Both Powers and Protesters Changed Between First and Second Navalny Protests, Kolezyev Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, January 31 – Between the first pro-Navalny and anti-Putin demonstrations on January 23^rd and the second on January 31, both the authorities and the protesters changed, signaling htat the situation in Russia “unfortunately” is becoming more like that in Belarus, Yekaterinburg journalist Dmitry Kolezyev says.

            He lists eight ways in which the powers that be have stepped up their repressive actions and five ways in which those taking part in the demonstrations have responded (kasparov.ru/material.php?id=6016C790ED4AC).

            According to Kolezyev, in the second wave, the siloviki used electro-shock devices against the protesters and even gas, something they had not done eight days ago. They inflicted “serious injuries” on those in the second wave compared to what happened earlier, and they reportedly mistreated those they detained far more often and seriously than they had.

            Moreover, he says, in the second case, the powers make use of military units of the Russian Guard, displayed more guns and other weapons than they had on January 23^rd, attempted to prevent the Russian media from reporting anything but official figures about the number of people taking part, and arrested far more journalists.

            In response, the Navalny staff used its telegram channel far more effectively to coordinate the demonstrations, rapidly shifting the places where people were assembled or marching, used paint as a weapon against the siloviki deployed against them, and were far more ready than eight days earlier to seek safety in yards and basements.

            Kirill Martynov, the political editor of Novaya gazeta, says that he views what has happened in recent weeks is the transformation of “the post-Soviet space from Minsk to Khabarovsk and beyond” into “a giant training ground” for solidarity with those opposed to the Kremlin increasingly acting to support one another against the regime.

            “Solidarity is beginning to work,” he argues, “despite the old post-Soviet distrust in collective actions;” and that makes the progress between January 23 and January 31 more likely to last, even as it raises the stakes against a regime committed to retaining power at all costs (novayagazeta.ru/articles/2021/01/31/88976-posle-terrora).

            There is much speculation about how many are joining demonstrations for the first time and who forms the core of the protesters. Very little real data exists, but a survey in St. Petersburg suggests that there at least 47 percent of those who came out on January 31 were doing so for the first time, up slightly from January 23 (rusmonitor.com/47-protestuyushhih-v-peterburge-31-yanvarya-vyshli-na-protesty-vpervye.html).

            But the same survey also found that 57 percent of the St. Petersburg protesters had higher educations, an indication that the Navalny protests at least there are primarily an elite phenomenon and have not drawn in less educated, lower-income groups who likely remain on the sidelines as supporters of the Kremlin.