Paul
Goble
Staunton, January 22 – Facing the
near certainty of more popular unrest, Vladimir Putin now faces a choice
between two models of repression, the completely lawless kind advocated by
Chechnya’s Ramzan Kadyrov and the nominally legal kind the FSB and other Moscow
siloviki organs in Moscow generally prefer, according to human rights activist
Lev Ponomaryev.
In a commentary this week for “Moskovsky
komsomolets,” Ponomaryev says that in fact, the two sides of this argument have
entered into “a competition” for Putin’s attention and approval; and the
selection of either or a combination of some of both will be disastrous for
Russians (mk.ru/politics/2016/01/19/zadachi-dlya-nesoglasnykh.html).
The Kadyrov side of the argument has
attracted more attention not only because of his flamboyance but also because
of mounting evidence that the Putin regime has used some of Kadyrov’s lawless
methods in the past against its opponents. But the activities of the “legal”
side of this dispute are equally a matter of concern, the rights activist says.
The Moscow siloviki have introduced
three measures in the Duma designed to legitimate the actions they may take
against the opposition. The first of these, the so-called “’law of sadists’”
which would give prison guards greater scope to mistreat inmates, has passed
only on first reading, and there is hope that it won’t be approved in the end.
The second measure which has passed
gives FSB officers expanded authority to use force against demonstrators
without fear of punishment. “Ahead is
the struggle for changing this law,” Ponomaryev says. And the third is a draft law which would
expand the ability of the police to use force against the population and
particularly against women.
“One of the odious” aspects of the
draft is that it restricts the use of force by the police only against women
who appear to be pregnant; but another more dangerous one is that the
legislation makes no distinction as far as the ability of the police to use
force between peaceful demonstrations and armed rebellion.
“Rights activists are demanding
public discussion and expert analysis of this law by the Presidential human
rights ombudsman and the Presidential Human Rights Council,” he says. Because such laws are so dangerous, the
choice Putin makes between Kadyrov and the FSB thus will result in “terror
against the peaceful population.”
“Is there a way out of this
situation?” Ponomaryev asks rhetorically.
“Usually people say now because Putin and his entourage have adopted a
course on life-long rule – and they see the tightening of the screws as the
only way to preserve their power.” If
they succeed in intimidating the population by either or both methods, the
result will be disastrous.
Over time, he continues, Russia “will
step by step be transformed into something like North Korea, a nuclear outcast.”
Alternatively, there will be a mass rising to overthrow the government but the
chances that such an action would be peaceful are “very small. Both variants
thus look catastrophic.”
Such outcomes could be avoided if
the government changed its economic policy, shifting resources from the
military to social needs. But that has been obvious for a long time and there
has been no movement in that direction rather in the reverse. And there needs to be a new cast of leaders
who “are not corrupt and have the political will to carry out these measures.”
Given the authoritarian nature of
Russia today, only Putin can make such a decision, Ponomaryev says. The problem is that “all talk that the
president is good and the boyars are bad is suitable only for television
propaganda.” At the same time, however,
Putin was elected more or less honestly and has the support of a large
majority.
“Therefore, demanding his retirement
which seems completely just can’t be fulfilled … and is premature.” But there are demands that can be made and
steps that can be taken. The Russian government can and should be
reconstituted, and the opposition must prepare diligently and in a cooperative
manner for the 2016 Duma elections to push for that.
Some may think these reflections “naïve”
given Putin’s 85 percent support in the polls, but the thing is, Ponomaryev
says, is that this “does not remove responsibility from the 15 percent who don’t
agree. That is not a small number,
especially if one considers that the 85 percent are not a monolith but on the
contrary an inert mass.”
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