Paul
Goble
Staunton, May 13 – Ten years ago
today, the Uzbek security services opened fire with automatic weapons on a
demonstration in Andizhan, killing more than 500, arresting more than 200 and
driving another 500 into emigration, first into Kyrgyzstan and then into
Europe, Australia and the United States.
Tashkent continues to insist and
some governments and observers to accept that it was facing an Islamist
insurgency and thus was fully justified in using force to put it down, a
position all independent investigations have shown to be so exaggerated that it
constitutes an outright falsification -- unless one believes that any actions
by Muslims are by definition extremist.
(For background
on what actually happened in Andizhan, see the 2005 OSCE report at fergananews.com/archive/2015/13may/oscereport13may.pdf; for its continuing and spreading fallout, see the
numerous reports listed at fergananews.com/andijan-2005 and amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/eur_62_1086_2015_uzbekistantorture_fullreport.pdf.)
But the failure of the international
community to challenge the official Uzbek explanation of what happened ten
years ago in Andizhan not only has allowed Islam Karimov to increase repression
at home and spread fear among Uzbek refugees abroad but also has contributed to
the growth of real Islamist groups like ISIS across Central Asia.
That is because the extremists can
plausibly and convincingly argue that there is no possibility for dialogue with
regimes like Karimov’s and the only way forward is to use violence, a view that
those who went into the streets in Andizhan ten years ago did not have but that
an increasing number of people in Uzbekistan and elsewhere in Central Asia now
do.
And thus those who are prepared to
support authoritarian actions taken in the name of stability not only are harming
the human rights of those who live under such regimes or are within the reach
of their diplomatic representations abroad but also are doing more to spread
Islamist radicalism and instability than ISIS or its allies could ever achieve
on their own.
Those are some
of the conclusions suggested by Alisher Ilkhamov, an Uzbek émigré in London and
the author of one of the most comprehensive early reports on the Andizhan
violence (fergananews.com/archive/2015/13may/akromiyailkhamovinabashin.pdf),
in a comment to Fergana.com timed to coincide with this anniversary (fergananews.com/articles/8532).
Ilkhamov
says that he remains convinced that neither Akram Yuldashev nor the community
around him were extremists, as the Uzbek authorities have insisted. Their
doctrines were and remain directed to the gradual transformation of society rather
than to the establishment of an Islamic state or khalifate.
He
suggests that most of the people involved have views that resemble European social
democracy, although Ilkhamov points out that the teachings of the group stress
socialism more than democracy. He adds
that there is even “a definite resemblance” between this group and the Mormons.
The
stress on gradualism reflects the repressive nature of the Uzbek state, he
suggests, and the stress on social issues reflects the anger many of those who
were involved with the Andizhan events feel about the massive corruption that
they and other Uzbeks encounter in their daily lives.
Ilkhamov
cites with approval the conclusions of Sarah Chayses’ new book, “Thieves of
State: Why Corruptin Threatens Global Security” (NY: Norton, 2015) and in particular the entire chapter she
devotes to the way in which corruption played a key role in the Andizhan
protests of 2005, prompting Tashkent to defend itself by accusing the group of
Islamist extremism.
Those
who remain in Andizhan and in Uzbekistan more generally are victims of Karimov’s
corrupt and repressive regime. Many are afraid to speak out lest they be
subject to persecution. But tragically,
even those who have fled abroad have not been able to entirely escape the long
arm of Tashkent.
Some who fled
have become more political at least to the extent of issuing reports and
cooperating with other Uzbeks (fergananews.com/archive/2015/13may/bahtiyormuhtarov.pdf).
But many who want to return home or who have relatives there have been
effectively depoliticized out of fears that anything they say could have consequences
for their relatives and friends at home.
Immediately after the Andizhan
massacre, “Uzbek embassies and special services began active work, acting
according to the principle of carrots and sticks to seek to neutralize the
influence” of those who had been involved in the protests and who then fled
abroad, Ilkhamov writes.
Tashkent has had some success. In
the US, it managed to get 53 people to agree to return, providing them with
money and tickets. But this effort was clouded by the fact that two who did so died
in mysterious circumstancfes just before leaving, many who went could not find
work, and some were sent to prison.
Seventeen of this group then fled to Kazakhstan.
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