
Internet. One of its commanders after being captured and released said it had “about
100” members and consisted “mostly of Ukrainians.”
This “army” was in fact active
before that, according to subsequent news reports who cited its leaders as
saying at that time that the group “is based on the Christian religion and
motivated by a feeling of lost honor and victories which many have felt since
the Soviet Union as destroyed and Ukraine became an independent state.”
Indeed, Nikolay Verin, the
33-year-old “commander” of the unit told Russian television that the group was
created in February after the victory of the Maidan in Kyiv, that it quickly
grew to more than 4,000 effectives, and that it specialized in intelligence
operations, building seizures and defense against Ukrainian military forces.
Unlike many other secessionist
groups, the Orthodox Army appears to have had relatively few veterans from
other hot spots or people with military or security service backgrounds.
Consequently, Maltsev says, it is probably less effective as a military force
than some of the others.
But as an ideological one, he
continues, it is extremely influential, providing ideas and enthusiasm to the
other units via religious services and propaganda. Moreover, it appears to be
the case that the Russian Orthodox Army may be a kind of advance guard for
further Russian aggression given that its commanders claim it has
representatives in many places.
The Russian Orthodox Army is closely
associated with Yury Kotenok, the insurgent’s Donbas governor and has
reinforced his view that the secessionist must more to “expand beyond the
borders of the Donbas” and engage in a “Russian ‘reconquest’” of more or even
all of Ukraine.
Another disturbing aspect
of this “army” is its close association with the “ultra-Orthodox” Russian
National Unity which, Maltsev says, “has remained loyal to Aleksandr Barkashov,”
a shadowy figures on the margins of the extreme right of the Russian political
system since the 1990s.Maltsev concludes his detailed article with the observation that “in the regions of Ukraine where armed conflict is taking place, groups which have not found their place under conditions of peace and in the framework of the social institutions of the post-Soviet pace are taking an active part.” Among them are Orthodox fundamentalists animated by ideas of “imperial revenge.”
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