Paul
Goble
Staunton, December 14 – Prophets, it
is sometimes said, are ignored twice, first when they make their predictions
and then when their predictions turn out to be true. But also ignored quite
often are the arguments their opponents continue to employ, even and perhaps
especially when the problems the prophets identified remain in place.
Those reflections are prompted by
the republication today by the Tolkovatel portal of two articles from “Rodina”
in October 1989 -- Zbigniew Brzezinski’s essay on why he saw the Soviet Union
heading toward disintegration and the response of the editors of that Soviet
journal about why they were sure he was wrong (ttolk.ru/?p=25602).
Two things about this exchange are
striking: On the one hand, as the Russian portal notes, “everything that
Brzezinski predicted in 1989 about the fate of the USSR has come to pass.
Eastern Europe and the Baltics have become part of a unified Europe,” while
many in Russia are infected by “’great Russian nationalism’” and want to
restore the empire.
And on the other, the arguments the
Soviet editors advanced against Brezezinski then precisely mirror the arguments
that Russian writers and many in the West now make against those who suggest
that the demise of the Russian empire is not over and that the latest outburst
of Russian chauvinism is in fact accelerating that process.
“The real problem for the future of
the Soviet Union,” Brzezinski wrote, “consists not in how long Gorbachev will
remain in power and even not in whether his attempts to enliven the Soviet
economy and state will be successful.” Instead, it is whether the system can
liberalize or, in attempting to prevent liberalization, put the country on the path
to disintegration.
Gorbachev, the American analyst
argued, clearly understood that for the system to survive, political changes
are even more important than economic ones; but “at the same time and perhaps
unconsciously, he made the first steps which quite possibly will lead to the
complete disintegration of the Soviet Union.”
Unfortunately for the first and last
Soviet president, Brzezinski continued, “both Russian history and Soviet
reality are in a conspiracy against the success of perestroika … Old habits and
inertia are creating enormous obstacles on the path of change.” Most Soviet
citizens are skeptical about reform and concerned less about perestroika than
about their monthly salaries.
“But the greatest weakness of
perestroika, its Achilles’ heel is the problem of the non-Russian peoples
within the Soviet Union.” If the USSR
decentralizes, they will be the beneficiaries and Moscow and the Great Russians
will be the losers. Indeed, Brzezinski said in 1989 the whole country could
come apart.
The desire to escape from Moscow’s
rule has spread from the Baltics to the Caucasus to Central Asia and to Ukraine
and even Belarus. And “Ukraine,” Brzezinski wrote 26 years ago, “with its large
population and rich natural resources could represent the most serious threat
to the survival of the USSR.”
“Growing national conflicts are
generating fear among the dominant national group of the USSR – the Great
Russians – and this by itself interferences with the carrying out of needed
reforms.” Indeed, Brzezinski says, “these conflicts increase the probability that
the real problem for Soviet communism is not constructive evolution but deep
decline.”
In fact, the American analyst argued
at the time, “the success of perestroika and glasnost are less probable than
four alternatives: a slow decline marked by protests, the renewal of
stagnation, the seizure of power by the KGB and force structures, or the
complete overthrow of the communist system.
The “most probable” of these is “a
lengthy and indeterminate crisis which will grow into a new period of
stagnation that will deepen still further the general crisis of Soviet and
world communism,” Brzezinski says. And
in trying to arrest that, Gorbachev has taken steps that only intensify demands
in the periphery for “the end of the Moscow empire.”
But the real irony of glasnost and
perestroika, Brzezinski wrote, is that they are “stimulating nationalism among
the [ethnic] Russians” who also suffer from Moscow’s rule but who cannot do
without it if they are to retain the empire. And that only adds to “the agony”
of the system and presages its approaching end.
The response of the editors,
entitled “Does Brzezinski Leave Us a Chance?” is if anything even more
instructive in today’s environment. The
author – and the article is cast as the statement of an individual rather than
a collective “we” – argued that Brzezinski’s position reflected a combination
of inertia, a radical inversion of his past views, and a failure to understand
how the state centered on Moscow was developing.
For several decades “before the beginning of
perestroika,” the article said, Western analysts including Brzezinski had
argued that “a totalitarian regime could not be modernized from above in a
peaceful way because this would mean that the leaders of such a regime would be
consciously denying essential aspects of their system.”
By 1989, the response continued,
Brzezinski appears to have accepted that change is possible but that it will be
very difficult and drawn out. But most
important, it said, the American analyst explained that by pointing to factors,
including paternalism and traditional factors that have faced all societies
seeking to modernize.
And the “Rodina” writer insists that
“if we destroy the diktat of agencies and the imperialism of ministries, about
which the Balts have spoken so much since the beginning of perestroika and
carry out a de-statification of the economy … then we will make possible the
establishment of a civil society separate from the state within the framework
of [the USSR].”
But the response to Brzezinski in
1989 focused primarily on the possibility that the USSR might break up. “the USSR lives and functions in an all-world
context,” the article said. It is part of “a definite balance of forces and a
certain stability which corresponds to the geopolitical interests of the main
participants of the world political process.”
Any serious shift would be “undesirable”
for all, the “Rodina” writer said. And thus it is not surprising that “all
countries after World War II repeatedly confirmed the inviolability of existing
borders in Europe.” Moreover, he said, “not
one of the republics is in a position to find its place in Europe after leaving
the USSR” and “the collapse of ‘the empire’ would entail not only unpredictable
consequences for the future of Europe but the beginning of global destabilization.”
Therefore, the respondent to
Brzezinski’s argument said, “the world community would prefer that the
processes taking place in our country would give a positive result in the
framework of existing borders.” It has seen what the fragmentation of
Yugoslavia has led to; the fragmentation of the USSR would be far more serious.
No comments:
Post a Comment