Paul
Goble
Staunton, October 11 – Because of
economic difficulties and massive corruption in the Russian Federation, Chinese
organized crime “exerts a powerful influence on all spheres of social life
[and] threatens the security of the state and society” in the Russian Far East
and more generally, according to the final results of a major study prepared in
Vladivostok.
As posted yesterday by the
Vladivostok Center for Research on Organized Crime, the 80-page study documents
how Chinese criminal groups have become “not only violating the normal
functioning of social and economic institutions” but also represent “a serious
threat to the the entire world community” (www.crime.vl.ru/index.php?p=4220&print=1&more=1).
The study was prepared by a research
group under the direction of the center’s S.E. Lelyukhin, and its preliminary
findings were approved by scholars at an inter-regional roundtable in May 2011
on “Transnational Criminal Challenges to Security” in the Asian-Pacific region.
Although Lelyukhin notes that Russian
law enforcement bodies have “an extraordinarily difficult time” in penetrating
Chinese criminal groups and thus documenting their nature, he provides a wealth
of evidence. Indeed, this study may be the most comprehensive yet on the
subject.
Among the topics covered are the
specific character of Chinese organized crime in the Russian Federation, the
directions and methods of Chinese organized criminal groups in the Russian Far
East in particular, “and also the factors which have promoted the increasing
activity [of such groups] under contemporary conditions.
The study draws the following
conclusions. First, while there are many
small Chinese criminal groups operating in the Russian Far East, the large
international Chinese organized crime families such as Big Circle, 14K, Red Sun
and Sun Yee On are the most important in Russia as well as elsewhere on the
Pacific rim.
These large groups “specialize in the
carrying out of the most complicated and largest criminal operations including
contraband and the distribution of narcotics, smuggling of goods, the organization
of illegal migration, fraud in the financial sphere and the laundering of ‘dirty’money.”
Second, over the last two decades,
Chinese organized crime has grown rapidly in response to economic problems and
corruption in Russia and at tempos exceeding the growth of the Chinese diaspora
in Russia. Third, there is “an increasing
tendency for Chinese and Russian organized crime to work together.”
Fourth, “the high level of
conspiracy within Chinese criminal organizations and their orientation toward
the members of the Chinese diaspora” in the first instance makes it especially
difficult for those Russian law enforcement agencies committed to opposing them
to gain information about their activities.
And fifth, Lelyukhin continues, the
main directions of Chinese organized crime in the Russian Far East are clear: the
export of raw materials from Russia to China, the illegal importation of
Chinese consumer goods into the region, money laundering and extortion, the
organization of illegal immigration and human trafficking.
Taken all together, he argues,
Chinese organized crime “has become a real threat to the economic security
(both because of its size and because of its destructive influence) to the Russian
Far East.”
But combatting Chinese organized
crime requires acknowledging, the Vladivostok scholar goes on to say, that its
growth in Russia “to a large extent” reflects problems in Russian administration
and the economy and “the colossal financial resources” that such groups can
deploy to achieve their ends.
Russia’s relatively open borders
next to over-populated regions of China is “one of the factors which has stimulated
the growth of migration processes, including illegal ones, and thus serves to
promote the formation of ethnic criminal structures” who prey on the diaspora
and then move into the Russian community itself.
Moreover, Lelyukhin writes, “the
negative tendencies of the development of the national economy, in the first
instance the high level of the criminalization of the economy and the corrupt nature
of some government employees” has allowed the Chinese criminal groups to assume
control over areas, like the export of raw materials, they cannot achieve
elsewhere.
Lelyukhin proposes that the Russian
authorities counter Chinese organized criminal groups by recognizing that the
fight against them cannot be won by short-term campaigns but must continue for
a long period, by forming special units, with Chinese language capability, to
fight these groups, by using “political levers” on Beijing to secure its
cooperation in this fight, by tightening border controls, and by “concluding
between Russia and the Chinese Peoples Republic a bilateral treaty" to share in
moneys confiscated from these criminal groups.
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