To Avoid Indifference and Protests, Moscow Scales Back Events Marking Crimean Annexation

Paul Goble

            Staunton, March 12 – In the clearest indication yet of the collapse of what some have called “the Crimean consensus,” the Russian government has decided not to organize the usual parades and public celebrations on the fifth anniversary of the annexation of the Ukrainian peninsula lest that occasion highlight indifference or spark counter-demonstrations.

            Moscow is casting this decision in very different terms, of course, journalist Ivan Slobodenyuk says, citing Valery Fadeyev of the Social Chamber who says Crimea is no longer a “political” question given how long it has been part of Russia (znak.com/2019-03-12/po_vsey_rossii_resheno_ne_provodit_politicheskih_mitingov_k_pyatiletiyu_prisoedineniya_kryma).

            Aleksey Makarkin, the first vice president of the Moscow Center for Political Technologies, gave a somewhat different explanation. He told the Znak writer that the Kremlin’s decision not to have marches and parades on this anniversary is “not connected with the victory of ‘the refrigerator’ over ‘the television.’”

            “If in 2014, the theme of ‘the refrigerator’ did not exist; now it has appeared. But ‘the refrigerator’ isn’t winning:  to a certain degree, it is correcting it. When people argue about the pluses and minuses of the annexation of Crimea, the pluses are mostly emotional … while the minuses are more rational, connected with arguments of an economic character.”

            “The issue has really become routine: five years have passed; people have gotten used to it, but there has arisen a lack of understanding of why so much money has to be put into Crimea. Four or five years ago, the argument was that was required ‘to keep and support’ it. But now more people are angry sensing that money going to Crimea is at the expense of other regions.”

                “A second possible cause of not having a major celebration,” the political analyst says, “are recollections about ‘missed opportunities’ and the heroes of that time. The political situation since 2014 has change in several respects since 2014 and discussions about whether Russia conducted itself correctly then, sparking criticism from two sides.” 

            “Each event has its own heroes, and they at the time of a jubilee have the chance to say something. Some of them consider that Moscow should have gone further and absorbed into Russia ‘Novorossiya;’ other say that it was necessary to take Kyiv, but some Lviv,”  Makarevich says.

            “Such talk now is not very suitable for the powers that be,” he continues, since it could not only raise questions by promote the rise of figures like Strelkov. When Crimea was annexed some Russians hoped that it would trigger “’a counter-revolutionary Maidan’” in Russia, leading to an end of corruption and a rise of patriotism.

            For such people, Makarevich says, “Crimea was connected with a popular initiative.” But now that has passed: “Crimea and Stavropol are ever more like any other Russian regions. There are some nuances but these are ever less important.”  By not having a commemoration, the Kremlin underscores this but also makes less likely protests from either direction.