Era of Multi-Vector Foreign Policies Over for Post-Soviet States, Mirzayan Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, October 1 – After acquiring independence in 1991, many of the former Soviet republics have tried to pursue foreign policies based on reaching out to both Moscow and outside powers and balancing the one against the other; but the era in which that was possible has come to an end, Gevorg Mirzayan says.

            They must make a choice between Moscow and the West, and however attractive and powerful the West may appear to them, in the neighborhood in which they live and given their status as third-level buffer states, Russia is the more important and the one they have no choice but to turn to, the political scientist at Moscow’s Financial University says.

            He begins his argument in that regard by suggesting that the famous Orwellian phrase “All animals are equal but some are more equal than others” applies with force to the international system even if no one wants to be that blunt from the podium of the United Nations (vz.ru/opinions/2020/10/1/1062948.html).

            There are great powers which organize the system of international relations; there are regional powers which have a role “exclusively in their own region.” And “finally, there are simply small states which formally have all the rights but in fact are forced to subordinate themselves to the rules established by other states,” the Moscow analyst says. 

            Among the last category are “the so-called bugger states” which are situated within the region dominated by the great powers or regional ones or at the borders of these other states. The post-Soviet republics of Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan are among them.

            The chief task of the elites of these countries, Mirzayan says, are to ensure their survival either by subordinating themselves to a major power or by seeking to play one of the latter off against another. The latter choice was possible until recently in the post-Soviet state, but now it is clear that these states do not have that option.

            There are three reasons that the pursuit of a multi-vector foreign policy no longer works. First, it is possible “only among countries which offer the buffer states equal or parity possibilities.” Some may think that the US can do that because it is more powerful than Russia, but in fact, it can’t when the issues involved are fundamental to Moscow’s interests.

            Second, such “diversification” is possible “only among countries which respect the buffer state.” When one great power or another doesn’t, then the strategy collapses because the buffer state is left defenseless against the power of the other. Belarus’ Alyaksandr Lukashenka should have learned that lesson but hasn’t.

            And third, such a foreign policy strategy is possible only “if all the external participants agree to play by its rules.” If Russia ignores those rules or if the West decides that isn’t how it wants to play, then again, the multi-vector foreign policies some post-Soviet non-Russian leaders are so proud of will inevitably fail.

            When any of these three conditions are not met, then national elites must face facts and choose those powers “which do not consider the buffer states as cannon fodder” and “which are vitally interested in stability on their own periphery.”  In the case of the post-Soviet states, that means they must “choose Russia” rather than play games about balance.

            Mirzayan is not a senior scholar, but his words may be all the more important because he isn’t. His argument is likely circulating in the halls of power in Moscow, and the willingness of some to express it so baldly suggests Moscow believes that the situation around it has changed and that balanced foreign policies by the former Soviet republics won’t be tolerated anymore.