Kremlin’s Nepotism ‘No Anomaly’ and a Problem for Regime, Baranov Says

Paul Goble

 

            Staunton, April 4 – When a leader or his spokesman has to deny the obvious, that is a good indication that the obvious has become a problem.  And that appears to be what is happening now that Vladimir Putin’s press aide has denied that the appointment of the sons and relatives of powerful people to posts is in any way an anomaly.

 

            Reacting to questions about the appointment of Andrey Patrushev, the son of the Security Council secretary, to be deputy general director of Gazprom Nefti, Dmitry Peskov said that he “would not agree with the notion that this was some kind of anomalous situation” that is in any way a problem.

 

            There are far more people in such positions whose relatives do not occupy high posts, the press aide continued, and there are many sons and daughters of those whose relatives do who don’t have senior jobs in government, non-government, or mixed businesses. Consequently, those with relatives who do get such jobs are doing so because of their qualifications and talent.

 

            But Anatoly Baranov, chief editor of Forum-MSK.org, says that the increasing number of people with family connections who are getting top jobs in Russia is something no one can credibly deny and that for Russians, traditionally concerned about justice, “the Kremlin’s nepotism is more annoying than sodomy” (forum-msk.org/material/news/10768362.html).

 

            As Baranov points out, there are numerous cases where sons, daughters, brothers, sisters and other relatives of senior people have gotten other top jobs without any particular qualifications except for those links. And if one extends this to the old friends of top leaders, the situation is even worse.

 

            Among the examples he offers is the fact that of the 13 members of the board of directors of Gazprom Nefti, three are relatives of more senior people and ten are Leningraders like Putin. Isn’t this exactly “an anomaly” Baranov asks. And he suggests another reason why senior people are now installing their children and friends in such positions.

 

            As a result of a recent Russian government decision, these people are being allowed to keep their incomes secret even though they are supposed to be “’effective managers’” for the people and government of Russia.  That hides some of this corruption, he says, but it can’t hide the problem from Russians.

 

            Why? Because the older declarations when such officials were still required to declare their incomes remain, and anyone who thinks about it will recognize that these people are still doing very, very well, even though the average Russian has seen his income decline precipitously over the last year.

 

            And such reflections, he suggests, are likely to prove more corrosive of the Kremlin’s authority than any of those in power may want to believe and undermine that authority even as the Putin regime tries to distract attention from the increasingly corrupt way in which it is behaving.