Monday, November 16, 2026

All Five Countries of Central Asia in Top 16 in the World in Use of Water Per Capita, AQUASTAT Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 15 – Aquastat, the United Nations body which monitors world consumption around the world, says that all five of the countries of Central Asia rank in the top 15 in terms of water use per capita, although overwhelmingly this water goes to agriculture or is lost in the aging distribution system.

            Turkmenistan ranks second, Uzbekistan seventh, Kazakhstan tenth, Kyrgyzstan eleventh, and Tajikistan sixteenth, Aquastat says. Azerbaijan which some now group with the Central Asia countries ranks eighth. Almost all of the water used by these countries goes to agriculture or is lost in distribution systems (cronos.asia/news/rashod-vody-na-cheloveka/).

            Among Central Asian countries, Kazakhstan has done the most to reduce the amount of water it uses. Today, it is expending nearly 40 percent less than it did at the time the Kazakhstan became independent in 1991. One reason Kazakhstan has had an easier time doing so is that it uses a lower percentage of water for agriculture – 62 percent – than do the others.

            One reason that Kazakhstan has worked so hard to cut water use is that 44 percent of its water comes from abroad – from China, Uzbekistan, Russia, and Kyrgyzstan – and thus access to water is a question of national security as other countries can restrict the flow of water into Kazakhstan if it does not do what they want.

Sunday, November 15, 2026

Patriotism and Sovereignty Outrank Life and Mercy as Traditional Russian Values, Putin Aide Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 13 – Aleksandr Kharichev, head of the Presidential Administration’s office for monitoring and analyzing social processes, says that patriotism and the defense of Russian sovereignty outrank the defense of life and the showing of mercy as traditional Russian values.

            Four years ago, the Kremlin published a laundry list of values it said were “traditionally Russian;” and last week the Duma passed legislation that will make violating those punishable by law (meduza.io/news/2026/11/13/patriotizm-vyshe-zhizni-i-miloserdiya-v-kremle-reshili-sdelat-ierarhicheskuyu-vertikal-dlya-traditsionnyh-tsennostey).

            Now, Kharichev has provided the clearest indication yet that for the Kremlin some values are much more important than others, with those about patriotism and national defense at the top and those concerning the defense of individuals and their rights and the display of mercy far down the list.

            Such a ranking is hardly surprising, but it is important to note because it undercuts the arguments of those who defend the Putin regime regarding traditional Russian values by making it very, very clear that for the Kremlin, it is security of the state rather than the characteristics of Russian people that it is concerned about.

‘To Be Precise’ Says There are Many More Cases of Slavery in Russia Than Moscow Brings Charges Against or Even Investigates

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 13 – Moscow says that it convicted nine Russians for using slave labor in 2025, a figure about twice that in each of the previous 15 years but one that gives little information about just how much slavery is actually present in the Russian Federation, according to the To Be Precise portal.

            Slavery-like cases, the portal says, are often investigated under other articles of the criminal code because such charges  are easier to investigate and bring to trial” or they are ignored altogether until scandals break out (tochno.st/materials/osudili-za-ispolzovanie-rabskogo-truda-v-rossii-v-2025-godu). Between 220 and 880 cases of slavery “were hidden” under such alternative articles between 2010 and 2024, it estimates.

            Ninety-two percent of these additional cases, To be Precise says, involved sexual exploitation and prostitution. This focus is perhaps understandable, but even it is incomplete: often officials ignore the problem and add the charge of slavery only as a result of media coverage and public outrage.

Moscow City and Not Just the Russian Government Profoundly Affects Development of All Other Federal Subjects, Shirov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 13 – In a paper that has not been published, Aleksandr Shirov, the head of the Institute of National Economic Forecasting of the Russian Academy of Sciences, says that Moscow “directly determines the development of the economy and the financial well-being of the federal subjects.”

            Some of this dominance reflects the fact that it is the seat of the central government but much of it reflects the enormous power of businesses centered in the capital which simultaneously aid and exploit the economies of the federal subjects, Shirov says (http://club-rf.ru/news/65597).

            In many cases, the Russian economic prognosticator says, Moscow is responsible for 40 percent or more of the GDP generated in the regions, to judge from excerpts of his paper that have been published, according to a report by the editors of the experts of the Club of the Regions portal.

            That Moscow is predominant is widely recognized by independent experts, but it is seldom acknowledged so directly by someone like Shirov who is close to the center of power. Indeed, the fact that his paper hasn’t been published in full reflects the judgment of the Kremlin that this is not the kind of information it wants distribute.

            After all, his figure of 40 percent dependence of the federal subjects on Moscow is much higher than many in the regions now think and therefore it is likely that as the numbers in his paper do leak out, it will exacerbate anti-Moscow feelings in many of them, given the economic stringencies the regions are now subject to because of Moscow’s policies.

Putin, 74, Knows He Must Rejuvenate Russian Leadership and He has a Plan, Pastukhov and Petrov Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 13 – Vladimir Putin, 74, is surrounded in the Russian leadership by people who are within the range of being five years older or five years younger than he is and knows that for his system to survive his own passing, he needs to rejuvenate the top ranks of the Russian government, Vladimir Pastukhov and Nikolay Petrov say.

            In a 33page report for the New Eurasian Strategy Center, the two outline Putin’s thinking and what he has already done to implement a change in generations but not a change in thinking in Russia (nestcentre.org/transition-without-a-successor/; summarized at ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/11/13/tranzit-2030-ili-smena-pokolenii-putinskoi-eliti-a211261).

            The details are important, but what is even more significant is that this report sends a warning to those who think that Putin’s passing will be the end of Putinism as such. What the Kremlin dictator has done is to install younger people in positions near the top who share his vision and can be counted on to carry it out even after he passes from the scene.

            Of course, some of them will change their tune when Putin dies; but many are those of Putiin and those close to him in age. If he succeeds in making all the changes that Pastukhov and Petrov point to, it will be extremely difficult to extricate Russia from the Putinist mold he has put in place.

            The big questions are whether he has the time and whether those opposed to what Putin has done understand the scope of the challenge ahead of them. If Russia is to change, it will require not just the departure of Putin from the scene but the wholesale replacement of those he has installed to continue to carry out his will.

            At present, unfortunately, most of those who talk about the future are not yet focused on just what that means and how difficult it will be; and consequently, they aren’t making the kind of plans that will replace not just Putin and the Putinists of his generation but the Putinists of the next he is putting in place. 

Communal Singing May No Longer Unites Baltic Peoples as Completely as It Did in the Past, New Study Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 12 – The role of communal singing in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the 1980s and 1990 was so great that their recovery of independence is often referred to as “the singing revolution.” But a new study suggests that such communal singing is no longer having the same unifying impact that it did then.

            That is the conclusion of a new study prepared by scholars at Denmark’s Aarhus University with the participation of researchers in all three Baltic countries and in the Scandinavian states as well (news.err.ee/1610193580/baltic-communal-singing-may-no-longer-bring-everyone-together-study-finds).

            At a time of crisis, the authors of the study say, peoples came together and overlooked both differences within their communities and the amount of talent any individual participant had as far as singing is concerned. But as crises have eased, the differences in the communities and the self-assessment of people as singers means that many no longer take part.

            The authors also found that older and poorer people were less inclined to take part because of the costs of transportation, and thus what many had assumed as a permanent part of the cultures of these countries is becoming less central than it was, although it survives and would likely reemerge with much the same force if a crisis arises.

            Indeed, while the study doesn’t stress this, the readiness of people in the Baltic countries to take part in communal singing may be an extremely useful barometer of how citizens feel their country is doing and whether they face a crisis now or in the future. 

Unlike Most Imperialisms, Russia Justifies Its Control in Family Terms, New Book Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 12 – Colonial powers have justified their imperialism in many ways, sometimes arguing that they must “civilize” other peoples and sometimes saying that they must settle “empty” land. But Russia is different, Galina Bogatova says, it justifies its colonial agenda in family terms, with the Russians as patriarchs of those it controls.

            In a new book published by Palgrave/Macmillan, Casting War as Love: Russian Colonialism in Familial Terms, the Russian scholar who now teaches in the United States discusses where this unique Russian rhetoric comes from and what the implications of its use are (euraknot.org/russias-familial-colonialism/).

            Bogatova shows that this justification of the Russian empire arises from the Russian understanding of the state as one ruled by a single individual to whom each person is subordinate to and explains why Russians simultaneous insist that the peoples under their control are one big family that the Russians must both protect and control to ensure stability and peace. 

            While many scholars have talked about how the Russian empire is different from most others, pointing to its territorial propinquity, for example, few have offered the kind of insights Bogatova does on how this familial definition, one that arises from the nature of the Russian state, explains why Russians approach the empire the way they do.

            As such, her book seems destined to take is place among the long line of studies of the Russian empire and help both experts and others to understand better why Russia does what it does in particular cases as well as why escaping from this understanding of empire will require escaping from the Russian understanding of the state as such. 

Moscow has Put More than 3,000 Russians on Secret List of People Subject to Restrictions without Any Court Decision, ‘First Department’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 12 – Russian officials have created a secret list of more than 3,000 Russians who are thought to be involved in extremist or terrorist activities and are subject to the same restrictions imposed on those formally identified as such by the actions of the courts, according to the First Department legal rights defense project.

            This allows the Russian authorities to place on such a list anyone it wants without any legal protections for those who are included and opens the way to the opening of criminal cases against them at any time, the project’s researchers say (dept.one/story/secret-rfm/ and currenttime.tv/a/33897779.html).

            The First Department portal has posted on line the list that it has found and is making it available to all who may be on it or who are concerned about the fate of those who are. Such a list is both dangerous in its own right and an indication of the increasing willingness of the Kremlin to end run even the limited protections Russian law and the courts provide. 

Friday, November 13, 2026

Reflecting Astana’s Concerns, Kazakhstan’s Anti-Terrorist Center Prepares Report on Islamic Movement of Eastern Turkestan

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 11 – Kazakhstan’s Anti-Terrorist Center has prepared and released a report on the Islamic Movement of Eastern Turkestan, one the reflects Astana’s concerns that the IMET may pose a threat to Kazakhstan and that calls attention to the fact that many of the post-Soviet states are now preparing similar reports that are seldom attended to by others.

            The ETIM has attracted widespread attention because of its involvement with the Uyghurs in China’s Xinjiang region and has been identified as an extremist group by the United Nations and much of the international community although the US in Nov. 2020 dropped that designation.

            Most of the new Kazakhstan intelligence report is devoted to the history of the ITEM that has been widely reported by others, but its comments about why Kazakhstan is focusing on it now are important. (For a text of the report, see gurk.kz/news/islamskoe-dvizhenie-vostochnogo-turkestana-chto-izvestno-ob-organizaczii.)

            Given Kazakhstan’s location on the border with Xinjiang and the ability of terrorist groups originating in one place to use the Internet to spread their messages and activities, the report says that Astana cannot help but pay attention to what the ITEM is doing, although it must be careful not to overestimate its activities while paying close attention to them.

            The report says that Kazakhstan is now devoting attention to “four potential directions” in the threat that ITEM can pose: “attempts to use the territory of the country as a transit route, the distribution of radical propaganda through the internet, the recruitment of people into foreign terrorism structures and the formation of channels of financial support.”

            According to the report, Kazakhstan gave its “legal assessment” of the ETIM “more than 20 years ago, when it declared it to be a terrorist organization and banned its operations on the territory of the country. In the two decades since, the ETIM has not been able to expand into the territory of Kazakhstan, although it may be able to eventually.

            “On the one hand,” the report says, “there is no evidence which allows fo the conclusion that ‘in Kazakhstan there exist armed groups of the ETIM. But on the other, it would be illogical to think that this is “exclusively a problem of China.” It is too easy for such groups to cross borders that their ideology does not respect.

            This report is important in its own right as a sign of Kazakhstan’s increasing maturity as a state, but it is also significant for those elsewhere who track developments there. The Gurk.kz portal on which it appeared also offers a regular selection of Kazakh government studies of a wide variety of issues and deserves close attention.

‘Nazaccent’ Portal Launches New Podcast Series on the Nationality Question in Russia and Devotes Its First Programs to Ethnic Russians and Their State

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 10 – Traditionally, what Moscow calls “the nationality question” is all about ethnic minorities and their relations with the state; but Nazaccent, the leading Russian Federation portal on ethnic relations, has upended that approach in its new podcast series on the nationality question.  The first issues focus on the ethnic Russians and their state.

            The first podcast is devoted to the way in which ethnic diversity is a resource for the Russian state, the second is on the well being of the ethnic Russian people, the third is on ethnic Russian mastery of its Arctic shores, and the fourth is devoted to the role of ethnic Russians in the North Caucasus.

            (Nazaccent’s report about its launch of this new series can be found at nazaccent.ru/content/46160-nacionalnyj-akcent-zapustil-podkasty-o-nacionalnom-voprose-v-rossii/ and links to these and other podcasts that portal has produced and posted on Facebook at youtube.com/@Nazaccent.)

            This shift in the traditional focus of Russia’s nationality question from the non-Russians to the ethnic Russian majority is a clear echo of Putin’s elevation of the Russians as the state-forming nation of his country and his moves to reduce the status of non-Russians to a cultural phenomenon.

            But it may have the unintended consequences not only of infuriating many of the non-Russians who thought that they could at least be the focus of Moscow discussion of “the nationality question” but also of prompting them to reflect on the ways in which the relationship between ethnic Russians and the non-Russians may ultimately lead to the demise of the empire.

            One of the most useful discussions of that possibility was offered in a book published abroad more than 60 years ago by Russian émigré I.A. Kurganov entitled The Peoples of the USSR and the Russian Question (in Russian, Munich, 1961) in which he focused on the way that Russian attitudes toward non-Russians will define Russia’s future. 

Thursday, November 12, 2026

Russia’s Political Leaders Mistakenly Ignoring Growing Pessimism in the Population, ‘Nezavisimaya Gazeta’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 11 – The results of several polls released last week show that pessimism among Russians is on the rise, although the share of those who think that the situation will improve or at least not get worse remains greater, according to a lead article by the editors of Nezavisimaya Gazeta.

            But it is a mistake to ignore the rising tide of pessimism, the editors say, because pessimists “have developed the habit of relying on themselves and their own possibilities as they do not believe in politics or politicians as a way to achieve change of any kind” (ng.ru/editorial/2026-11-11/2_9622_red.html).

            Because of that attitude, the pessimists “aren’t trying to convert their mood into political behavior,” the article says; and as a result, those in power are satisfied with the situation” and are ignoring the implications of a society where the number of pessimists is growing as rapidly as in the case of the Russian Federation.

To ignore such pessimism is to ignore the possibility that it “can grow into pronounced discontent” and to fail to try to ensure that there are legal channels for its expression. If there aren’t, there is a danger that when the amount of pessimism passes a certain point, those with that attitude will seek alternative means to achieve their ends that may challenge those in power.

For the time being, the powers that be feel no such threat; and discussions of pessimism remain confined to sociological studies and commentaries. But there is no guarantee that this will remain the case; and failure to reflect on that possibility could lead to a disaster at some point in the future when those in power will have to rely more on the attitudes of the population. 

Moscow Set to Allow Russians to File Denunciations on Line, a Move Likely to Increase Amount of Political Snitching to Unprecedented Levels

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 9 – Russians who want to denounce other Russians for violating the law or state policies will no longer have to appear or write on paper such “snitching,” if a new proposal by the interior ministry goes into effect. Instead, they will be able to snitch via the internet.

            That will make it easier for Russians to denounce their neighbors especially for political “crimes” like offending the feelings of believers or spreading fakes about the Russian army because in such cases, those snitching won’t have to appear (t.me/endoflaw/4132 repeated at echofm.online/news/mvd-razreshit-rossiyanam-pisat-onlajn-donosy).

            Consequently, the number of denunciations for political crimes is likely to expand dramatically in the coming months. At the same time, however, because those who snitch about ordinary crimes like theft will still have to make an appearance before the authorities, reports about actions of those kinds are less likely to grow.

Young Russians Caught in ‘Paternalistic Trap,’ New Study Finds, with Many Expecting to Deliver Basic Social Guarantees but No Longer Trusting It to Do So

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 10 – Young Russians expect the state to deliver the basic social guarantees it has promised but no longer trust that it will do so, leaving them in “a paternalistic trap” and putting this critical social contract at risk of collapse in the event of shocks, according to a new study of students in Yekaterinburg universities.

            The study by Urals Federal University scholars Yekaterina Zaytseva and Irina Britvina is entitled “Life Strategies of Students in Yekaterinburg as a Reflection of the State of the Social Contract” (in Russian) is in the latest issue of the Courier of the Institute of Sociology and is available at fnisc.ru/index.php?page_id=2624&jn=vestnik&jn=vestnik&jid=1171.

            It is discussed in detail by Yevgeny Chernyshov, a Nakanune journalist who follows social and political trends in the Urals region, at https://www.nakanune.ru/articles/125255/. In his review, the journalist says that the findings of this study call into question assumptions that all is rosy in relations between young Russians and the Russian state.

            The survey Zaytseva and Britvina carried out found that the vast majority of students (79 percent) have paternalistic expectations about the state and believe that the state much live up to its promises to provide high incomes, housing, medical care and the like. But just over half of these felt the Russian government is currently living up to its half of the bargain.

            According to the authors, “young people have not broken ties with the state physically but are alienated from it psychologically, no longer seeing any meaning in continuing a dialogue with the authorities.” Indeed, the authors say, young Russians “do not perceive the state as a party to which a contract is possible or necessary.”

            University students in Yekaterinburg thus believe they must make their own way and not count on the state to come through, a situation which could have serious political consequences in the event of a shock, Chernyshov says, one ever more likely to arise because the internet spreads imagery of the failings of the Russian state now to fulfill its promises. 

Future Commercial Rewards from Expanded Arctic Shipping ‘Surprisingly Small,’ European Scholars Say, but ‘Environmental and Geopolitical Risks Remain Substantial'

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 9 – Many have accepted Moscow’s vision that the Arctic will be a major route for maritime shipping, Boris Vergote says; but the rewards from the retreat of sea ice may be “surprisingly small” while “the environmental and geopolitical risks” are likely to “remain substantial.”

            Vergote, one of the co-authors of a 56-page study of these issues by European scholars, says that their research shows that Arctic routes are indeed shorter but that by itself doesn’t mean they are more cost effective or less risky. (The full text of the report itself is available online at  cdn.bfldr.com/WF0QU2QB/as/k97r4kr5v4m7r9ggnn5zr9/Systemiq_-_Breaking_the_Ice_Report A detailed discussion of its key findings can be found at arctictoday.com/arctic-shipping-brings-shorter-routes-but-few-rewards-new-research-finds/.)

            Among the greater costs that shippers using the Northern Sea Route or other Arctic routes must bear are building ice-capable ships, higher insurance premiums, lower speeds, and sparse infrastructure on shore in the case of accidents or for intermediate stops, the last of which is a major component for container shipping elsewhere.

            As a result and despite boosterism in Moscow, Beijing and some other centers, the report says, shipping in the Arctic is unlikely to form more than 0.2 percent of global maritime trade by value in 2050 because shippers who use these routes will save only 100 million US dollars by doing so, a drop in the bucket of spending on oceanic shipping worldwide.

            The European report also stresses that such shipping will cause serious environmental damage and will likely involve geopolitical competition among major powers given the location of Russia along much of the route and the US location at the entrance of the Arctic from the Pacific.

            The report thus serves as a useful corrective to the enthusiasm of some and the fears of others that the Northern Sea Route and other Arctic shipping lanes will soon radically transform international trade routes. Arctic routes may play a key role in the extraction of resources there, but they won’t transform international trade in the near term nearly as much as some suggest.

 

Wednesday, November 11, 2026

Russia’s Muslim Leaders Support Tokayev’s Proposal for Russia to Become Associate of Organization of Turkic States

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 6 – At the Organization of Turkish States summit in Ankara on October 30, Kazakhstan President Kasym-Jomart Tokayev proposed having the Russian Federation participation in an associate capacity with the OTS, something Russia’s Muslim leaders welcomed but that a senior Turkish official has questioned because of language requirements.

            Tokayev’s proposal (akorda.kz/en/kassym-jomart-tokayev-addresses-the-13th-summit-of-the-organization-of-turkic-states-319348) drew immediate support from the leaders of Russia’s senior Muslim Spiritual Directorates who clearly view the idea as something that would elevate their status (altyn-orda.kz/rossijskie-musulmane-podderzhali-ideyu-tokaeva-o-vstuplenii-rossii-v-tyurkskij-soyuz-chto-zayavili-v-moskve/).

            But a senior Turkish political official questioned the idea given that the OTS requires that its members speak a Turkic language, something those in power in Russia clearly do not do, a reaction that makes it unlikely Tokayev’s call will gain traction (timesca.com/turkish-official-questions-tokayevs-proposal-of-ots-observer-status-for-russia/).

            This back and forth recalls both the ongoing debate in Turkish nations over whether Pan-Turkism should be “large” or “small” (cronos.asia/news/bolshoy-i-malyy-pantyurkizm-pochemu-raskalyvaetsya-tyurkskiy-mir/) and the presentation to Turkish President Erdogan in November 2021 of a map showing the Turkic peoples of Russia as part of the Turkic world (caucasuswatch.de/en/news/nationalists-presented-erdogan-map-of-turkic-world-with-regions-of-southern-russia.html).

The appearance of that map provoked a violent response by Russian commentators who declared that even if the OTS expanded, it would never include nations like the Republic of Sakha in the Russian north (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2022/01/greater-turan-will-never-include.html).

Moscow TV Film Describes Portion of Norway’s Svalbard Archipelago as ‘a Russian Enclave Beyond the Arctic Circle’

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 6 – A 52-minute NTV film entitled “Svalbard. The Coal Archipelago” being shown in Moscow this week simultaneously suggests that Russia already has an “enclave” there and that Norway is militarizing the islands in violation of international law, according to Denis Zagorje of The Barents Observer.

            The film itself is available at rutube.ru/video/410a40573261fa50d530c6c02f587b3e/. The Barents Observer journalist’s report about it is at ru.thebarentsobserver.com/novosti/na-ntv-pokazali-film-pro-svalbard-cto-s-nim-ne-tak/461421.

            According to Zagorje, the film creates “the impression that there is a territory under Russian sovereignty in the archipelago” by stating that those who view it will see “how they live and work in the Russian enclave beyond the Arctic Circle,” a falsehood given that there is no such thing as a Russian enclave there. All the territory is under Norwegian sovereignty.

            But that is not the only false message of the film, he continues. Most of the movie is devoted to attacking Norway for militarizing Svalbard, even though the pictures the film claims show that are of military exercises elsewhere and the attacks against Oslo are at a minimum tendentious and more to the point outrageously false.

            This is the latest and most public example of Moscow’s effort to prepare Russians for the possibility of a move against Svalbard and thus NATO. For background on that possibility, see jamestown.org/moscows-first-move-against-nato-could-take-place-in-norways-svalbard-archipelago/ and jamestown.org/moscow-using-svalbard-to-test-natos-readiness-and-resolve/.  

Unlike Belarusians who Left Their Country in 2020, Russians who Left Theirs in 2022 have Not Formed a Unified Political Community, Konstantin Ivanov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 8 – For three major reasons, Konstantin Ivanov says, the Belarusians who left their country in 2020 after Lukashenka stole the election have formed a unified political community while the Russians who left theirs in 2022 because of Putin’s expanded war in Ukraine have not formed one and appear unlikely to do so, Konstantin Ivanov says.

            For any mass exodus to lead to the formation of such a community, the commentator says, three things are necessary: a common event which provides a point of reference for all involved, a vision of the future within which people can argue, and horizonal institutions where individuals can become participants.

            The Belarusians, Ivanov continues, “have all of these; while the Russians have none of them.” And thus it should surprise no one that the Belarusian diaspora has become a political community while the Russian diaspora has not and does not appear likely to do so anytime in the future (ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/11/08/nenastupivshaya-diaspora-a210728).

Tuesday, November 10, 2026

Had Bolsheviks Not Seized Power, Russia Would have Been Reduced to the Size of Muscovy Shortly After October 1917, Shirokorad Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 7 – A major reason Russian patriots should be glad that the Bolsheviks seized power in October 1917 is that they prevented their country from being reduced to the size of Muscovy, something that would certainly have happened, Aleksandr Shirokorad argues on the anniversary of the Bolshevik coup d’etat.

            Indeed, the Russian military commentator says, “without the Bolsheviks, the Russian sate in the best case would have been transformed into the Muscovite principality with borders of the 15th century;” and “whether one likes it or not, only the Bolsheviks could hold the Power in the borders of 1917” (svpressa.ru/post/article/539737).

            At a time when people from many regions and republics are talking about independence for themselves and reducing the state centered on Moscow to that of Muscovy alone, what Shirokorad says is important. The center would not have held the rest of the country together had anyone but the Bolsheviks taken power.

            Instead, it would have likely fallen apart into many pieces, even if the largest one was a predominantly ethnic Russian core without significant access to the seas or control over much of what Russians today think of as their historically determined state extending from the Baltic to the Pacific and from the Arctic to the south.

            For a discussion of how a future disintegration of Russia might occur and why it could be limited by a Bolshevik-type strategy in Moscow, see my discussion of this issue a year ago at windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/11/future-disintegration-of-russian-state.html.

Russian Federal Subjects Putting Homeless Dogs to Sleep Form Deadly New ‘Archipelago’

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 6 – Since the end of 2023 when the governments of Russia’s federal subjects were authorized to kill homeless animals, a relatively small number of these regions and republics have put to death almost 16,000 dogs, thus forming what Takiye Dela journalist Aleksey Semyonov describes as a deadly new “dog archipelago” in Russia.

            Almost half of these deaths have taken place in Astrakhan Oblast, another 3300 dogs were put to sleep in Stavropol Kray, 1500 in the Tyva Republic, and 667 in Penza Oblast, he writes, with significantly fewer in other regions and republics (takiedela.ru/notes/arkhipelag-sobak/).

            Semyonov says he examined data from the 34 federal subjects where regional governments have adopted laws allowing the authorities to capture and then put down homeless dogs.  He notes that officials have been chary about releasing such data and acknowledges that these figures are almost certainly far from complete.

            Prior to the issuance in 2023 of  the federal law allowing the killing of stray dogs, regional officials were required to catch, then sterilize, vaccinate and release the dogs, an arrangement that did little to reduce the number of strays or the number of complaints of dog attacks by Russian residents.

            Even since then, about two-thirds of the federal subjects which have adopted laws allowing the killing of homeless dogs typically tried to find other means of getting the dogs off the streets, including adoption and dispatch to pounds and zoos. But in ten cases, the journalist says, the authorities have chosen execution as the primary means of control.

            According to Semyonov, the killing of dogs has done little to reduce the number of bites reported. Indeed, in nine regions where dogs were killed in significant numbers in 2025, only two showed declines and small ones at that regarding the number of bites that residents had suffered from homeless dogs.

            Animal rights activists are seeking to overturn these inhumane laws and hope that as people see that killing dogs doesn’t give them the results they want, they will be willing to support other measures to deal with what has long been a problem in Russia (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/05/if-duma-enacts-putin-regime-backed.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2026/09/more-than-half-of-russian-households.html).

Monday, November 9, 2026

A Political Nation is Emerging in Russia But One that isn’t Conscious of Itself but is Both Something the Kremlin Doesn’t Want and that Many Should Fear, Shelin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 6 – Putin has consistently worked hard to “ensure that Russia has no civil society, no ‘nation’ of citizens,” Sergey Shelin says; but the first signs of such a political nation, “albeit one that is deformed and quasi-fascistic, have emerged” in response to the Kremlin leader’s war in Ukraine.

            When Putin talks about national unity, he means something very different than the unity of the people of his country as a citizenry; and he has limited its rise. But despite his efforts, there is clear evidence that ever more Russians are identifying with and supporting what they view as their “own” army (ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/11/06/natsiya-kotoraya-sebe-neponyatna-a-rezhimu-nezhelatelna-a210600).

            In many countries people begin to think of themselves as a political nation when they are at war and focus on the need to help their “own” soldiers win; and as they do that, they come over time to view themselves as a political nation. That is beginning to happen in the Russian Federation, although the process is far more advanced in Ukraine, the commentator says.

            When Russians were asked an open-ended question by VTsIOM about what they consider the basis of “the unity of their people,” 25 percent pointed to a shared territory, nine percent to a shared history, and eight percent a shared pride in their country, Shelin says. Only three percent mentioned shared interests or civic values.

            Other more exact closed-end polls in which respondents were asked to choose among a list of unifiers found the same thing. Again and again, the commentator says, Russians “themselves failed to identify any sense of civic-mindedness within themselves,” despite a war that has now lasted almost five years and requires some support “from below.”

            And such support exists. Indeed, “voluntary or at least semi-voluntary assistance to the army is not uncommon in the Russian Federation,” Levada Center surveys show, although there are very few such people in Moscow and other large cities and far more in the regions and republics which have provided the most soldiers for the war in Ukraine.

            For Russia as a whole, the share of people regularly involved in volunteer work in support of the army is perhaps only two or three percent, but “it is nonetheless quite significant for a population which has shown a traditionally limited capacity for collective action” on its own, Shelin argues.

            Indeed, according to him, “voluntary and active solidarity with "one's own" army—an army currently attempting to seize another country—is clearly present in Russia, even if it does not encompass the majority. Even more to the point, there are no other visible forms of collective civic engagement.”

            Shelin says that this is “the Z sector in the provinces” and consists of people “acting on their own initiative and not by order from above.” In fact, “the regime does not encourage them particularly effectively or skillfully, and, for the most part, they do not hold the regime in any great affection.”

“It is here—not in the capitals or among the intelligentsia—that we see the first living shoots of a Russian political nation, whether we like what it looks like or not,” Shelin says, noting that “personally, I do not like them given their proto-fascist character and the lack of any real self-consciousness of themselves as a nation.”

“But it is precisely these forces that will emerge and claim the right to speak first once Putin is gone—when the screws are loosened, or perhaps even torn off entirely,” he concludes. And they will matter because “neither those who have emigrated nor the ‘interna’" émigrés pose any real competition to them.”

Thursday, November 5, 2026

Variations in Spending on Artificial Intelligence Deepening Gap Between Moscow and Federal Subjects, ‘Club of Regions’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 3 – The gap in incomes between Moscow, on the one hand, and the federal subjects beyond the ring road, on the other, continues to expand, the latest reason being the vastly different amounts of money being devoted to the development of artificial intelligence (AI) in the two places.

            Last year, the Club of Regions says, Russian spending on AI increased by 95 percent, but almost all of that went to Moscow where the largest businesses and government bureaucracies are located, leaving the regions ever further behind on  this metric (club-rf.ru/news/65522).

            Of the 176.1 billion rubles Russia spent on AI last year, only 14.3 billion – less than ten percent – was invested in the regions, the portal says, a figure that means they will fall even further behind the capital than they now are because of the increasing importance of this factor in development. 

            In some federal subjects such as Ingushetia and the Jewish Autonomous Region, spending on AI was less than one million rubles – about 13,000 US dollars – and in three – the Komi Republic, the Nenets AD and the Chukchi AD – there was no investment in AI at all during 2025. 

Having Suffered from Nuclear Explosions in Soviet Times, Sakha Banned Them Only to have Putin Cancel that Ban

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 3 – In the final decades of the Soviet Union, Moscow exploded 124 nuclear devices to help develop mines, change the course of rivers and create storage facilities for waste of various kinds. Sakha (Yakutia), the enormous republic in the Far East, was the site causof 12 of these.

            Unlike nuclear tests and accidents elsewhere, the Soviet authorities were able to throw a veil of secrecy over such tests in that distant republic, refusing to tell those near explosion sites what was going on or allowing local officials, scholars and activist to investigate and report on their consequences (kedr.media/stories/otecz-videl-belok-bez-meha/).

            In at least two cases, there were massive releases of radiation which left people ill and led to premature deaths, sparking protests when that became possible and prompting the Sakha parliament to adopt a law prohibiting nuclear explosions or even storage of nuclear waste on the territory of the republic.

            But in 2000, in the name of unifying the legal space of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin demanded that Sakha cancel that law and the Sakha authorities backed down. But as a new Kedr.Media investigation shows, people in that distant republic are still furious not only about the tests themselves and their consequences but also about Putin’s action.

            In many places, Estonia being the best known, protests about environmental depradations by Soviet officials led to protests which became political. Sakha is another such place, although just as its ethno-political protests were the first in the late Soviet period, predating even the 1986 clashes in Kazakhstan, they have been mostly overlocked.

            The new 3,000-word Kedr.Media article provides details about what happened in Sakha in this regard and thus allows that enormous but little known republic far from Moscow to take its place near the beginning of these processes, a fact that merits mention not only for  historical reasons but also for what may happen in the future.

Wednesday, November 4, 2026

Most Russians Believe They Can’t Influence Political Decisions, the Powerful Don’t care about Ordinary People, and that Moscow Tries to Solve Its Problems at Expense of the Regions, Club of the Regions Monitoring Finds

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 3 – Seventy-two percent of Russians believe “most citizens can’t influence political processes,” 64 percent say that “those in power don’t care about ordinary people,” and 47 percent believe that “the main thing for those in power in Moscow is to solve their problems at the expense of the regions,” Club of Regions monitoring finds.

            The survey, conducted last May but only just now reviewed by the Club of Regions portal, also found that only 23 percent of the population is satisfied with political arrangements in Russia, 47 percent say here are a lot of shortcomings but these must be dealt with gradually, and only 19 percent say there is a need for radical change immediately (club-rf.ru/news/65542).

            Forty-nine percent of Russians trust the Russian government, but 36 percent say they do not. As for the Duma, only 28 percent trust it while 53 percent do not. A pattern similar to that for the Duma exists regarding political parties, the media, banking and business, although support for Putin and the army is much higher, 72 percent and 69 percent respectively.

            Perhaps the most important finding of this monitoring, however, is to be found elsewhere: it calls into question “the widespread belief that support for the current government is higher among lower-income people” rather than those with enough money to meet all their needs. 38.5 percent of the latter back the current government, but only 13.6 percent of the former do.

Talk about Denunciations in Stalin’s Time and Now Effort by Kremlin to Shift Responsibility from Itself to the Population, Krivenko Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 3 – Mass denunciations in Stalin’s time and more recently are “a myth” disseminated by the authorities to shift responsibility from themselves and onto the population, according to Sergey Krivenko, a human rights activist who has specialized on the Great Terror.

            The numbers of denunciations Moscow claimed then and now were exaggerations, he says; and efforts by Stalin-era officials to get real numbers led them to report that there were only a handful compared to the number that the Stalinist media reported. Something similar is true now (semnasem.org/articles/2026/10/27/kak-rabotal-sovetskij-terror).

            Some Russians did and do denounce people either to get preferment from those above them or to get apartments freed up so that they could move in, Krivenko acknowledges; but the real number of denunciations then and now are far smaller than the authorities claim or report in stories about this phenomenon.

            It is long past time to recognize that the numbers circulating are made up and intended to suggest that the Russian people were behind repressive moves by the state, thereby legitimating what the state wanted to do and was prepared to release false numbers in the pursuit of its own goals. 

Past Territorial Concessions to Moscow in North ‘Not Set in Stone,’ Estonian Legal Specialist Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 2 – There are seven regions in the Baltic and Scandinavian regions where Russia has acquired territory or special rights on the basis of Cold War era agreements, Denis Polman points out, but because circumstances have changed, everyone needs to recognize that these earlier concessions are “not set in stone.”

            The seven are, the Estonian legal specialist says, Koenigsberg (Kaliningrad), Karelia, Porkkala, Hanko, the islands of the Gulf of Finland, Finland’s Aland Islands, and Norway’s Spitzbergen (Svalbard) (arvamus.postimees.ee/8575084/denis-polman-kellele-kuuluvad-konigsberg-ja-karjala  reposted at mariuver.eu/2026/11/02/komu-prinadlezhat-koningsberg-i-karelija/).

            These seven cases, Polman writes, share in the fact that they were the subjects of agreements with Moscow “when the balance of interests today is completely different from what it was in the middle of the 20th century.” Indeed, two of the territories, Hanko and Porkkala, have already been returned to their rightful owners.

            The others remain open, he continues. The Western powers transferred Koenisberg to Moscow’s control but only until a final peace treaty for World War II would be concluded, something that has not yet happened. Karelia was transferred to Russian control by a Finnish minister who was under Moscow’s influence, something that vitiates their legitimacy.

            And both Spitzbergen and the Aland Islands gave Russia special rights but only so long as Russia observed its obligations, something it has not done. Consequently, Polman says, all these places where Russia has control or exercises special rights need to be reexamined and possibly reversed by law rather than my any military action.

Tuesday, November 3, 2026

Surviving Soviet Mosaics Send Messages Fundamentally at Odds with Putinism, Shtepa Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 2 – Many of the mosaics which were installed at the end of Soviet times but continue to be maintained contain messages very much at odds with the ideology of Putinism, promoting as they do peace, internationalism, and the future rather than war, Russian nationalism, and the past, Vadim Shtepa says.

            The editor of the Tallinn-based Region.Expert portal says that in fact, many of the messages from the past which survive in these murals are so at odds with Putinism that their authors if they appeared now would be subject to criminal sanctions of one kind or another (arvamus.delfi.ee/artikkel/120621668/vadim-stepa-ei-sojale-maailmale-rahu-tanaseni-pusivad-noukogude-loosungid-arritavad-kremlit-taiega reposted at region.expert/mosaic/).

            Indeed, Shtepa continues, “inside Russia, it is absolutely impossible to create new mosaics on the topics of world peace, friendship of the peoples and a future in space now.” That has had an unanticipated result: many advocates of these things are now trying to restore the Soviet-era mosaics lest attention to such values disappear under Putin’s onslaught.

Telegram Channels Now Surpass TV as Source of News for Uzbeks, First All-Uzbekistan Study of Media Use Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 2 – A joint EU-Uzbekistan government study of media use in that Central Asian republic, the first all-Uzbekistan poll of its kind, finds that Uzbeks are now more likely to turn to telegram channels than to television for news but they are still far more likely to trust TV than either telegram channels or social media.

            According to the representative sample of 1440 Uzbeks, 66.2 percent of them turn to telegram channels, 44.6 percent to television, and 41.6 percent to social networks for news; but 44.3 percent trust TV while only11.3 percent trust telegram channels and only 7.4 percent news sites.

            (For the study as a whole in Uzbek, see https://massmedia.uz/oz/news/h2rdxffx-duacoky7-eedktvj9-nmcr-uzb; for a discussion of its findings in Russian, see podrobno.uz/cat/obchestvo/telegram-operedil-televidenie-po-populyarnosti-sredi-istochnikov-novostey-v-uzbekistane/.)

            Despite these low levels of trust, Uzbeks are active users of social networks and telegram channels, with 64.8 percent saying they use social networks regularly and 86.1 percent saying the turn to telegram channels. Television attracts fewer and radio broadcasts even less, with more than 70 percent of Uzbeks saying they don’t use it at all.

            The differences between younger and older Uzbeks, those living cities and those living in villages, and those more educated and less educated parallel findings of media consumption in other post-Soviet states.

Deforestation of Siberia to Sell Wood to China a Primary Driver of Bear Attacks, Environmental Activists Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 1 – In order to cut enough wood to sell to China, Russian officials have allowed lumber firms to clear cut far larger areas than can easily be reforested and that together with the impact of climate change and widespread distribution of photographs of bears on social media have stoked fears this year that Russia is facing an explosion of deadly bear attacks.

            That is the judgment of environmental activists east of the Urals who point to deforestation as a primary driver, experts in Moscow, and the natural resources ministry which says that Russians taking pictures of bears to share online is attracting more attention to the problem (currenttime.tv/a/medvedi-napadayut-na-lyudei-pochemu/33887431.html).

            In fact, the ministry says, the number of bear attacks has not gone up dramatically during the past season at least as compared to the last few years. But the fact that selling lumber to China is part of the cause may lead those much-photographed attacks to trigger a rise of political environmentalism in Russia east of the Urals.

            That is all the more likely to be true because it is now widely known that China itself has restricted deforestation within its borders but is all too happy to purchase wood harvested that way in Russia, something corrupt and/or greedy Russian officials are all to happy to accommodate Beijing’s growing demand for wood.

Kazakhstan and Russia Suffering Most Immediately from Declining Water Level of Caspian Sea

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 1 – Kazakhstan and Russia are suffering the most from declining water levels on the Caspian Sea because, while the surface of the sea has falling relative to sea level by almost exactly the same amount everywhere, the depth of the sea is far lower in the ports and sea lane in the waters off those two countries than elsewhere.

            All of Kazakhstan’s ports and sea lanes require constant and expensive dredging to keep them open. In the case of the Russian Federation, the major port at Astrakhan and sea lanes leading from it are now at risk as well, although Moscow can and does have a better option in the case of Makhachkala (casp-geo.ru/v-kazahstane-iz-za-snizheniya-urovnya-vody-v-severnom-kaspii-poyavilis-novye-ostrova/).

            There, the decline in the depth of the sea is less; and that may be one of the reasons why Moscow relocated the main base of its Caspian Flotilla there from Astrkhan, although that highlights the problems the Russian navy will have if it seeks to move ships from the Caspian via the Volga-Don canal to waters off Ukraine.

            Russia also faces the problems arising from the fact that Dagestan, the most Muslim of all the federal subjects of the Russian Federation, is also one of the most restive, raising questions about security in the sea lanes and ports there and in transit across that region northward into Russia proper.

            The three other Caspian littoral states – Azerbaijan, Iran and Turkmenistan – also face problems with siltification, but these threats are longer term, and the three countries have more time to address the situation. There, the shallowing of the Caspian in the north makes them relatively more important transportation routes.

Beria, Stalin’s Notorious Secret Police Chief, Making a Comeback in Putin’s Russia

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 29 – The city of Cherepovets has proposed and Vologda governor Georgy Filimonov has promised to consider the creation of a mural showing among others Lavrenty Beria, Stalin’s notorious secret police chief who was arrested and shot by Stalin’s successors.

            Filimonov praised Beria as “an outstanding historical figure” but said that the decision about whether to have a mural memorializing him would be made next year not now (ru.thebarentsobserver.com/novosti/v-cerepovce-hotat-narisovat-mural-s-dzerzinskim-i-beriej/460527).

            Opponents of the idea point out that the Russian Supreme Court has ruled that Beria is among those not subject to rehabilitation for his crimes and that putting up his picture as a hero is an insult to his victims and a threat to the future of the country. But they are likely to be ignored.

            On the one hand, Putin is pushing the idea of a single stream of Russian history and cherry picking from the lives of past figures positive developments while ignoring their crimes. And on the other, the Kremlin dictator is known to be an admirer of Beria (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/07/putin-admires-beria-one-of-stalins-most.html).

            Efforts like those of Cherpovets to memorialize Beria raises a larger question: where will the rehabilitation of those guilty of the crimes of the Stalin era and other periods of Russian history stop. If a mural featuring Beria does go up, there would seem to be little possibility those who want to memorialize other notorious figures will not try to do the same.

Sunday, November 1, 2026

With All the Money Going to Putin’s War, Cancer Treatment Collapsing across Russia

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 1 – To finance his war in Ukraine, Putin has cut back on healthcare in general and in cancer care in particular, with the latest budget figures showing that Moscow will spend 91 percent less on cancer diagnosis and treatment in 2027 than it did in 2026, with most of the cutbacks hitting not Moscow and St. Petersburg but the poorest federal subjects.

            In many federal subjects, Russian experts say, there are few oncologists and only 10 to 14 percent of any of the recommended anti-concern drugs. In 15 of the 48 federal subjects the National Institute of Cancer monitors, cancer screening does not meet government requirements (currenttime.tv/a/rossiyskie-regioni-massovo-urezayut-rashody-meditsina/33885002.html).

            As a result, patients can’t get the drugs they need even if they have their own funds; and some of them, the Russian Movement against Cancer says, are simply removed by officials from expensive therapies because the medical system doesn’t allocate enough to pay for what they need. The result is brutal: all of them suffer and many of them die prematurely.

            Many observers focus on the combat losses of the Russian military in Ukraine as the best measure of the suffering Russians are undergoing because of Putin’s war; but those suffering and dying from the lack of necessary cancer treatments are just as much losses that must be laid at his door.

Ukraine’s Attacks on Russian Shipping via Black Sea Creating Cascading Problems for Moscow

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 1 – Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian ships on the Black Sea have forced Moscow to reroute its exports of grain eastward to the Caspian and northward to the Baltic and Arctic seas, an exercise that has highlighted serious bottlenecks in both places that are restricting the export of Russian grain.

            Not only has the redirection of grain shipments overloaded Russian railroads and the capacity of the Volga-Don canal to carry cargo in these new directions, but it has highlighted the fact that most of the ports Moscow wants to use as alternatives lack the onloading equipment needed to function (istories.media/news/2026/11/01/rossiya-perevozit-zerno-cherez-arktiku-i-kaspiiskoe-more-iz-za-obstrelov-v-chernom-more/).

            As a result, Russian shipping companies say, these routes will not be able to compensate for much of the export volume lost with the closure of the Black Sea routes, where shipping has declined and the costs of using what remains have risen dramatically, another example of the ways in which Ukraine has achieved more against Russia than many think.

Death of Aral Sea has Left ‘a Toxic Desert’ Behind

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 1 – The death of the Aral Sea has created “a toxic desert” from which more than 100 million tons of dust are spreading to neighboring countries and causing illness and death, according to the United Nations body responsible for tracking desertification and responding to this threat.

            Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are seeking to remedy the situation by planting trees to hold the former seabed in place, and the other Central Asian countries have started monitoring programs. But these efforts have done remarkably little to reduce the dust, much of it extremely toxic, from spreading with the winds (centrasia.org/news.php?st=1793469240).

            The spread of this dust has not only harmed people living nearby but also fallen on glaciers in the mountains of the region and reduced their reflection of the light and heat of the sun. As a result, the glaciers are melting more rapidly, exacerbating the shortages of water that the original death of the Aral signaled in the first place.

            The impact of this echo of the death of the Aral is important both in its own right given the problems it is creating for the Central Asian region and for what it means elsewhere around the world where lakes and seas are drying up. Soon, others, like the Caspian, will also be the source of such dust flows and thus creating similar or even larger problems than the Aral has. 

Saturday, October 31, 2026

FSB Now ‘Main Operator’ of Repressive Policy and Its Focus has Shifted from the Capitals to the Russian Periphery and Occupied Territories, ‘Re-Russia’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 30 – The Judicial Department of the Russian Supreme Court has restricted its release of details about politically sensitive cases but the Re-Russia portal has examined the data available and has concluded that the FSB is now in charge of repression and its focus has shifted from the capitals to the Russian periphery and occupied Ukrainian territories.

            While many observers have concluded that the number of politically motivated cases was roughly the same in 2025 as in 2024, the Re-Russia portal says that its own figures show that there was a rise of about 70 percent, most of which can outside of the capitals of Russia and within occupied Ukraine (re-russia.net/analytics/0467/).

            Growth in the number of politically sensitive cases in those two areas reflects the FSB’s decision to focus on occupied areas of Ukraine in order to support the Russian war effort there and on regions and republics far from Moscow which it had ignored earlier but where other forms of political actions are now on the rise. 

After Protests Brought Arrests, Azerbaijanis who Support Right to Wear the Hijab have Shifted How They are Resisting with Some Teaching Their Daughters at Home, Activists Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 30 – In early October, the Azerbaijani authorities insisted that pupils and teachers in state schools could no longer wear the hijab because in their view that represents a threat to the secular nature of the Azerbaijani system. Such protests have stopped but resistance is continuing, with some families pulling their daughters out of school, Kavkaz-Uzel reports.

            That resistance underscores just how committed many Azerbaijani parents are to having their daughters wear the hijab and how much anger the decision of the authorities have stirred up (kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/427925; for background on these protests, see jamestown.org/bakus-hijab-ban-sparks-protests-in-azerbaijan-and-creates-problems-with-turkiye/).

            While parents can pull their children out of school as long as they provide alternative instruction in private schools or at home, teachers who wanted to wear the hijab have no such fall back position: they must either give in to the official rules or face dismissal from their jobs, something that appears to be happening in an increasing number of cases.

            What makes this worrisome is that many of these parents may be far more inclined to listen to and even follow underground religious leaders who defend what the parents want but who have even larger agendas regarding secular Azerbaijan. To the extent that happens, what may seem to some like a tempest in a teapot may become something far larger in the future.