Demolishing Soviet War Memorials in Estonia will Create Problems for Tallinn, Moscow Propagandist Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, August 30 – In 2007, the Estonian government moved a Soviet war memorial, known as the Bronze Soldier, from the center of Tallinn to a cemetery on the periphery of the city. That sparked protests by ethnic Russians in Estonia, a diplomatic crisis between Tallinn and Moscow and criticism in the West (windowoneurasia.blogspot.com/2007/05/window-on-eurasia-does-bronze-soldier.html).

            Now, 13 years later, Aleksandr Nosovich, of the pro-Moscow Rubaltic portal, says calls by some Estonians to demolish rather than repair other Soviet war memorials in the Estonian capital are likely to spark another crisis (rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/20200828-novye-bronzovye-soldaty-estoniya-gotovitsya-snova-snosit-sovetskie-pamyatniki/).

            But his words suggest that Moscow has far fewer hopes for action by the ethnic Russians remaining in Estonia, the overwhelming majority of whom are far more integrated into their country of residence than they were then, and instead is focusing on creating a political crisis between parties in the Estonian coalition government.

                Estonian interior minister Mart Helme has suggested that the complex at Maarjamäe on the coastline be torn down because it is in decaying condition and remains for many an unwelcome symbol of the Soviet occupation of Estonia. Because it is an enormous concrete edifice, there is no chance it could be moved in the way the Bronze Soldier statue was.

            Nosovich says such calls are especially offensive because they come at a time when Estonia has erected a memorial to the forest brothers who resisted Soviet power and even inexplicable because the Estonian authorities have just allowed the Russian government to erect a memorial to Soviet soldiers in Tartu.

            The Russian commentator suggests that what may be going on is a political struggle within the Estonian coalition between Helme’s Conservative Peoples Party (EKRE) and the Center Party. The latter controls the city government, is opposed to demolishing the statues, but is part of Estonia’s coalition government.

            That remark underscores how much the situation has changed since 2007 and also points to the way in which Moscow and its local allies may nonetheless try to use any moves against Soviet-era statues in Estonia to create problems within Estonia and between Estonia and its NATO allies.

            On the one hand, since 2007, the percentages of ethnic Russians and non-citizens in Estonia have declined, with ever more ethnic Russians shifting their identities and even acquiring Estonian citizenship. In fact, now, more than in 2007, far fewer Russians there would be ready to march for Moscow and far more would be offended by being asked to do so.

            But on the other, Russia still can play political games in Estonia, less by using any remaining mass support for its policies but rather by exploiting differences among the country’s political parties on how to deal with the survivals of the Soviet past and can be expected to continue to do so as long as those divisions remain significant.

            Consequently, while Moscow might like to see a repetition of 2007, it likely can’t achieve that even if Estonia does go ahead with demolishing a statue whose obelisk has long been dismissed by Estonian wits as “the dream of the impotent.” But it can create problems for Tallinn. What matters is that both Estonians and others understand what is going on.