Friday, May 8, 2020

If Putin is Removed in Palace Coup, Moscow’s War in Ukraine Won’t End and Chances for a Belarusian Anschluss May Increase, Sannikov Says


Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 6 – Because Vladimir Putin has been behind Moscow’s aggressive approach toward Ukraine and Belarus, many assume that his removal would open the way for the return of Crimea to Ukraine and the solidification of Belarusian independence; but they are wrong, Andrey Sannikov says.

            A post-Putin regime won’t return Crimea although it might limit its military actions in the Donbass at least for a time, and it won’t end its pursuit of the absorption of Belarus, the head of the opposition European Belarus campaign says. Indeed, it might even increase its efforts in that direction (ru.krymr.com/a/sudba-kryma-budet-zaviset-ot-tverdosti-zapada-belorusskij-politik/30593506.html).

            The reasons for such conclusions, Sannikov suggests, lie in the nature of the Russian regime Putin has established, the approach of the governments in Minsk and Kyiv, and the weakness of a West which will almost certainly be satisfied by Russian promises Moscow will not keep rather than demanding fundamental changes in its behavior.

            A palace coup is “completely possible” in both Belarus and in Russia, he says. “In Belarus, if Lukashenka were removed, the entire system would collapse. [But] in Russia, there exists a system of power which the special services run, and Putin is a creature of the special services.”

            “His leadership ever more recalls a classic FSB legend, and the FSB which created this legend is capable of removing him” not because of his weakness or illogical actions but rather because “for a long time, he has not had any success,” Sannikov argues.

            “One should not forget that the Putin system began its effective functioning precisely by relying on the West, that is, by penetrating Western strategic centers and destroying them, imposing on them its own agenda, receiving money from them, and in turn investing ever more money in the purchase of luxury items them.”

            “In a word,” Sannikov says, “’the elites’ destroyed their own country in order to live well abroad.”

            From the perspective of those who backed his rise, Putin’s conflict with the West has gotten in the way of their goals which are more wealth for themselves and more opportunities to live well in the West.  They would like to restore those possibilities, although Sannikov says he is anything but optimistic that they would radically change policies toward Ukraine and Belarus.

            The reason for that is that they don’t need to actually change Russia’s actions but simply make empty promises. “The West is weak and ready to believe any promises Moscow makes without waiting for any practical steps to confirm these promises.”  The FSB recognizes this and so has no reason to retreat from its positions in Russia’s western neighbors.

            Moreover, Kyiv and Minsk are not taking a hard line against Moscow. Yet another prisoner exchange has taken place between Russia and Ukraine and still there was no mention of Crimea. Consequently, the most anyone can hope for in the Ukrainian direction is a reduction in military action in the Donbass but not in the return of the peninsula to Kyiv’s control.

            As far as Belarus is concerned, Sannikov says, Lukashenka recognizes the Kremlin’s current weakness and thus feels free to criticize it, but he “all the same dreams about a seat in the Kremlin himself and therefore uses every chance to show his superiority over Putin” in the hopes that the stars will fall on him.

            Consequently, in the event of a palace coup in Moscow by the FSB, “the threat of ‘a creeping annexation’ of Belarus will be even higher than today.” The chekists won’t put up with Lukashenka’s games as long as Putin has, and both he and Belarus will be very likely at risk as well.

             According to Sannikov, what happens in both Ukraine and Belarus will depend in large measure on the West and its readiness to demand “respect for international law, an end to Moscow’s aggressive policy, and free elections.” If such demands are not insisted upon, “even after Putin’s exit one shouldn’t expect serious changes in the Kremlin’s foreign policy.”

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