Zhirinovsky Another Irreplaceable Leader Who Must Soon Be Replaced, Shaburov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, March 12 – What will happen to the LDPR and the Russian political system when Vladimir Zhirinovsky exits the scene has become the focus of much discussion in Russia this year because it is not clear who can replace this irreplaceable leader of this irreplaceable political party, Aleksey Shaburov says.

            And this discussion is especially intriguing because it can provide some important clues about how another irreplaceable leader who must at least in principle soon be replaced might exit the scene as well, according to the editor of the Yekaterinburg portal Politsovet.ru (politsovet.ru/62072-sudba-zhirinovskogo-i-problema-2024-goda.html).

            In the course of the last several months, several scandals have emerged around Zhirinovsky and his alleged diversion of government subsidies to his party for personal use. How true these charges turn out to be remains to be seen, but the fact that such charges are being made suggests that his future and that of his party is now becoming an issue.

            The main problem concerning is replacement is that “there is no one to replace him.” His political strength rests in his personality, and his party rests in him. Moreover, he doesn’t want to leave the scene because his party represents for him and others “an enormous resource, including financial.”

            But it isn’t only Zhirinovsky and the LDPR who need each other. His party “in its current form is needed by and is useful for the Kremlin. A specific segment of the electorate votes for the LDPR,” a protest electorate but a protest one “not for liberal democratic (despite the name of the party) but by right wing conservative” elements.

In 2016, it received seven million votes in the Duma elections and was the only party of the parliamentary opposition which improved its position; and last year, two LDPR candidates defeated United Russia ones for governors.  But despite this, Zhirinovsky and his are loyal to the Kremlin and have not tried to build on their success to challenge the regime.

The powers that be “need such a party.” To create a new one might be possible but would be difficult: “It is easier to work with one which already exists,” Shaburov says. But the clock is ticking: in 2021, Zhirinovsky will be 75 and he will have to be replaced in the not too distant future.

The first question is who will lead the LDPR in the Duma elections in 2021? There isn’t much time, and there is no obvious candidate to replace Zhirinovsky. Will he lead the party and if he doesn’t will the party survive? And if it doesn’t, where will his protest voters go? All those are questions the Kremlin is concerned about.

If he is pushed aside and a new man installed, that could fail altogether; and so the powers that be may want to try a “soft” variant in which Zhirinovsky will run as coleader with someone else in 2021 and then exit the scene afterwards, the Yekaterinburg political commentator suggests.

But if the problem of 2021 is solved, that of 2024 is much more difficult: who would run as the LDPR candidate then if there are real elections and not just ones conducted for show.  If an LDPR candidate runs but with the intention of winning more votes, what will the Kremlin do? And if he doesn’t, who will pick up the support that would otherwise go to him?

Consequently, Shaburov argues, “Zhirnovsky’s fate is much more tightly connected to the problem of 2024 than might appear. The leader of the LDPR certainly understands this and will attempt to use the existing situation in ways that benefit him.” And that leads to another and more important conclusion:

In what happens to him and his party, Russians may be able to glean “how will be solved the problem of the transfer of power in 2024.”