Paul
Goble
Staunton, October 1 – Claims by
Ravil Gaynutdin, head of the Council of Muftis of Russia (SMR), that there are more
than three million Muslims in Moscow and that their numbers will be increasing
there and elsewhere (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2019/09/gaynutdins-figure-of-three-million-plus.html) continue to provoke discussions in Russia.
The latest to join this discussion on this
most sensitive of issues are Konstantin Kazenin, the director of the Center for
Regional Research at the Russian Academy of Economics and State Service and Irina Starodubrovskaya, a specialist on
regional development at Moscow’s Gaidar Institute (gazeta.ru/comments/2019/09/30_a_12697381.shtml).
Kazenin focuses on
the demographics of the Muslim community of Russia. Much of its projected
growth depends on in-migration from Central Asia where fertility rates are
higher but far from stable. If they remain at three plus children per woman,
there is likely to be further pressure for the younger generation to migrate to
Russia, pushing up the number of Muslims there.
The demographic
behavior of the second generation of immigrants is also “unpredictable” as they
may either maintain the fertility rates of the countries they came from or
adopt the fertility rates of the country into which they have moved, Kazenin
says. As for third and succeeding generations, they will copy the behavior of
people in their new country.
As for the situation
in the North Caucasus, one can speak of two North Caucasuses, the Western part
(Karbardino-Balkaria, Karachayevo-Cherkessia, Adygeya and North Ossetia), where
fertility rates resemble those of the rest of Russia, and the Eastern including
Daghestan, Chechnya, and Ingushetia, where they are higher.
In part this
reflects efforts to recover from military losses over the last two decades; and
in part, it is the product of the continuing strength of tradition in these
republics as opposed to those in the west.
Starodubrovskaya
for her part addressed the issue of a possible “Islamic threat” to Russia. She
says that there are various points of view on that, with some holding that the
situation now is the calm before a new storm and others suggesting that the
situation will improve if Russia adopts the right strategy and includes rather
than antagonizes its Muslim population.
“If the state in
its policy will take into consideration the interests of Islamic youth, draw it
into dialogue and allow peaceful forms of protest and not permit any restarting
of ‘a vicious cycle of violence,’ then these more negative scenarios can quite
possibly be avoided,” the Moscow scholar says.
One issue of
importance in this regard is the number of mosques. There should be enough so that Muslims will
feel free to live anywhere in major cities rather than clustering around a few
mosques and thus forming the basis for Islamic ghettos. Many think mosques spread radicalism, but in
fact, it is the absence of mosques that opens the way for underground
activities.
The state should
not be funding the construction of mosques just as it shouldn’t be paying for
churches or any other religious facilities, she says; but neither should it be
in the business of preventing one set of believers from having a religious
facility while denying that opportunity to others. That is a recipe for
disaster.
“If Muslims
understand that no one is interfering with their ability to practice Islam, if
they do not feel discrimination on a religious basis, this is the most
important precondition for creating a situation in which the cyclical growth of
force … does not become a reality,” Starodubrovskaya says.
Immigrants may
bring radicalism with them, she adds; but at the same time, many immigrants are
fleeing from radicalism at home and therefore are among its most stalwart
opponents when they arrive in Russia.
Asked about allowing
the introduction of shariat law in Russia, she says that ever more countries
are allowing regions with religious minorities to use religious laws to govern
their lives. “I do not see problems if
in Muslim regions ,,. people could but are not required to use the norms of the
shariat for example in family or commercial law.”
“In fact,” she
says, “this is happening now: certain analogues of shariat courts officially
act in regional muftiates” and act as courts.
But at the same time “there are several tactical considerations which do
not allow [her] to support proposals for the full legalization of the adoption
of shariat norms.”
On the one hand,
that would likely sharpen conflicts among various Muslim trends and lead to radicalization
of some. And on the other, it has
happened that the widespread existence of shariat courts has been used by
radicals to insist that Muslims use only them and not the civil ones, thus
dividing society.
The best policy
with regard to such religious courts, Starodubrovskaya suggests, is therefore “’neither
legalize nor prohibit.’”
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