Paul
Goble
Staunton, August 10 – The Russian
media present a highly distorted image of Russian nationalism because it
focuses on a few Moscow figures whose “influence in the nationalist movement is
not great” and thus misses both the divisions within that grouping and the
ongoing generational change among its leaders, according to a Russian analyst.
In an essay posted on the
Nazaccent.ru portal yesterday, Maksim Sobesky argues that it is necessary to
understand that at present “Russian nationalism is more marginal than real when
it comes to politics, that it arose during perestroika, and that it immediately
divided into two types: left and right” (nazaccent.ru/content/8060-russkoe-pole.html).
The most prominent representative of
left-wing Russian nationalism, he writes, was the National Bolshevik Party,
whose actions made them for a time “real political players.” Right-wing nationalism, in contrast, was less
interested in gaining power than in promoting certain policy positions such as
restrictions on immigration. It quickly fragmented.
According to Sebesky, “the paradox
of [rightwing Russian] nationalists is that the majority of them are
non-ideological and apolitical” while “almost all” organizations they have
sought to form have proved to be “stillborn.” Only on the left has there been
the development of what one could call “political culture.”
At the origins of post-Soviet
Russian nationalism was Konstantin Kasimovsky, the founder of the Russian
National Union (RNS) and publisher of “Shturmovik.” Challenged by the National Bolshevik Party,
he was unable to keep his group together but rather gradually moved into the
Orthodox camp.
Another figure of the 1990s was
Aleksandr Ivanov-Sukharevsky, founder of the Popular National Party which
sought, in the manner of European rightist groups to promote not monarchism but
white racism Most of its members were skinheads, and Ivanov-Sukharevsky
personally served time for anti-semitism.
After about 2005, many of these rightwing
nationalists turned to force, following Maksim Bazylyev, who established
himself as a leader of the skinheads in Moscow through the organization of a
National Socialist Society and by pushing the idea of “revolutionary terror”
via his journal “Russkaya Volya.” But in
2009, he was arrested and died while incarcerated.
Another Russian nationalist who
acquired influence in the ranks at that time was Sergey Kotov, a Yekaterinburg
lawyer. He headed the city sections of
the NNP and the DPNI. His open chauvinism and opposition to official
arbitrariness won him support. But he was sentenced to four years in prison for
extremism. Since his release, he has played only a marginal role.
A fourth influential member of the
founding generation of post-Soviet Russian nationalism was Vladimir Istarkhov,
author of the book “Udar Russkikh Bogov.” In 2012, he succeeded in forming the
Russian Right Party, a group that has attracted attention largely because its
adherents regularly appear with pagan flags.
A fifth member of this generation
was Dmitry Bobrov who formed to radical groupings before being sent to the camps
for six years for beating immigrants. Freed in 2009, he created the National
Socialist Initiative and wrote “Notes of a POW.” He seeks to present himself as
an “authoritative” leader of all Russian nationalists.
And a sixth representative of this
first generation was Andrey Savelyev, a monarchist and founder of the Velikaya
Rossiya Party. He has been close to
Dmitry Rogozin, a supporter of Vladimir Putin, and an “aggressive” Duma deputy
from the Rodina group. He has also
written 14 books on the nationalities question.
This older generation is now being
supplanted by a younger one, few of whose members have yet become widely known
beyond the ranks of their followers, Sobesky says. One of these is Oksana
Vyolva-Borisova, a 19-year-old activist from Mineralnye Vody who writes widely
on ethnic crime, corruption, and inter-ethnic conflicts.
A second is Kirill Banshetsev, who
had been a DPNI activist in St. Petersburg and now heads the Volnitsa organization,
which promotes “revolutionary nationalism,” “populism”, and opposes monarchism
and the Nazis. A third is Maksim
Kaliinichenko, also from the Northern Capital, who organized the Russkiye probezhki
group.
A fourth is Natalya Kholmogorova,
who in 2006 began her political career in the Russian Social Movement together
with Konstantin Krylov. Like Aleksey Navalny, whom Sobesky describes as “another
moderate nationalist” and lists fifth, Kholmogorova as Ukrainian roots. She
urges her followers not to engage in online debates but to support victims of
the regime.
And a sixth member of the new generation
is Rostislav Antonov, a Novosibirsk journalist who wrote “Primorsky partizany”
and who opposes anti-semitism. His backers support him for the position of
human rights ombudsman, and it is at least possible that at some point he will
be legitimized in that way.
Sobesky summarizes his description
of these twelve by saying that none of them represents the “charismatic” leader
who could unite Russian nationalists across the country and across the
political spectrum. And he says that
there is no immediate prospect for the formation of a European-style rightist
party.
Instead, he suggests, Russian
nationalism is likely to remain divided among a variety of groupings and thus
be fated either “to self-destruct” or “to become transformed into puppets of
the powers that be.” That does not mean
they do not reflect dangerous ideas; it does mean that they are unlikely to be
the ones to impose those ideas on Russian society.
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