Paul
Goble
Staunton, October 1 – “Russian
propaganda remains an extremely effective weapon of information warfare,”
Kseniya Kirillova says, “much more effective than its Soviet predecessor” precisely
because it isn’t tied to a specific ideology, can tailor its approach to
specific groups much more readily, and relies heavily “information noise” to
undermine truth as such.
In a major article for Tvezero,
the US-based Russian journalist says that Russian propaganda now is especially
effective because unlike Soviet communism, it “does not include any complex
logical constructions” and can present ideas to various groups that are contradict
one another (tverezo.info/post/103329).
Present-day Russian propaganda,
Kirillov continues, “creates not a system of views but a sense directed at
feelings, instincts, reflexes and passions, whose combination leads to the
result the Kremlin needs.” And it is being used both within the Russian
Federation and around the world.
It is based on “lies, slander,
distortion of facts, the creation of conspiracy theories and many versions of
reality which contradict one another which are designed to call the concept of
truth as such into question and also on the use of the smallest contradictions
which exist in western societies for weakening and dividing these societies.”
At the same time and as part of this
effort, Moscow has been creating and using “special mini-ideologies,
distinct worldview systems directed at specific social groups, most frequently
of all those who are attached to the most radical views,” Kirillova says. She
devotes most of her article to describing them.
Among the most prominent, she
suggests, are those directed at extreme right groups and using racialist,
religious and ultra-traditionalist messages, others at the descendants of White
Russian emigres in the United States, the far left there and in Europe, and
even secessionist groups again in Europe and the US.
Inevitably these appeals contradict
one another, but “they are all based on one and the same basic principle: they
create a definite picture of the world which to the maximum extent possible
impresses a specific social group and in which representatives of this group
really want to believe.”
Because that is the case, “unmasking
specific examples of disinformation often are ineffective because the disinformation
in question is so firmly rooted in the picture of the world of its consumers that
people simply have no stimulus to accept alternative information.” In fact,
they may view attacks on what they do believe as confirmation of its truth.
If the Kremlin’s information war is
to be countered, Kirillova argues, its opponents must recognize three aspects
of it: First, they must accept that for its intended audiences, the Kremlin’s
message is both attractive and acceptable. It isn’t and can’t be effectively presented
as alien.
Second, the Kremlin is succeeding by
creating images of the enemy and fears; and third, the Kremlin links them
directly or indirectly to support for Russian policies. That is the weakest point in this algorithm
but attacks on it must take the other two factors into account or they will reinforce
all three.
At the same time although it is too
often ignored, “far from all Russian propaganda and disinformation takes the form
of some well-formed ideology.” More often, it is involved in promoting “’information
noise,’ which is called to finally confuse the consumer of information” and
lead him to conclude that all messages are self-interested and false.
Kirillova concludes that “the weak point in ‘ideology for export’ is in
the first instance logical chains and the connecting links between the image of
the enemy.” That is where the defense against the Kremlin’s information war can
be most effective.
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