Paul
Goble
Staunton, December 21 – The collapse
of oil prices and the ruble along with Western sanctions have destroyed any
basis for the grand bargain that the Kremlin had made with the Russian people –
economic growth in exchange for political passivity – and raised the question
as to whether there can be a new one or not, according to Aleksandr Belousov.
With the old one gone, the Moscow
commentator argues, “the main question now is what a new one might look like,
who will be its participants and whether it will be concluded at all” (slon.ru/russia/konets_sytoy_epokhi_putin_i_novyy_obshchestvennyy_dogovor-1196771.xhtml).
According to Belousov, there are
three possible variants of a new grand bargain, and which one becomes the most
likely depends as in the past on the calculations of the authorities even though
they have fewer options now than they had in the past.
The “first and most banal” one is
simply to call for patience and to suggest that the old grand bargain will
return shortly. That would require a reduction in the level of the regime’s
aggressiveness and there is some evidence that Moscow is moving in that
direction with its predictions that the crisis will end in two years and its
willingness to talk with the West.
But Moscow’s
ability to achieve this depends, the commentator says, on the willingness of
the West to reach agreement and on the currency and raw materials market
places. In short, it is not something over which the Kremlin has the kind of
control that it would like to believe and thus is not the most likely outcome.
The second
variant, he argues, is “isolationist, military, and in fact Hobbesian: ‘life in
exchange for well-being.’” Hobbes
described the basic social contract as being “a voluntary giving up by citizens
of part of their freedoms to the state in order to achieve their own security.”
That is very much an option for Putin.
But it
presupposes being able to create at least the image of a constant and nearly
universal threat to Russia that makes such an accord palatable and that in turn
calls for an increasingly aggressive foreign policy that constantly provokes
such opposition if it doesn’t exist.
Moreover, it
requires that the population which has already given up its freedom for
security now be willing to give up its well-being as well, something that may
be harder for them to accept after having had the experience of a dramatically
improved standard of living within living memory. At the very least, such
suggestions will raise questions.
One part of the
population will certainly be willing to enter into that new bargain: the
military and security forces. But even they will want to be ensured a better
life in exchange, and that will be possible only by extracting more resources
from everyone else, thus further suppressing the standard of living of most of the
residents of Russia.
And there is a
third variant, Belousov says, one that can be described as “satiety in exchange
for greatness.’” Under its terms,
Russians will be offered a sense of national greatness as compensation for
their deteriorating economic situation. The annexation of Crimea will be
presented as something that was worth such a sacrifice.
That bargain
recalls the Soviet one, and if Moscow goes in that direction again, “the state
will be conducting itself in a typically socialist fashion, conceiving
everything around as a resource for itself and its values.” In this sense, Belousov
argues, “contemporary Russian patriotism [would be] in no way distinguished
from Soviet patriotism.”
In thinking
about a new grand bargain, he continues, it is necessary to distinguish the
very different roles that Crimea and the Donbas play. The first is “a marker of
national pride” but requires spending money; the second is “a marker of
security and of a willingness to sacrifice oneself for ‘the Russian world.’”
In short,
Belousov says, the state would be offering to and asking for very different
things from the population depending on which of these issues it makes central,
if it goes in this direction. And that means Russians will be waiting “impatiently”
for Putin to answer the question as to what they should sacrifice in the coming
year, not why or who is guilty.
For Putin, of
course, this question is critical because on its answer depends his ability to
form a new grand bargain. If he is not able to do so, then it is entirely
possible that he will face a situation in which others will propose different
accords between the power and the people, accords far less profitable for himself.
No comments:
Post a Comment