Paul
Goble
Staunton, February 25 – Three Russian
analysts say that Moscow still has more levers in Ukraine that it has chosen to
use so far but that by not using those that is does have, the Russian
government may increasingly find itself in a position where it will have to
choose between taking steps that will cost it any remaining support there or
lead to a break with the West.
In an article on the “Svobodnaya
pressa” portal yesterday entitled “Does Russia retain any levers of influence
in Ukraine?” Aleksey Polubota surveys the opinions of three Russian analysts,
all of whom argue that Russia does but that for various reasons, it has not yet
employed as fully as it might (svpressa.ru/politic/article/82812/).
Moscow’s silence at the highest
levels as the new Ukrainian authorities take ever more radical steps, including
stripping Russian of its official status in the eastern oblasts, raises a
number of questions which demand answers, the “Svobodnaya pressa” journalist
suggests.
Among them are the following: How long
must everyone wait for Russia “to support those forces in Ukraine which are
traditionally oriented toward it?” And “Does Russian in principle retain levers
of influence [in Ukraine] considering the changed geopolitical landscape”
there?
Aleksandr Shatilov, a sociologist at
the Russian government’s Finance University, says bluntly that “the events of
recent times have demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the former policy of the
Russian Federation toward Ukraine,” a policy designed to “support there a
relative balance of the interests of various elite groups.”
But that balance has been destroyed by the Maidan, Shatilov
says, and “therefore, if Russia does not want to entirely lose it influence in
Ukraine, it must take sufficiently decisive actions” because the victory of the
Ukrainian West and Kyiv is rapidly spreading into “the traditionally
pro-Russian regions of South-East Ukraine.”
“A
counter-attack” is all the more necessary “especially if Vladimir Putin doesn’t
want that something similar will take place in our country,” the sociologist
says.
According
to Shatilov, “our possibilities for influence on the situation in the South and
East of Ukraine up to now are quite broad.” They include various “financial and
administrative levers” and variants of limited force influence.” But what
matters most is to identify people there who are not “gray and selfish
bureaucrats” but those who are real leaders.
Shatilov
suggests that what Moscow must do is carry out a kind of “casting call” in
order to identify those “charismatic” figures on whom the Russian Federation
could rely.
He
argues that giving aid to Kyiv is not a good idea because it will not purchase
the loyalty of the Ukrainian leaders.
That has already been demonstrated in the case of Viktor Yanukovich.
Therefore, Shatilov argues, “it is necessary to stop any handing over of
financial bonuses to Ukraine.”
Despite its promises, the European Union has
its own problems and won’t be delivering the kind of massive assistance Ukraine
needs. Consequently, Moscow has room to
maneuver and instead of providing help, it should in Shatilov’s view be “introducing
certain economic sanctions.”
What might those look like? There are many gastarbeiters in Russia from
Western Ukraine. Under the current conditions, “it is completely possible to
close the border to them,” something that would inflict real pain on their home
communities.
But what is most necessary of all,
the sociologist continues, is that Moscow stop
being “inert” and “demonstrate that it is a strong player in the
Ukrainian political arena. Otherwise, if we again surrender our positions in Ukraine,
to speak about our influence in this country will be senseless.”
He notes that in Russia itself there
are already suggestions being made that “it is necessary to reach an agreement
with Yuliya Timoshenko.” That is a mistake. The Timoshenko of today is “not the
Timoshenko of Yushchenko’s times.” Now,
she is “a figure who is strengthened by the victory of the nationalist Maidan.”
And with the West’s support, she won’t be forthcoming.
He suggests that Moscow is still
trying to figure out what to do because it is aware that “interference in this
situation in Ukrainian processes will elicit serious dissatisfaction from the
West” and that will “put at risk” the money members of the Russian elite keep
in Western banks. That is something “Vladimir Putin is forced to consider.”
But the Russian president now, after
the triumph of the Sochi Olympics, has “a certain cart blanche” from the
Russian people. How long that will last,
of course, is an open question, and if the Kremlin leader does not act soon,
Shatilov suggests, the Russian opposition is certain to try to organize a
Maidan in Moscow.
If Russia does introduce troops into
Ukraine, there is “no doubt” that the reaction of the West “will be extremely
negative.” Consequently, Moscow is
unlikely to do that, at least directly. But, “if the South-East of Ukraine
rises to defend itself from the expansion of the Banderites, then there will be
a chance to assist it as peace keepers” as well as to provide it with “arms,
finances and specialists.”
Tamara Guzenkova, a researcher at
the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, agrees. She say that “Russia
retains levers to create a situation in its favor” in Ukraine. But she adds that there is a “but” in this
regard: “Does the leadership of Russia
want to do so?” It hasn’t acted yet, and
she says she can only hope that this is because of the Sochi Games.
And Sergey Tolstov, director of the
Kyiv Institute of Political Analysis and International Research, adds that
Mosco needs to “define its goals” in such a way that they “correspond with the
interests of a significant part of Ukrainian society.” If it doesn’t do that
and quickly, and if Kyiv does not behave repressively, “a significant part of
Ukrainians” will support the new order, further limiting Moscow’s options.
Specifically, he says, “Russia needs
to be consistent regarding those groups of the Ukrainian people who place
definite hopes in it. As far as
political representation is concerned, this part of society is now in a poor
position. The politicians who acted in its name have been discredited.”
Tolstov says it would be “senseless”
to try to re-impose a customs blockade. That would only lead to “a sharp growth
of negative attitudes toward Russian among Ukrainians.” At the same time, however,
Moscow needs to recognize that “the new Ukrainian government hardly will enter
into constructive talks with Russia.”
More economic pressure will make
progress of that kind even less likely, he continues. “The deepening of the economic problems of
Ukraine as a result of Russia’s position will stimulate processes of an
ideological character which perhaps will be welcomed in the US but will hardly
lead to any constructive relations between our countries.”
The outcome of the situation in
Ukraine is still far from certain, Tolstov says, but one thing is clear: Russia’s
policies must be carefully calibrated and targeted lest blunter ones lead to
just the reverse of what Moscow hopes for.
As far as a possible pro-Moscow candidate
in the May 25 Ukrainian presidential elections is concerned, Tolstov says, “today
there is no such candidate.” The
south-east of the country has been politically “beheaded and disarmed” in the
run up to the voting “and cannot actively participate in political life in the
near term.”
Over a longer period, however, the
population of that region can engage in “a process of self-organization and
self-definition.” But that will take time, and “the appearance of a strong
pro-Russian candidate for president in the time remaining [before the May vote] is practically impossible.”
In sum, these three experts suggest,
Moscow does have levers but these are not as effective as they once were, and
many of the policy choices that appear to be under consideration in Moscow now
could easily backfire making the situation in Ukraine far worse from Russia’s
point of view than it is now and having a negative blowback effect on Russia
itself.
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