Paul
Goble
Staunton, May 13 – National socialism
is emerging as an alternative to the current regime in Russia, Moscow’s leading
specialist on inter-ethnic attitudes says, because its combination of two ideas
– xenophobia and a demand for social justice – are to be found across the
Russian political spectrum.
In an interview published in “Ogonyek”
today, Emil Pain, a professor of political science at Moscow’s Higher School of
Economics, describes the results of his just-completed study of Russian
ideological attitudes as reflected in the country’s increasingly important
social media (kommersant.ru/doc/2184637).
Pain
told “Ogonyek” journalist Olga Filina that there is no longer a clear divide
between “Internet” Russia and “television” Russia. More than 51 percent of
Russian adults now use the Internet on a regular basis, and his survey of
opinion online corresponds to what broader sociological polls have found.
The
investigation he led found, Pain continues, that “the division of society into
ideological groups can be considered a fait accompli.” In some respects, this
is a “positive” step forward from the “amorphous mass of Soviet people” because
it means that “total mobilization” in peacetime is impossible and “the
manipulation of people” less likely.
But
on the other hand, he suggests, this ideological division entails some serious
dangers because Russian society is far more divided than most others, its
various parts have little overlap, and they have not yet shown an ability “to
talk with one another and reach agreement.”
As a result, “this is a dangerous tendency.”
Pain
identifies four distinct groups – the pro-regime, the left, the democratic
liberals, and the nationalists – but suggests that they share three
commonalities: consolidation based on negative rather than positive factors,
growing dissatisfaction with the existing situation, and great skepticism about
the possibility of any positive change.
They
vary in terms of their current power – the pro-regime group is now on top – and
on their ability to organize. “The
greatest ability and readiness to organize are shown by the left and the
nationalists,” while the liberals are the least likely to be interested in that
and the pro-regime groups only somewhat more so.
More than the
other groups, Pain says, the liberals like to talk about private life and justify
themselves by pointing out that that is what their counterparts in the West
do. But that ignores the fact that in
the West, liberal values have largely triumphed while in Russia, they are not
yet dominant and may never be.
Given Russian conditions, he continues, “it
would seem that liberals ought to form up under the batter of the defense of
human rights, but alas even in this camp there are discussions about the
utility of observing these rights” and a willingness to accept openly xenophobic
positions on the Caucasus and on immigration.
Moreover, “the idea of a civic
nation, which was put forward by Renan 150 years ago, is not even mentioned in
the liberal community.” As a result, there is now a debate between “liberal cosmopolitans”
and “ethnic nationalists,” a discussion that can only lead to a dead end, Pain
argues.
But in the Moscow scholar’s view, “the
main sin of contemporary Russian liberalism is the inclination of its
supporters to the idea of historical predestination,” either pessimistic with
the notion that given Russia’s past, not much positive is possible, or
optimistic with the obverse notion that everything will work out to their
benefit without their having to do very much.
Given that pattern, “it is not
excluded that completely new forces will become competitors for the first place
– ideological mutants arising from a combination of xenophobic m and left
social populism.” His research found that “the single idea common for the mass audience
of each of the four groups is xenophobia” and that demands for social justice are
growing.
Filina
challenged him: “You want to say that the alternative to the party of power is
national socialist?” To which Pain responds that Russia is entering a period of
“bad weather,” one whose exact outlines are not clear but many of whose
component parts are already very much in view.
Because of the stability or even
stagnation of the current situation, Pain continues, “the majority of
ideological groups remain passive and can permit themselves to reflect
abstractly” about what they would like to do. The regime itself has thus set in
chain a series of events like those of a century ago in which the ultimate
outcome is far from clear.
The regime is no longer willing to
have a dialogue with the opposition. It simply wants to suppress it. But that
desire conflicts with its need to attract more foreign investment, something
that won’t happen if Moscow is too obviously repressive. As a result, the entire system of “checks
and balances” that created stability has become “deformed.”
By way of conclusion, Pain says that
he sees two broad scenarios: In the first, the various opposition groups would
unite and work out “a road map” for a democratic transition much as the
opponents of Franco’s regime did in Spain.
In the second, Russia would follow the trajectory of Germany’s Weimar
Republic, “from authoritarianism to dictatorship.”
“In the second case, as we remember,
unification did not take place by means of dialogue and the consideration of
the opinions of opponents but by removing or pushing out all those who did not
agree to the common program.” The first
scenario is possible in Russia, Pain says, but “the danger of the second is
very much present” because it is “much simpler” to carry out.
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