Paul
Goble
Staunton, August 30 – Many commentators
have focused on the geopolitics of the Belarusian situation, on the extent to
which Moscow requires a friendly regime in Belarus to project power into
central Europe and the West and on the way in which the coming of a pro-Western
regime in Belarus would push Russia further east.
Those are certainly reasonable
judgments, but they are longer-term and more global than the calculations
Moscow is likely making. Instead, as Moscow commentator Vadim Avva says, if
Russia were to lose the battle for Minsk, Moscow would “automatically hand over
Kaliningrad to the enemy” (svpressa.ru/politic/article/274613/).
The only land routes from the
Russian Federation proper to the exclave of Kaliningrad lie either through Lithuania,
a NATO member, or through Belarus. The exclave can be supplied by sea and by
air, but moving heavy weapons and materiel there by those means is both
prohibitively expensive and time consuming.
Moscow currently counts on being
able to ship such military supplies to and from Kaliningrad via Belarus. Were the
government in Belarus to turn radically away from Russia, Moscow would lose
more than Belarus. It almost certainly would rapidly lose its position in
Kaliningrad which many there would like to see become a fourth Baltic republic.
That means that as Moscow calculates
its next moves in Belarus, it will be factoring in the Kaliningrad dimension
and likely taking steps to ensure that it does not face the rise of a
regionalist movement there. That Kaliningrad is part of Russian thinking, as Avva
suggests, is beyond question. It should be part of Western thinking about what
is going on as well.
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