Tatars Must Remember 1921-1922 Famine Because of Its Continuing Impact, Gylman Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, December 4 – The famine of 1921-1922 in the Middle Volga cast just as large a shadow on the Tatars as the terror famines in Ukraine and Kazakhstan did. But this most horrific tragedy in the history of Tatarstan during the 20^th century remains “almost forgotten,” Nail Gylman says.

            The Tatar scholar says that the famine of 1921-1922 resulted in the death of “more of our people than all the wars of the 20^th century taken together” and that because of its impact, along of course with the other tragedies of the first half of the 20^th century, Tatars did not number as many as there were in 1914 until 1970 (zamanabiz.blogspot.com/p/1921-1922_13.html).

            Unfortunately, the standard sources don’t provide the details about this tragedy, preferring instead to wrap the Tatar tragedy within the all-Russian or at least pan-middle Volga area, Gylman continues. Consequently, he decided to conduct his own investigation and is now publishing his results.

            Subsuming the impact of the famine on Tatars and Tatarstan under the all-Russian or pan-middle Volga areas has the effect of understating just how great a tragedy it was, a tragedy that carried off more than 500,000” people in Tatarstan, almost a quarter of the total population at that time.

            “The main cause of the 1921-1922 famine was Bolshevik policy of war communism as applied to the peasantry,” from whom the Bolsheviks seized so much food that the people were left to starve. Using available statistical materials, Gylman says that “about 535,000 residents of Tatarstan died of starvation or related illnesses.

            If one adjusts for the redrawing of the borders, that figure falls slightly, but only slightly; and the explanations Moscow historians often give – blaming the civil war for these losses, saying that the Tatars had a low birthrate, or claiming that many Tatars fled the area – don’t hold up on inspection, the Tatar analyst says.

            Moreover, he continues, 350,000 of the more than 500,000 deaths from the famine in Tatarstan were Tatars. They died at a higher rate than ethnic Russians and others because Moscow wanted to crush the national resistance now that it had ousted anti-Bolshevik White Russian forces from the area.

            “The number of Tatars on the territory of the TASSR recovered to the level of 1914 only in 1970.” As a result, the Tatar share of the population declined and they lost their plurality to the ethnic Russians. Of course, the famine in 1921-1922 was not responsible for all of this: other Soviet actions share in the blame.

            About 10 percent of the Tatars died during the famine caused by collectivization in 1932-1933, 350,000 Tatars died fighting in the Soviet army against the Germans, and Moscow dispatched Tatars to the former union republics in higher percentage terms than any other nationality in the RSFSR.

            Gylman provides details on all this and more in his article, but he ends by insisting that “we do not have the right to forget about the famine …or the assistance Herbert Hoover and the ARA provided.” And “we do not have the right to forget about the thousands who died in battles or who were shot during peasant uprisings.”

            “The centenary of the beginning of the famine is approaching,” the Tatar writer notes. “Unlike the centenary of the revolution, the establishment of the TASSR and many other joyous and tragic dates, no one is remembering [about the famine] now. We must not allow this. This tragedy must have a worthy place in our historical memory.”