Paul Goble
Staunton, April 7 – Many members of
the Russian intelligentsia do not support Vladimir Putin and his repression at
home and aggression abroad, but a significant and surprising number of them do,
the result of a complex combination of their experiences over the last
generation and Putin’s actions as well, according to Kseniya Kirillova.
In Novy region-2 today, the commentator
says that her contacts in Russia suggest that “the overwhelming majority” of those
usually classed as members of the intelligentsia “if they do not support Putin”
cannot be classed as his opponents and are unlikely to lead resistance to him (nr2.com.ua/blogs/Ksenija_Kirillova/Proputinskaya-intelligenciya-nabroski-k-portretu-94045.html).
But
because such people are normally the ones Russians and others expect to be
agents of chance, Kirillova suggests, it is important to understand as precisely
as possible “the nuances” of their position, even if these shadings are more
anecdotal than based on the kind of survey research that could be checked by
replication.
The
support Putin has among the intelligentsia is hardly “unqualified,” the commentator
writes. The majority “try not to evaluate” his actions lest they have to take a
position, and “many honestly acknowledge that they do not know whether he is
acting correctly” even if they are “convinced that there is no other figure
capable of running Russian in present circumstances.”
The
cause of that, she suggests, lies with their “inadequate understanding of the situation.”
Most members of the intelligentsia just like most other Russians “believe that
Russia is ‘encircled by enemies,’ which will instantly destroy it in the case
of the slightest weakening of the central authorities.”
On
the basis of this false assumption, they believe that “Putin may be mistaken
but they do not see another leader suitable for work ‘under conditions of war.’”
That he and Russia were the initiators of this war is something they simply do
not want to consider.
Like
other Russians, the commentator continues, members of the intelligentsia share “the
standard list of Russian fears: revolution, destruction, and disintegration of
the country,” and the standard believe that however bad things may be, anything
and anyone else “’will be even worse.’”
“Even
among educated people,” Kirillova continues, most back “‘the restoration by
Russia of its influence’ on the territory of the former USSR” because “many
sincerely suppose” that Russia needs a buffer zone around it and because “the
majority who in the past belonged to the ‘perestroika’
liberal intelligentsia dream about the restoration of the Soviet Union.”
“In part,”
Kirillova says, “this also is explicable: the current authorities despite all
their totalitarianism and aggressive attempts to regulate all spheres of life …
are not offering society a model of a desirable future. As a result,” she
suggests, Russians in many cases are looking to “an idealized past.”
Many Russians “really
believe” that a USSR could be restored but “do not have specific ideas on how
to achieve that in reality,” Kirillova says. Many in the intelligentsia too
fall victim to that. And “many in this
milieu and not without basis are afraid of repression” and when they hear about
bad things, are inclined to say “’Thank God, this doesn’t affect me.’”
Moreover, like other Russians,
members of the Russian intelligentsia want to hope for something; but because
many of the latter have concluded that liberalism has lived out its day and
that “a ‘firm hand’ is better than liberal softness,” they are prepared to back
moves to restore what the regime insists is Russia’s rightful place in the
world.
“The single positive distinction of
educated Russians from all the rest is a lower level of aggression towards
others,” Kirillova says. “The intelligentsia has no desire to ‘beat the Yukes’
or anyone else. They are also more tolerant to differences of opinion within
their own milieu than are other strata,” even if they accept the Kremlin’s line
on the Donbas.
The picture, she says, is not
encouraging. “That force which could become the basic protest group of
contemporary Russian for many reasons is incapable of fulfilling this function. [Thus,] Russian society at present is still
extremely far from awakening.”
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