Paul
Goble
Staunton, February 26 – The Turkish
government is seeking to revive GUAM in order to form an alliance of states
against Russia broader than the pan-Turkic groupings it had promoted in the
past, Aleksey Fenenko says; but he adds that Ankara faces real difficulties in
doing so and that Moscow has the means to block any such geopolitical effort.
In today’s “Nezavisimaya gazeta,”
the instructor on world politics at Moscow State University says that “Turkish
diplomacy is trying to revive a block like GU(U)AM” consisting of “countries
which have difficulties with Russia” and which thus could help Ankara in its
conflict with Moscow (ng.ru/cis/2016-02-26/3_kartblansh.html).
GUAM was formed by Georgia, Ukraine,
Azerbaijan and Moldova. Uzbekistan later joined and left the organization:
hence, its acronym. Like Latvia, Turkey
already has observer status in the group and like its members it wants to make
the organization into “an alternative” to the Moscow-led Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS).
The idea of creating such a grouping
of states arose in the mid-1990s. In June 1996, Moldova and Georgia issued a
joint statement. And in October 1997, they were joined by Azerbaijan and
Ukraine in calling for a system of mutual consultations in order to “’counter
Russian hegemony.’” That became GUAM at a meeting in Yalta on July 7, 2001.
But despite the aspirations of its
organizers, the group has not become a truly effective grouping of states,
Fenenko says. They are divided on many
issues, and Uzbekistan has pointed to its dissolution by leaving as a result of
differences with the others over relations with the United States.
In 2005-2007, the Moscow scholar
continues, Poland attempted to promote GUAM as a counterweight to Moscow and to
attract to its membership Lithuania and Romania. Little came of that besides
the addition of Latvia and Turkey as observers.
Now, instead of Poland, Turkey is seeking to use GUAM for its own
purposes, Fenenko writes.
“The idea of the leadership of
Turkey in a sub-bloc alternative to Russia is by itself not new,” he continues.
In October 1992, Ankara hosted the presidents of the Turkic countries that
emerged following the collapse of the USSR; and they signed a declaration on
mutual cooperation. A year later, they signed another about the unity of Turkic
peoples.
But again and despite Ankara’s
hopes, this grouping was riven by differences and did not take off, Fenenko
says. What is new today is that “this
time, Turkish diplomacy is seeking to revive a partnership … not simply with
Turkic countries but with countries which have claims against Russia (Georgia
and Ukraine) or fear Russia’s ties with its opponents (Azerbaijan).” He adds
that “theoretically,” Moldova and Romania might fit into such an arrangement.
However, he writes, in his view, “the
format of ‘a Turkish GUAM’ today is not very realistic.” What Ankara tried to do in the 1990s rested
on pan-Turkist feelings, but even they, Fenenko argues, “are not prepared to
completely re-orient themselves to Ankara given the weak Turkish military ‘umbrella.’”
He gives three additional reasons
for his skepticism. First, Georgia has “traditional
concerns” about territorial disputes with Turkey. Second, Azerbaijan is always
worried that if it moves too close to Turkey, Moscow will expand its support
for Armenia. And third, Turkey and
Ukraine have very difference visions about the ultimate future of Crimea.
But having said all that, Fenenko is
clearly concerned that something may come of this effort anyway. Russia should not “react inertly to the
project of a renewed GUAM. Sometimes, the consolidation against someone (in
this case, Russia) can force people to forget mutual resentments despite the
consequences.”
“The task of Russia,” he concludes, “is
to carefully monitor the corresponding processes and maintain dialogue with the
states of the Trans-Caucasus.” Moscow has, Fenenko points out, “20 years of
experience” in opposing GUAM.
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