Paul
Goble
Staunton, December 26 – Most
commentators on the media scene in Russia blame its current sad state on the
Kremlin’s effort to control those parts of it with the largest audience –
television in particular – and to restrict or isolate other sectors so that
they will represent a simulacrum of media freedom without being the threat to
the regime that a free media would be.
But in a new article on Colta.ru,
Kirill Kobrin argues that the sources of the problem are much broader and
involve three trends within the media itself that must be addressed and opposed
if the media are going to be in a position to recover the influence and
authority they had earlier (colta.ru/articles/society/5799).
These three trends are, first, “the
disappearance of interest in anything about the surrounding world not directly
connected with ‘Russian affairs,’” “a militant anti-intellectualism” which uses
emotion rather than reason to connect with its audience, and an ever greater
dependence on what the various media outlets perceive as their audience.
Because of that last point, Kobrin
argues, media outlets, both government-controlled and not, are all too often unwilling
to challenge the views of their audience, choosing stories that reinforce what
the audience wants in order to keep the number of viewers, listeners, readers
or hits up.
Indeed, and that is one of Kobrin’s
central points, these three trends increasingly are affecting Russian media
across the board, from that sector controlled or influenced by the government
to that which explicitly stands in opposition to it. And that means that the latter
often unintentionally echo the framework of the former even when they criticize
its specifics.
The Russian powers that be exploit
this situation “to the full extent,” Kobrin says, because they benefit even
when opposed if those speaking against them are using the same kind of “emotional,
anti-rational and anti-intellectual” discourse which they are using themselves
because that keeps what passes for argument at a level the authorities can
almost always win.
In the current media environment, he
continues, “any serious problem is easily transformed into an occasion for mutual
denunciations and manifestations of one’s own feelings” rather than as the
occasion for serious discussions. That has opened the way to “the most banal
xenophobia” and “intolerance to opponents” of the kind the Kremlin wants – and precludes
the kind of analysis that challenges those in power.
Moreover, it reinforces the mental
patterns of the totalitarian past, a past from which many in Russia have not
escaped, that refused to acknowledge any link between specific problems and
high politics and thus limited the possibility that anger about the one could
take the form of political opposition.
To those who might reply that the
media exists in order to inform and that its popularity in any particular case
reflects its skill in doing so, Kobrin says that that may very well be the case
in “a mature Western society,” but it is “not so in the Russian [one].”
Instead, in Russia, “’supply dictates demand’” rather than the other way
around.
“In other words,” the Russian
analyst says, “as long as the public … is not offered a fundamental and serious
conversation on serious things, there won’t bee a demand for such a
conversation.” And thus it is both easy and profitable for the authorities to
prevent such a possibility from arising.
Moreover, he points out, “the
majority of the Russian media outlets who preserve at least the remainders of a
basic approach to journalism depend on the market not as strongly” as many
believe. They have their reputations, and they should be thinking about them
rather than about the number of readers or hits they get today.
Those who try to oppose propaganda
with propaganda not only will fail but will help their opponents. Clearly, he
says, they have forgotten that “the Soviet Union and the communist ideology
collapsed not as a result of ‘counter-propaganda’ but because a serious
cultural conversation at a high intellectual level was conducted with ‘Soviet
man.’”
The situation now is “catastrophically”
worse and that in turn helps condition “the current crisis of Russian society.”
In that crisis, “the fault of the media is difficult to overstate.” Because of
its degradation, “Russian society has been deprived of the language of discussion.
Instead of it, it is given the language of unreflecting publicistic works.”
The new media – the Internet and
social media – have only made this situation worse not only by their own
content but by their impact on the print and more traditional broadcast media,
undermining the notion of serious editorial discussions and levelling the
playing field to the point where everything seems equally plausible or
implausible.
As a result, what matters is no
longer the argument but who presents it – or to put it another way, “the source
of authority and trust in a propagandist becomes the tribune from which he
speaks.” Content no longer matters nearly as much. Instead, it is the emotional
appeal of the speaker or writer – especially if alternatives are limited by
fiat or by choice.
That is the case, Kobrin says,
whether the tribune is occupied by a nationalist or a liberal, by a supporter
of the regime or one of its opponents. And thus the spread of the Internet and
of social media will not prevent situations like the current one in Russia but
rather make it more likely that they will be repeated.
In fact, Kobrin concludes, “the
Internet and social networks will hardly liberate the consciousness of
[Russian] society; on the contrary, they will simply intensify its prejudices.”
And therefore, “no online revolutions will be able to influence the character
of public consciousness in Russia; more than that, they will only make its
illness worse.”
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