Paul
Goble
Staunton, June 10 – Many Russians believed
in 1991 that by jettisoning the Turkic republics of Central Asia, Russia along with
Ukraine and Belarus could make rapid progress toward democracy and economic
freedom, Aleksandr Tsipko says; but the last 30 years have shown that such
hopes were misplaced and have been dashed for a long time to come.
Instead, the senior Moscow
commentator says in an essay about the future of the Slavic peoples of the
former USSR, “the cleansing of the Slavic nucleus of the Turkic peoples did not
guarantee the [Slavic countries] a worthy statehood.” Instead, it has opened
the way to tragedy and farce in all three (ng.ru/ideas/2019-06-10/5_7595_kazakhstan.html).
The reason that the three Slavic
republics have not become “full-fledged European states” lies in the fact that “neither
the Russians, nor the Ukrainians, nor the Belarusians were civic nations.”
Serfdom among the Russians for 400 years and among the Ukrainians and
Belarusians for more than 200 precluded that, as did the Soviet re-imposition
of a modernized form of it.
Tsipko says he agrees with Ukrainian
political analyst Vadim Karasev that the victory of a comic in the Ukrainian presidential
elections was possible only because “Ukrainians have not become an adult
nation.” But the same thing can be said about Russia and Belarus where the
peoples were kept in an infantile state by their history and their leaders.
The Ukrainians at least have a
partial justification for what they have done. They “never had in essence a
nation state before 1991. But Russians, it is commonly assumed, already have
had their own national state for a thousand years.” They thus have much less
excuse, the commentator continues.
“Now, everyone sees that not only Belarus
but Russia too is not the West.” And Ukraine despite efforts to move in that
direction has slid back. But the worst
case is Russia where after 2014, thecountry “has gone along the path which Belarus
and Kazakhstan followed in the 1990s. Now, everyone sees that Putin’s autocracy
very much recalls Lukashenka’s authoritarianism and Nazarbayev’s oriental
despotism.”
That which Vladislav Surkov views as
“our Russian achievement,” the dispensing of any system of checks and balances
and a state based on the mystical union of people and supreme ruler has existed
in Kazakhstan since the 1990s, Tsipko argues.
“By the way,” he continues, “what
happened with democracy in the RSFSR was predicted by Nikolay Trubetskoy in the
1920s in his essay, The Heritage of Chingiz Khan.” Putin’s rise to power
confirms what Trubetskoy warned about in some detail almost a century ago.
In fact, it has turned out, Tsipko says, that “God
really choose us to show all humanity what it should not do and how it must
avoid any resemblance to unpredictable Russia.” Only fantast like Surkov could believe
that any real European would want to copy with Russia has done with itself.
Now, “almost 30 years after the disintegration
of the USSR,” Tsipko suggests, he “understands that it would have been more
secure for us to live in some kind of Slavic-Turkic federation” of the kind
Nazarbayev dreamed about in 1991 than to exist alone in “central Rus” and condemned
to “eternal searches for a special Russian path and the faith that it is
calledupont to open to humanity a door to a new future.”
It is of course “possible,” that
such a Slavic-Turkic federation would not have saved the situation, “but it would
have been less affected by the temptation of Russian messianism and the
freezing out of the instinct for the self-preservation of the nation.”
Tsipko says he had expected the
Belarusians to move in a different direction because of their past history, but
instead, they have become under Lukashenka a giant collective farm with all
that entails. And until the recent
Ukrainian elections, he adds, he had hoped for more from Ukraine.
Now, he has become a pessimist about
all three but especially about Russia. With
the coming of Putin, Russia has lost the possibilities for progress that it had
under Yeltsin, despite the latter’s many failings, and has ensured that it will
not move forward but remain for a long time “’a besieged fortress.’”
The Russian messianism which this only
intensifies, Tsipko says, and this “faith in a special Russian mission” contain
within them “much that is dangerous. “Messianism gives rise to militarism and the
striving for victories at any price … with all the inevitable political
consequences.”
“In a besieged fortress, as the spiritual
experience of the USSR showed, the right to doubt in the correctness of the
decisions of ‘the supreme ruler,’ the right to one’s own opinion, and the right
to the competition of ideas and programs are impossible. With all this, there
cannot be any development.”
Tsipko continues: “Under conditions
of a besieged fortress, Russia again is being converted into an ulus of the
Tatar-Mongol empire where long-suffering and humble people without their own
opinion look with gratitude into the eyes of the latest Chingiz Khan who tells them
that in their veins flows the blood of heroes and sends them to die in a new
war.”
God knows, the Moscow analyst
concludes, that he has been seeking without success some way that Russia can
avoid all these “messianic charms of ‘Putin’s long state” which Surkov and
others so celebrate.
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