Putin Now Cultivating a Leviathan State rather than Just a Personalist Dictatorship, Stanovaya Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Dec. 21 – Vladimir Putin is increasingly cultivating not a personalist dictatorship but rather a Leviathan state, one in which the political authorities act beyond the reach of the population but also increasingly at odds with what the Kremlin leader may in fact prefer in specific cases, according to Tatyana Stanovaya.

            That is because, the Moscow analyst says, by promoting “a cult of the state,” Putin has made it rather than himself the core value, something that may ease the transition to a post-Putin future but only at the cost of marginalizing him on occasion while he is still in the position of paramount leader (carnegie.ru/commentary/86091).

            This cult of the Leviathan state, the analyst continues, explains “the sharp resistance to any attempt to open the archives of the NKVD, the fevered reaction to criticism of Stalin [and] the transformation of the functioning of the state in the direction of secret special operations.” In such a system, there is no place for even systemic opposition.

            By pushing the Russian regime in this direction, Putin is building “not a personal authoritarian regime but a depersonalized one where the security of the state defines the ideological contours of the functioning of the powers as a whole” with the state growing in importance while Putin’s personal role is eroding.

            Putin’s “faith in a certain moral-historical mission leads to the sacralization of the state” necessarily puts it beyond any possible examination or punishment. “the right of the state to the legitimate use of force is thus transformed into the right to cruelty … which is not simply excessive but which in most cases occurs without the immediate involvement of the president.”

            “Such a system,” Stanovaya says, “finds it not only ever more difficult to admit mistakes but to loosen its control in ways needed for the achievement of its ends.”  And that in turn means, she continues, that “today the personal role of Putin is being marginalized” even on issues where he is well informed and deeply concerned.

            The Kremlin leader has distanced himself from many issues, presenting himself as an observer rather than actor who is organizing everything behind the scenes. It certainly appears that he sees this as the basis for stability at a time of difficulties even though it means others within the state can act in ways he is unlikely to fully approve of.

            For the time being, Putin is politically strong enough to deal with this strengthening of the state, but over time, its rise and his marginalization carry with it risks to him as well, Stanovaya suggests, although he obviously sees this as a stratagem to allow for the continuation of his system even if someone else has the top position.

            Putin has clear goals both domestically and in foreign affairs. Domestically he wants to achieve a tightly constructed power vertical in a unitary state; and in foreign affairs, he wants to neutralize Ukraine and absorb Belarus into a union state. After those things are achieved, he can retire.

            In the medium term, however, this makes Putin increasingly dependent on those immediately around him than he was earlier; and in the slightly longer term, it means that the Leviathan state may produce a successor sovereign who will want to “reorder the public contract and return to himself the function of ‘arbiter in the last instance.’”