Kremlin-Supported Fantasy Novel Posits a World in Which Top Leaders have Been Killed, Putin is Recovering from Wounds, and Moscow has Reassembled the Empire

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 20 – Taking advantage of widespread Russian interest in fantasy novels about the future, the Kremlin has supported some with prizes and other kinds of backing to ensure that its preferred image of “a bright future” for Russia reaches a large audience, according to Anastasiya Zhigulina.

            The Bumaga journalist says that instead of simply taking books off shelves by means of censorship, the Russian authorities are sponsoring books about the war and the future, the kind of fantasies that polls suggest as many as a third of all Russians currently want to read (paperpaper.io/z-fantastika-kak-obraz-svetlogo-budush/).

            Zhigulina gives a number of examples of such books. Perhaps the most intriguing is one by Moscow IT specialist Olga Uskova entitled The Studies of Cherny. It centers on the fallout from a terrorist act that kills the leaders of the Big Seven who are replaced by underlings. In it, Putin is recovering from his injuries.

            But working with artificial intelligence, and and his government succeed in forcing other countries to replace leaders hostile to Russia with others who want to cooperate with it. That, Uskova says, allows Moscow to fight those with an LGBT agenda and lead a war against opponents of Christianity. Uskova says she sold 50,000 copies in four months.

Almost equally interesting is a second called The Church that Vrubel Painted by Kaluga writer Timur Suvorkin who last year won a major prize (300,000 rubles) in a competition Moscow supported in which novelists were asked to describe Russia 20 to 25 years from now. His novel also begins with the victory of Russia over Ukraine and the formation of a new Union of Fraternal Peoples on the model of the former Soviet Union.

Commenting on these and other such political fantasies, Zhigulina says that Russians really are interested in fantasy literature but not in this particular kind. Many Russians in fact say they can see right through such fiction and aren’t prepared to allow themselves to be led by the nose through it.

Ethnic and Regional Identities in Sakha Intensifying among Ethnic Sakha and Ethnic Russians Living in That Republic, Sociological Survey Shows

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 20 – The Moscow Institute of Sociology posted on its Facebook page yesterday a summary of an article that appeared in its journal last year showing that ethnic and regional identities are on the rise in Sakha among both ethnic Sakha and ethnic Russians and that both groups favor greater autonomy from Moscow.

            Ekaterina Arutyunova’s article, “Ethnicity and regionality in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia): the significance and content of identities under external pressure” [in Russian], Vestnik instituta sotsiologii, 16: 1 (2025): pp. 13-29, is summarized on Facebook at facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid0ekV6xf5GJNm4nYgXspCzaN3oKrTfnFYpkKsEZKaokk8KXauJKNqBgJccKFGfSnVXl&id=100064692787010. The full text is available at vestnik-isras.ru/files/File/Vestnik_2025_52/Arutyunova_13-29.pdf.

            Both the decision of the Institute to post information now about this article by one of its senior researchers and the findings Aryutyunova are important, suggesting that the ethnicization and regionalization of identities in Sakha and likely elsewhere in the Russian Federation are intensifying and that the Institute wants her work to gain more attention.

            Those with an interest in these topics should go back to the original article; but the summary the Institute has posted on Facebook now is fair and merits reporting as an indication of what that Academy of Sciences body is thinking and wants others to pay attention to at the present time.

            The summary of the article suggests that “the ethnic identity of the Sakha people (ethnic Yakuts) remains consistently high and subjectively significant” and that “among Russian Yakuts its level is rising as well.” For both groups, the most important component of identity is native language.”

            The article specifies that religion is an increasingly important component of ethnic identity in Sakha and notes that for ethnic Russians there, “the statehood and history” they share with ethnic Russians across the country is “significantly important,” not surprising given the intertwining of ethnic and civic identities for that group.

            According to Aryutyinova, “regional and local identities are also very significant for ethnic Yakuts;” and she adds that “high level of regional identity” was also part of the identity of ethnic Russians living in the republic.  Both Sakha and ethnic Russians say they believe that “all citizens of Russia should have equal rights.”

            But, the summary notes, “more than a third of the Sakha agree with the position that "representatives of the indigenous nationality should have more rights in their national republic than representatives of other nationalities." That position could lead to unequal treatment, but the article suggests it may reflect fears of losing their ethnic identity.

            Both groups overwhelmingly believe that “it would be good for the peoples of the republics to have more independence;” but at the same time, both say that “it is important to prevent the growth of influence of outside actors hostile to Russia” who are exploiting “the so-called anti-colonialist and anti-imperial agenda” of some.

Gas Crisis Forcing Many Russians to Turn to Problem-Plagued Public Transport

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 20 – Not surprisingly, Russians who are unable to get gas for their cars are turning to public transportation, only to discover that that system on which they generally had to rely is suffering from serious problems and that these problems which they had ignored because of their cars have seriously intensified since Putin launched his expanded war in Ukraine.

            That is the conclusion of an Important Stories investigation written up by the portal’s journalist Rina Nikolayeva who says there do not appear to be any quick fixes and that Russians without gas are often without bus service as well (istories.media/news/2026/07/20/v-35-regionakh-rossii-podnyali-tseni-na-proezd-ili-sokratili-marshruti/).

            In 25 federal subjects, she writes, public transportation operators, both private and governmental, have raised prices since the gas crisis began, a natural response given that they are having to pay more for fuel as well; and in 10 more regions and republics, these services have reduced the number of routes and the frequency of buses.

            “Public transport,” Nikolayeva continues, “can work normally only when the local authorities treat it as a vital infrastructure like sewage or water supply and allocate enough funds from the budget for its development and operation.” But a present, “the level of underfunding is catastrophic.” And Russians are increasing left with no transportation options.

            The gas shortage crisis is only one of the reasons for this, the Important Stories journalist says. There is also a serious shortage in the number of drivers, many of whom left that service to fight in Ukraine given the large bonuses the state offered for those who volunteered to do so. But as a result, there simply are no drivers for many buses.

            This isn’t a headline-grabbing kind of development, but it almost certainly plays a role in the rising anger Russians now feel about their situation and the declining approval they are giving to Vladimir Putin, the person whose policies including the expanded war in Ukraine is behind it.

Scholars in the Russian Far East Say They have Developed a Bio-Cement to Help Build and Maintain Roads and Other Infrastructure in the Far North

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 20 – In what could be a game changer for Russia and other countries seeking to build and maintain roads and other infrastructure in areas where permafrost is now melting, scholars at the Institute of World Oceans at the Far Eastern Federal University say they have developed a bio-cement that will allow roads and buildings to melting and refreezing.

            Reporting this development, Yulia Fursova of the Siberian Economist says that “building in the Arctic has always been a challenge. The soil constantly changes properties due to cyclical freezing and thawing which leads to the deformation of roads, buildings and pipelines (sibmix.com/?doc=22093).

            “Traditional methods of strengthening require the importation of large volumes of cement or chemical reagents,” steps that Fursova points out are not only “expensive” but “unsafe for the fragile nature of the Arctic.” Now, specialists at the Far Eastern Federal University have come up with an alternative approach one based on bacteria.

            Researchers there “isolated bacteria from coastal soils, capable of producing an enzyme that triggers a chemical reaction. When these microorganisms are added to the ground … they begin to produce calcium carbonate … and tiny calcite crystals fill the voids between the grains of sand and glue them, turning loose soil into a stone-like structure.”

“Unlike chemical reagents and cement, bacteria work gently and do not pollute the environment. Moreover, the process of bio-cement itself is involved in the binding of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere - just as it happens in nature in the formation of limestone rocks,” one of the researchers involved says.

            The developers say that the application of this technology is not limited to roads but can be used in dams, pipelines and other infrastructure elements. And they say that now they have completed laboratory research, they are ready for tests in the field. If these tests succeed, it could transform construction tasks in the north.

If Northern Caspian Disappears, Russia will Lose Its Caspian Flotilla and Much Else Besides, Mammadov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 20 – The northern segment of the Caspian is historically and geologically much shallower than the southern part, Rauf Mammadov says; and if as some environmental experts suggest the northern part will disappear and the southern silt up in the coming decades, Russia will lose a lot, beginning with its Caspian Flotilla and the bases that force uses.

            The Azerbaijani environmental expert who now works in Europe and the US says that such predictions about the future of the Caspian sea may be hyperbolic; but they call into question the insistence of Russian experts that Moscow should keep the water of the Volga rather than allow it to help keep the Caspian alive (caliber.az/post/ischeznet-li-kaspij).

            “If the five Caspian littoral states wish to preserve the Caspian Sea, they must act in concert, he says, suggesting that “this is especially true for Russia, given that the Volga River accounts for 85% of the water flowing into the Caspian." Unfortunately, many Russian officials and analysts say that Moscow can ignore the interests of the other states.

            It is true that Russia may benefit in the short term by taking more water out of the Volga and thus putting the Caspian at ever greater risk, the Azerbaijani environmental expert says; but over all, the shrinking of the Caspian will have a series of negative consequences no Russia should want to see happen.

            Falling water levels of the Caspian, Mammadov says, “will lead to a sharp decline in Russia’s maritime trade with other Caspian nations, potentially leading to the collapse of the Russian merchant fleet” and beyond any question harming the Russian fishing industry on that body of water.

            Moreover, he continues, the drying up of the Caspian will have “severe environmental implications for “the entire south of Russia,” with areas “as far as Voronezh and Volgograd and perhaps even further experiencing significantly higher temperatures” and an infestation of pests.

            In addition, Mammadov says, there will be the impact of sandstorms arising from the dried-up former seabed as well as the ecological and economic degradation affection entire coastal regions and cities, including Astrakhan, Kalmykia, Makhachkala, Derbent and all of Dagestan.”

            And at the same time, he points out, “Russia’s traditional Caspian Flotilla bases would disappear; building new ones would be costly, and there would simply be no suitable locations left for them.” Together with the other changes, “ Southern Russia would also suffer the consequences of internal migration.”

Moscow Patriarchate Asks Faithful to Pray for Defense of Russian-Occupied Crimea and for Protecting Russia against Internal Conflicts

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 18 – Reflecting the concern of many in Moscow over Ukraine’s recent military successes, the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church has asked its parishioners to pray for Russians defending occupied Crimea from “visible and invisible adversaries.”

            The prayer asks that the Mother of God ensure “an Orthodox presence in Crimea’ and grant “victory from heaven” and goes on to ask St. Fyodor Ushakov, identified in the prayer as the patron saint of the Russian navy and Sevastopol to intercede to ensure Russian control of the Ukrainian peninsula (ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/07/18/pobedi-navidimiya-inevidimiya-supostati-daruyai-sinod-rpts-utverdil-molitvu-vzaschitu-krima-a201174).

            The new prayer, approved at the latest meeting of the church’s Holy Synod, continues with a request for divine intervention to help the Russian military “in its defense of the Fatherland” and heavenly assistance to ensure that Russia itself will be “shielded from the invasion of foreign foes and internecine strife.”

            Such a prayer is likely intended to mobilize Russians in support of the war; but it is certain to raise concerns among Russians about just how serious the problems Moscow now faces in prosecuting the Putin’s war in Ukraine and even how much at risk Russia itself is because of its invasion of Ukraine.

            As a result, the Kremlin is certain to be anything but thrilled but this latest Patriarchal effort to show its loyalty, one that may backfire and reduce the loyalty of Russians to the author of this war and its illegal occupation of Ukraine’s Crimea and his policies in their own country that are already losing support.

Russia’s Regional Media Largely Continue to Operate Below Moscow’s Radar Screen, Kharatyan Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 18 – Most media outlets still open in the Russian capital operate under the close supervision of the Russian authorities, but those at the regional level in many cases continue to operate below Moscow’s radar screen largely because they do not make attempts to “independently cover” federal issues, Kirill Kharatyan says.

            “By focusing on local issues,” the media specialist at The Moscow Times says, “they aim to earn the trust of readers and satisfy the demand for objective local information, a need central publications by definition cannot meet” (ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/07/18/media-v-emigratsii-i-v-rossii-adaptatsiya-k-realnosti-vo-vremya-voini-a201173).

            Such media, he continues, “often function without registering as a legal entity or obtaining a formal media license. Frequently, they do not even register their telegram channels with the Moscow authorities. In this way, they strive to attract as little attention as possible from federal officials and politicians.

            In addition, these “outlets often enjoy the support of a loya and active readership that contributes in various ways, including financially;” and they often are provided with leads by readers. Their relationships with local elites are “unique.” Some regional elites are even supportive because they see such media as useful to themselves.

            But what is critical is that “most regional and local authorities turn a blind eye to the activities of regional media.” Whether this will continue is very much an open question; but as of now, regional outlets do provide the kind of news most central ones don’t, including on occasion coverage of issues that Moscow doesn’t allow Moscow outlets to produce. 

Baku Shipyard with Tools from the West Building Ships for Itself, its Caspian Littoral Neighbors and Foreign Customers Further Away

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 19 – The Baku Shipyard is transforming trade and security on the Caspian basin and helping Azerbaijan to become a major supplier of ships of all kinds to a wide variety of countries, leading Caliber journalist to describe what is is doing as “the birth of an iron colossus.”

            Timur Rzayev, says the shipyard has achieved its current prominence with equipment from Finland, the Netherlands, Germany, the Czech Republic, the UK, South Korea and Singapore and with orders from the region and  more generally (caliber.az/post/rozhdenie-zheleznogo-kolossa-tak-sozdaetsya-morskaya-mosh-azerbajdzhana).

            Many of the ships the yard has produced are in support of the Middle Corridor, a transport route “connecting China and Europe,” bypassing Russia and “passing through Azerbaijan whose importance as a transportation hub is increasing “every day,” the Caliber journalist says.

            But what is especially important is that the development of the Baku yards marks an important transition for a country that had been part of the Russian empire: it is not only charting its own way but now producing the equipment it needs to do so, rather than relying on supplies from the former imperial state. 

Notorious ‘Black Marias’ of Soviet Times are Returning to Russia's Streets at Government Order

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 16 – In Soviet times, prisoners were collected and transported in unmarked black vehicles that came to be known as “Black Marias.” Now, at the order of the Russian government, such vehicles are returning, albeit with the one difference that they must have a reference to the FSB or its border service painted on them.

            “During the Great Terror, NKVD officers used such so-called ‘Black Marias’ to pick up those targeted for repression,” The Barents Observer notes. Now, they are back, a small but frightening aspect of Russia’s return under Putin to notorious Stalin-era practices (ru.thebarentsobserver.com/novosti/vozvrasenie-cernogo-voronka/454043).

            Such vehicles are likely to become ever more visible on the streets of Russian cities and towns because the FSB now has control of seven pre-trial detention centers, including Lefortovo in Moscow and Shpalerka in St. Petersburg and is increasingly involved in the detention, arrest and transport of migrants and others charged with various crimes.

Putin Excluding Individuals and Groups from Common Legal Sphere Much as Nazis Did, Shumanov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 18 – “Max Weber described the state as a structure possessing a monopoly on the legitimate use of force” but Putin’s Russia like in Nazi Germany, “the authorities have gone further: they are constructing a monopoly on the power to exclude individuals and groups from public life” and its legal protections, Ilya Shumanov says.

            The founder of the Arktida project, which defends the numerically small peoples of the Russian north, says Moscow has “established an extensive nomenclature of labels” – such as “undesirable organization” or “foreign agent” – stripping those assigned to these categories of access to the rights of others (sapere.online/ot-monopolii-na-nasilie-k-monopolii-na-isklyuchenie/).

            According to Shumanov, “the goal of these designations is not merely to punish, but to create a system of exclusion: once a person steps onto this ladder, they are gradually stripped of their rights until their continued presence in society becomes impossible.” And “each step up this ladder of escalation and exclusion strips away specific rights.”

            “A "foreign agent" is barred from teaching, running for office, monitoring elections, placing advertisements, writing books, or posting on social media without a mandatory disclaimer,” he says. Moreover, “for every status, there are protocols, corresponding registries, and rules governing both the maintenance of these lists and removal from them.

Shumanov continues: “Everything is strictly formalized to create an appearance of legality, even though there is very little actual legality in the actions of the Russian authorities. The law is inverted: instead of protecting human rights, it becomes a switch that turns off human or civil rights.”

A similar system existed in Nazi Germany. It was promoted by Carl Schmitt who argued that “the sovereign is the one who decided on ‘the state of exception’ – that is, the one with the power to create exceptions to the rules. The same logic is now evident in the Russian context where the state established this set of exceptions.”

This is very much the case with the ways in which Moscow deals with ethnic minorities, the activist says. “The state encourages their cultural diversity, viewing them as a kind of ethnographic subject; but when anyone talks about genuine political rights -- such as rights to land, self-determination, or environmental protection – these are denied.

In short, Shumanov says, “culture is permitted but political agency is not.”

According to him, “approximately 100 indigenous initiatives in Russia have been designated as terrorist or extremist” by the Russian state; and the state is increasingly “delegating the functions of state-sanctioned violence to proto-state or non-state actors,” like the Wagner PMC and the Russian Community.

“these groups serve as a buffer for the Russian state, ensuring that the fallout from acts of violence does not attach to the state itself or further undermine trust in institutions of power that are already compromised,” Shumanov suggests, as “the state can easily label a grassroots initiative ‘radical and disavow it as necessary.”

When hundreds of thousands of veterans return from Putin’s war in Ukraine, this trend will almost certainly increase and even lead to the possible creation of a veterans party that will aid the Kremlin in putting even more individuals and groups beyond the protection of the law. 

Disaster Ahead This Winter for Russian North, United Russia Deputies in Arkhangelsk Parliament Warn

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 17 – United Russia deputies in the Arkhangelsk parliament have appealed to Moscow to provide “emergency financial assistance” because they lack the funds to ensure that residents will be provided with heat this winter and note that fuel deliveries for northern settlements are already falling far behind because of budgetary stringencies.

            Not only does this highlight how Putin’s war in Ukraine and Western sanctions are having a deleterious effect on the Russian North, but it also strongly suggests that the most negative impact of the current gas shortage is ahead because critical deliveries won’t arrive (ru.thebarentsobserver.com/novosti/na-grani-cs-arhangelskaa-oblast-prosit-u-moskvy-dengi-ctoby-ne-zamerznut-zimoj-izza-sankcij/454130).

            For members of the ruling party to make such public appeals is unusual, and their actions almost certainly reflect fears among them that the population will vote against them for what is going on unless they can somehow distance themselves from Kremlin policies, a move with grave consequences for the Putin regime.

            Unless Moscow comes up with the money and soon, that means that the much-ballyhooed power vertical Putin has created may begin to show more and deeper cracks as deputies pay more attention to those who nominally elect them and less to those above who in fact have selected them.

            That both reflects and could intensify a growing regionalization of political life in the Russian Federation at least while the election campaign is going on, something that will simultaneously frighten Moscow and give encouragement to regionalist and ethno-national movements as well. 

Russians Fear Returning Veterans, Thus Isolating Them and Making Them More Likely to Engage in Violence, ‘Barometer’ Sociologist Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 17 – The dominant emotion Russians feel about returning  veterans is fear that they will engage in violent crime, Asmik Novikova says; and that is “very bad” because it means society will isolate those veterans, limit their re-integration into society, and thus make it more likely that they will commit crimes.

            The sociologist at the Barometer Research Group says that a recent survey by her organization found that many Russians are afraid of the returning veterans and what they will do and that this is isolating veterans and making it more likely these fears will become self-fulfilling prophecies (cherta.media/interview/vernuvshiesya-s-vojny-i-nasilie/).

            The reason this is so, Novikova says, is “simple: the higher the level of stigmatization, the greater the information blockade becomes and as a result the greater unpredictability of what can be expected from a stigmatized group.” She says that with rare exceptions, there has not been any crime wave; but the attitudes of Russians who didn’t go to war may help produce one.

Muscovites Getting More Gas, People in Regions and Republics Ever Less, CDB BENZ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 17 – The Kremlin is fighting the gas shortage in the first instance by giving Moscow residents more gas even as the shortage of fuel increases in the other federal subjects of the Russian Federation, to judge from data gathered by a CDB Benze application almost half a million Russians have now downloaded.

            That app allows Russians to find out where gasoline is available and where it isn’t so that they can make decisions about where to go to fill their tanks. Not surprisingly, its map shows that in Moscow gas is becoming ever easier to get while in the rest of the country, shortages continue to mount (pointmedia.io/story/6a5a118d75d0d3346a25cb5c).

            This doesn’t surprise Russians. One Muscovite told Point Media that as far as Russia is concerned, “Moscow is another country.” It took her “exactly three minutes to go to a gas station and fill up while in the regions, many people have to search and search and then wait in line for hours. 

            That the Kremlin has been taking care of elites loyal to itself has been much noted; that it is taking care of Muscovites more than other residents of the Russian Federation has attracted less attention. But as this becomes more widely known, it may infuriate those beyond the ring road and even have an impact on the upcoming Duma elections.

Ubykhs have Lost Their Language but Not Their Identity, Circassian Activist Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 18 – Russian officials regularly that the Ubykhs do not exist, noting that the last Ubykh speaker died in the 1990s; and many Western observers of the North Caucasus, following this logic, draw a similar conclusion. But Kase Kik, a Circassian activist, says that while the Ubykhs have lost their language, they have not lost their identity.

            A subgroup of the Circassian nation who lived in the mountain highlands and were among the most active participants in North Caucasian resistance to the Russian advance into their homeland, the Ubykhs were expelled to the Ottoman Empire as part of the Russian genocide against the Circassian nation as a whole.

            In the Ottoman Empire, Ubykh leaders encouraged their people to learn Turkish so that their children could make careers; and in the absence of official support for their native language and their tradition of speaking more than one language, they gradually lost Ubykh, one of the  regmost difficult languages in the world.

            (For background on the Ubykh people and the fate of their language, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2016/12/can-ubykh-one-of-worlds-hardest.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2014/10/window-on-eurasia-can-ubykh-language.html and the sources cited therein.)

            The Ubykh language disappeared as a living tongue when the last native speaker died 30 years ago, but Kase Kik, a Circassian activist says that their historical memory and identity have not and that they are “an inalienable part of the common history of the Circassian people” (kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/425017).

            Ubykhs take part in all Circassian actions, he continues, both in the diaspora and in the homeland. Indeed, Kik suggests, they are fully part of the Circassian nation and will remain so and like other Circassians want the right to return to their homeland and would like to see their language revived.

            But the Ubykhs are realists, the activist says, and recognize that however much some activists may try to revive the language, only a concerted state program in a restored Circassian republic will be able to succeed in doing that. 

Moscow Finalizing Plans to Take Baltic Countries to International Court of Justice over Their Treatment of Ethnic Russians

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 16 – The Russian foreign ministry says that Moscow is now finalizing plans to files suit in the International Court of Justice against Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania for their treatment of ethnic Russians. Baltic officials and experts say that there is no basis for such charges but warn that the case, even if ultimately unsuccessful, will have negative consequences.

            Russian foreign ministry spokesperson Mariya Zakharova said the Russian government is ycompleting the pre-litigation phase and expects to file charges by the end of this year or the beginning of next (en.rebaltica.lv/2026/07/from-propaganda-to-the-courtroom-how-russia-is-building-a-legal-case-against-the-baltic-states/).

            Baltic governments and academic experts say the charges Russia plans to bring are baseless but that the Russian case is of real concern to them because Moscow will use as a form of propaganda against the three Baltic countries and even to set the stage for a more major military move against them.

            More immediately, there is the danger that the ICJ will issue some temporary orders even if it ultimately rejects the Russian suit and the certainty that the case will drag on and be very expensive not only in terms of money but perhaps even more in terms of the reputation of these three countries.

            This latest Russian use of lawfare against its opponents is intended to lead to demands within the Baltic countries that their governments not continue to support Ukraine; but what is most worrisome is that by presenting Russia’s claims in ostensibly legal language, many in the West will be taken in and reduce their support for the three. 

‘Digital Archaeological Gap’ Hitting Central Asia Especially Hard

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 16 – Many assume, the Bugin portal says, that digitalization has made documents immortal; but the reality in Central Asia – and not just there – is that “digital memory is proving less durable than that kept on paper and electronic files far more vulnerable to decay than an ancient manuscript.”

            As a result, the current faith that digitalization will save the situation may mean, the portal continues, that future students of the past “may know more about life in cities from two millenia ago than about the daily lives of people who lived in the internet age” (bugin.info/detail/khrupche-drevnikh-ruin-kak/ru).

“It is commonly assumed that digital information is immortal, yet the reality is quite the opposite. Files constantly require migration to new devices, as operating systems, storage standards, and software evolve. A document saved thirty years ago often cannot be opened using modern software,” Bugin says.

              “In Central Asia,” it continues, “this issue is compounded by the uneven pace of digitalization. While state archives are gradually transitioning to electronic storage systems, municipal institutions, local newspaper offices, rural libraries, cultural centers, and small museums often operate with limited resources.”

            “The avalanche-like growth in the volume of information being created … works against preservation because people stop organizing their archives and rely instead on cloud services, social media or phone storage;” and this is leading to “the emergence of a new phenomenon: ‘the digital archaeological gap.”

            Paradoxically, this gap is why “we sometimes know more about the life of a person from the 19^th century than we do about someone from the early 21^st,” Bugin says. That is true in many places, but Central Asia faces especial challenges because of the high mobility of the population, climate which works against preservation, and the shortage of efforts to save archives.

            What is an especially important task now, the portal says, is “establishing unified preservation standards: File formats, backup systems, metadata requirements, cataloguing methods, and interoperability of archival platforms are becoming just as important as the documents themselves.”

            If those issues are not addressed now and solutions found, even “digital collections risk becoming fragmented data sets that no one will be able to use only a few decades from now,” Bugin concludes.

Career FSB Officer who heads Russia’s Agency for Nationality Affairs Demands International Community Stop Trying to Speak in Defense of His Country’s Minorities

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 16 – Igor Barinov, a career FSB officer who now heads Russia’s Agency for Nationality Affairs and whose staff includes at least 13 others drawn from Russian security agencies, is demanding that the international community stop trying to speak in defense of his country’s ethnic minorities.

            At the 19^th session of the UN Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples held in Geneva this week, Barinov called  on the international community to adopt “a depoliticized approach” regarding indigenous rights and complained about “the lack of objectivity” in the mechanism’s research regarding Russia.

            (For details on his speech and background on his FSB service and his use of other security agency officers in the bureaucracy responsible for overseeing Moscow’s approach on ethnic minorities, see t.me/fadnrf/6838 as discussed at echofm.online/news/rossijskij-chinovnik-v-zheneve-prizval-depolitizirovat-zashhitu-prav-korennyh-narodov-ranee-on-sluzhil-v-fsb-vyyasnila-arktida.)

            In his speech, Barinov said that Russia “has its own historical experience in recognizing and ensuring the rights of indigenous peoples. This approach has made it possible to preserve their population numbers, as well as their traditional settlement patterns, livelihood systems, and self-governance structures, over the centuries."

            One hardly knows where to start to address just how false Barinov’s claims are, notions that have been documented as untrue by activists and academic specialists in Russia itself and recognized as untrue by those in the international community who have paid close attention to Russia’s efforts to undermine and even destroy ethnic minorities.

            Attempting to dismiss their criticism as political and demanding that they adopt a non-political approach, a demand that seems little more than one which calls on everyone to accept everything he and other FSB officers say, is yet another example of the regime headed by another FSB officer trying to deny the obvious by throwing a shroud over unpleasant realities.

            The best response to this bombastic and outrageous approach is for all those taking part in the UN mechanism on minorities to step up their demands that the peoples themselves and their representatives be allowed to speak for themselves rather than their places being usurped as now by security personnel whose commitment to the truth is anything but strong.

            And in addition to that, the international community as a whole needs to focus more attention on just what the Putin regime is doing when it comes to ethnic minorities and the ways in which it is trying to hide its horrendous record in that regard. Anything less will allow the Kremlin and the FSB to proceed with what they have been doing.

Ukrainian Reaction to Firing of Defense Chief Proves ‘Ukraine is Not Russia,’ Eidman Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 16 – The reaction by Ukrainians to the dismissal of their country’s defense ministry is compelling evidence that Ukraine is not Russia, Igor Eidman says. Anyone who thinks otherwise needs only to ask himself or herself if one could imagine Russians reacting the dismissal of a defense minister by taking to the streets to protest.

            The Russian sociologist now living in Germany says that “Ukraine has once again shown that it is a democratic state with a mature civil society,” one in which “people care what happens at the top, react keenly and immediately to events, and one in which the authorities listen to them (t.me/igoreidman/3119 reposted at echofm.online/opinions/pochemu-ukraina-ne-rossiya).

“It remains unclear how this case will end,” Eidman continues. “ Zelenskyy might yet reverse his decision under public pressure, just as happened with the attempt to strip anti-corruption bodies of their independence,” something absolutely unimaginable in the case of Russians and their leader.

If Putin “dismisses another defense minister, the vast majority of the population simply wouldn’t care,” he continues. Firing anyone without regard to what people think is “the god of that country,” and this god has the prerogative to do what he likes. The population thus “behaves not like a society of citizens but rather a mute herd.”

According to Eidman, “this herd views everything happening at the top as a natural phenomenon—something beyond its control and something it cannot influence. Any action taken by the cruel shepherd is met either with submissive lowing or, more often, with total silence.”

That settles the matter: Whatever Putin or anyone else thinks, “Ukraine is not Russia,” he says. And the war going on there is “not merely Russian aggression …  It is also a struggle by a Ukrainian democratic society against a totalitarian system of enslavement, a system obsessed with extending its internal servitude to others.”

New Law Defining Who is a Writer May Change Little But Opens Door to Abuse, Experts Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 15 – Under the terms of a law that will go into effect as of September 1, writers will be formally recognized as a distinct profession within the Russian legal system. Most observers see it as a positive step that will allow writers to formalize employment relationships and qualify for social benefits, but some see it as a potential tool for bureaucratic control.

            Nakanune journalist Elena Rychkova, in reporting on this debate, says that after the Soviet Union collapsed, “writers, composers and other freelancers lost the system of creative unions that had previously provided them with pension contributions and healthcare coverage” (nakanune.ru/articles/124847/).

            Most of the professionals who lost such standing in the legal system have already regained it, but writers are only doing so now, she continues. They will now be accruing employment hours and pension contributions, something they have not been able to do since 1992.

            But the question arises, Rychkova points out, as to “who will decide whether an author is professionally qualified or not.” Presumably most firms which employ writers, such as publishing houses, will make that determination on their own and so the new law will benefit the writers without limiting their opportunities.

            There is, however, “an even more important question,” she suggests. “Might the existence of the standard defining a writer lead to the homogenization of creative work, where meeting formal criteria becomes more significant than artistic merit.” The bureaucrats who will decide who is a writer in legal terms will thus have a powerful and perhaps adverse effect.

            That happened in Soviet times when the Writers’ Union expelled those its political masters did not approve of; and that could happen again under this new arrangement. For most writers, however, the new legal arrangement will be a net plus, although as Rychkova’s interlocutors say, abuses of various kinds remain quite possible.