Paul
Goble
Staunton, February 6 – The strengths
and weaknesses of the power vertical system that Vladimir Putin established in
Moscow and has pushed regional leaders to follow are on clear display in two North
Caucasus republics, one (Daghestan) where experts say no power vertical exists,
and another (Chechnya) which some say has a more effective one than Putin’s.
Writing for Novopol.ru, Sergey
Markedonov, one of the most thoughtful commentators on ethnic issues in the
Caucasus, describes the situation in Daghestan (www.novopol.ru/-respublika-bez-vlastnoy-vertikali--text140021.html), while WordYou.ru queried four experts on Chechnya (wordyou.ru/v-rossii/vertikal-ramzana-krepche-chem-vertikal-putina.html).
Daghestan, Markedonov writes, “unlike
Chechnya or Ingushetia,” does not have “a power vertical as that is traditionally
understood.” Consequently, its new
leader, Ramazan Abdulatipov, who has made his career in Moscow rather than
Makhachkala, will have greater freedom to make cadres changes because of his
lack of ties to republic-level clans.
But this very “freedom,” the analyst
suggests, contains with itself certain “specific problems” given the nature of
power in the North Caucasus’ most multi-national and Islamic republic. In
addition to the obvious challenges of dealing with the “ethnic quota” system
used to form government institutions, Abdulatipov faces “far more power”
mayors.
The heads of the three largest
municipal governments, in Makhachkala, Khasavyurt and Derbent, are not
creatures of the republic leadership as is the case in many other places; they
have “their own resources of influence and even separate paths to various
Kremlin ‘towers’” and so cannot be easily pushed aside.
In addition, Markedonov continues, “one
should not minimize the role and importance of ‘the Moscow Daghestanis,’ that
is, the representatives of major business at the federal level like Suleyman
Kerimov and Ziyavudin Magomedov.” They
too have “significant autonomy and serious influence on the processes in the
republic.”
Thus, any attempt to use “harsh
administrative pressure” in Daghestan is likely to be “problematic” and could
even backfire. But even more than that, the Russian analyst argues, it might do
little to resolve “the systematic problems which exist in Daghestan,” problems
that may not be amendable to resolution by any conceivable power vertical.
Many of Daghestan’s problems reflect
the impact of economic change, which has forced many people to leave their
rural homes, sparking new conflicts over land, and move to Daghestani cities,
which have their own problems, or to Russian ones, like Stavropol and Moscow,
where they often encounter antagonism.
Unless the government in
Makhachkala, working in close touch with Moscow, can address these problems and
ensure both the legal resolution of property disputes and personal security,
Daghestanis “will turn for help not to the civil but to other authorities,”
among whom are Islamist radicals.
The power vertical alone won’t solve
these problems, and “if these factors multiply in the absence of a quality
nationality policy, then as a result, we will have the break of Daghestan from the
rest of Russia, and also two-sided or even many-sided antagonism and xenophobia”
with unpredictable consequences for the future.
Because Chechen leader Ramzan
Kadyrov recently told Vladimir Putin including that there had not been a single
terrorist act in his republic in 2012 and that his economic system was “the
most effective” of any region or republic in the country, Wordyou.ru queried
four experts on that point.
Abdulla Rinat Mukhametov, a
political scientist who works as a journalist, responded that Chechnya does in
fact stand out in comparison with other North Caucasus republics. “One need only cross the administrative
border between Chechnya and say Ingushetia or Daghestan, and everything becomes
clear.”
But it is quite another matter to
say that Chechens are happy with the price they have had to pay for this “relative
well-being.” Their main problems are not so much economic and political but
psychological. They want more channels for self-realization and need the
advantages of “social escalators” which do not now exist.
Kadyrov has achieved a great deal,
but “this is only the beginning of the path.” Chechnya needs “all-around
development,” and that “will require not less but perhaps even more efforts,
simply titanic ones” that he and Putin have made to this point.
Maksim Shevchenko, a member of the
Russian Presidential Council on Human Rights, answered more briefly. He said
that Kadyrov was absolutely right, that he has conducted “a serious cadres policy”
and that he has concentrated “financial resources in the needed directions.” As a result, Chechnya now really is “an
example to other republics.”
Dmitry Orshkin, a senior specialist
at the Moscow Institute of Geography, however, dismissed Kadyrov’s claims as
nonsense. First of all, “there were terrorist acts in Chechnya” last year,
whatever Kadyrov says. Second, one can
hardly call Chechnya an economic success story when Moscow s sending “about two
billion dollars” to prop it up. And
third, Kadyrov hasn’t solved the problems of security and so no one wants to
invest there.
And finally Ruslan Kurbanov, a
senior specialist at the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies, acknowledges
that Kadyrov’s harsh measures have generally suppressed the militants. But he
argues that it would be a mistake to assume such an approach will work
elsewhere and particularly in multi-ethnic republics like Daghestan.
And he too focuses on the problems
of the rising generation of Chechens who want “a more open discussion on the
problems which agitate them,” something Kadyrov with his power vertical has
been unwilling to allow. “There are talented
Chechen lawyers and journalists (many in Moscow and many abroad) who would like
their republic to become more open.”
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