Paul
Goble
Staunton, May 21 – Vladimir Putin
now finds himself in a paradoxical situation, Vladimir Sokratilin says. The
more he strengthens the power vertical and gives the siloviki ever greater influence over events, the weaker it and he
becomes, as the failure of the August 1991 coup showed.
Many are overread poll results
showing that 90 percent of Russians aren’t ready to take part in protests, the
sociologist points out. In fact, the share that is prepared to do so will rise
to 100 percent as happened in Volokolamsk and Kemerovo if an event provides a
focus for popular discontent (gorod-812.ru/chem-bolshe-putin-ukreplyaet-vlast-tem-slabee-ona-stanovitsya/).
At present, he says, “the situation
is stable” in the absence of such triggers, “people live quietly, but the level
of social tension is dangerously high.” If conditions deteriorate slowly,
people won’t go into the streets; but if something like a fire or an accident
happens, then they will because they see no other way to press their causes, Sokratilin
continues.
“If in society there are mechanisms
which allow for the resolution of such conflicts, then a social explosion won’t
occur,” he says. But over the past decade, in the name of building the power
vertical, Putin has destroyed most of those mechanism and any popular belief
that they can be effective in resolving problems.
Instead, Russians see a system where
it isn’t open politics that decides outcomes but the struggle of clans behind
the scenes each of which seeks to use or is very much part of the siloviki. The latter, of course, “have
their own interests;” and it is significant that the work siloviki has followed sputnik
into international discourse.
The rise of the siloviki has occurred, the sociologist argues, because Putin has
destroyed democratic procedures and the separation of powers and “what is most
important” has created a situation in which officials don’t have to take public
opinion into account but rather have to concern themselves only with interested
siloviki.
There is yet another shortcoming in
Putin’s system: “no serious official however much he may want to can involve
himself with the development of the sector he is responsible for because he is forced
to spend all his time on repulsing hostile attacks and conducting his own” as a
condition of remaining in power.
This is a big change from a decade
of so ago. In 2008, mayors were still elected in most places. Consequently,
when Kondopoga happened, no one ever raised the possibility of resolving it by
the use of force. Officials thought
first and foremost “about how to conduct a propaganda campaign, as it was
called.”
But today in Volokolamsk, Russian
officials turn to force first, not seeing any need to pay attention to the
views of the population. Indeed, Sokratilin
says, “officials are no longer concerned about a feedback loop with the population;
they are worried only about their own positions in the system of power.”
Apologists for this new system “justly
say that the people of Russia has never lived as well as it does not,” the
sociologist continues. “That is true. But at the same time, the sense of
injustice in the organization of the life of society and the alienation of the
powers in public consciousness is very strong.”
When the powers that be think first
of all about applying force against those who do protest, that has another
consequence which may prove fatal: The
application of limited amounts of force “fight only the most intellectual and
well-disposed part” of those protesting. And that means that “the more radical
part” remains.
“Force, unfortunately, gives rise to
force,” Sokratilin points out. And as the events at the end of Soviet times
show, when the population starts to blame the siloviki for the use of force, the siloviki will begin to calculate whether they should follow orders
to suppress the population, knowing they are certain to be blamed and even sold
out by the political types.
“In the USSR, there was also a harsh
power vertical and an uncompromising under the rug struggle among the siloviki of that time. When the political elite used the army as in
Tbilisi, the army got blamed. And that
meant that in August 1991, commanders were much more reluctant to be used
against the population.
“What can we expect under
contemporary conditions? The suppression of mass risings – this carries with it
big risks.” If passers-by are wounded or
killed, the situation can easily get dangerously out of hand. Many discount this because they do not feel Russians
have experienced “the last drop” of oppression.
But that is a mistake, Sokratilin
says, because in fact the appropriate model is one in which the pressure of
social tensions is such, that any massive protest that would lead the Kremlin
to use force in a massive way could touch off a far greater social and thus
political explosion than anyone expects.
What this trigger will be is
impossible to say, just as it was impossible just months ago to predict the rise
of protests in Volokolamsk.
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