Paul
Goble
Staunton, October 18 – Vladimir
Putin’s call to put Holy Books beyond the reach of Russian courts was clearly
intended to solve the political problem created by Chechen leader Ramzan
Kadyrov’s objections to the decision of a court in the Russian Far East finding
verses from the Koran to be “extremist.”
But Putin’s move not only highlights
Russia’s moves away from a secular state toward an Orthodox-Muslim one but also
calls into question the entire logic of Russian legislation that allows for
courts and other officials to ban anything they object at any particular time
to as extremist.
Vadim Shtepa, a leading Russian
regionalist writer, calls attention to all these problems and more in a
commentary on the Spekr.press portal (spektr.press/pravoslavno-islamskoe-gosudarstvo/). His words
should give pause to all those who think that what Putin has proposed will
solve the problem rather than cause even more difficulties for Russia in the
future.
Four days ago, he writes, Putin
“proposed to make an exception from the law “On Countering Extremist Activity”
for “the Bible, the Koran and other holy writings.” By so doing, the Kremlin
leader “of a de jure secular state
shows himself prepared to put religious teaching above the legislation of the
country.”
Such a move, Shtepa continues, “fits
in beautifully with the logic of recent times and only confirms the clerical
evolution of the current Russian authorities.”
Of course, Putin’s move came in response to
Kadyrov’s complaints, although others have challenged religious texts,
including the Bible. (See sib.fm/news/2015/09/16/zhitel-novosibirska-poprosil-prokuraturu-proverit-bibliju). And of course,
“Chechnya is a unique subject of the Russian Federation, in which much more is
permitted than elsewhere.”
Indeed, it is “obvious that there was a secret pact
between the Kremlin and the Kadyrov administration after the second Chechen
war,” one in which “in exchange for colossal subsidies from the Kremlin
‘Allah,’ the Chechen leadership began to position itself as enthusiastic
patriots of Russia and its protects by threatening activists of the
opposition.”
But
even that accord might have not been enough to push Putin to act had it not
been for the support Kadyrov’s position received from the Moscow Patriarchate
of the Russian Orthodox Church. Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin, who speaks for
Patriarch Kirill, called for ending court cases against “holy texts” (newsru.com/religy/11sep2015/chaplin_hl_schriften.html).
Chaplin
even added that in his view and apparently that of many in the official
hierarchy, “the Russian Constitution of 1993 was ‘illegitimate’ because ‘it was
adopted without the active public participation of Orthodox people and also of
traditional Muslims” (politsovet.ru/49717-v-rpc-zayavili-o-nelegitimnosti-konstitucii-rossii.html).
“Thus,” Stepa
writes, “in Russia a definite rapprochement of the positions of Orthodox and Muslim
conservatives if not their complete coming together has taken place” That trend
was on view even earlier given the similar statements the Moscow Patriarchate
and the leaders of traditional Muslims in Russia made about what should be
permitted in society.
From one perspective, this shouldn’t
surprise anyone. Five years ago, Putin asserted that “Orthodoxy is closer to
Islam than it is to Catholicism” (islamnews.ru/news-28541.html).
“Now,” Stepa says, “it is precisely the president who stands in defense of
religious texts against the law,” something that that view and the ideas of
Eurasianism support.
According to the regionalist writer,
“the moratorium against criticism of ‘holy texts’ proposed by Kadyrov and
Chaplin and supported by President Putin will mean the actual liquidation of
secular statehood,” because it will place them above the law and thus “destroy the
very institute of civic law on which contemporary civilization is based.”
Kadyrov and Chaplin limit these holy
texts to the Koran and Bible respectively, “but any religious community can
have its own ‘holy writings’ and it also will insist that they are ‘beyond the
reach of the law.’” But that will prove
impossible to sustain, as Putin has acknowledged by adding the texts of
Buddhists and Hindus already.
The only way to “return the
situation to a rational dimension is a principled and consistent insistence on
the constitutional principles of a secular state,” from which Putin and his
friends have now departed, having failed to recognize that their support of “’traditional
religions’” undermines this possibility.
“It is indicative,” he says, “that
Orthodox clericalists are concerned with practically the same thing that Muslim
fundamentalists are. The two equally dislike European freedoms and are
supporters of the introduction of a certain ‘correct’ dress code, especially
for women. The Muslims are more radical in their demands, and the impression is
that the Orthodox are following them.”
Several years ago, Ravil Gaynutdin, the head of the Council
of Muftis of Russia (SMR), suggested that the Koran should be recognized as “the
third Testament,’” after the Old and New (regions.ru/news/2097731/). Under the
protection of the Putinist state, that “rapprochement” appears to be happening.
And
if things proceed any further, “one anti-utopian anecdote could be as follows: ‘In
1927, Russia said: “there is no god.” Now, it needs to be added, “except Allah.’”
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