Paul
Goble
Staunton, January 8 – Few issues are
more explosive than the question of how many ethnic Russians are Muslims, because
such converts are often thought to be especially inclined to and useful for
terrorist activities and because such conversions challenge assumptions about
links between Russianness and Orthodoxy and highlight weaknesses in Russian
national identity.
And because there are no reliable
data available – the Russian census does not ask about religious affiliations
and at least some who have converted are understandably unwilling to run the
risks of declaring this to the state – estimates vary widely from a few
thousand to a few hundred thousand, with no on in a position to say exactly
what the number is.
That makes a portion of a new
article by Vasily Ivanov on the spread of radical trends in Islam among ethnic
Russians in the Middle Volga especially useful because he addresses this question
directly both for the Russian Federation as a whole and for the Middle Volga in
particular (kazan-center.ru/osnovnye-razdely/11/412/).
Ivanov’s discussion on the numbers,
first presented in October 2013 at an Ufa conference on “Islam and the State in
Russia” on the occasionof the 225th anniversary of the establishment
of the Orenburg Mohammedan Spiritual Assembly, is worth attending to even if
one does not accept all of his conclusions about the amount of radicalism to be
found in this group.
He begins by acknowledging that “exact
data on the number of Russian Muslims are lacking as a result of the fact that
the All-Russian census o the population does not allow defining the relationship
of the ethnic and religious attachments of the population” and that “existing
data are extremely contradictory.”
Media reports range from a few
thousand to several hundred thousand, with the lower numbers typically offered
by the mainstream media and the higher ones by Islamic websites. There are certainly a number of Russian
converts to Islam as a result of marriage or conviction, but the real number is
clearly somewhere between these high and low figures.
The low figures are simply guesses,
but the high figures are reached by an analogy that is not without its
problems. The 2009 Kazakhstan census
which did ask questions about religion and ethnicity found that there were
54,277 ethnic Russian followers of Islam in that Central Asian country, out of
a total number of 3,793,764 Russians there.
If the same share of ethnic Russians
in the Russian Federation were Muslims, that would mean more than a million of
the faithful there, but most writers, even on Islamic sites, assume that the
figure needs to be adjusted downward because Kazakhstan is a country whose
titular nationality is historically Islamic.
But there are other reasons not to
accept the Kazakhstan figures, Ivanov says. In the course of a scandal about
that census, it was discovered that a large portion of the population was
counted twice and the figures then had to be adjusted by officials, a change
that allowed the introduction of all kinds of distortions including on matters
of ethnicity and faith.
The actual figure for the Russian
Federation as a whole probably approaches 10,000, Ivanov suggests, but he notes
that “assessing the number of ethnic Russian Muslims in the Middle Volga is
much difficult” for a variety of reasons.
It is clear that there has been an
increase in the number of such people in Russia as a whole and in the Middle
Volga in recent years, and Ivanov says there are three basic groups among
Russian Muslims: those who have converted as a result of spiritual searches,
those who have as a result of marriage, and those who have out of social and
political calculation.
(In the last category is a sub-group
that is not increasing now but still attracts much attention, Ivanov continues.
Its members are Russian security and military personnel who have been “forcibly”
converted to Islam as a result of their imprisonment by the Afghan mujahideen or
Chechen rebels. There are only a few dozen such people.)
According to the Russian researcher,
who cites Russian security agency studies, most Russian Muslims follow Sunni trends such
as Wahhabism, Hizb ut-Tahrir, Tabligi Dzhamat, the Nurjilar, and the Hanafi and
Shafi rite. But there are also among
them a few Shiites and Sufis as well.
Many of the converts accept a “syncretic”
faith, one that combines elements from various trends, including extremist
ones. That happens perhaps especially often among those members of the business
and political elites who accept Islam out of political calculations as can be
seen in Ufa and several other Middle Volga cities.
Those who accept Islam for
ideological reasons, he suggests, can be subdivided among the following groups:
First, those who do so because of an interest in the esoteric or occult but who
seldom become practicing Muslims; second those who are attracted to Oriental
life, most of whom become Shiites; those who do so because they view Orthodoxy
as a “religion of the weak” and see in Islam a source of vital strength; and
those who accept Islam because they are criminals and want to cooperate with
Muslims who may be as well.
The last two categories, which might
be called “revolutionaries” and “criminals,” typically “find a common language within
organized criminal groups.” Unlike the other two, they are committed to being “practicing
Muslims.”
Some investigators, Ivanov says,
point to the existence among Russian Muslims of supporters of “Aryan Islam” and
“Marxist Islam.” The former “combine
Islam with Russian nationalism and racism” and view Islam either “as ‘a path to
the rebirth of the Russian nation’ or ‘a path to the armed struggle of the
white race.’” The latter see Islam as “’a means for the worldwide liberation of
the oppressed,’” and are internationalist in their outlook.
Given the attention to ethnic
Russian women converts to Islam, Ivanov says that those in this category fit
into one or two subgroups: Eitehr they have accepted Islam for family reasons
or consciously chosen to join bands, or they have been recruited, often by
deception, into the faith and into militant bands. More often than their male
counterparts, it appears, they have links to the North Caucasus.
According to the Center for the
Geography of Religion in the Synodal Department on Relations of Church and
Society of the Moscow Patriachate of the Russian Orthodox Church, a hardly
disinterested source, “there are now in Russia more than 200 ethnic Russian
Muslims” who are being investigated, sought or confined for criminal activities
such as terrorism.
That allows the conclusion, Ivanov
says that “Russian Muslims are the most criminalized ethno-confessional group
in the country,” a conclusion that appears to be widely accepted in Moscow but
that also appears to be more the product of prejudice and assumptions about the
total numbers of Russian Muslims than of anything else.
What is clear and what Ivanov stresses
is that there are clear “’distinctions in the mentality’” of ethnic Russians
who accept Islam not only from ethnic Russians who remain Orthodo but also from
representatives of nations who historically have followed what Russian
researchers call “traditional Islam.”
Also clear, and again something
Ivanov stresses, is that many ethnic Russians who accept Islam do so because
they know little about Russian Orthodoxy, something that investigators say is “to
a large extent the result of poor work by the Russian Orthodox Church” which typically
does not conduct missionary work among ethnic Russian youth.
Such work is absolutely necessary
now, Ivanov concludes, because “the main cause of the success of Islamic
proselytism among particular representatives of the Russian people is that the
majority of ethnic Russians remain cut off from their spiritual roots and in
fact are not acquainted with the religion of their ancestors” and have “distorted
ideas about this religion.”
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