Siloviki Created and Elevated by the Putin Regime Now a Threat to It, Gallyamov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 14 – The Golunov case shows that the force structures are like Frankenstein’s monster, Abbas Gallyamov says. They were created by the regime for its defense but like Frankenstein’s monster, they have taken on a life of their own and threaten their creator which is being forced to take steps to defend itself against them and show who is in charge.

            In one sense, of course, this is the problem all authoritarian regimes face, the political scientist suggests; but in this case, it has assumed particular urgency for the Kremlin because it has lost much of the other bases of legitimation and power and become increasingly reliant on the use of force and that is the siloviki to control the situaiton.

            By firing two senior MVD generals, Gallyamov says, Putin has shown that he wants to “impose order in his own force structures so that the siloviki will know their place,” something they have forgotten and have been acting “as if” they and not the Kremlin are the most important (echo.msk.ru/programs/personalnovash/2444181-echo/).

            By its actions in the past, the Kremlin has given the siloviki reasons for thinking they are more important than the regime can afford them to become. On the one hand, it clearly relies on them ever more often. And on the other, the courts back them up. Whatever they do, “fewer than one percent” of those they bring charges against are exonerated.

                In this situation, Gallyamov says, the silooviki are undermining Putin “not because they wish him evil but simply because that is the way things are arranged. “Each of them and this is the problem is pursuing its own interests,” and the interests of the siloviki, not surprisingly at a time of “institutional collapse,” have diverged from those of the Kremlin.

            The force structures “do not understand political questions,” he continues. “They are administrators not politicians.” For them discrediting, killing or jailing are something they do understand but dealing with popular forces or larger goals aren’t. Sooner or later, this creates “political problems” for the regime.

            Indeed, this consequence of de-institutionalization with regard to the siloviki is “the problem of the regime as a whole. And if there is a problem with the regime, then one won’t correct it by modifying specific elements of the existing system.” It must be replaced – and there are several ways that can happen.

            Happily, Gallyamov says, this can happen “without any revolution.” In Russia, the classes “needed for the normal functioning of a contemporary society” already exist. “What is needed is only the rearrangement of the political superstructure.” That can happen if a reformer comes to power, if an authoritarian dies, or if the sense things must change spreads wide enough.

            In the last case, if enough people come to believe that things must change, the regime will not have more than a few “hardliner freaks” left to defend it. “They always exist but they really at a certain moment marginalize themselves.” That will happen in Russia again as it has happened before. 

Some liberalization will eventually take place in Russia, Gallyamov says. “The question is when, who will head it, how thorough-going will it be and will the opposition seize the initiative. If it does, this may lead to a revolution If the regime does, then the country may experience a mega-transit.”

At present, however, the opposition lacks a consolidating leader and the ability to move from moral protest to a political one which would challenge those in power. When the regime is divided as now, it may retreat in the face of public opposition but it will not thereby reform itself at least not yet.

Thus, the opposition can succeed when it engages in “moral protest” which doesn’t raise the question of power. “The powers that be are not able to work” with that kind of protest because it is about “the struggle with injustice,” an injustice that many within the regime feel is unacceptable too.

Indeed, by reacting as it did in the Golunov case, the Kremlin suggested that it too is “for justice.” That kept the overwhelming part of the population loyal. Had it done otherwise, they might have shifted over to the opposition. That is particularly likely in the current situation when the authorities have lost legitimation through economic success.

As a result, ever more Russians are focusing on the other form of legitimation which is procedural and where the regime is in clear violation of expectations. As long as economic conditions were improving, most accepted the violation of procedures; but now, they increasingly are focusing on those. And that too is a challenge for the regime.

As Russians turn to the Internet and learn how many violations of procedural norms the regime has allowed itself, they are growing angry, Gallyamov says. One must remember that there are real limits to how much falsification of elections the authorities can permit themselves if for no other reason that “the simple human factor.”

Those who count the votes are not going to be willing participants if among them there is a growing proportion of those who feel that one can no longer live in the same way as in the past.  “They will not make a revolution, but they will suddenly refuse to falsify ballots.” And that too is a challenge the Putin regime now faces, the political scientist concludes.