Paul
Goble
Staunton, April 8 – The recent
re-elections of Islam Karimov as Uzbekistan’s president and Nursultan
Nazarbayev as Kazakhstan’s, two leaders who have held office since Soviet
times, is a testimonial to the fact that in those countries, “neither ‘the
eastern’ nor the ‘western’ mechanisms of the transfer of power are working,
according to Denis Yermakov.
But the existence of “irreplaceable
leaders” afflicts not only these two but also other “personalist regimes” on
the post-Soviet space, “from Russia and Belarus to Tajikistan and Azerbaijan,”
but also “deprives [all] these countries of the conditions needed for “a stable
future,” the commentator continues (profile.ru/eks-sssr/item/94927-bez-preemnika-v-golove).
Because Karimov and Nazarbayev are
older, the issue of succession is more immediate – and perhaps especially
worrisome because their two countries are ethnically complex, authoritarian and
without obvious successors, and currently threatened by Islamist movements, Yermakov
says.
But even though the “irreplaceable”
leaders in some other post-Soviet states are younger, that only means that the
issue of organizing and legitimating a transition is not quite as immediate a
challenge. Moreover, all of the countries undergoing the transition from
communism to capitalism have had to face it.
Some in Eastern Europe immediately
restored Western models of competitive democracy. Some in China and Vietnam
have retained the structure of communist parties and their rules for choosing a
new leader. But many of the post-Soviet states have chosen either of those
routes but rather sought to avoid the problem. They haven’t been able to.
More than half of the post-Soviet
states have relied on “personalist political regimes which are based not on
institutions but on the charisma and personal power of national leaders. In
such a system there isn’t and for certain cannot worked out firm rules
governing this most important political process.”
In some of them, power has passed by
inheritance (as in Azerbaijan), in others by appointment from the departing
leader (Russia), and in a third by a palace coup (Turkmenistan) or by agreement
within the “family” of the core leadership, although that is often extremely
difficult to arrange.
Given the lack of predictability,
Yermakov says, such regimes are “forced either to put off as long as possible
the presentation of a potential successor lest he become the victim of
competing groups or constantly change them in the public space or openly make a
bet on two or three in order to see how the elites will struggle among
themselves.”
Such political systems often make
use of democratic forms in order to try to legitimate themselves, “but the
misfortune is that the institutions needed for this have not been created in
[these] countries, the party system doesn’t work, and the opposition, if it
exists, does not have any levers of influence on what is taking place.”
“It is indicative
of this situation,” Yermakov says, “that in the post-Soviet space over the last
20 years,” many potential successors have been removed from the scene in what
have been “extremely mysterious circumstances.” Consequently, he suggests, “many
[of these leaders] have ‘skeletons in their closets,’” something that makes
them especially reluctant to leave office and face investigation.
“But the main
problem,” the analyst continues, “is that under conditions of a lack of
democratic institutions, the sudden exit of an irreplaceable leader, father of
the nation or vozhd can lead to an explosion inside the country.”
Given that
danger, one is compelled to ask: “why haven’t these independent states after a
quarter of a century created either strong institutions or even public and elite
demands for them?”
The answer reflects
the fact that the old system collapsed so suddenly that no one was really
prepared for something new and that those near the old elites were interested
in the first instance in privatizing the wealth of their countries into their
own hands, something that was far easier to do on the basis of personal ties
than if institutions had been put in place.
“Unfortunately,”
Yermakov says, “little has changed since the ‘wild ‘90s’ on the post-Soviet
space.” Rentier capitalism continues to dominate the public space, and those
who have control do not want to give it up to anyone else, something they might
be at risk of if institutions were created.
But there is
another form of “rent” as well, the analyst continues: political rent. The
leaders of some smaller countries can keep power because they play an important
role for outsiders who either want one-stop shopping or see the
authoritarianism of the regime as protecting their own geopolitical interests.
Until all these
sources of rent disappear and as long as the incumbent leader is able to “satisfy
the growing demands of his closest entourage,” he will have no interest in
creating institutions that might mean the leadership would have to share pieces
of the pie with the majority of population.
No comments:
Post a Comment