Those in the Kremlin who Will Decide on War or Not live in ‘an Alternative Reality,’ Shelin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 9 – Those who make predictions about the possibility of war between Russia and Ukraine do so on the basis of the realities they see around them. but the Russian leaders who will make that decision live in a different “alternative” reality and thus how they will act is driven by factors other than those the analysts point to, Sergey Shelin says.

            Most analysts east and west, the Rosbalt commentator says, do not see any real interests pushing either Moscow or Kyiv toward war because they argue both stand to lose more than they would gain. That’s fine if those making decisions are viewing things the same way, but there is good reason to think that, in Moscow, they aren’t (rosbalt.ru/blogs/2021/04/09/1896546.html).

            Unfortunately, those who make such decisions in the Putin regime aren’t providing much insight into how they really view the world. Putin himself rarely speaks. His spokesman isn’t interested in providing information but in spreading confusion. And his foreign minister matters “only by his position but not essentially” on big questions.

            There are two people who matter who have talked, and their remarks are instructive. Dmitry Kozak who oversees the Donbass for the Presidential Administration has suggested that any war would be self-destructive for Ukraine and that the West won’t get involved, an indication Moscow believes it can keep any conflict localized (tass.ru/politika/11098963).

            That has inspired optimistic analysts to conclude that there won’t be a war or at least a large one, Shelin continues. “But it is much more difficult to remain one if one reads the interview of Security Council Secretary Nikolay Patrushev, who is almost universally recognized as the second most powerful man in the country” (kommersant.ru/doc/4762137).

            Patrushev too says Moscow isn’t going to fight and expects the West to come to its senses as far as Ukraine is concerned. But there are two reasons not to believe this part of his remarks and to focus on two others: he views Ukraine now exactly as he did seven years ago and he sees the United States as “evil in absolutely everything.”

            Because Moscow decided to invade in 2014, the fact that those close to the throne in the Kremlin think the situation there is the same suggests they are considering doing so again; and because they view the US as inherently ill-disposed to Russia, they are less likely to be dissuaded from doing so by how the Americans will react.

            If Ukraine is on the brink of fragmentation and if there is no possibility for reaching a compromise with the West about it, then there is only one option left, Shelin says. And that is war if one sees the world as Patrushev and his comrades in arms appear to.

            Optimistic analysts say that these men don’t really live in such an alternative reality, but they are likely wrong, Shelin suggests. They act as people ordinarily do not on the basis of their “real interests” as defined by others but by those interests as they define them on their own. That could lead them to war or create a situation where they conclude they have no other choice.