Paul
Goble
Staunton, April 3 – Moscow has finally
recognized that “the seizure of power in Syria by radical Islamic groups inevitably
will lead to the growth of tensions in the North Caucasus” and the exacerbation
of conflicts there because of the number of North Caucasians who are fighting with
the Syrian opposition, according to a former Russian interior ministry officer.
Evidence gathered by the Izborsky
Club during its visit to Damascus last month shows, Oleg Ivannikov, now a
leader of the Russian Public Foundation for the Support of Law and Order, that
North Caucasians now in Syria, in the event of victory there, will make their
homeland their next “target” (ostkraft.ru/ru/articles/480).
Indeed, the former MVD official
says, the graffiti these fighters have written on the walls of Syrian buildings
leaves no doubt that their “main motivation for participating in the Syrian
events” is to gain experience and support for launching attacks on Russian
positions in the North Caucasus and elsewhere in the Russian Federation.
Even the most superficial
consideration of the case shows, Ivannikov continues, that “the main threat to
the integrity of Russia comes from the North Caucasus.” That is something “our
enemies understand perfectly well,” and they are quite prepared to make use of
that understanding to pressure Moscow.
“Unfortunately,” he says, “the
general social, economic and inter-ethnic situation” in the North Caucasus “leaves
a lot to be desired.” Special operations against the militants continue in
Daghestan, the situation in Kabardino-Balkaria is unstable,” and conflicts
between Chechnya and Ingushetia are intensifying.
“Behind all these processes always
stand serious financial structures or oligarchic circles,” Ivannikov says,
noting that it is sufficient to recall the involvement of the late Boris
Berezovsky in helping Chechen militants at the end of the 1990s when Shamil
Basayev escalated the conflict there.
Russia has sufficient military force
to cope with external threats to the country, “but internal threats for
contemporary Russia appear much more dangerous and real” and there are some questions
as to whether the Russian armed services are focusing on them to a sufficient degree.
Events in Syria show just how
necessary such a refocusing of attention is. On the one hand, Damascus long
prepared for a war with Israel rather than for the one with its own population.
And on the other, Ivannikov says, there is growing evidence about “the
preparation of our new ‘friends’ from the EU and from across the ocean” to
exploit any Russian weakness.
They have already launched a number
of trial balloons, he says, including the “’partisans’ of the Far East” and
much talk about the utility of “the exit from the Russian Federation of certain
of its subjects who feel themselves too independent and self-sufficient.”
“The logical continuation of these reflections,”
Ivannikov argues, “could be information about the beginning of centralized
training by ‘our friends’ of militants for the conduct of military actions
already on the territory of Russia,” especially given the possibilities and
cover for such things that the Syrian conflict offers.
Consequently, the security expert
says, “judging by everything,” they will “try to overload Russia with internal
problems and possibly send militants who are now fighting in Syria to the
Caucasus region.”
No one knows precisely how many
North Caucasians are currently fighting for the Syria opposition, he says, “but
there are more than a few.” Moreover,
the numbers are of less import than the likelihood that they would be able to
invite their “’former comrades in arms’” from Syria “to take part in the
liberation of their brothers in the faith from ‘Russian oppression.’”
Moscow’s recent moves in response
to the Syrian crisis, Ivannikov says, “cannot fail to please” those who
understand what the risks are. Opposing Western efforts to overthrow Asad,
rebuilding Russia’s Mediterranean fleet, and assisting the Syrian government
are all valuable steps to promote Russian interests.
“But the development of events may
take place as often happens in Russia, more quickly than we are counting on.” And that should lead Moscow to ask “whether
the Russian army is prepared for the Syrian variant in the Caucasus.” Having asked that question, the Russian
government needs to respond by rapidly expanding and improving its internal
troops.
Syria did not have such units, he
writes, and it is now paying the price for that. But as Moscow’s earlier combat in the North
Caucasus shows, Russia needs to improve these units and increase their level of
coordination with the regular Russian army if they are to be in a position to
counter efforts to destabilize the country.
There is a need for speed, Ivannikov
concludes, because “the weak are always beaten, and the more prepared the
Russian military is for such scenarios, the less likely anyone will make
attempts to carry them out.”
Ivannikov’s argument is likely
overblown and reflects his own experience with the MVD. But it is certain to be one that is
circulating among the Russian elite and suggests that those who argue that
Vladimir Putin is currently supporting Asad because the Russian president has
won in the North Caucasus may have gotten the situation exactly backward.
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