Paul
Goble
Staunton, November 10 – Despite
occasional upticks caused by changes in the numbers of women in prime
childbearing age cohorts, the population of the Russian Federation continues to
decline, but instead of bewailing it, Moscow officials are now saying that this
decline will lead to a growth in the incomes of those who remain and become “a
motor of economic growth.”
In an article in “Argumenty Nedeli”
entitled “Withering Away for the Better,” Denis Terentyev calls attention to a
declaration of the Economic Development Ministry in September in which
officials said that population declines will continue but they will work to the
benefit of those Russians who remain (argumenti.ru/society/n364/212546).
According
to the ministry’s report, declines in the size of the reserves of workers and
growth of productivity of work as a result “’will stimulate the growth of
pay.’” Such a statement represents a major departure from the widespread view
that “bad demography” constitutes “the main macro-economic risk” to Russia.
Until
now, most officials from Vladimir Putin on down have routinely said that “the
reform of health care and the promotion of greater numbers of birth” are
critical. Spending on mothers, the so-called “maternal capital,” began in 2008,
he continues, but it has not boosted birthrates: Today, among women under 25,
the birthrate is lower than in the crisis year of 1999.”
“Demographic
indicators” are a long term thing, sociologist Sergey Prokhorov observed. “For example, in the 1990s, very few children
were born, and this fact will define demography over the next 10 to 15 years. Before 2020, the number of potential mothers
18 to 35 will decline by five million.”
Moreover,
even if health care is improved, deaths among the baby boom generation of the
1950s are going to go up as the numbers of the oldest age cohort rise from 15
million to 35 million by 2027, a figure that surpasses any that Russia has ever
known, according to the sociologist.
“It is possible and necessary to stimulate
fertility,” he continues, “but even in the most favorably placed countries of
Europe it does not exceed 1.6 children per woman. And this means that no
natural growth of the population of Russia will take place.” The only source of increase will be from
immigration.
Some
officials suggest that Russia can avoid population decline by increasing life
expectancy, but “the most optimistic predictions” in that regard foresee an
increase only “to 70 years for both genders.” That would be an improvement over
now, but in fact, as the sociologist points out, “it would only be a return to
the level which existed in Russia in the 1980s.”
The
Russian government not only is not spending enough per capita on health care –
its current expenditures are “two to three times less than in Bulgaria and
Romania, not to mention Sweden and
Norway,” and the Russian figures will decline further unless the economy grows
much faster than is likely.
That is even more likely because the
bureaucracy has become ever less interested in investing in health care now
that there is widespread recognition that “Russian women will not give birth to
six or seven children as in the middle of the 19th century.” As a consequence, “plans for improving
demography will remain without money and attention.”
Almost a year ago, Elvira
Nabiullina, the then economic development ministry, said that the Russian state
budget couldn’t support population points, unless they had at least 100,000
residents. Concentration in Russian megalopolises is part of a worldwide trend,
sociologists say, but in Russia it has taken extreme forms and become
“dangerous.”
As many people now live in Moscow
and its environs than do in all Siberia, a pattern that some Russian economists
argue means that Russia is following the Canadian path. But that is nonsense: Canadian agriculture is
highly profitable and based on good road and rail connections with the cities;
Russia has none of those advantages.
This fall, the Economic Development
Ministry has stopped “denying the obvious. Instead, it now acknowledges that
the working age cohort in the country will fall by four million over the next four
years. Supposedly as a result,
productivity and hence wages will grow, as employers have to get more out of
the remaining employees.
But economist Andrey Bliznets says
that it is far from clear where the investments for such a development will
come from given that capital is flowing abroad in unprecedented amounts. Instead, he says, investments and incomes may
fall, and to cope with the situation, Moscow will have no choice except to
raise taxes.
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