Paul
Goble
Staunton, January 1 – Pavel Pryanikov,
the always interesting and sometimes provocative editor of the Tolkovatel
portal, says that the three most important trends of the past year that are
likely to cast a shadow on Russian domestic politics in the year ahead are the return
to high office of the methodologists, the end of Russian nationalism, and the
revolt of the regions.
“The main event of 2016,” the
blogger says, is the return of the methodologists “to the levers of power.”
They first emerged out of the technical intelligentsia in the 1970s, were brought
into midlevel positions by “the liberal Chekist” Andropov, and played a role in
perestroika (ttolk.ru/2017/01/01/три-с-половиной-тренда-внутренней-пол/).
The second trend
of the last year, he continues, is “the continuation of the active departure of
Russian nationalists from the ranks of ethnic Russians.” The largest number of
these are turning to Islam, some to the Ukrainians and a still smaller part to
the “all-European” position. There are
compelling reasons for this, Pryanikov argues.
“In Russia, there are only three
groups with solid support and traditions of activity over the last two to four
generations: the special services, the old Moscow liberals and Islam. But the first
two are closed: entrance to them is now by birth. And the most democratic [of
these options] is Islam.”
And the third trend which emerged
last year and is likely to become more important in 2017 involves protests by
the regions. “The destruction of the USSR
also began with the fronds of national regimes.” That by itself makes the
protests from the Transbaikal, the Middle Volga and the North Caucasus
significant.
Pryanikov adds a fourth to this
list, one he says is for the moment still “a half-trend.” That involves “the
erosion of supreme power” because of the presence in the Presidential
Administration of the methodologists who control the media, and the Volodin
command which controls the United Russia Party and the governors.
Putin retains control over both, but
this system of “’checks and balances,’” one that recalls the arrangements in
Boris Yeltsin’s time may or may not prove stable, especially given that Putin
is “already a real grandfather, a pensioner of 65” just as Yeltsin was in 1997
when the former president “rapidly lost the levels of rule on those checks and
balances.”
What remains to be seen in the year
ahead is whether this “half trend will grow into a trend” or not.
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