Paul
Goble
Staunton, February 24 – The
Ukrainian revolution has delivered a powerful blow against Putin’s plan “to
create a pan-Eurasian ‘community of dictators’” and called into question his
own authoritarian rule at home, although he is likely to be able to maintain
himself because of the strength of “the post-imperial syndrome” in the Russian
Federation.
In an article on Slon.ru today,
Vladimir Milov, president of the Moscow Institute of Energy Policy and a former
deputy energy minister, says that that conclusion arises from the fact that
Moscow has been wrong on two points: the ability of Viktor Yanukovich to
suppress the Maidan and the supposed interest of Eastern Ukraine in splitting
off from the rest of that country.
In fact, he writes, “efforts to
forcibly disperse the Maidan were not crowned with success (and after them
Yanukovich fell) and the prospects for a territorial split of Ukraine” are not
nearly as great as many in Moscow and elsewhere think. Moreover, Moscow hasn’t
prepared for either (slon.ru/world/milov_pro_ukrainu_-1060888.xhtml).
Those who believed that it would be
easy to disperse the Maidan by force “overrated the possibilities of the
Ukrainian force structures.” Yanukovich
had some support for doing so among the top generals – he worked hard in recent
months to find and promote such loyalists -- but almost none among the
soldiery, and that wasn’t and isn’t enough.
That should have been obvious to
Moscow, Milov says, but it wasn’t. Nor, “despite numerous speculations on the theme
of the splitting of Ukraine have we seen the formation of a single [and Milov
stresses “a single”] serious political force which would prepare the
institutions for the independence of the South and the East.”
The South and East aren’t interested
in such a split, Milov argues. On the
one hand, “the lack of love of residents of the South and East of Ukraine for
the Westerners in no way mean that they have somehow been oppressed and
forcibly Ukrainianized all these years and that they have suffered from ‘the
Western yoke.’”
Even under Yushchenko, the Ukrainian
language was not imposed on them, and “power in these regions in general always
belonged to local elites so that no one felt on himself any real ‘occupation,’”
Milov continues. Instead, each region has led its own lie, even if “Ukraine is
not de jure a federation.”
And on the other, “the local elites,
business and population [of the East and South] despite all its sympathies of Russia
and antipathies to the Westerners is not burning with a desire to be trampled
under the boot of the Putin dictatorship.” In reality, “many like Russia, but
few like the Putin system,” something it is long past time Russians understood.
“The fate of Abkhazia and South
Osetia very instructively demonstrates to everyone else what will happen with
those post-Soviet territories who decide to create their own ‘independent’
states under the flag of love for Russia,” Milov says.
The basic reason that Russian
analysts have been wrong about Ukraine is that they have “extrapolated” Russian
values and experiences and assumed that because the Putin regime can easily
suppress the opposition, Yanukovich could do the same in Ukraine, and because their
Russianness trumps citizenship, it must do the same in Ukraine. Those two ideas
are wrong.
All this does not mean that the road
ahead for Ukraine is easy, the Moscow analyst argues. The right radicals in
Ukraine are a problem because they are almost as opposed to integration into
Europe as they are to subordination to Russia.
The economic situation is dire.
And divisions within the country’s elite are deep and will be exploited
by Moscow.
But Putin’s
policies inside Russia have made the choice of Ukrainians easier. Had Russia
presented a more attractive image to the world, more ethnic Russians in Ukraine
and even more Ukrainians might have been interested in following its lead. But
Putin has made that impossible. Instead, he has unintentionally raised the question
of how Russia itself should change.
Putin recognizes the threat and has
taken steps to protect himself and his system.
In recent years, he has “quite effectively struggled with potentially
opposed groups” in Russian society so that there will not be any organized
group capable of challenging him and sought to tar them as representatives of an
alien “’American threat.’”
And what is far more immediately
important, “Putin and company have been conducting a very serious ideological
processing of the officer corps and ranks of the force structures,” suggesting
that there is “an ‘American conspiracy’” abroad interested in “’seizing our
natural resources.’” As absurd as this is, “people believe it.”
As a result of this brainwashing,
Milov continues, “many in the force structures who block street protests really
believe that they are not defending the power of the cleptocracy but are ‘struggling
with an American conspiracy.’”
Nonetheless, the impact of the
Ukrainian events on Russia is likely to be “extraordinarily strong.” Putin has suffered a major foreign policy
defeat and “in a country which is most similar to Russia historically and ethno-culturally.”
And its defeat is all the greater because Russia has interfered and “Putin has
underrated the Ukrainians,” something he now “understands.”
“Putin’s idea of creating a
pan-Eurasian ‘community of dictators’ has received a powerful rebuff, and Ukraine
once again has shown that its statehood, although quite chaotic is stronger
than that of a number of its ambition neighbors.” After all, unlike them, the
Ukrainians have been able to prevent the rise of a dictatorship while
maintaining their independence.
That in turn means, Milov says, that
the issue before Moscow is this: “Is Putin now capable of changing his views
about the citizens” of Russia. That is “a big question.” Russians delivered Putin “an enormous surprise”
in the last election by not voting overwhelmingly for him. And consequently, they may do even more in
the 2016-2018 electoral cycle.
But Milov adds, “everything is not
to simple: the post-imperial syndrome which doesn’t exist in Ukraine is Putin’s
ally.” And he will for some time be able
to use it to “mask his desire to preserve control over [his] corrupt billions
by an invented struggled with ‘the pernicious influence of the West.’”
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