Paul
Goble
Staunton, March 23 – Moscow has been
relatively successful in fighting Islamist radicalism by the use of force, but
it has been much less so in the ideological sphere, often committing mistakes
that give its opponents an opening which they have eagerly seized to promote
their ideas.
Perhaps the most horrific of these
unintended mistakes, one Russian commentator says, was Vladimir Putin’s decision
to exclude all holy books, including the Koran, from being examined as sources
of extremism. That has made some Russian
judges reluctant to examine materials that contain citations to the Koran.
And their reluctance, one analyst
says, has the Islamists celebrating. “’Finally,’”
they openly declare, “we have been given the chance to freely disseminate
everything that we want. Allah protects us and the Koran preserves us from the
judges of the Russian Federation’” (ridus.ru/news/215348).
But
if that is the most egregious failure on the ideological front, it is far from
the only one the Russian authorities are committing, according to Moscow
commentator Yekaterina Trofimova, who on the basis of consultations with
Russian experts points to a large number of others.
The
Russian government’s support for immigration from Central Asia has allowed
Islamist radicals from there to seize control of many of the mosques in Russian
cities and transform them into recruiting centers for ISIS and other radical
groups, according to Aleksey Grishin, head of the Religion and Society Center.
Moreover,
he says, the Russian authorities have compounded this error by seeking the help
of these mosques to adapt the migrants to Russian conditions. Thus, the Russian state itself is sending
Muslims to Islamist recruiters and appears oblivious to the consequences of its
own blindness.
Moreover,
when it cracks down on migrants, it also fails, according to Georgy Fedorov, a
member of the Russian Social Chamber. To the extent that its targets remain in
Russia, they form underground mosques that are inherently radical; and to the
extent they return home, they become a source of instability in their own
countries.
Indeed,
as a result of Russian government policies in this regard and the economic
recession at the present time, Russia has been transformed from “an importer of
Islamist extremism” into an exporter, something the Central Asian countries
recognize even if Moscow does not.
Indeed,
the governments in that region have concluded, Fedorov continues, that “the
main path to Syria for these migrants passes through Russia” because that is
where those who are now fighting for the Islamic State were first exposed to
Islamist messages. They thus threaten Russia’s allies and Russia itself.
But
the threat of Islamist extremism is not restricted to migrants, Trofimova
continues. Galina Khriziyeva, a
researcher at the Russian Institute for Strategic Research (RISI), says that it
has domestic sources as well given Moscow’s failure to support official Muslim
hierarchies, despite being asked, and the lack of the authority of those
institutions relative to ones controlled by the extremists.
One
of the reasons that Moscow has failed to understand this, Khriziyeva says, is
that it is addressing the problem too narrowly. The issue is no longer that of
recruitment for the Islamic state, although that continues, but rather “the
formation of a new system of convictions” among Muslims who have concluded that
they have the opportunity to seize power in Russia too.
As
a result, Trofimova says, ever more mosques and soon some of the Muslim
spiritual directorates (MSDs) have become centers of extremism without Moscow
taking note. Indeed, according to Grishin, the center isn’t even in the
position to provide advice to local officials on how to cope with such
extremist actions.
When
he worked in the Presidential Administration, Grishin says, “governors
telephoned and asked how to respond in this or that situation” regarding Islamist
activists. But neither he nor his colleagues had a well-developed set of advice
to give them; and the extremists exploited that lack as well.
Just
how bad things are as far as the official response to Islamist radicalism is
shown by the following story, Grishin continues. One official who visited a
summer camp for Muslim youth told him that the young people attending were told
that “Muslims must love their motherland.”
That
was true, the Moscow expert says; but if one listened to the tape, one heard
that “’Muslims must love their motherland only if their motherland doesn’t
persecute Islam.’” To another question, “must a citizen defend his motherland?’
The response was “’he must, but he must understand that where citizenship and
faith are concerned, faith must take priority.’”
That
is not a message, Grishin suggests, that the Russian state can afford to allow
Islamists to deliver.
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