Paul
Goble
Staunton, February 14 – Every
historical period is symbolized by a specific event in a specific place when
and where societies and their rulers demonstrate whether or not they are
capable of responding to the challenges they face. Today, Liliya Shevtsova says, Ukraine is that
place and that time not only for the post-Soviet states but more broadly.
In today’s “Yezhednevny zhurnal,”
the Moscow Carnegie Center scholar argues that what is taking place in Ukraine
not only reflects the situation there and in other post-Soviet states but also
that in the broader international community and thus represents in a “concentrated”
form the challenges both face (ej.ru/?a=note&id=24432).
Ukraine now, she says, highlights
both the efforts of some of the populations of the post-Soviet states to escape
“the historical dead end” they find themselves in as well as “the exhaustion”
of the recipes which had succeeded earlier, when social protest led to a split
of elites, the formation of a coalition between some in the elite and the
population, and then change.
That recipe has not yet worked in
Ukraine, Shevtsova continues, forcing both the opposition and the government to
look for new ways to move forward and thus making the future far more “unpredictable.”
At the same time, she suggests, “the
international situation around Ukraine is only making its path forward more
difficult. The hopelessness of Europe and the indifference of the US are
returning” the world to one of “spheres of influence to the world of Yalta.”
And no one can have any doubts about which “sphere of influence” Ukraine will
find itself.
In short, the Moscow analyst argues,
“Ukrainians are trying to break out of the past even as the West prefers to
seek refuge in it.” Russia’s Vladimir Putin “has turned out to be the most
successful leader even according to many Western observers.” Germany’s Angela
Merkel “is trying to avoid any choice,” and US President Barack Obama and other
Western leaders are doing much the same.
But despite this, the Ukrainians are
continuing to meet in the Maidan, something which highlights “the indifference
of some and the cynicism of others.”
These others like to say that “the Ukrainians must solve their own
problems.” As Shevtsova points out, “theoretically,”
of course, that is true.
However, Ukrainians could do so only
if Moscow were not seeking to control what happens in Ukraine and only if the
Western powers insisted that the Russians not be allowed to play that
interventionist role. Unfortunately, the
West appears to be failing to understand what is at stake and Russians are
taking advantage of that failure.
As a result, she says, “everything
which is taking place in Ukraine, including the radicalization of the Maidan,
the inability of the political elite to form a new government, the approaching
economic catastrophe, and the loss of control over the country is the result
... of this direct outside influence on Ukrainian processes.”
If anyone had any doubts of this,
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s statements this week should have laid
them to rest, Shevtsova says. The only “freedom”
he wants Ukraine to have is the “freedom” to reject the West. That of course means nothing other than the
inclusion of Ukraine into “’Russia’s geopolitical space.’”
But Ukraine is teaching the world
even more than this, she continues.
First, it is showing the complete “exhaustion of the post-Soviet model
of development which is characterize by the existence of a paternalist state
and the drawing of leaders to autocracy,” the three Baltic countries being the
only “exception.” Ukraine as “the weak link” is where the breakdown has come
first.
Second, Ukraine reflects a new
pattern development in the world in which street protests rather than the political
opposition take the lead. That has happened before “from Turkey to Brazil and
from Bulgaria to Thailand.” In Ukraine, “the
civic Maidan arose without the participation of the opposition” and is
developing “practically without its leadership.”
That is “an unwelcome surprise not
only for the authorities but also for the opposition.”
And third, the course of Ukrainian
events has “destroyed the stereotype, popular in Russia, according to which
social protests must lead the regime toward collapse.” At least so far, the Maidan
has not succeeded in doing that. Instead, there is a situation in which “dual
power is beginning to take shape.” That raises issues for those who want change
and those who don’t.
But perhaps the biggest question ahead
is this: “all previous successful democratic transformations have occurred with
some kind of support from the West.” But
today there seems to be indifference in Europe to what is happening in Ukraine,
an indifference that could play a fatal role.
Perhaps this is only “a temporary
paralysis,” Shevtsova writes, “but it is not excluded that this is a more
permanent tendency.” Regardless, it suggests the additional conclusion that “Europe
without pressure from Washington cannot become an active international actor.” But
this situation is certainly is now part of the calculus in Moscow and in other
post-Soviet capitals.
“The history of the Maidan is far
from completed,” the Moscow commentator says. “Possibly it is only just beginning.”
But how that history will turn out depends, whatever anyone says, not just on the
Ukrainians themselves but on the actions of others. And the latter, especially
Western leaders, need to see that what they do or don’t do will determine a
lot.
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