Paul
Goble
Staunton, July 2 – Russian officials
have made no secret of their desire to divide the Euro-Atlantic community and
to weaken or even supplant organizations like NATO and the EU, but now that the
British vote to leave the EU has put the future of that community in doubt,
Russians are discussing which demise of the European Union would be most useful
to them.
According to Regnum’s Yury
Baranchuk, Russians see three main possible futures for the EU. These three are
continuing stagnation and uncertainty, the complete collapse of the EU into
separate states, and the formation of two EUs, one centered around Germany and
France and the other mostly consisting of the East European states (regnum.ru/news/polit/2152298.html).
There are no
others, he insists, and he describes the arguments Russians have made concerning
each of them given that they are convinced that with Britain’s exit, the EU
cannot continue to operate in the manner that it has in the past, take in new
members or serve as a model for people in Eastern Europe.
According to the first scenario,
Baranchuk says, some Russians see a continuation of the current stagnation of
the present EU project. This will occur
if Britain drags out its exit, allowing Poland and the Eastern European members
of the EU to mobilize against Paris and Berlin.
This will deepen the split between “old
Europe” and “new Europe,” with the former limiting American influence which has
been pushing the EU toward anti-Russian moves and the latter seeking to
maintain both American influence and the anti-Russian stance of the European
community.
This is an inherently unstable and
thus short-lived prospect, Russian analysts think, and will more or less
quickly devolve into one or the other of the two remaining scenarios: the
complete collapse of the EU with a return to a Europe of nation states or the
formation of a two-part Europe, “old” and “new.”
Given this uncertainty, the current
members won’t be taking in any new members anytime soon, and they will shelve
such notions as “the project ‘Ukrainians are not Russia.’” Both these shifts
would be to Moscow’s advantage. And to exploit this, Moscow must develop
bilateral ties with the key countries of “old” Europe.
Such a policy will work for either
of the two scenarios, Baranchuk says.
For European countries, either will be extremely stressful because many
of them no longer know how to function as nation states apart from
supra-national institutions and will find it difficult to function without the
latter, especially the countries in Eastern Europe.
The third scenario, one in which
Europe will split into a more tightly integrated “old” portion and a weaker “new”
one, will also work to Russia’s advantage, Moscow analysts say. Russia’s relations with the Europe dominated
by France and Germany will be bilateral and economic, and it will be clear to
all who has the power and who does not.
The “new” Europe will become “a
pro-American and anti-Russian bloc led by Poland.” But its relative weakness
will mean that both “old” Europe and Moscow can discount it and consider how
best to bypass it in order to move toward greater Eurasian economic integration,
Baranchuk argues.
He says he and most Russian analysts
think that the third scenario is not only the most likely but the best for
Russia because it will elevate economic interests above American and East
European political ones, eliminate many current conflicts, and open the way to
form “a single Eurasian economic and political space from Beijing to Amsterdam
and France’s Brest.”
Moreover, Baranchuk writes in
conclusion, “this will be a different Europe in principle than the one Russian
stars-and-stripes liberals see and dream about, a Europe without Russophobia
and without claims to historical or national exclusiveness.”
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