Alcoholism among Russians Increased Last Year by Largest Amount Since 2015, ‘Important Stories’ Reports

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 16 – Nearly 56 of every 100,000 residents of the Russian Federation were diagnosed as alcoholics or suffering from alcohol-induced psychosis last year, the highest level since 2015, and a 30 percent rise from 2024, strongly suggesting that it is related to the impact of Putin’s war in Ukraine and Russia’s current economic problems, Important Stories says.

            Last year’s dramatic rise reverses the declines between 2010 and 2021 when these alcoholism figures fell by nearly half from 100,000 to 53,000 for the Russian population as a whole, figures from the health ministry and private clinics show (storage.googleapis.com/istories/news/2026/04/16/zabolevaemost-rossiyan-alkogolizmom-i-alkogolnim-psikhozom-virosla-na-tret/index.html, ru.themoscowtimes.com/2024/01/15/v-rossii-uvelichilos-chislo-alkogolikov-na-fone-voini-v-ukraine-a118376 and ru.themoscowtimes.com/2024/06/24/v-moskve-zafiksirovali-vzrivnoi-rost-chisla-bolnih-alkogolizmom-a134827).

            Despite Putin’s calls for sobriety, the sales of hard liquor including vodka but not including moonshine or samogon as Russians call it rose to 8.5 liters per person per year, high enough to have a major impact on health (ru.themoscowtimes.com/2025/03/31/rossiyane-ustanovili-8-letnii-rekord-po-potrebleniyu-krepkogo-alkogolya-a159666).

Kazakhstan’s Plan to Expand the Small Aral Sea a ‘Hare-Brained Scheme,' Bayalimov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 16 – Astana’s plan to expand the Little Aral Sea, created when the Kokaral Dam was constructed in 2005 and slowed the drying up of what had been part of the larger and dying Aral Sea, Dauletiyar Bayalimov says. Adding to the height of that dam won’t do because there won’t be enough water to fill the Little Aral even to its originally planned level.

            The Kazakh member of the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea says that the plans on offer ignore not only massive evaporation but the likelihood that neither Kyrgyzstan nor Uzbekistan will allow enough water to flow in to improve the situation (spik.kz/2595-malyj-aral-200-milliardov-tenge-na-zavedomo-beznadezhnuju-zateju.html).

            Many in Kazakhstan and in the international community see the Little Aral Sea projects as a kind of magical salvation of the problems that have been killing off the Aral Sea as a whole; but such views reflect ignorance or worse and at best ignore the fact that Astana’s plans are nothing more than expensive “hare-brained” schemes.

            It would be far better to try to change the flow of water through the Little Aral so that it would become less saline once again and thus support fishing or to invest in improving the irrigation systems in the country. But those are not the kind of projects that many governments seem to prefer. Instead, they want flashy big ones that will fail, but only after their time.

Northern Sea Route Unlikely to Operate on a Regularly Scheduled Year Around Basis Anytime Soon, ‘Siberian Economist’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 16 – Despite the claims of Russian officials, the Northern Sea Route is unlikely to operate on a regularly scheduled year around basis anytime soon, Arseniy Krepov says. Unpredictable weather and Russia’s failure to meet earlier targets and to construct the necessary infrastructure mean such boasts are unlikely to be fulfilled.

            Earlier this month, Igor Tonkovidov, head of the SovKomFlot, told the St. Petersburg Transportation and Logistics Forum in St. Petersburg that the NSR is now operating on a year-round basis. And Rosatom head Aleksey Likhachev said that his icebreakers will soon have the NSR operating in a way “comparable in its regularity and predictability to commuter trains.”

            But those claims are at a minimum overly optimistic and almost certainly unattainable, the Siberian Economy expert says. Weather in the north and in adjoining regions is simply too unpredictable and Russia has not developed the necessary infrastructure on land to support such goals (https://sibmix.com/?doc=20839.

            Indeed, Moscow doesn’t have the money to do so, he continues; and it must turn to China or some other international investor if it is even going to be close to what Putin and other Russian officials are calling anytime in the next several decades. Indeed, this year, the NSR carried only half of the amount Putin projected it would now a few years ago.

            And there is an additional bottleneck which the boosters of the NSR ignore: Most of the cargo carried along the NSR now consists of bulk cargo of oil, gas and coal for export; but sanctions and changes in what other countries are buying and from whom mean that the NSR won’t have any chance of meeting its goals until it diversifies what it carries still further.

Moscow Plans to Extend to the Postal System the Same ‘Last Mile’ Approach It has Employed against Internet Providers, Yakovlev Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 16 – Moscow has sought to establish control over “the last mile” approach as far as digital traffic on the Internet is concerned. Now, Denis Yakovlev says, it is planning to “extend this very same model into the realm of the delivery of physical goods”  by making Russian Post “the gateway for the consumption” of mail.

            This plan, the Most Media commentator says, will not only have an impact on the delivery market alone but will impose state control over everyday life in ways that are “quiet and imperceptible” but extraordinarily radical (https://mostmedia.org/ru/posts/bitva-za-poslednjuju-milju-rossyskaja-vlast-beret-pod-kontrol-rynok-pochtovyh-uslug-po-toi-zhe-modeli-chto-i-internet).

            The Russian Ministry for Digital Development has proposed legislation that will require all private delivery services to contract with and use Russian Post for the delivery of packages to consumers’ homes, the so-called “last mile” in the network between suppliers and consumers, he says, thus giving the state new control over much of Russian life.

            If this bill is approved, and it almost certainly will be, “all private marketplaces will be forced to operate through this channel and, according to the provisions of the measure, have to pay for the privilege,” something that in the short term may save the troubled government postal service but in the longer term will restrict the rights and freedoms of Russians still further.

            “Massive, unwieldy and in a perpetual state of reform,” and now bleeding employees at an unprecedented level because of low pay and poor working conditions, “the Russian Post on paper is the country’s largest logistics network with nearly 40,000 branches, of which 27,000 are in remote rural settlements,” the commentator says.

            According to Yakovlev, “rescuing the floundering Russian Post could result in the demise of almost the entire fleet” of private delivery services and thus “drive a vibrant, competitive market into an inefficient and crumbling state-run infrastructure” that would ensure central control but not good service.

            At the present time, he continues, “Russia’s delivery service market operates on two levels: the urban one that is largely controlled” by private firms “and the rural one which is dominated by Russian Post through its network of post offices. What makes sense for cities is very different from what makes sense for rural areas.

            If large numbers of private firms leave the delivery business rather than pay the high charges the government wants them to give to Russian Post, the entire system will slow down, but Moscow will gain near total control over the delivery of physical goods just as it is trying to do with regard to digital information on line.

‘For First Time in Modern History, Russian Economy Suffering from a Labor Shortage,’ Central Bank Head Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 16 – For the first time in its modern history, “the Russian economy is facing a labor shortage,” a development that is imposing severe structural constraints on its growth, Elvira Nabiullina, head of the Russian central bank says. And that along with restrictions on trade is evidence that “the economy is overheating.”

            Her remarks to the Moscow Economic Forum are the latest indication that the Russian authorities if not yet Vladimir Putin are frightened by what is going on and see no real prospects for change until major changes are taken in policies across the board (rosbalt.ru/news/2026-04-16/nabiullina-v-rossii-nehvatka-rabochey-sily-vpervye-v-ee-istorii-5581310).

            Nabiullina’s words will add to pressures on the Kremlin not only to wind up Putin’s war in Ukraine, something that would be popular among most Russians but also to reverse course on restricting the entrance of migrant workers from Central Asia and the Caucasus, something that would likely be extremely unpopular.

            Putin has acknowledged that the Russian economy is contracting and now stands at a level 1.8 percent below what it was a year ago; but he appears to believe he can ride this out, although comments by senior officials like Nabiullina are going to make that more unpopular among many in the elite as well as even more in the population.

A Football Team that Was Losing as Much as the Russian Economy Is would Change Managers, Academician Nigmatulin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 16 – Speaking at the Moscow Economic Forum on April 8, Academician Robert Nigmatulin said that any football team which was losing as much as the Russian economy has been recently would get rid of those in charge and bring in a team capable of acting more effectively.

            To the applause of his audience, Nigmatullin said that Russia now ranks 51^st out of 53 of “the more or less developed” economies in the world, a position that must be changed for Russia to have a successful future (echofm.online/video-dnya/robert-nigmatulin-my-iz-53-h-bolee-menee-razvityh-stran-zanimaem-51-e-mesto-nu-chto-mozhno-govorit-eshhyo and x.com/JayinKyiv/status/2045389885461127630).

            His words and the extent they were welcomed by his audience are significant because they carry with them the strong suggestion that Putin and his team are to blame for what is happening and must be replaced by others who can do a better job just as a failing sports team would certainly do more quickly than the Russian polity seems capable of.

Blogger Attracts Attention of Russians and the Kremlin for Saying Putin Doesn’t Know What is Happening in His Country

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 16 – Viktoriya Bonya, a former Moscow tv host who now writes a popular blog, has attracted widespread attention both from the Russian population and even from the Kremlin for saying that Putin doesn’t know what is happening in his country and needs to establish a channel that will bypass what she suggests are aides who don’t tell him the truth.

            In an 18-minute blog post (instagram.com/reel/DXFiPlrCBdS/), she casts herself as a supporter of the president who fears he is being isolated, the latest example of the old Russian belief in “the good tsar” being separated from his people by “the bad boyars” (novayagazeta.eu/articles/2026/04/14/mnogogo-vy-ne-znaete, meduza.io/feature/2026/04/14/narod-vas-boitsya-viktoriya-bonya-zapisala-obraschenie-k-vladimiru-putinu and maximonline.ru/guide/obrashenie-viktorii-boni-k-vladimiru-putinu-pochemu-ono-vyzvalo-obshestvennyi-rezonans-i-pochemu-bonya-izuchena-vsego-na-1-id6966563/).

            Bonya says that it is obvious that Putin doesn’t know what is agitating Russians about such problems as the flooding in Dagestan, oil leaks, the killing of protected species, the destruction of farm animals, and the problems that have arisen because of government restrictions on the Internet.

            Her post has attracted more than 23 million views and over 500,000 likes, with some of the visitors expressing a certain contempt for her ideas given that she lives in Monaco rather than Russian but overwhelmingly, Russians have backed her arguments. The Kremlin has acknowledged it is paying attention too but has asked pro-Kremlin media not to cover the story (meduza.io/news/2026/04/16/v-administratsii-prezidenta-kak-uznala-meduza-nastoyatelno-poprosili-loyalnye-smi-ne-razvivat-temu-obrascheniya-boni).

            Given that Kremlin critics have rarely been able to reach as many people or gain the attention of people in the Kremlin, it is entirely possible that what some are calling “glamour” protests will now grow as other popular bloggers speak out while professing only loyalty and concern.

            That may not sound like much but in a country where the Kremlin tries to block all criticism otherwise, this is an important development and one that may have an impact not only on future policies by on politics more generally as Russia heads into the campaign for the Duma election now scheduled for September.

Since Putin’s War Started, Russia Opening Crematoria in Cities where Orthodoxy is Weak and Cemeteries where that Faith is Strong

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 15 – Even though Russia’s population is stagnant or even declining, that country has been forced to open more cemeteries and crematoria over the last decade, a reflection of both the aging of the population and losses from Putin’s war in Ukraine, the Russian government says.

            Between 2015 and 2025, the number of cemeteries in Russia rose from 72,760 to 73,833 up by more than a thousand and the number of crematoria rose by 33, the government’s statistical arm said; but what is interesting is the pattern, which highlights the differences between the cities and rural areas (mk.ru/social/2026/04/15/v-rossii-rastet-chislo-kladbishh-i-krematoriev.html).

            In Moscow city, the number of cemeteries actually declined by one over the decade, while in Moscow oblast, it fell by 22 to 1495, with those closed the reflection of rising land values and an urban population less committed to living according to the dictates of the Russian Orthodox Church which opposes cremation (saintjohnchurch.org/can-orthodox-christians-be-cremated/).

            Beyond the capital’s ring road where the increase in land prices has been less and the commitment to Orthodox principles remains stronger, the number of cemeteries has grown   while that of crematoria has remained constant or even declined, yet another indication that Putin’s “traditional Russian values” are in this case followed primarily in rural areas.

            As urbanization continues, those values at least as measured by this metric are likely to decline still further overall, with the declining numbers of people in the rural areas still adhering them but those in the cities turning away, a trend that can be anything but welcomed by the Putin regime.

Putin Promotes or at Least Benefits from Narrative that the FSB is Behind the Attack on Telegram Channels, Rogov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 16 – Russian commentators in emigration have been promoting the idea that the Kremlin’s moves against Telegram channels and VPNs have been taken “on  the initiative of the FSB,” which such writers say involves “ignoring” the civilian bureaucracy, according to Kirill Rogov.

            Rogov, who himself is in emigration and writes frequently about Kremlin politics, says that just as the design and execution of the Great Terror was the work of Stalin alone so too the attack against the Internet is the handiwork of Putin alone, rather than the result of pressure from the FSB (echofm.online/opinions/mif-o-chyornoj-bashne).

            In fact, he continues, “the narrative regarding ‘an FSB initiative’ is a standard, intra-regime trope concerning ‘the Dark Tower’—a mechanism that serves to mitigate the risks associated with challenging the Supreme Leader’s initiatives -- while simultaneously offering the "wise satrap" a convenient exit strategy should he wish” to change directions.

Nor does it particularly matter whether this narrative of "loyalist dissent" constitutes an organized campaign orchestrated by Kiriyenko or not,” the Russian political commentator continues. “It is, first and foremost, a phenomenon that generated itself—though it may well have subsequently garnered cautious support.”

According to Rogov, “its emergence into the public sphere is a distinct, autonomous feature of the regime’s internal dynamics. It is, in essence, a signature ‘trick’ of the regime” and should be recognized as such rather than be promoted by those who oppose the Putin regime.

Despite Nominal Ban, Russian Military Still Signing Up Mentally Handicapped to Fight and Die in Putin’s War in Ukraine, Activists Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 15 – Before Putin launched his expanded war in Ukraine in February 2022, the Russian military tried to avoid drafting those with psychiatric problems or mental retardation to serve in the ranks; but since then, to meet the military’s needs, such restrictions have been ignored and many who shouldn’t even be in the military are now dying in the war.

            That is the judgment of various soldiers’ rights activists as reported by Regina Khisamova, a journalist for Radio Liberty who focuses on the particular problems of the North Caucasus (idelreal.org/a/diagnoz-ne-pomeha-kak-v-rossii-verbuyut-na-voynu-lyudey-s-mentalnymi-narusheniyami/33731342.html).

            Officially, bans on the induction of those with psychiatric problems or mental retardation remain in place, these activists say, with the defense ministry even issuing new lists of conditions that if identified should excuse an individual from having to serve. (For the most recent of these lists, see regulation.gov.ru/projects/166381/.)

            But as the war has continued and the need to fill the ever-depleting ranks of the Russian army, these bans are simply ignored; and courts typically ignore suits by relatives of such people because commanders on the ground see even the psychologically disturbed or mentally retarded as resources,  especially when fully healthy men are difficult to find.

            Consequently, those who should be protected by the government and who are so protected at least on paper are increasingly put in situations where they cannot escape continuing to serve until as far too often happens they die in a military conflict that they either cannot cope with or even fully understand.

            Activists say that the problem is widespread, but they cannot say exactly how many men are involved. It appears likely that this problem is greater in rural areas far from major cities where there are few people familiar with the law and ready to defend such individuals and where the courts may be especially unwilling to support such people.

            But however small the number of cases this involves, it is yet another example of the way in which the Putin regime rides roughshod over its own rules in order to find enough men, however poorly equipped they are, to fill the ranks that are constantly being thinned by battle. The longer the war goes on, therefore, the more likely this problem will continue to grow.

 

Despite Recent Declines, Fertility Rates in Central Asian Countries Average More than Twice That Metric in Russian Federation

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 16 – Fertility rates in Central Asia, the number of children per woman per lifetime, are still 1.5 to more than twice the corresponding figure for the Russian Federation and all more than the replacement figure of 2.2, a pattern that means the population of that region is increasing both absolutely and relative to Russia.

            The figure for Tajikistan is 3.3; for Kyrgyzstan, 2.9; for Kazakhstan, 2.8; for Uzbekistan, 2.7 and for Turkmenistan, 2.6; while that for the Russian Federation is below 1.4 (podrobno.uz/cat/world/detey-vse-menshe-v-stranakh-tsentralnoy-azii-znachitelno-sokratilas-rozhdaemost/).

            Russian commentators who spend much of their time following Putin and calling for a rise in fertility rates are seeking to put the best face on this by suggesting that the high rates in the Central Asian countries “threaten their security” (ritmeurasia.ru/news--2026-04-16--rost-naselenija-srednej-azii-ugrozhaet-ee-stabilnosti-87118).

            These Russian writers say that high birthrates make it difficult if not impossible for the countries to provide enough jobs for young people and force ever more of the residents of these countries to move to other countries and to the Russian Federation in the first place to find employment.

            That high fertility rates can be a problem in that regard is beyond question; but they also mean that the Central Asian countries are rapidly increasing in size and also can afford expanded pension payments, something that countries like the Russian Federation where rates are below replacement level cannot do.

In Putin’s Russia, ‘Cruelty has Become a Form of Patriotism,’ Dmitry Muratov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 16 – On April 11, Dmitry Muratov who won the Nobel Peace Prize for his work in promoting independent journalism in Putin’s Russia published an important interview in the French journal Liberation (liberation.fr/international/europe/dmitri-mouratov-prix-nobel-de-la-paix-2021-en-russie-la-cruaute-est-devenue-une-forme-de-patriotisme-20260411).

            The Moscow Times has now published a Russian translation of that interview (themoscowtimes.com/2026/04/16/novaya-gazetas-dmitry-muratov-cruelty-has-become-a-form-of-patriotism-a92510); and among the many valuable observations Muratov makes, one is especially important.

            After Putin launched his expanded invasion of Ukraine, the Russian Nobelist says, the Kremlin’s propagandists long insisted that Russians “do not strike critical infrastructure” but now they say “we will freeze Kyiv, freeze Kharkhiv and wipe them off the face of the earth,” thus “openly admitting they are destroying civilians.”

            What is “new” in Russian propaganda, Muratov continue, is “an open embrace of cruelty, an acknowledgement that Russia is prepared to inflict mass suffering on other people” and that its actions reflect that in Russia today, “cruelty has become a form of patriotism” and celebrated as such.

            “When suspects accused of shooting civilians at Crocus City Hall were arrested, television channels broadcast footage of their ears being cut off. They glorify the sledgehammer associated with Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, used to execute alleged deserters. That same sledgehammer is now displayed in the office of a deputy speaker of parliament,” he points out.

            All these things – “the cult of death, the cult of cruelty, the cult of the leader, and the cult of territorial conquest based on historical claims” – have been “described by Umberto Eco as markers of fascism;” and thus one is compelled to conclude that Russia under Putin is moving ever more in that direction.

United Russia’s Duma Candidates May Lose the Way Orban’s Long-Serving Elite Did in Hungary and for Many of the Same Reasons, Aksyonov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 15 – Not surprisingly, most observers in Russia and around the world are focusing on the impact the defeat of Orban’s party in the recent Hungarian elections on EU support for Ukraine in its fight against Russian aggression, but for senior members of Putin’s United Russia, there may be an even greater threat, Sergey Aksyonov says.

            The Moscow analyst cites the words of Anatoly Shariy, a Russian speaking Ukrainian blogger, who points out that Orban’s defeat was the product of “a series of errors that bear a striking resemblance to the well-known blunders committed by Ukraine’s former ruling party in the run-up to the 2014 Maidan protests (svpressa.ru/politic/article/511113/).

            Shariy “draws a direct comparison between the two ‘Victors’ – Orban and Yanukovich – pointing to various parallels not only in the politicians’ physical stature but also in their political profiles.” Indeed, he says, "Fidesz today is essentially the 'Party of Regions' all over again,” with corrupt officials having entrenched themselves and feeling they needn’t answer to the people.”

            The Ukrainian blogger continues: “people who previously voted for Orbán’s party are now voting against it; they can no longer tolerate the local bosses who have become entrenched in power and, as a form of protest, are backing its opponent” justifying this by arguing that Magyar’s affiliation with the Tisza Party is “merely nominal.”

            That Magyar’s party has now won a constitutional majority reflects not only this popular anger but “the specific features of the electoral system, features Orban introduced to serve his ruling Fides Party” but which now as the election has showed have led to his party’s defeat and his own.

Aksyonov points out that this “majoritarian system plays a pivotal role in Hungarian politics. Of the 199 members of parliament, more than half—106, to be precise—are elected in single-member constituencies; and any votes cast for a winning candidate in excess of the minimum required threshold are not discarded, but added to the party list voting.”

“This mechanism grants a massive bonus to the leading party,” he continues, “enabling it to attain a constitutional majority (two-thirds of the seats) even without enjoying a commensurate level of support among the general population.” Hungary stands out in this regard as most European countries do not arrange things in this way or change electoral district boundaries as often.

As Shariy and Aksyonov point out, Russia also employs the manipulation of district boundaries, albeit using a different method. It utilizes the "petal principle," whereby a major city is carved up into sectors and segments, and each of these parts is then attached to a vast, neighboring rural district—an area where loyalty to the authorities is traditionally higher and opposition votes are effectively diluted.”

“As for the electoral system itself, in the Russian Federation, it represents a hybrid model: votes cast for losing candidates in single-member districts are effectively wasted—they do not serve to boost the winners, as they do in Hungary, nor do they serve to offset the results of the majoritarian districts, as is the case in most other European countries.”

As a result, the analyst says, “this "Orban-style" electoral system [in Russia] bolstered and ‘fine-tuned’ by domestic ‘inventors’ within the Central Election Commission, and capped off with a dome of additional filters and options are designed to provide a one-hundred-percent guarantee of the desired outcome—yet another victory for the ruling party this September.”

“But what if this multilayered construct—designed to dispel any doubts regarding United Russia’s success—were to yield a completely different, indeed diametrically opposite, result, given a political reality that has shifted radically—turning precisely on its head” as has just happened in Hungary and happened earlier in Ukraine?”

In that event, the long-entrenched United Russia “princelings” “could welll be soundly defeated—just as the Hungarians routed the ossified "Orbanites." Everything the Presidential Administration,” Aksyonov says, “has spent years building to prop up the ruling party would then turn against it.”

And this could have revolutionary consequences, he says, even if Moscow falsifies the results to ensure a Putin victory. If it is too obvious, then these United Russian princelings and the system they serve and that serves them could suffer a defeat even greater than outright defeat. After all, that is what happened in Ukraine just over a decade ago.

‘Like Russians, Tatars are a Political Nation and a State-Forming People,’ Fakhrutdinov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 14 – All groups which include Tatar in their names are part of the Tatar nation, a group “like the Russians” which represent “a political nation” formed by the experience of the states they formed or lived within and even form are “a state-forming people,” Rail Fakhrutdinov says

            The direction of Kazan’s Institution of International Relations, History and Oriental Studies adds that again like the Russians, the Tatars passed from being “a confessional identity” into being “a national one” at about the same time in the 19^th century, the Russians a little earlier and the Tatars only a little later (milliard.tatar/news/rail-faxrutdinov-tatary-eto-politiceskaya-naciya-gosudarstvoobrazuyushhii-narod-9496).

            The Soviet state sought to divide up the Tatars, but “the thing is that the Kazan, Astrakhan, Siberian Tatars and the Mishars entered a single Russian state at approximately the same time having preserved a common cultural and linguistic space,” he says. To this day, they are all part of the modern Tatar nation.

            More to the point, “the Tatars like the Russians are a single nation” despite differences in dialects and regional identities. “More than that, our history is indivisibly connected with the history of a state: we are a state-forming, imperial nation” as the history of those Tatars who worked for the Russian state at various points demonstrates.

            And Fakhrutdinov concludes: “despite the presence of ethno-territorial groups with local language and cultural distinctions, which characterizes many peoples of the world, the Tatars form a single people, single with a common language, a common culture, historical straditions, self-consciousness and finally with a common ethnonym, Tatars.”

            The Tatar historian’s argument is likely to inspire many Tatars, but it will certainly outrage many Russian nationalists and Moscow centralists both because it posits that the Tatars have evolved in ways parallel to the Russians and because it suggests that many in Kazan view all Tatars are part of their patrimony. 

Soviet Regime Collapsed in Third Generation; Putin One Won’t Survive Even into a Second, Kurilla Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 12 – Many Russians now in the West are increasingly identifying themselves not only as emigres but as emigres like the wave that left a century ago after the Bolshevik revolution and even are beginning to think that few if any of them will ever return, Ivan Kurilla says.

            But in fact, the Russian historian who now teaches in the US, says, it is important to remember that while the two emigrations  do bear a certain resemblance to one another, “Putin’s Russia and Soviet Russia differ fundamentally in their horizons and future prospects” (echofm.online/opinions/perezhivet-li-putinizm-putina).

            “A century ago, Soviet Russia was a young, ideologically driven state, led by young leaders and a party apparatus that was resolutely focused on the future. Putin’s Russia in contrast is a regime of aging leaders that relies neither on a political party or the military and has no vision for the future, let alone ideas that might prove appealing to anyone,” he says.

            The Soviet regime “collapsed during its third generation,” Kurilla points out; “the current one will not even manage to survive the transition to a second,” given the absence of any vision of the future other than a continuation of the present and opposition across the board not only in the population but among elites to such a prospect.

            “Consequently,” he concludes, he “fully expects to go back” and to a Russia very different than Putin’s. “I cannot predict how the current regime or the one that comes after will go about ending the war and normalization relations with Ukraine and with other countries around the world.”

            But the Russian historian says he is convinced that “Russia will not disintegrate” and the arguments of those who say “we need not concern ourselves with the future of a unified country” because it won’t exist “to be fundamentally mistaken.”

Moscow to Limit Ability of Federal Subjects to Modify List of Numerically Small Indigenous Peoples

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 13 – Under existing Russian law, the heads of federal subjects have the power to propose including or dropping nations from Mocow’s Unified List of Numerically Small Indigenous Peoples, which determines whether members of these groups are entitled to special subsidies or not.

            But if new draft legislation proposed by the government is adopted, something that is almost a certainty, the regional heads will be severely constrained in their ability to do so (pnp.ru/social/status-korennykh-malochislennykh-narodov-predlozhili-prisvaivat-po-soglasovaniyu-s-ran.html).

            That is because census results seldom provide sufficient information on the smallest ethnic groups in the country and so regional heads have been able to add or subtract groups to this list on their own. Under the new law, these heads will be required to support their claims with materials from the Academy of Sciences and other Moscow agencies.

            There are currently 47 national groups on the Unified List of peoples with fewer than 50,000 each. Some of them number only a handful but others are close to or even have exceeded the 50,000 threshold. In the first case, some groups may disappear; and others may become too large to be included.

            By imposing the new requirements, Moscow will thus take away the ability of regional heads to act as independently as they have in the past of making such determinations, although to be fair the heads were never all that independent as the Russian government could reject their applications for changing membership. But now that ability will be codified and thus reduced.

            According to some Duma deputies, the measure is intended to save money, although given the small number of people involved, there are few economies. More likely what this means is that Moscow will decide who gets to be a favored minority and who loses that status on the basis of the needs of the government and its business allies.

            At the very least, it will give Moscow even more leverage on the question and mean that some groups on the list will be dropped either because they have effectively died out or because they have grown to beyond the 50,000 upper limit of this category and promote the further homogenization of the population of the Russian Federation.

            Some of the smallest groups will be Russianized and even reidentify as ethnic Russians, but at least some of them are likely to assimilate to other numerically small groups as these populations seek to find ways to continue to get the benefits both financial and in terms of rights into the future.

            The biggest fights, however, are likely to be at the other end, involving those groups which are now close to or even above the 50,000 threshold as once Moscow experts decide that they have done so, these groups will almost certainly be removed from the list and lose the subsidies and special benefits they currently receive.

            Two groups that may be most at risk are the Abaza in Karachayevo-Cherkessia and the combined Evenk-Even nationalities. The former is approaching the 50,000 limit and the latter, if the two do combine – they are closely related – are already above that threshold.

Team Against Torture Report Provides Rare but Very Partial Window into Torture by Russian Force Structures

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 13 – The Team Against Torture, an independent human rights group, has released a report on torture in the Russian Federation. Its findings are interesting but necessarily incomplete because the report was based exclusively on incidents where those who committed this crime were brought to court and convicted.

            That is likely why there are no cases reported of torture against women prisoners or of torture carried out by the FSB which is likely to have more success in protecting its officers against charges than are the militia of the interior ministry (echofm.online/documents/pytki-delo-molodyh-novoe-issledovanie-komandy-protiv-pytok-o-portrete-pytatelya-v-rossii).

            Nonetheless, because data on torture in Russian penal institutions is so rare and usually anecdotal, the report is worth noting because it was based on an examination of 77 torture cases held in the archives of human rights defenders in which 144 law enforcement officers were convicted of torture.

            Three-quarters of those convicted were under the age of 35, 93 percent were employees of the interior ministry, with 88 percent being officers of various territorial subdivisions and 43 percent were part of the Criminal Investigation Department of the ministry, according to the Team Against Torture report.

            Fifty-eight percent of those convicted were cooperating with others, the report says, noting that “securing a conviction against those who did not participate in torture but merely turned a blind eye to it is practically impossible.” It also notes that sometimes officers failed to stop their colleagues from torturing people because of ignorance of the law.

Moscow Not Only Carried Out a Genocide against Soviet People but Announced It was Planning to Do So and Even Boasted about It, Savvin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 13 – The Putin government has now pushed through legislation that makes it a criminal offense to deny that the Germans carried out a genocide against the Soviet people and continues to persecute those who point out that the Soviet regime was responsible for many of the losses Moscow now wants to blame exclusively on the Germans.

            But in doing so, Dimitry Savvin says, editor of the Riga-based conservative Russian Harbin portal, the Putin regime is seeking to cover up that the Soviet regime launched a genocide against the Soviet people shortly after it came to power in its September 1918 Decree on the Red Terror (harbin.lv/dekret-o-krasnom-terrore).

            That has been covered up now as the Putin regime has tried to shift all the blame for losses on the Germans and has been largely ignored by many in the West who are prepared to accept Putin’s lies as long as they are doused in what has become a kind of universal moral solvent provided by Soviet victories in World War II.

Russians Believe Their Country Needs a Strong State More than an Open Political System, Busygina and Filippov Argue, and Putin Relies on That

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 11 – Many assume that Putin remains strong because of repression and fear, Irina Busygina and Mikhail Filippov say; but in fact, it is because he relies on the widespread belief among his countrymen that Russia can be successful if and only if the state is insulated from the buffeting of a competitive political system.

            The Kremlin leader’s “regime does not merely suppress alternatives: it offers its own distinct political formula for the country, one that is internally consistent, historically recognizable and institutionally codified. At its core is the idea of the need for a strong state” (novayagazeta.eu/articles/2026/04/11/gosudarstvo-vmesto-politiki).

            Because of the need for such a state, the two Russian analysts who now teach in the US, most Russians follow Putin and believe that “open competition for power must be expunged from public life. Politics is permitted only in forms that are controlled—and, for the regime, safe.”

            For that reason, Busygina and Filippova argue that “Putinism frames depoliticization not as a restriction on normal life, but as its very precondition. This concept was not imposed from above; rather, it rests upon a genuine and broad consensus that took shape within Russian politics as early as the 1990s.”

“In various guises,” they continue, “this consensus was shared by democrats, federalists, nationalists, and communists alike. While they harbored profound disagreements on nearly every other issue, they concurred on one point: Russia requires a strong state. It is upon this very foundation that Putinism has constructed its political hegemony.”

The Putin regime delivers “a level of macroeconomic stability, administrative competence, and targeted social support adequate to ensure that the majority does not view democratization as a necessary price to pay for improving their lives” that the Kremlin feels no compulsion to promise freedom.

Instead, the two write, the Putinist state “promises a ‘managed normality’—and, moreover, a ‘modern’ normality: a market economy without political competition, technocracy without accountability, and limited openness to the world without political pluralism.” That is why this state is so hard to change and why the war in Ukraine has made it more not less so.

For a successful challenge, “simply calling for freedom of speech, fair elections or a reduction in arbitrary rule is not enough.” Instead, those making it must “answer a more complicated question: how can a strong Russia be built without a ruling elite that is insulated from political competition and accountability?”

According to Busygina and Fillipova, “the Russian opposition lacks a coherent answer to this question and, as a result, the system is resilient,” with most of the elite and much of the population believing that “even a limited liberalization ‘within’ the regime appears to be too dangerous.” Until that changes, the Russian regime isn’t going to change, even after Putin.

A Measure of Moscow’s Desperation: People Visiting AIDS Centers in Karelia Urged to Join Russian Army

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 13 – Even though the Russian defense ministry prohibits those with HIV or hepatitis from serving in the military, recruiters in Karelia are now circulating appeals to those visiting HIV/AIDS centers in Karelia to join up with promises that they will get substantial bonuses, debt relief and consideration even if they have criminal records.

            The ban can be found at publication.pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202601300038; the report about this recruitment effort in Karelia is at ru.thebarentsobserver.com/v-centre-spid-razmestili-reklamu-kontraktov-dla-ludej-s-vic-i-gepatitom/448477; and background on such efforts elsewhere at t.me/istories_media/10317.

            The Russian military has avoided recruiting those with such illnesses in the past not only because such soldiers would likely require more medical attention but also because knowledge by the Russian population that the military was allowing those with HIV/AIDS  to serve would likely discourage others from signing up.

            Hence, this recruitment effort, which explicitly says that “recruitment is [now] open for people with HIV and HEPATITIS,” strongly suggests that the Russian military is having increasing difficulty filling its depleted ranks in Ukraine and has apparently has been directed to take in even those with serious and highly communicable illnesses.

            Not surprisingly, this effort so far appears confined to places far from Moscow where coverage is less likely to reach a broader audience. For that reason, The Barents Observer is to be commended for reporting in detail on this latest action by the Moscow authorities. Its report should be picked up and disseminated by others.