Moscow Closes Another Military Facility Abroad – This Time in Kazakhstan

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 30 – Despite the aggressiveness of Vladimir Putin’s rhetoric, he has been quietly cutting back on Russia’s permanent military presence abroad, closing down bases of various kinds in former Soviet republics. The latest such move came in Kazakhstan less than two weeks ago.

            On July 21, the Duma denounced its agreement with Kazakhstan on a Russian radar site near Lake Balkhash that was set to run out in December. This legislative action means that Moscow will not extend the agreement for another five years as the 2014 accord, ratified a year later, allowed.

            There are two other Russian facilities abroad which Moscow was supposed to make a decision on extending or closing in July but which up to now the Russian government has made no announcement, military expert Pavel Luzin says. These are a radar site and a naval communications facility in Belarus (ridl.io/ru/kogda-rossija-pokidaet-svoi-bazy/).

            Given tensions with Belarus and the upcoming presidential election there which may lead to a change in government, it is understandable to Moscow hasn’t made any announcement, especially as it is possible that it might be forced to change its position if a new president in Belarus were to insist upon it.

            But the Kazakhstan case raises a larger question, he says. “Why is the Kremlin which by tradition considers a military presence on of the most important foreign policy levers, prepared to give up this presence?”

            According to Luzin, the answer lies in the fact that in the decades since the disintegration of the USSR, Moscow has established replacements for radar sites in the former republics on its own territory and therefore doesn’t need them in these neighboring countries and so in most cases is prepared to give them up.

            And even if it does maintain such bases, Luzin says, Moscow wants to avoid being dependent on them given uncertainties about the future. Consequently, it will preserve bases on former Soviet territory only where its foreign policy interests but not its defense of Russia require it.

            At present, Moscow has eliminated the military value of such facilities abroad in all but one case: the Window optical-electronic site in Tajikistan which even today is “the most advanced system” for the Russian military and one that Russia’s defenses require (structure.mil.ru/structure/forces/vks/50letRKO/skkp.htm).

            According to Luzin, the Russian government could give up the others if purely military considerations were the only ones involved; but it retains them at least for the time being for political ones. That is the case in Belarus. Moscow could shutter the two facilities there without a loss in security, but it doesn’t want to be embarrassed by such a withdrawal.

            If in fact, Moscow is compelled to close them, the commentator suggests, that would constitute “a serious diplomatic defeat for the Kremlin.” And Moscow would seek some compensation by taking other means to cover its loss.