Moscow’s Compatriots Program Unintentionally Leading to Formation and Growth of Ethnic Enclaves in Russian Federation

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 21 – Twenty years ago this month, Putin established a program for the resettlement of ethnic Russians and other Russian speakers in the Russian Federation. As a result, 1.2 million people have arrived, but many aren’t ethnic Russians – and they are now contributing to the rise of ethnic enclaves, critics of the program say.

            The program was adopted in 2006 in order to compensate for the demographic decline of ethnic Russians in the first decade of this century after the relatively large-scal returns of ethnic Russians from the former Soviet space had ended in the decade before  (ritmeurasia.ru/news--2026-06-21--20-let-programme-pereselenija-sootechestvennikov-naskolko-ona-okazalas-effektivnoj-88501).

            But it has not worked entirely as intended, Rhythm of Eurasia says. The overwhelming majority of ethnic Russians who lived in the other Soviet republics in 1989 still live in what are now independent countries, and Moscow’s efforts to have them specifically return have been far less successful in percentage terms than have Astana’s to facilitate the return of ethnic Kazakhs.

            Most of the returnees are from five republics of the former USSR, the portal says, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Armenia. The inclusion of Tajikistan and Armenia on this list highlights something Moscow prefers to ignore: a large share of the compatriots returning to Russia aren’t ethnic Russians.

            There were only 68,200 ethnic Russians in Tajikistan in 2000 and only 14,600 ethnic Russians in Armenia in 2001. Consequently, “the intake from these countries could only occur through the participation of representatives of their titular ethnoses,” Tajiks and Armenians, something that has led to the appearance of growth of enclaves in Russia.

            Equally serious is the fact that the compatriots program which has been promoted as a way to increase the share of ethnic Russians in the Russian Federation population or at least limit the decline of this metric is not having the intended effect but instead is contributing on its own to the mounting migration crisis there. 

Northern Sea Route Development Experiencing Delays and Cost Overruns Because of Shortages of Skilled Workers and Attempts to Attract Them with High Salaries

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 21 – Russia’s much-ballyhooed Northern Sea Route is currently facing serious shortages of skilled workers needed to complete development projects on land. To try to attract more workers, companies are increasing the salaries they are prepared to pay; but that is creating another problem: pushing up costs at a time of budgetary stringency.

            According to Maksim Maksimov, an expert consultant for the Russian North television channel based in Vologda, shortages of personnel is “one of the key systemic problems in the development of the Norther Sea Route” and one that the project has not been able to overcome (caspian.land/37380-severnomu-morskomu-puti-nuzhny-kvalificirovannye-kadry.html).

            Attempts by the companies involved to lure specialists from other places by offering high salaries has created another problem: the costs of these projects increase dramatically, something that makes them targets for cutbacks by a government that is facing budgetary restrictions due to the growing costs of Putin’s expanded war in Ukraine.

            Consequently, higher salaries are at best a stopgap and may end by forcing Moscow to cancel projects because they have become too expensive to finance at the present time. 

Popularity of Conspiracy Theories about Demise of USSR Intended to Distract Attention from Real Causes, Tsipko Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 22 – Conspiracy theories about the demise of the USSR, associated in the first instance with publicist Yevgeny Spitsyn, are intended to distract attention from the real causes of that event – the way Lenin reassembled the empire after 1918, the way Stalin repressed the population, and the way Russian nationalism undermined the USSR, Aleksandr Tsipko says.

            In a 5,000-word article in which he details the numerous mistakes and misinterpretations Spitsyn and his ilk make, the senior Russian social scientist and commentator makes a large number of points based on his reading of history and on his own experience near the center of power in Gorbachev’s time (ng.ru/ideas/2026-06-22/6_9521_ussr.html).

            But his arguments about the real reasons for the disintegration of the USSR in 1991 are especially important, particularly because all three of them are not only ignored by the conspiracy theorists but also are at odds with the ideological pronouncements of Putin and supporters of his regime.

            First, Tsipko says, one must keep in mind that Russia was reassembled by Lenin in 1918-1921 not as a voluntary union of republics but by military force. It was never the free union of peoples that Soviet leaders insisted and that Putin and company continue to insist existed. Consequently, when the center weakened, the country Lenin established began to fall apart.

            Second, he continues, Stalin was never the hero for most Soviets. Instead,  he was recognized as a brutal dictator from which not only the population of the USSR wanted to escape but also from which the leaders of the CPSU wanted to do as well. Any attempt to restore Stalinism, therefore, will only increase opposition and fissiparousness as it did in 1991.

            And third – and this is Tsipko’s key point, one especially important because it is typically ignored – the USSR “was destroyed in 1991 above all by the ethnic Russians and became a victim of Great Russian separatism” (stress supplied), with Boris Yeltsin playing the key role but others like Aleksandr Yakovlev who earlier warned about this doing so as well.

            According to Tsipko, it was Yeltsin’s drive in 1990 to have the RSFSR declare its laws rather than those of the USSR dominant on its territory that was the proximate cause of the demise of the Soviet state; but it was efforts by Yakovlev and others to boost the study of pre-revolutionary Russia that also contributed to the USSR’s collapse.

            The senior Russian commentator says “we must always bear in mind what Nicholas Berdyaev said about the mystery of Russianness,” specifically his argument that the Russian people made great sacrifices to create the Russian state … but remained without power over their own vast realm.”

            “Imperialism, in the Western and bourgeois sense of the word, is alien to the Russian people and yet they have submissively devoted their energies to building an imperialism in which they were not committed or beneficiaries. Herein,” Berdyaev wrote, “lies the mystery of Russian history and the Russian soul.            “

Kremlin will Use Indebtedness of Russia’s Federal Subjects to Impose Even Tighter Central Control, Economist Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 20 – The increasingly hard-pressed federal subjects of the Russian Federation are now forced to cut costs, but because of the absence of any law allowing them to go bankrupt, Moscow will ultimately have to bail them out, although such aid will come at the price of what is left of their autonomy, economist Dmitry Nekrasov says.

            Nekrasov, who now lives abroad and is part of the CASE network, says “the painful reduction in various expenditures at the regional level will continue, but on the other hand, it is clear that Moscow will intervene to solve these issues” (svoboda.org/a/bednye-stanut-bednee/33785267.html).

            Russia “doesn’t have a procedure for regional bankruptcies” and so when regional governments get in debt over their ability to cope, Moscow will have to take action – but that action will come at a high price in the ability of the regions involved to take any decisions on their own.

            Nekrasov suggests that this situation is “rather similar to what happened to Greece in the EU during the debt crisis” 15 years ago. The EU refused to allow Greece to default and provided  funds to ensure that that wouldn’t happen, but this money was given only on condition of “severe reductions” in Greek spending, something that infuriated Greeks and created other problems.

            The economist does not address the most extreme step Moscow might take: the amalgamation of the hardest hit regions with those doing somewhat better. Putin has long wanted to reduce the number of federal subjects; and the debt crisis in the federal subjects could very easily become the trigger to restore that process. 

Infertility Increasing and Affecting Ever Younger Russians, Experts Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 22 – In its drive to increase the birthrate of Russians, the Kremlin faces a many problems including on that is seldom discussed, that few of its programs address and that in at least one case make the problem even worse, according to Russian experts surveyed by Elena Rychkova of the Nakanune news agency. 

            Between 2023 and 2024, the number of cases of infertility diagnosed in Russia rose 5.5 percent to 245,800 women and 6.9 percent to 32,700 men, the result of both medical conditions and stress factors like fatigue, poor nutrition, and especially increases in the use of anti-depressants, medical researchers say (nakanune.ru/articles/124745/).

            Because these behavioral consequences are more often found in younger people than older cohorts, that has led to increases in infertility among both men and women at ever earlier ages, precisely the time when underlying medical conditions are typically the best for having children.

            Most government programs intended to boost the birthrate ignore these factors and instead relying on financial incentives and increasing opposition to abortion. While the former may help reduce stress, it isn’t explicitly intended to do so; and anti-abortion campaigns may increase stress and thus increase infertility.

            But the most important consequence of government policies in this area is the constant raising of the age that Moscow considers young. Now, it stands at 40. That is designed to ensure that couples who want to have children well into their 30s will not feel that they are taking a risk. But in fact, experts say, after 35, the physical condition of women leads to more infertility.

            That in turn means that talking about youth as extending to age 40 may lead some couples to delay trying to have children and those who do may find themselves less able to have them, something that will push down the fertility rate in the Russian Federation still further, exactly the reverse of what the Kremlin wants.  

Russia Media Losing Audiences as People are Tired of Bad News and as Aggregator Algorithms Expand, Commentator Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 22 – Russian media are losing their audiences for many of the same reasons that their counterparts in other countries are: people are tired of bad news and feel a sense of information overload and at the same time aggregator algorithms like Google are summarizing media products in ways that mean people don’t have to go to the originals.

            Such downward pressure is costing many media outlets their audiences even if such newspapers and websites are able to escape pressures to conform from the authorities, commentator Denis Yakovlev writes (mostmedia.org/ru/posts/novosti-bez-chitateley-pochemu-smi-terjajut-auditoriju-po-vsemu-miru-i-kak-eto-proishodit-v-rossii).

These two factors are hitting media at all levels in the Russian Federation. Between May 2025 and May 2026, Russians turned to internet media sites far less often. In Moscow, the decline was from 17.2 million users a month to only 12.3 million this May. At the regional and local level, the declines were even more precipitous, by almost 50 percent or even more.

Consequently, any analysis of the Russian media scene must recognize this and not ascribe them to Kremlin actions alone. Indeed, Yakovlev suggests, the impact of the popular desire to avoid bad news and the willingness of people to use aggregator summaries rather than go to originals may be even more important.

If these twin factors continue to operate, many of the media operations that now offer their own product will close regardless of whether the Kremlin seeks that outcome or not in an particular case; and the amount of genuinely produced news will decline perhaps even more than those around Putin in fact want. 

Andrey Danilov, ‘the Saami Navalny,’ Says Separatism is ‘Nonsense’ for His Nation but that It will Survive

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 19 – Andrey Danilov, known to his friends and supporters as “the Saami Navalny,” says that separatism is “nonsense” for his numerically small people in the Russian North – there are only about 1300 left there  --  but that his nation will survive because its members have their own strategy for dealing with the governments under which they live.

            That strategy, he says, combines a readiness to work with the governments on whose territory they live while simultaneously resisting attacks on their culture and language and withdrawing to the north when these states adopt aggressive strategies against them (nemoskva.net/2026/06/19/saami-my-est/).

            And they have the advantage, Danilov continues, in that there are Saami communities in Norway, Sweden and Finland, all of whom unlike Russia admitted guilt for their past genocidal policies and now actively support the Saami who live on their territories, including those like him who have fled there from Russia.

            He had been deputy chairman of the Saami Parliament of the Kola Peninsula in the Russian Federation before he fled from that country when Putin launched his expanded war in Ukraine in February 2022. Now he lives among Saami in Norway and continues to speak out in defense of  his nation.

            Of mixed ethnicity himself – his father is a Saami while his mother is an ethnic Russian – Danilov grew up at a time when few of his age cohort spoke the Saami language; and he admits that he still has to use a dictionary when he does because he has not yet mastered all the words he needs.

            According to the émigré activist, “the Saami are a semi-nomadic cross-border numerically small people who have an anthem and a flag but have never had their own statehood” or army. “Today, they live in four countries, who colonized their lands and forces the Saami to retreat northward when that was possible.                     

“In Norway, Sweden and Finland, the Sami parliaments have been working as official representative bodies of the indigenous people for several decades,” he continues. “They do not pass laws, but without their consent, no issue concerning language, culture, reindeer husbandry and other traditional crafts can be resolved.”

            That is what the Saami people inside Russia have sought to copy. They too created representative bodies, but those were first taken over and gutted by the Russian authorities and then suppressed altogether, although Danilov still refers t himself as the deputy chairman of their common parliament.

Ukraine’s Drone Attacks on Moscow Won’t have the Immediate Impact Many Expect, Pastukhov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 18 – Many in the West and in Ukraine and Russia as well “think that bombing Moscow is completely different from bombing Voronezh and that Muscovites will react differently and demand that Putin “immediately end the war, Vladimir Pastukhov says; but that is “nothing more than another illusion.”

            “Muscovites,” the London-based Russian analyst says, “are not separated from the rest of Russia by any ‘Chinese wall;” and they won’t act either more rapidly or more effectively to this challenge  (t.me/v_pastukhov/1931 reposted at /echofm.online/opinions/u-putina-na-novoj-stadii-agonii-est-vremya-vybrat).

            Pastukhov continues: “Most likely the reaction of society” – both in Moscow and in Russia as a whole – “will be slow.” Russians do on occasion, perhaps once every 150 years, rise in merciless revolt, “but that doesn’t happen in an empty place and certainly not because Moscow is bombed.”

            According to the Russian analyst, “the Russian historical clock” has returned to “somewhere either of 1855 or 1916: the tsarist armored train is still moving forward bugt the rails are slowly being dismantled and used for firewood … But for now, we are only talking about a delayed and not an immediate effect.”

            Consequently, Pastukhov concludes, “Putin at this new stage in the agony of his regime still has time to choose whether to follow the path of Nicholas I and go for a humiliating exit from Crimean War 2.0 or to following the path of Nicholas II, go all our and bring the country to the brink of a palace coup.”

Russian Economy ‘Doesn’t Need Universal Higher Education,’ Minister who Oversees Universities and Science Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 19 – The rising demand for university degrees by the population, Valery Falkov says, “does not align with the economy’s needs” and is something that is “neither good nor right,” and the balance between specialized secondary education and higher education must be reset.

            According to the minister for science and higher education, “the demand for higher education that has built up over decades” means that today “practically every high school graduate” in Russia wants to go on to university. That must change and Moscow is taking steps to do so (novayagazeta.eu/articles/2026/06/19/rossii-ne-nuzhno-mnogo-liudei-s-vysshim-obrazovaniem-zaiavil-glava-minobrnauki-news).

            In reporting the minister’s words, Novaya Gazeta Europe points to the reduction in government funded slots and even the size of fee-paying students, increases in tuition this year with plans for more in the years ahead, tracking both pupils and students into the military for service in Ukraine, and restrictions on contacts with universities and scholars abroad.

            It is certainly true that Russia like many other countries needs the kind of skills that secondary schools can and in many cases do teach, such restrictions on higher education will inevitably mean that the chances for the scientific breakthroughs that all countries want will be especially limited in places like Russia.

            In the short term, this cutback in access to higher education will infuriate many Russians who had hoped that a higher education would give their children a greater chance for upward social mobility and thus the restriction of such chances will become yet another reason for an increasing number of Russians to be angry with the current regime.  

            

Moscow’s Violation of Rights of Indigenous Peoples ‘Systemic in Nature,’ New ‘Arctida’ Study Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 18 – Moscow’s violations of the rights of indigenous peoples is “systemic in nature,” according to a new study by the Arctida group, the first Russian NGO devoted to examining the situation in the Far North that was established in 2022 but then declared by Moscow to be “an undesirable organization” earlier this year.

            The 106-page study focused on six cases of the ways in which Moscow’s drive to develop the North has run roughshod over the rights of the peoples of the North and even threaten their survival. (The full text of this study is available at cdn.sanity.io/files/tsza235h/production/b821a512c1f38ecffb2b54133b74d3fe34bf5735.pdf).

            Its overarching conclusion is that “the violation of Indigenous peoples' rights in the Russian Arctic is systemic in nature, stemming not merely from isolated incidents but from the very structure of the prevailing regulatory and institutional framework” in the Russian Federatin at the present time.

“Under this framework,’ the study says, “indigenous peoples and communities bear the primary social, environmental, and territorial costs of resource development, yet lack commensurate influence over decision-making processes” with consultations mainly for show and often with government controlled GONGOs rather than the peoples themselves.

The Arctida report urges that Moscow’s approach must be changed, made transparent and involve representatives of the population at every stage of projects as participants rather than obstacles or objects of state action. Otherwise, the future of the numerically small peoples of the North is going to be grim indeed.

Kadyrov Treats Russians Far More Tolerantly than He Does Chechens, Pleasing Moscow but Alienating His Own People, ‘NeMoskva’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 18 – Ramzan Kadyrov has treated Chechens far less well than he has ethnic Russians and others who arrive to work with his regime, a policy that undoubtedly plays well in Moscow but that is infuriating and even alienating the titular nationality of his republic, Beka Atsayev says.

            This situation has reached the point, the NeMoskva journalist argues, that it is now possible to speak of “Two Chechnyas,” the one, mostly ethnic Russian or part of his government, that is loyal to Kadyrov and Moscow and the second, overwhelmingly Chechen, that increasing despises both (nemoskva.net/2026/06/18/dve-chechni/).

            The two exist in what can be described as “parallel realities,” an extreme form of what may exist in other non-Russian republics of the Russian Federation but one because of Chechnya’s past that that is making each more contemptuous of the other and leading the Kadyrov-Russian one to become ever more repressive, thus likely sparking an explosion.

            Among the manifestations of this division, Atsayev points to the fact that “non-Chechen citizens of the republic have the right to express disagreement with the decisions of the powers without repression following” while Chechens who dissent are immediately suppressed often in the harshest possible ways.

            Other examples he cites include the fact that Chechen police know not to issue tickets to Russian drivers for offenses that they would give citations to Chechen ones and the division of the prison system in Chechnya between facilities for Russians and facilities for Chechens, a kind of “segregation” that is seeping into ever more segments of life there.

            This may please Moscow in the short term, given its pro-Russian position, but it is an approach likely to so deepen divisions between Russians and Chechens that when there is an inevitable weakening of central power, the Chechens will increasingly act in an anti-Russian fashion, at least in part because of what Kadyrov is doing that the center welcomes now.         

            Despite its ethnic Chechen face, it is increasingly the case that the Kadyrov regime, despite is ethnic Chechen face, now appears to other Chechens as nothing more than an occupying force, a group of compradors who have sold out to Moscow – and in the future, that sense is likely to trigger exactly the kind of explosion Moscow installed Kadyrov to prevent.

Russia May Never See Another Upward Wave of Demographic Growth, Academy of Sciences Scholar Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 17 – In the Putin years as in Soviet times, Moscow officials have suggested that any downturn in the numbere of births reflects first and foremost a decline in the number of potential mothers, echoes of the far fewer women born during World War II, and suggested that when they are replaced by a more numerous successor there will be more babies.

            There is some truth in that but it is one that is declining as waves in the number of potential mothers have declined in size both upward and downward and as both have been overwhelmed by a decline in fertility rates as a result of modernization and urbanization, a reality Russian scholars have increasingly pointed out but been ignored by officials.

            Now, in a new study, Oleg Rybakovsky of the Federal Research Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences argues that Russia may never have a new upward wave both because the amplitude of the waves in both directions is falling in size and fertility rates are declining for secular reasons and that current policies aren’t compensating for this fact.

            In the latest issue of Population Studies, the demographer at the FRC’s Institute of Socio-Economic Population Problems, he traces what has happened over the last 25 years – the period of Putin’s rule – and shows Moscwo has failed to see this and adopt policies that reflect this reality (narodonaselenie-journal.ru/index.php/population/article/view/11060/10724).

            In a discussion of Rybakovsky’s article, Nakanune journalist Yevgeny Chernyshov argues that this reflets a more general problem: the current regime doesn’t want to be guided by reality but instead acts on the basis of its own convictions many of which no longer correspond to what is actually going on (nakanune.ru/articles/124763/).

More than 40 Circassian Organizations in Turkey Protest Plans to Strip KBR Constitution of Provisions on Defense of that Republic’s Borders

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 17 – In Kabardino-Balkaria, local activists, most Kabards, a branch of the Circassian nation, have come out against the plans of officials there to strip their republic’s constitution of provisions that give the republic and its people the right to oppose any change in that federal subject (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2026/06/leading-opposition-figures-in-kabardino.html).

            They have now been joined in this protest by the leaders of more than 40 Circassian organizations in Turkey, something that has transformed a domestic problem into an international one for Moscow (zapravakbr.ru/ne-dopustit-peresmotra-klyuchevykh-osn/ and zapravakbr.ru/sorok-odna-kavkazskaya-obshchestvennaya-organizatsiya-turtsii-obratilas-k-rukovodstvu-i-parlamentu-kbr/).

            No non-Russian nation within the Russian Federation has more of its members living abroad than the Circassians – some seven million in all and more than half of those in Turkey – and consequently what Moscow does to the Circassians living inside the Russian Federation – about 700,000 – has an outsized influence.

            But more important, this foreign base of support gives Circassians within the Russian Federation a far greater ability to defend themselves and advance their cause and is one reason why the Circassian nation may be one of the first to escape Moscow’s control as the disintegration of Russia continues.

            For a discussion of that possibility, see this author’s argument at windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/12/circassians-have-chance-to-lead-coming.html.

Putin’s ‘Turn to the East’ has Not Overcome the Divide between the More Prosperous Western Portion of Russia and the More Depressed Eastern One, Academy of Sciences Study Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 17 – In a new 405-page report, the Moscow Institute of Economic Prognostication says that Putin’s turn to the east has now narrowed the gap between the more prosperous western portion of the Russian Federation and the depressed eastern one as many had expected but in fact deepened that divide.

            The study details why this is so, largely the product of inertia, a decline in the size of federal funds deployed from Moscow to the regions, and Putin’s war in Ukraine which has boosted the defense industries in the west while sanctions have cut exports from the east (ecfor.ru/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/denezhno-kreditnaya-i-byudzhetnaya-politika-vzaimodejstvie.pdf).

            In discussing this report, Tatyana Rybakova of the NeMoskva portal says that “the deepening division of the economy of the country may lead to a situation in which we will have a successful west and a depressed east, especially in the case of the end of the war and the renewal of ties with Europe (nemoskva.net/2026/06/17/kuda-idut-dengi/).

            If that happens, something that seems inevitable unless Moscow changes course, she continues, “the talk about the disintegration of Russia will cease to be theoretical,”  driven by  this economic divide rather than the nationalisms of the non-Russian peoples that are usually seen as the cause. 

Many Countries Became Stronger after Defeats and Weaker after Victories and Russian has and Can Again Do So, Russian Blogger Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 18 – Russians must recognize that the claims the Putin regime and z bloggers are making are fundamentally wrong and that “anyone who wants a good future for Russia should not only wish for its speedy military defeat but also do whatever he or she can to ensure that outcome,” Dmitry Chernyshov says.

            Many countries, including Russia, “have become stronger after defeats and weaker after victories, the blogger writes on his Facebook account in words that have been picked up by EchoFM (echofm.online/opinions/mnogie-strany-stanovilis-silnee-posle-porazhenij-i-slabee-posle-pobed).

            Those who know the history of Russia and other countries already know this, Chernyshov continues; but those who don’t need to overcome the propaganda messages from the Kremlin and its allies.  Seeing how wrong three claims these sources routinely make is a first step in that direction.

            First of all, Russians must see that those who say that whether what Putin is doing in Ukraine is right or wrong, it is still their country. But it isn’t, the blogger says. “It is a country of chekists and bandits, not yours … nothing depends on you and you cannot choose or change power.”

            Second, Russians must reject the idea that since the war has started, it must be won. “Who told you such nonsense?” Don’t you see how much the war has cost in blood and treasure and that “by supporting the war, you become its accomplices?” That has to be recognized and acted upon.

            And third, following from that, Russians must see how absurd it is to say that one mustn’t change horses or leaders in the middle of things. That is precisely when you have to change horses/leaders if you want to change direction. Russians must thus stop equating the country and the state. “These are different things.

It is time to “understand that only defeat gives hope for changes in the country. The country will not cease to exist, but the power of the Chekists and bandits can.” And history shows that matters: “After the defeat in the First Crimean War, serfdom was abolished in Russia.”

With “a defeat in the Second Crimean War, there is a chance that the serfdom [Putin has put back in place] can be ended as well.

That Russia can benefit from defeat is something opposition politicians and commutators have been talking about for some time. Chernyshov’s post is an example of how their more abstruse discussions are coming down to the popular level and is thus particularly important for that reason.

Putin Regime Now Views Those It Persecutes ‘Not as Ordinary Criminals but as Enemies of the State’ and Punishes Them Accordingly, Memorial Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 17 – Since Putin launched his expanded war against Ukraine in 2022, the Russian authorities have changed the way they view anyone who opposes them. Such people, the regime now views “not as ordinary criminals but as enemies of the state” who must be opposed with ever more severe punishment so as to intimidate the rest of the population, Memorial says.

            According to the human rights organization, those being “persecuted for political reasons” are being given sentences almost twice as long as was the case for the same actions in 2021, 11 years behind bars rather than six years, seven months and not let off with fines or suspended sentences (memopzk.org/analytics/vragi-a-ne-prestupniki).

            The war in Ukraine contributed to this development in two ways, the organization says. On the one hand, the authorities faced more opposition; and on the other, “the war unleashed the authorities and allowed them to increase control over society with minimal costs to themselves. This combination could not but lead to increased political repression.”

             A key aspect of this trend is that the powers that be in Moscow have decided that they can achieve their goals of intimidation not by radically increasing the number of people put behind bars, although that has risen, but rather by acting “as cruelly and demonstratively as possible,” so that those not yet attacked will decide not to continue their opposition.

            To that end, Moscow has increased the number of laws governing political cases and increasingly used others in an expansive way so as to be able to act unexpectedly and then viciously against opponents. Moreover, prosecutors have added to the number of charges any individual may face and imposing harsher sentences for the same ones as well.

            Memorial concludes its report with the following observation: “It is important to note that court sentences are only part of the activity of the repressive machine, the most noticeable and officially recorded. Other instruments of repression are more bleak and more hidden from public attention.”

Veterans Groups Becoming Shock Troops for Putin’s Whitewashing of Stalin’s Crimes

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 17 – The impact on Russian life of the returning veterans of Putin’s war in Ukraine has attracted a great deal of attention, but one aspect of this influence is only now emerging as especially important: the way in which these veterans are helping the Kremlin dictator to whitewash the crimes of Stalin.

            It is now being widely reported that a memorial in Vorkuta to victims of Stalin’s GULAG was demolished by local officials “at the request of veterans of the special military operation” who objected to the fact that among the 33 prisoners named there were several who had participated in resistance to the restoration of Soviet power in Ukraine.

            On this, see nemoskva.net/2026/06/17/v-vorkute-po-prosbe-veterana-svo-demontirovali-pamyatnik-pogibshim-v-gulage/, ru.thebarentsobserver.com/novosti/v-vorkute-po-trebovaniu-ucastnikov-svo-demontirovali-pamatnik-zertvam-gulaga/452671 and svoboda.org/a/v-vorkute-demontirovali-pamyatnyy-znak-zaklyuchyonnym-gulaga/33782984.html.

            This situation might be dismissed as a special case in that it involved the issue of memorializing in the Russian Federation Ukrainians who had resisted Stalin, but the fact that the objection was a collective one by veterans of Putin’s war and was responded to positively by local officials strongly suggests that it is the opening salvo in a much larger operation.

            To the extent that is so, the most serious impact of returning veterans may not be their contribution to a rise in crime or to the formation of paramilitary support groups for the Russian Community by as adjuncts in Putin’s efforts to whitewash the crimes of Stalin and thus make it even easier for him to restore a totalitarian system.

90 Percent of Russians Say They’d Back Law against Domestic Violence Something Putin Did Away with in Name of Traditional Values

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 17 – A new poll by the Russian Field organization is important in its own right and also for highlighting something that is even more important. Despite Kremlin hype, Russians are far less enamored by the idea of traditional Russian values that Putin promotes and the actions he takes to promote those values.

            The new poll shows that 90 percent of Russians surveyed say they would support a law in Russia providing punishment for those who engage in violence within families (russianfield.com/protivnasiliya and novayagazeta.eu/articles/2026/06/17/90-rossiian-podderzhalo-by-poiavlenie-zakona-o-domashnem-nasilii-russian-field-news).

            Given the rising tide of violence against women and children by family members in the Russian Federation today (t.me/novaya_europe/62044 and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2026/05/feminist-anti-war-resistance-documents.html), this is a welcome sign that Russians are horrified by that trend and want to see something done about it.

            But it is more than that: it is a vote against the Putin regime’s policies in this area. Until 2017, Russia had laws against violence in the home; but in that year and with the support of the Moscow Patriarchate and in the name of promoting traditional values, the Kremlin leader decriminalized such attacks.

            In the years before Putin launched his expanded war against Ukraine, various commentators, activists and Duma members called for new laws against domestic violence, but these efforts failed because of opposition from the Orthodox Church and the Kremlin. Last year, the Russian government reiterated its opposition to such a law.

Moscow Hopeful UN will Soon Approve Its Claims to Enormous Segment of Arctic Shelf

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 15 – Aleksandr Alimov, Russian deputy foreign minister, says that he believes there are “good prospects” that the United Nations will soon recognize Russian claims to extended boundaries of its continental shelf in the Arctic, an action that would dramatically change the geo-economics and geo-politics of the northern polar region.

            Alimov says that “our submission [regarding Arctic shelf boundaries] is currently under review, and the outlook [that the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf to extend Russian control beyond the 200-nautical mile zone] is promising” (ria.ru/20260615/arktika-2098925848.html and arctic.ru/20260616/1537774.html).

            If the Russian diplomat is correct, that would bring to an end of 25-year-long effort by Moscow to gain such recognition and give the Kremlin an enormous victory because it would give the Russian authorities the whip hand in dealing with development of mineral resources and the passage of ships in the region.

            Shortly after Putin became Russian president, Moscow submitted such a claim; but it was rejected by the UN authorities because it lacked the needed topographic studies and maps. In 2015, it submitted a revised shelf claim, expanding Russia’s claims by nearly 1.2 million saquare kilometers (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/08/moscow-again-makes-expansive-claims-to.html).

            Other Arctic powers objected, although the US, which has never ratified the Law of the Sea Treaty, has had limited influence on this  situation. But in 2022, in the wake of Putin’s launch of his expanded war in Ukraine and the collapse of the Arctic Council, the possibility of approval appeared dead in the water (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2022/12/moscows-pursuit-of-international.html).

            Moscow has been furious about the delays in approving its claims, and some Russian analysts have suggested that the Kremlin should act unilaterally if the UN doesn’t approve its claims  (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2020/11/moscow-should-act-unilaterally-if-un.html).

            Now, however, Alimov’s upbeat interview suggests that Moscow thinks it is going to achieve what it has long sought and get the UN to go along. If so, that would give the Kremin an enormous victory at a time when it is in retreat on a variety of fronts and open the way for Russia, with China in support, to dominate the Arctic in the coming decades. 

In a Continuing Act of Genocide, Russia has Been Attacking Ukrainian Cultural Sites since 2014

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 15 – People and officials around the world have been shocked and outraged by Moscow’s attack on the Kyiv-Pechorsk Lavra church center in the Ukrainian capital, but many of them have failed to recognize that this barbaric act is not something new but rather continues a policy Russian forces have been pursuing not just since 2022 but since 2014.

            Yegor Mostovshchinkov, an independent journalist who is preparing a book on this subject, says that Moscow has been “waging a systematic war on Ukraine’s cultural heritage since 2014, destroying monuments, museums and churches” and taking “more than 1.7 million cultural exhibits” to Russia (novayagazeta.eu/articles/2026/06/15/rossiiskaia-armiia-nanosit-udary-po-ukrainskomu-kulturnomu-naslediiu).

            Ukraine’s culture ministry says that “Russia has destroyed 1783 cultural heritage sites and 2540 cultural infrastructure sites throughout the country, including cultural centers, libraries, art schools, museums, galleries, theaters, and music centers; and Mission Eurasia reports Russian forces have damaged or destroyed at least 737 churches.”

            Such Russian actions, obviously intended to destroy the culture of the Ukrainian people fall well within the internationally accepted definition of acts of genocide and are in sharp contract to Ukrainian actions which are directed exclusively at infrastructure and individuals involved in making war on Ukraine.

            As welcome as outrage about the Russian attacks on the Kyiv-Pechorsk Lavra are,  all people of good will need to recognize that what Moscow has done there is part of a broader policy of genocide against Ukrainians and do what they can to ensure that those responsible, from Putin on down, are brought to trial in international courts for this and other crimes.

Central Asian Populations Continue to Look to Russia Because of Transfer Payments but Governments and Business Increasingly Look to China because of Beijing’s Investments

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 14 – According to the Eurasian Development Bank, China has surpassed Russia and become the largest direct foreign investor in the countries of Central Asia; and as a result, businesses and governments increasingly look to China rather than Russia.

            But at the same time, the importance of transfer payments home by Central Asian migrant workers who remain several orders of magnitude greater in the Russian Federation than they are in China mean that in many of these countries the population and especially its poorer rural segment continue to look to Moscow.

            Consequently, experts in the region say, the shift to China by Central Asians is often overstated both in the Central Asian media and beyond because the existence of the migrant worker factor remains extremely important even as Russian direct investment falls (svoboda.org/a/biznes-estj-biznes-kitay-obgonyaet-rossiyu-v-tsentraljnoy-azii/33777438.html).

            This has a large number of consequences in the politics of the Central Asian countries, but two are especially noteworthy. One the one hand, because migrant workers and their transfer payments are so important, the shift from Russia to China as the dominant foreign direct investor remains less than many have suggested.

            And on the other, if Moscow does reduce the number of migrant workers from Central Asia in Russia dramatically as some in the Russian capital would like to do, that could change this equation and lead to a far more dramatic turn in the policies of Central Asian countries away from Russia and toward China.

            Concern about that possibility is thus likely to be part of Moscow’s calculus on just how many Central Asian migrant workers to allow into the Russian Federation. If the Russian government reduces that number too fast or if it shows itself too hostile to such people, Moscow would almost instantly see its influence in Central Asia decline and that of China rise.

Kamchatka Meeting on Demography in Russian Far East Highlights Two Changes in Moscow’s Approach

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 15 – A meeting in Kamchatka on the demographic development of the Russian Far East over the next decade highlights two important shifts in Moscow’s approach to that sector, a greater focus on promoting more children in families which already have several and on the federal districts rather than Russia as a whole in designing demographic policies.

            Until recently, the Russian government has devoted most of its attention to getting marriage pairs to have children rather than on those with several children to have even more, but now, having discovered that it is easier to get a family with three children to have a fourth, it has been changing its focus.

            That is certainly the message the Ninth All-Russian Conference on Demographic Development of the Far East sends. Speakers there talked about increasing family size not from zero to one or two but rather from two and three children to four or more (eastrussia.ru/news/na-kamchatke-obsudili-demograficheskuyu-strategiyu-dfo-do-2036-goda/).

            As the participants at this meeting noted, that is what is happening not just in the Russian Far East but in the Russian Federation as a whole, a shift that means some of the financial incentives that Moscow has come up with in the past haven’t been as effective as the center had hoped and are likely to be changed.

            The other shift that the Kamchatka meeting marks is the increasing recognition in the center that demographic policy should not reflect a one-size-fits-all approach but rather take regional differences into account, a devolution of decision making from Moscow to the federal districts in one area that could lead to a kind of broader decentralization in the future.

Kremlin Now Fighting Divorce in Russia, ‘a Problem that Doesn’t Exist,’ To Be Precise Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 15 – The To Be Precise portal which tracks social developments in the Russian Federation says that at the present time, the Kremlin has launched a campaign against divorce in the hopes of boosting the birthrate. But the problem it has identified is in fact one that “doesn’t exist.”

            Since January 2025,  the Russian government has increased the costs of those wanting a divorce by eight times and introduced waiting periods and required meetings with counselors in the hopes of reducing the number of divorces and thus making more births likely, the portal says (tochno.st/materials/razvoditsia-posle-10-let-braka).

            But according to To Be Precise, “most Russian marriages are more stable than is commonly believed;” and while divorce occurs most often in the first ten years, the median duration of such marriages is still eight years” and not a few months as the authorities in Moscow seem to believe. 

            Over the course of a lifetime, fewer than half of all marriages dissolve, the portal continues, with “the risk of divorce reduced by children, economic inequality between the partners, and the chronic illness of the husband.” Women are more likely to file for divorce in Russia than men.

            The portal does concede that its figures are incomplete and that the actual number of marriages ending in divorce may be higher, but it insists that even if that is the case, the policy moves Moscow has made are not having a big impact and in fact are directed against a problem that really doesn’t exist. 

Moscow’s Efforts to Promoting Civic Identity in North Caucasus May Be Opening the Way for the Rise Not Only for More Islamic Identity but Also Even Islamist Extremism

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 15 – In April, a Russian Field Poll found that residents of Kabardino-Balkaria, one of the two bi-national republics in the North Caucasus, were significantly more likely to reidentify as civic Russians than residents of other mono-ethnic federal subjects there.

            But it also found that younger people in the KBR are less likely to list citizenship in the Russian Federation as their primary identity than are their elders who were born in Soviet times and instead continue to identify in ethnic or even religious, which in this case means Muslim, terms (vedomosti.ru/society/articles/2026/04/02/1187301-severnogo-kavkaza). 

            Now, the SOVA Center which monitors racism and xenophobia in the Russian Federation says that KBR courts for the third time in two years are convicting ever more young residents of that republic for taking part in shariat patrols which sought to intimidate residents into following Islamic rules (sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/news/counteraction/2026/06/d53950/).

            This prompts a question which neither Vedomosit nor SOVA ask: are Russian government attacks on ethnic identity, which until now has exercised a powerful influence on behavior in the North Caucasus, opening the way for the expansion not only of Islamic belief but of Islamist activism?

            In early Soviet times, Moscow promoted ethnic identities in Muslim areas precisely to weaken the power of Islam. Its success in boosting ethnic identities did weaken Islam in many places. After 1991, the weakening of the state meant that Islam expanded to fill the void left by the decline in a secular ethno-nationalism.

            That was especially obvious in the case of Chechnya where an extremely secular national movement in 1991-1993 gave way to an increasingly Islamic and sometimes Islamist one thereafter. Now, Moscow’s efforts to weaken ethnic identity by promoting a civic Russian one may be having the same effect and over more parts of the North Caucasus.

            If that proves to be the case, Moscow in its rush to try to solve one problem may be creating a different and even larger one instead.

‘Main Result’ of Moscow’s Nationality Policy has Been that Russia Remains Stable, FADN Report to Duma Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 15 – “The main result” of Moscow’s nationality policy over the last dozen years has been that contrary to the expectations of many and the attempts of external and internal enemies, Russia remains stable, according to the government’s Federal Agency for Nationality Affairs.

            In an 80-page report to the Duma, the FADN pointed to the increase in the percentage of Russian Federation residents who say their civic Russian identity is more important than their ethn0-national ones and who believe that ethnic problems are declining in seriousness and importance.

            (For the full text of the report, see fadn.gov.ru/otkritoe-agenstvo/realizacziya-strategii-gosudarstvennoj-naczionalnoj-politiki-rossijskoj-federaczii-na-period-do-2025-goda/file-download/rubxj5jyrvezivdndqlxev43k2y36gpy; for a useful summary, see   nazaccent.ru/content/45587-nazvany-glavnye-itogi-strategii-nacpolitiki-rossii-v-20122025-godah/.).

            The report celebrates both what it says is improved monitoring of ethnic relations in the Russian Federation and the fact that “for the first time, significant attention has been devoted to the strengthening of the unifying role of the Russian people as the state-forming people … as well as strengthening the regional component of nationality policy.”

            But beneath these celebratory claims, the report acknowledges that the shift from ethnic to civic identity has been slower in the North Caucasus than in other regions and that challenges to Russia’s stability have intensified both from foreign and domestic sources, developments that mean all the tasks of nationality policy have yet to be achieved.

Kazan Institute of History Set Up in 1996 to Help Tatars Recover Their Identity has ‘Moved Away from Concept of the National Liberation Struggle,’ Salikhov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 14 – Thirty years ago, Tatarstan established an Institute of History within the republic’s Academy of Sciences to help Tatars recover their national past and identity; but now, Radik Salikhov, its current director says, “we have moved away from the concept of the national liberation struggle of peoples.”

            The first director of the institute, Rafael Khakimov, was not only an internationally recognized specialist on federalism but also an advisor to Tatarstan President Mintimir Shaymiyev. He sought to have the institute play an active role in the rebirth of Tatarstan after Soviet times (business-gazeta.ru/article/704512).

            Now, however, the situation is different and so too is the mission of the Institute of History, its current director says. “We are an integral part of the state scientific institution … nd we view ourselves as an institute dedicated entirely to the well-being of all the peoples of our region and of Russia as a whole.”

            “Perhaps the most significant change has been a rethinking of the approach to the historical process itself,” Salikhov says. “We have moved away from the concept of the "national liberation struggle of peoples"—which dominated both the Soviet period and the 1990s—as a universal model of historical development.”

The earlier approach often led “to confrontation and did not foster a constructive understanding of the past.” In its place, he ways, the institute is now “emphasizing the concept of service to the Fatherland. I consider this ideological and methodological shift to be one of our major achievements in recent years.”

Salikhov continues by observing that “disputes often arise around specific events, figures, or historical legacies—and sometimes even attempts at a kind of’"privatization’ of history, in which various groups seek to claim something as being exclusively part of their own tradition and no one else’s.”

But the current direction insists that “the task of historians is not to exacerbate these divisions, but to seek common ground and foster a balanced, evidence-based understanding of the past. History should not divide people; rather, it should promote mutual understanding and strengthen social cohesion.”

1990 RSFSR Sovereignty Declaration Response to Moves by Baltic Republics, Moldova and Georgia, Baburin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 14 – A proposal by Sergey Baburin to move the Russian capital from Moscow to some small city in the central part of Russia is likely to attract more attention, but his words about the RSFSR Supreme Soviet’s 1990 Declaration of State Sovereignty in which he worked as one of the drafters are far more significant.

            The Russian nationalist politician argues that “the Declaration of the State Sovereignty of the RSFSR,” the anniversary of which is now marked as the Day of Russia, “was our respond to corresponding documents about sovereignty or about independence by separatists in the Baltic republics, Moldova and Georgia” (business-gazeta.ru/article/704511).

            Only the naïve or those who wish to shift the blame to others can blame what the RSFSR did as a primary cause of the disintegration of the USSR because that declaration “presupposed the preservation of the Russian Federation as a legal state within a renewed USSR” rather than having the RSFSR go its own way, Baburin says.

            In preparing the draft of the declaration, Baburin says, he “insisted that the state power and sovereignty of Russia belong not to the ethnic Russian and other peoples but to a single multi-national people of the Russian Federation. For me,” he continues, “such a formulation was very important.”

            That is because had we “divided sovereignty within the country into Russian, Tatar, Mordvin, Yakut and so one parts, then the destroyers of the USSR would have been able to destroy the Russian Federation as well,” a danger that would remain if people don’t understand how such talk threatens the country. 

            Most of Baburin’s other comments in the course of a long interview as typical of those of Russian nationalists and imperialists like himself. But one stands out as very different. Instead of defending Moscow as the capital of the country, he urges that the Russian capital be shifted to the geographic center of the country and not to a major city but to a small one “like Washington.”

            Indeed, he says, the capital should ultimately become what is now a small city of perhaps no more than 40,000 which could be developed and expanded but which would not have the problems of corruption and imagery that Moscow represents both objectively and subjectively in the minds of many.

United Russia Deputies Block Karelian Parliament from Discussing Problems of Karelian Village whose Water Supply has Been Cut Off for Almost a Month

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 12 – Residents of Kurkiyoki, a 1,000-person village in Karelia, say that they have not had water for more than three weeks because of problems with the pipeline carrying it to them and add that the ruling United Russia party has blocked the republic parliament from discussing their plight and then addressing it.

            This may seem a minor issue, but it is an important sign of the ways in which the problems the peoples of the Russian Federation are becoming increasingly political in advance of the September Duma elections (novayagazeta.eu/articles/2026/06/12/kak-poselok-v-karelii-tretiu-nedeliu-vyzhivaet-bez-vody-iz-za-avarii).

            This controversy is one of the first signs of a development that many in the regions and republics welcome and that many in the Putin regime fear, the way in which elections almost inevitably politicize issues that up to now both the population and its rulers have viewed as ordinary and non-political disputes.

Ecumenical Patriarch ‘Completes Process’ of Restoring Orthodox Church in Lithuania to Constantinople’s Jurisdiction, Furman Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 13 – During a brief visit to Lithuania earlier this month, Bartholemew, the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, completed the process of restoring the Orthodox Church in Lithuania to his patriarchate’s jurisdiction, thus officially ending Moscow’s control of  Orthodoxy in that Baltic country, Lera Furman says.

            The Russian-Ukrainian religious affairs specialist who left Russia in 2022 after Putin launched his expanded war in Ukraine says that the Ecumenical Patriarchate never recognized Russia’s claims there but could do little as long as the USSR existed (novayagazeta.eu/articles/2026/06/13/baltiiskii-pravoslavnyi-front).

            “Over the years,” she writes, “Constantinople has taken under its omophorion a number of clergy [there and elsewhere] who were ‘stripped of holy orders by the ROC MP for their anti-war stance, including a group of Lithuanian clergy.  (For background on these developments, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/03/constantinople-patriarch-moves-against.html and https://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2026/04/vilnius-stepping-up-pressure-on-russian.html.)

            “Three years ago,” she continues, “Bartholomew announced the establishment of his exarchate in Lithuania; its ranks included not only anti-war Lithuanian clergy but also priests Georgy Roy and Alexander Kukhta—who had fled Belarus—and later, the prominent theologian Deacon Andrei Kurayev, who had left Moscow.”

            On May 31, Bartholemew named Archimandrite Panaretos, who supervised the Slavic-Turkish Orthodox in Istanbul, as bishop of Tamassos and exarch of Lithuania and then presided over the bishop’s formal installation in Lithuania at the Church of the Holy Trinity in Vilnius on June 7.

            This action in Lithuania is echoing in Belarus and even Ukraine, Furman says. “Many Ukrainian and Belarusian refugees attended the service; and the Patriarch addressed them specifically, noting Vilnius’s hospitality and the Christian calling to remain faithful to the truth, even when such fidelity disrupts one’s accustomed way of life.”

            Denis Kuchinsky, an advisor to Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tiskhanouskaya, attended the enthronement and “highlighted Belarus’ historical closeness of the Patriarchate of Constantinople.” That statement suggests that the Orthodox Church of Belarus to pursue independence from Moscow following the country’s liberation.”

            On Belarusian interest in pursuing such autocephaly more generally, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/07/moscow-patriarchate-losing-ground-in.html and the numerous sources cited therein.

Moscow Organizes Summer School in Svalbard to Expand Russian Influence There

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 11 – Moscow’s Center for International Research and Education is organizing a summer school on the Svalbard archipelago (Spitzbergen) for students from Russia and non-Arctic countries as part of a Russian government effort to use soft power means to oppose what its  director describes as NATO’s militarization of those islands.

            The summer school, to take place June 16-29, is a pilot project, its director Irina Strelnikova says, and shows that “amidst rising international tensions, the militarization of the archipelago by Norway and Svalbard’s inclusion in NATO’s military-political planning, Russia is giving priority to soft power mechanisms” (arctic.ru/20260611/1533664.html).

            This is the latest in a series of Russian moves over the last year intended to increase its influence in Svalbard and to involve countries not part of the Arctic Council which has suspended contacts with Moscow since Putin launched his expanded war against Ukraine in February 2022.

            For background on what Moscow has been doing in this Norwegian territory and what these moves may presage, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2026/02/moscow-increases-its-focus-on-two-north.html, jamestown.org/moscow-using-svalbard-to-test-natos-readiness-and-resolve/ and jamestown.org/moscows-first-move-against-nato-could-take-place-in-norways-svalbard-archipelago/.